We are pleased to restart our monthly seminar series with a talk by Dr. Jonathan Mitchell (University of Warwick), who will be talking about ‘Affective Representation in Phenomenal Consciousness’.

ABSTRACT: Many philosophers have sought to understand the representational dimension of different types of affective states along the model of sense-perceptual experiences, even claiming that the relevant affective experiences are perceptual experiences. In this paper, I argue that many affective experiences involve a kind of personal level representation called affective representation, which is significantly disanalogous with the representational character of paradigmatic perceptual experiences. My positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation. In affective intentional experiences a felt valenced attitude (an ‘affective response’) represents the intentional object of the experience as minimally good or bad, and one experiences that evaluative standing as motivating – having ‘the power’ to motivate – the felt valenced attitude it does. I also show that by appreciating the distinctive character of affective representation, so framed, we can make better sense of some of the distinctive features of affective experiences, such as their valence, motivating power, and connection to value.

The talk will be held on Wednesday 6th of December (2-4pm) at the Open University’s Campus at Walton Hall, in Room 006, Gardiner Building 1. All welcome.