‘Science’s Immunity to Moral Refutation’ in the 2013 volume of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. In the article, Alex argues that moral realists (some of them, anyway) have trouble explaining why we would never reject a scientific theory simply because it has implausible-sounding moral implications.
Key Questions in Philosophy A333 replaces AA308, with a first presentation in October 2014. This new module will have a structure and approach that is closer in spirit to Exploring philosophy (A222). Like A222, A333 covers a wide range of philosophical fields but focuses on specific questions such as: When is a war just? How can truth emerge from fiction? What is weakness of will? Does dying leave one worse off? Does it make sense to say that humans as a species are irrational?
Carolyn Price and Derek Matravers will act as academic advisors for two new BBC programmes. Carolyn will be working on a new BBC 4 series on Confucius, Socrates, and Buddha. Derek will advise on a new Radio
Mind Meaning and Rationality group seminar
Dr Sophie Archer (Keble College, Oxford)
October 1 2014
When one considers whether or not to believe something, what kind of considerations can one bring to bear on this question? You might think it obvious that in considering whether or not to believe something, all one can consider is whether or not that thing is true. However, recently, some philosophers have made an interesting case for the idea that this is not so. They have argued that, under certain circumstances, one can take into account practical considerations like whether one would like to believe that thing. However, I will argue that although considerations such as whether or not one would like to believe something undoubtedly influence one’s deliberation concerning what to believe outside of one’s conscious awareness, such practical considerations can never enter into one’s conscious deliberation concerning whether to believe something. Believing just doesn’t work like this. I will defend the idea that there is a certain exclusivity pertaining to the kinds of considerations that one can take into account when one is considering whether or not to believe something. That is, that it is only epistemic considerations – considerations concerning the truth of the matter – that one can consciously consider when deciding whether or not to believe that that thing is the case.