Remediating *jihad* for Western news audiences: the renewal of gatekeeping?

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Abstract

Gatekeeping is an important concept and practice for understanding both the ongoing transformation of the news media industry and the study of journalism and mass communication. The ‘connective turn’ (Hoskins, 2011) refers to the ways in which digitization of media content create unprecedented networked, diffused relations between news producers and consumers. It presents a fundamental, ontological challenge to broadcast-era metaphors (gate, channel, flow) and not least to traditional understandings of who news gatekeepers are, where gates lie, the presumed audience, community or culture gatekeeping is done for, and indeed what it means to gatekeep. This challenge becomes evident through the analysis we present of the processes through which four jihadist speeches by bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri and others are translated and remediated from their original websites, languages and contexts by various translation intermediaries and by Western mainstream news, including the BBC. Detailed analysis of four examples demonstrates an apparently simple and settled gatekeeping model that produces systematic patterns of translation, selection and omission whereby lengthy, complex multimodal jihadist productions are reduced to short aggressive outbursts. This gatekeeping, however, is embedded within a much broader communication network the text moves through, including
terrorism-monitoring sites, Arabic media, and jihadist websites’ own self-monitoring and feedback services. By ignoring these broader networks and contexts, Western news creates an obstacle to understanding why such texts may be appealing to some Muslim audiences, and offers and delimits a ‘mainstream’ understanding which other research indicates Muslim and non-Muslim audiences are dissatisfied with. We recommend further research to follow how original productions are gatekept for many purposes by many sets of actors, so that we can begin to understand how media ‘messages’ move beyond the control of their originators. A focus on multilingual, multiplatform gatekeeping helps illuminate how the loci and forms of power and authority are changing in the connective turn, and to which media practitioners and scholars must adapt.

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Introduction1

When someone demands to know how we are going to replace newspapers, they are really demanding to be told that we are not living through a revolution. They are demanding to be told that old systems won’t break before new systems are in place. They are demanding to be told that ancient social bargains aren’t in

1 We are indebted to Mina Al-Lami for her assistance with this article and to two anonymous referees for their useful comments.
peril, that core institutions will be spared, that new methods of spreading information will improve previous practice rather than upending it. They are demanding to be lied to. (Shirky, 2009).

Clay Shirky’s pronouncements in his blog ‘Newspapers and Thinking the Unthinkable’ characterise an industry in denial. Unwilling or unable to recognise the revolution in digital media and content as signalling the end of the organizational form of the newspaper, various schemes for the extension of the old into the new, such as micropayments – charging online for specific content – have been and are being heralded as the industry’s saviour. Shirky continues: ‘Round and round this goes, with the people committed to saving newspapers demanding to know “If the old model is broken, what will work in its place?” To which the answer is: Nothing. Nothing will work. There is no general model for newspapers to replace the one the internet just broke’ (ibid.)

There is more than a mere corollary here with the scholarly study of news organizations, structures and content. The same paradigmatic shifts that are confronting the news industries pose scalar challenges of a similar magnitude to the explanatory models, and indeed, scholarly cultures, built on and ingrained in the era of ‘the mass media’. These shifts are ushered in through a ‘connective turn’, namely, the ‘massively increased abundance, accessibility and searchability of communication networks and nodes, and the seemingly paradoxical status of the ephemera and permanence of digital media content’
(Hoskins, 2011). Of all media genres, news is one of the most centrifugal in terms of its inextricableness from the connective turn, yet there is something stubbornly residual today in terms of the persistence of the explanatory concepts and models established to probe twentieth century journalism. This includes the ubiquitous ‘news values’, which certainly predates Galtung and Ruge, 1967 (George E. Vincent, 1905; see Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2007/2009 for a critique) and the concept we see as an exemplar of some of the tensions outlined above, ‘gatekeeping’ (Lewin, 1947, White, 1950).

