The Concept of Mind

A.303/4

Project No: 00525/3017 Duration: 24'30" Production by: Mary Hoskins Colour Film No: OUF.152

First Transmission: 4th April, 1973

Linked to correspondence text for units 1 and 2, "Body and Mind". Open University Press 1973. Price

"The Concept of Mind" is one of the most influential books on philosophy to have been published since the war. In it Professor Gilbert Ryle attacks what he calls the 'Official Doctrine', that is, the Cartesian conception of a person being two things - a Mind and a Body. Mrs. Susan Haack, of the University of Warwick, questions Professor Ryle about some of the main themes of the book. Professor Vesey introduces and comments on the argument.

DESCARTES CRATESIAN'S DUALISM OPEN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Title: The concept of mind

Producer: Mary Hoskins

Contributors: Gilbert Ryle Susan Haack Godfrey Vesey

PROGRAMME SEQUENCE LIST

CU A303/4 Tape No. 6HT/70789 Project No. 00525/3017 0.U. film no.152 colour Date Recorded. lst TX. 14.3.1973 Form VTR Duration 23'25" Class nos. 128.2

Summary: The 'offical' doctrine of mind is questioned and discussed by the contributors.

				RWW
Seq.	Time.	Footage.	Sequence List.	Sound Cue
1	2.47	43	Godfrey Vesey introduces the discussion between Haack and Ryle; he defines the 'official doctrine' of the concept of mind and describes its descent from Descartes.	Desca⊢tes was up to
2	6.01	91	Haack, by questioning, Ryle, by replying, offer a critique of Cartesians' dualism (i.e. mind and non-mind) in their description of the problem of the concept of mind.	I'm not altogether clear he's set the questio
3	6.51	103	Godfrey Vesey sums up the preceding sequence and introduces the next sequence.	It's one thing on these questions
4	14.05		Haack questions Ryle on the definition of 'behaviour'. Ryle then goes on to attempt an explanation, or rather, the beginning of an explanation of intelligent behaviour. Godfrey Vesey sums up the points made and introduces the following sequence.	at least to Descarte
5	23.04	303	Susan Haack speaks at some length on the problem of 'imaging' or 'visualizing' and the difficulty of actually defining such improptu acts (when 'imaging' is improper and not a conscious effort) in behaviourist terms. Ryle goes on to discuss behaviourism further in an attempt to explain why 'seeing in the minds eye' would not be really seeing. His explanation would arise from his notion of 'megative inert behaviour'.	I think we cond
	23.25	307	Credits	