尼采讨论班·Nietzsche Colloquium

2017-03-27 同济人文 同济人文



Memento Mori, Memento Vivere: Nietzsche on History, Embodiment, and Value in his Untimely Mediation II.

记住你将死,记住你正生:尼采论历史、具身性和价值



曼努埃尔·蒂里斯教授将在接下来的两周上海尼采讨论班(Nietzsche-Kolloquium Shanghai)中,以介于讲座和讨论班之间的形式,围绕他的同题论文对展开对尼采的第二篇《不合适宜的沉思》——即《论历史对于生活的利与弊》(HL)——的重新阅读。



曼努埃尔·蒂里斯教授(2007年剑桥大学哲学博士)是英国开放大学哲学系主任,牛津大学圣希尔达学院哲学系的讲师。他的研究主要为形而上学,伦理学与心灵哲学的交互联系,尤其关注欧洲后康德哲学的历史及其对当代相关领域争议的贡献。

他的最新文章请关注http://open.academia.edu/ManuelDries。

Manuel Dries (PhD Cambridge, UK, 2007) is Head of the Philosophy Department at The Open University, UK, and also a Lecturer in Philosophy at St Hilda's College, University of Oxford. His research focuses on questions at the interface between metaphysics, ethics, and the philosophy of mind. He has a particular interest in the history of post-Kantian European philosophy and its contributions to contemporary debates in those fields. For his most recent publications, please go to http://open.academia.edu/ManuelDries

Time

16:00-18:00 30.March-6.April,2017 (Thursday)

Place

Yuntong Lou 221

Language

English, with Chinese translation of Texts





时间

时间:下午四点到六点

2017年3月30日、4月6日(周四)

地点

地点: 云通楼221

语言

英文, 提供中文讲稿

蒂里斯教授观点概略 (中英)

学界广泛认同心智、自我和价值的具身性在尼采后期哲学中的中心地位。在本文中,我将重新阐释尼采第二篇《不合时宜的沉思》(即《论历史对生活的利与弊》,德文缩写HL),并说明尼采的早期文本中就已开始使用一种冲动模式来解释心智。HL的核心问题——"历史学热病"——所得到的诊断,即是具身性和冲动控制的失效。

我将首先论证,《不》所批判的对象正是"末人"形象的前身。其次,我将对尼采这一阐释学诊断框架中的关键术语,诸如"冲动"、"情绪"、"价值"等,给出行之有效的定义。随后,我立足于HL中被忽视的文段——对比中世纪的"记住你将死"与近代的"记住你正生"的说法——来阐释尼采的观点:在他看来,前一句格言发挥着有使意志和自我控制具身化的功能,而后一句现代格言则是它不成功的替代者。最后,我引入对具身认知研究的最新进展,并借此点明损害鲜活生命的"历史学热病"的两大根源:过载和语义具身性。

The centrality of the embodiment of mind, self, and values for the later Nietzsche is widely acknowledged. In this text, I reconstrue Nietzsche's second Untimely Meditation (HL) to show that he uses a drive model of the mind already in this early text. The "historical sickness" central to HL is diagnosed in the form of failures of embodiment and drive control. First, I argue that a precursor to Nietzsche's figure of "the last human" is already the target in HL. Second, I offer working definitions for terms such as "drives," "affects," and "values," which are crucial to Nietzsche's heuristic diagnostic framework. I then focus on the neglected passage that contrasts the medieval memento mori with a modern memento vivere, showing that the former functions as an embodied mechanism of willing and self-control, which Nietzsche claims the moderns have been unsuccessful in replacing. Finally, I draw on recent research in embodied cognition and identify two causes—"overload" and "semantic embodiment"— of the modern "historical sickness" that undermines flourishing.



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