Our choice of the term gatekeeping here is not simply because of its long legacy in mass communication and journalism research, where it is often understood as a process of the selection or filtering of news content by a professional, such as an editor – a conception one might think would diminish following the connective turn in which authority is increasingly mobile, provisional, collective and anonymous (Antoniades et al., 2010). For instance, sites such as Amazon, E-Bay, Digg, Slashdot and indeed news sites aggregate user ratings of online content to offer continual evaluations of artefacts, news stories and even the contributors themselves (de Waal, 2007). Scholars have recently begun to re-examine the gatekeeping concept and its relevance in this new media ecology (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008, 2009; Shoemaker & Vos 2009). We ask then, is this a useful scholarly renewal of the term, just as mainstream media organisations have adapted to renew their models of news production and dissemination, harnessing user-generated content, for instance. Or, does such a conceptual
recasting indicate an unhelpful reproduction of mass communication prisms and thinking from a previous generation that, as Shirky argues above, afflicts the industry itself? Put differently, does ‘gatekeeping’ fit the trend identified by William Merrin, who champions a ‘Media Studies 2.0’: Merrin (2008) argues: ‘For many, new media seemed to offer a realisation of the ‘active audience’, extending those practices they had identified with new possibilities of interactivity, but this interpretation is backward-looking, still trying to understand the post-broadcast world through broadcast-era categories’ (see http://mediastudies2point0.blogspot.com/). Hence the recent explosion of terms – citizens and media practitioners are both media producers and consumers hence ‘prosumers’ (Toffler, 1971; cf. Bruns, 2007), or are all media ‘workers’ (Deuze, 2007) or ‘information does’ (Gowing, 2009) – as scholars and media professionals try to achieve some analytical and conceptual purchase on what people today do with media.

To briefly consider this problematic within the scope and extent of this article, we present original analysis of a news phenomenon only made possible what we call a ‘new media ecology’ (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010; cf. Fuller, 2007; Postman, 1970). This brief, exploratory analysis is part of a series of collaborative projects tracing how jihadist violence is legitimated and contested across online and

2 The two-year Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) project, ‘Legitimising the discourses of radicalisation: political violence in the new media ecology’, Award Number: RES-181-25-0041, led by Andrew Hoskins (http://www.newmediaecology.net/radicalisation/) and the 12-month Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) project, ‘Developing our Understanding of the Language of Extremism and its Potential for Predicting Risk’, Award Ref: PSA7731, led by Paul Taylor.
offline practices. By jihadist we refer to the political culture promoting the goals, practices and ideology of Al-Qaeda (as an idea and set of networks) rather than to broader forms of political Islam which may also advocate violence. We recognise the term’s contested and problematic status; indeed, audience research in these projects indicate that people do not use terms ‘radicaliation’ and ‘jihad’ in ordinary talk and resist and contest the terms when introduced into conversation (O’Loughlin et al. forthcoming). However, the term has sufficient validity for it to capture the political culture clearly identifiable in a network of websites, pamphlets, and violent acts which have been well documented by Faisal Devji (2005, 2008) and Gary Bunt (2009a, 2009b). Our research has focused on apparently radicalising communications by jihadists as well as communications about jihadist radicalisation issuing from governments, journalists and other experts, focusing primarily on the UK government and media but also analysing US and Arabic media in particular case studies.

In the analysis presented here we explore the ‘remediation’ (Bolter and Grusin, 1999), translation and ‘trans-editing’ (Cheesman, Nohl et al., 2010; Stetting, 1989) by mainstream news organizations of the translation of often long, complex and highly multimodal texts initially published online by jihadists or Islamic extremists. Remediation refers to the manner in which the style of one medium, for instance aspects of the ‘televisuality’ of television or the home-camcorder

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3 For a brief conceptual discussion see Garton-Ash (2007); for more scholarly treatment, see Peters (2008). Our use of the term jihadist also emerges from the conference Rethinking Jihad: Ideas, Politics and Conflict in the Arab World & Beyond, 7-9 September 2009. Details available at: http://www.casaw.ac.uk/conf/rj2009/about-the-conference.html
aesthetic, is adopted once content is then picked up by/through another medium. By translation we mean simply linguistic transformation from one language to another. And by trans-editing we mean the editing work done to render a translated text from culture intelligible in another, which can include the addition of extra material, references, analogies and so forth or the subtraction and omission of anything presumed to be unintelligible, offensive or dissonant in some other way in the audience for the trans-edited version (Stetting, 1989). We examine how video productions featuring addresses by Osama bin Laden, Aymen Al-Zawahiri and others are remediated, translated and trans-edited from an original point of publication on jihadist websites “down” or “through” information networks to the BBC and other English-language news. This compliments the study elsewhere in this special issue tracing how various versions of the same story are produced across different language sections of the BBC World Service (cf. Cheesman, Nohl et al., 2010). The jihadist translations often pass to news organisations via terrorism-monitoring sites such as the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) and the NEFA Foundation (Awan et al. 2010), but here we simply report on how these sites present the original texts just as media sites do.

