All plenary sessions will take place in the Trust Room and will consist of 40 minute talk + 20 minute discussion.
| Wednesday 5th July |
10-11 |
Arrival and Registration. Coffee. |
| 11–12 |
Jonathan Evans (Psychology, Plymouth): The multiplicity of mind. (Chair: Keith Frankish) |
| 12–1 |
Vinod Goel (Psychology, York University, Toronto): Multiple reasoning systems: the case from common sense and neuropsychology. (Chair: Keith Frankish) |
| 1–2 |
Lunch |
| 2.15–3.15 |
Keith Stanovich (Human Development and Applied Psychology, Toronto): Is it time for a tri-process Theory? Distinguishing the reflective and the algorithmic mind. (Chair: Jonathan Evans) |
| 3.15–4.15 |
Paul Klaczynski (Developmental and Learning Sciences, National Science Foundation): Counterintuitive age trends, dual processing, and the development of irrationality—or, Obesity is contagious, but what does one catch? (Chair: Jonathan Evans) |
| 4.15–4.45 |
Coffee break |
| 4.45–5.45 |
Ara Norenzayan (Psychology, British Columbia): Two systems of thinking across cultures. (Chair: Peter Carruthers) |
| 5.45–6.45 |
David Over (Psychology, Sunderland) The constructive/non-constructive duality and dual process theory. (Chair: Peter Carruthers) |
| 7–8 |
Dinner in the College hall. |
| 8.30–11.30 |
Bar |
| Thursday 6th July |
| 8–9 |
Breakfast |
| 9.30–10.30 |
Matthew Lieberman (Psychology, UCLA): Reflective and reflexive processes in social cognitive neuroscience. (Chair: David Over) |
| 10.30–11 |
Coffee break |
| 11–12 |
Keith Frankish (Philosophy, Open): Dual-process theories and the personal-subpersonal hypothesis. (Chair: Carolyn Price) |
| 12–1 |
Peter Carruthers (Philosophy, Maryland): An architecture for dual reasoning. (Chair: Carolyn Price) |
| 1–2 |
Lunch |
PARALLEL SESSIONS
Sessions will consist of 30 minute talk + 15 minute discussion. |
Group (A): Trust Room
(Session Chair: Veli Mitova) |
2.15–3 |
Valerie Reyna (Human Development, Cornell): Dual processes in reasoning and decision making: fuzzy rationality. |
| 3–3.45 |
Keith Stenning (Human Communication Research Centre, Edinburgh): What are System1 processes like? Defeasible but logical perhaps? |
| 3.45–4.30 |
Valerie Thompson (Psychology, Saskatchewan): Dual process theories: questions and outstanding issues. |
| 4.30–5 |
Coffee break |
| 5–5.45 |
Gideon Keren (Technology, Eindhoven) and Yaacov Schul (Psychology, Hebrew University Jerusalem): Do two-systems models constitute a theoretical advance? |
| 5.45–6.30 |
Jon May (Psychology, Sheffield) and Philip Barnard (Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge): Reasoning with complementary pathways not competing processes. |
Group (B): Walter Grave Room
(Session Chair: Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen) |
| 2.15–3 |
Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde (Institut Jean-Nicod CNRS-EHESS-ENS, Paris) and Pierre-Stanislas Grialou (ENS, Paris & University of Keio, Tokyo): What is dual in dual process theories of reasoning? A critical assessment of Goel’s data. |
| 3–3.45 |
Agnes Moors (Psychology, Ghent): Examining the mapping problem in multi-mode models. |
| 3.45–4.30 |
Jean-François Bonnefon (LTC-CNRS, Toulouse): A mixed Rasch model of dual-process conditional reasoning. |
| 4.30–5 |
Coffee break |
| 5–5.45 |
Clare Saunders (Subject Centre for Philosophical and Religious Studies, Leeds): In two (or more) minds about rationality? Dual process theory's contribution to the rationality debate. |
| 5.45–6.30 |
Leland Saunders (Philosophy, Maryland): Reason and intuition in the moral life: a rationalist defense of moral intuitions. |
[End of parallel sessions] |
| 6.30–7.30 |
POSTER PRESENTATIONS with drinks reception sponsored by the Open University Faculty of Arts (Walter Grave Room) |
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Linden Ball (Psychology, Lancaster): The dynamics of reasoning: chronometric analysis and dual process theories. |
| |
Matthew Carmody (Philosophy, Richmond-upon-Thames College and King's London): Misunderstanding ourselves: vagueness and two systems of classification. |
| |
Shira Elqayam (Psychology, Plymouth): Rationality2: no guide for the perplexed. |
| |
Aidan Feeney (Applied Psychology, Durham): Inductive reasoning and dual processes. |
| |
Uri Leron (Science and Technology Education, Israel Institute of Technology): Application of dual-process theories in mathematics education (and vice versa). |
| |
Fiona Montijn-Dorgelo (Human-technology Interaction, Eindhoven): Impact of dual process models in scientific progress and communication: the case of the role of affect. |
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Magda Osman (Psychology, University College London): Undoing one's learning in an a complex causal inductive task. |
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Robin Scaife (Philosophy, Sheffield): Dual-process and cognitive checking. |
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Christopher Viger (Philosophy, Western Ontario): The acquired language of thought hypothesis (ALOT). |
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Cilia Witteman (Behavioural Science, Radboud University Nijmegen): Personal preferences for rationality or intuition. |
| 7.45–9 |
Conference dinner in the College hall |
| 9.00–11.30 |
Bar |
| Friday 7th July |
| 8–9 |
Breakfast |
| 9.30 |
Richard Samuels (Philosophy, King's College London): The magical number two, plus or minus: Some comments on dual-processing theories of cognition. (Chair: David Over) |
| 10.30 |
Coffee break |
| 11.00 |
Dan Sperber (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris) and Hugo Mercier (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris): Intuitive and reflective inferential processes. (Chair: Derek Matravers) |
| 12.00 |
Michael Oaksford (Psychology, Birkbeck College London): Dual processes or dual aspects? (Chair: Derek Matravers) |
| 1.00 |
Lunch |
| 2.15 |
Zoltan Dienes (Psychology, Sussex): Unconscious knowledge and inference. (Chair: Keith Frankish) |
| 3.15 |
Steven Sloman (Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences, Brown): How well are two process models standing up to the Bayesian Challenge? (Chair: Keith Frankish) |
| 4.15 |
Coffee and deregistration |