We find the remediation-out of particular audio-visual juxtapositions common in jihadist online material but omitted from Western news as well as the online context of a list of comments ‘under the line’ of the production (as with YouTube); the translation-out of any scripture, reference to the speaker’s status and
credentials, or any speech by actors other than the lead speaker such as bin Laden; and the trans-editing-out of the political contexts referred to by jihadist leaders and the imposition of a Western war on terror context. Despite these multiple aspects in which varied re-presentation might be expected, mainstream news reports consistently reduce the original texts to short, aggressive statements without political demands or a context of explanation. In other words, this is a process that seems to fit the extremely broad definition of gatekeeping that opens the recent Shoemaker & Vos’ Gatekeeping Theory, as:
culling and crafting countless bits of information into the limited number of messages that reach people each day, and it is the center of the media’s role in modern public life… On the face of it, narrowing so many potential messages to so few seems to be impossible, but there is a lengthy and long-established process that makes it happen day in and day out. This process determines not only which information is selected, but also what the content and nature of messages, such as news, will be (2009: 1).

Although our findings suggest a renewal of this traditional gatekeeping function, albeit with the ‘gate’ networked across a series of news and other organisations, we must ask how enduring and generalisable these findings are. There is much at stake here, and just because we find a networked but nevertheless singular gate in this case does not mean greater diffusion of gatekeeping will not happen or is not happening across media more widely. First, this matters for policy. Residual broadcast era categories employed in academic work may inhibit
innovations by government and policy-makers particularly in the area of security and in tracking and interpreting the resonance or otherwise of ‘messages’ (e.g. extremist) on a given group or population, and the ‘gatekeepers’ thereof. This applies beyond security: marketing and branding practices as well as political party and public diplomacy campaigns all depend upon disseminating, tracking and evaluating the movement of ‘messages’ through communication networks. The assumption that there are clearly identifiable gatekeepers or passage-points through which messages do (and should) pass could undermine strategic communication. Second, this matters for the constitution of society and public, political cultures. The networked but systematic gatekeeping practices carried out by news editors and journalists evident from our analysis both assumes and constitutes a presumed distinction between a social mainstream for whom jihadists texts are somehow alien or threatening and a social margin of potential or actual ‘radicals’ for who the jihadist texts are intended and presumably consumed. Yet the broader research projects of which the analysis here is a part demonstrate how some individuals position themselves across this divide, for instance some British Muslims who are familiar with the jihadist media culture but who do not endorse its prescriptions of violence (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010 forthcoming). Such individuals lie on both sides of ‘the gate’. Journalists and policymakers who ignore this, and hold to a rigid conceptualisation of there being a definable ‘gate’ between social mainstream and radical margin could mistakenly position such individuals as ‘extremist’ because of their familiarity with one ‘side’ of the gate. Hence the gatekeeping of security news has important
political consequences. Before we develop these points we will first provide an overview of the development of the idea of ‘gatekeeping’ and its current renewal.

**Gatekeeping: Origin, revival, and disjuncture**

The experimental psychologist Kurt Lewin is widely reported to have coined the term gatekeeping in his article ‘Frontiers in Group Dynamics: II. Channels of Group Life; Social Planning and Action Reserch’, posthumously published from an unfinished manuscript in 1947. His theory of gatekeeping was premised upon work on food habits and the multiple possible ‘channels’ (e.g. gardening, buying) through which food reaches the family table. Lewin argued:

‘A certain area within a channel may function as a “gate”; the constellation of the forces before and after the gate region is decisively different in such a way that the passing or not passing of the unit through the whole channel depends to a high degree upon what happens in the gate region. This holds not only for food channels but also for the travelling of a news item through certain communication channels in a group, for movement of goods, and the social locomotion of individuals in many organizations’ (1947: 145).

It is this last sentence, however, that has spawned a gatekeeping boom across disciplines such as sociology, business, information, journalism and communication studies. David Manning White’s article, ‘The “Gate Keeper”: A Case Study in the Selection of News’, published three years later, did precisely
that, helping to jettison Lewin’s aside on news to folklore status in mass communication research. White’s study explored the role of a ‘non-metropolitan’ morning newspaper’s wire editor – as the end gatekeeper in a ‘chain of communications’, named ‘Mr. Gates’ (yes, really) – in selecting or rejecting stories filed by three press associations over a week in February 1949. Mr. Gates was asked to save every piece of wire copy that came to him and to separate the stories rejected by him from those that he selected for inclusion in the newspaper, and to annotate the rejected pieces with a reason for their rejection. White found that Gates received around the equivalent of 12,400 inches of press association news, of which he used around 1,300, or one-tenth, across seven issues of the newspaper. White concludes that the editor’s role was crucial ‘as the terminal “gate” in the complex process of communication’ and that he found ‘how highly subjective, how based on the “gate keeper’s” own set of experiences, attitudes and expectations the communication of “news” really is’ (1950).

Lewin and White’s work have been much criticised and much developed over the past sixty years or so, see for example, Roberts 2005 for a concise evolutionary account and Barzilai-Nahon 2009 for a superb comprehensive critical review. Despite the methodological critiques and developments building on the origins of gatekeeping, there is perhaps one obvious methodological strength of the White experiment that is often overlooked, but which speaks to a disjuncture in what is variously labelled as media content analysis and the gamut of approaches therein. Notably, one of the simple but defining strengths of White’s ‘Mr. Gates’
study was in the completeness of his media content corpus over the period of the sample in terms of content in and content out of this particular gate – the measurable inches of ‘news’. To apply this threshold of completeness of quantifying media content ‘in’ to any kind of news editorial position in today’s era of ubiquitous media one might wish to name, with some semblance of ‘out’, would seem an absurd proposition. Yet, this reductive binary metaphor of gatekeeping (gates can be open or closed) somehow not only lives on but is being attached to the very phenomena one might imagine would render it obsolete.

This disjuncture is not hidden in the work of Barzilai-Nahon who is at the forefront of the regeneration of the notion of gatekeeping as applied to the realm of information and networks. Barzilai-Nahon proposes a theory of ‘network gatekeeping’ which sees gatekeeping as ‘the process of controlling information as it moves through a gate’ [including] selection, addition, withholding, display, channelling, shaping, manipulation, repetition, timing, localization, integration, disregard, and selection of information’ (2008: 1496). In this approach, ‘Gate is defined here as entrance to or exit from a network or its sections… The existence of a clear gate (conceptual of physical) is almost impossible under network gatekeeping due to the dynamism of networks and information technologies, and therefore the concept of gate is of less importance than the rise of the network gatekeeping components’ (ibid.) It is on the basis of the detailed and comprehensiveness of the network gatekeeping theory proposed by Barzilai-
Nahon, and her acknowledgement of the very limited application of the concept to networks, that fits precisely Merrin’s concern above, namely: ‘interpretation is backward-looking, still trying to understand the post-broadcast world through broadcast-era categories’ (2008).

Another way of seeing this disjuncture is to consider those that advocate gatekeeping as a still useful tool for probing today’s media ecology as representative of what Brian McNair (2006) calls a ‘control paradigm’. This paradigm, McNair claims, ‘stresses the importance of structure, stasis and hierarchy in the maintenance of an unjust social order’ (2006: 3). In his analysis of the sociology of journalism, in contrast, McNair suggests that the scale of transformation requires a shift to a ‘chaos paradigm’ (ibid.) In the chaos paradigm elites still aim to control information networks but ‘the performance, or exercise of control, is increasingly interrupted and disrupted by unpredictable eruptions and bifurcations arising from the impact of economic, political, ideological and technological factors on communication processes. These lead to unplanned outcomes in media content’ (ibid.) In election campaigns, for instance, we have witnessed in recent years shifting forms or mechanisms of political mobilisation, particularly through use of online tools in which parties-cum-gatekeepers must cede a degree of control of their campaign ‘message’ in order to harness potential voters’ online social networks and the creativity ‘produsers’ can bring to the campaign. Chadwick writes, ‘posting messages to online forums and collaboratively maintaining data repositories, e-mail lists, and blogs in which the
information and communication resources required for mobilization are ‘happy accident’ outcomes of countless small-scale individual contributions’ (2007: 290, italics added). We are not suggesting that gatekeeping exclusively fits the control over the chaos thesis, but that it is premised on a model of order, rather than taking chaos, complexity and what we call ‘diffusion’ as the central dynamics of media and communication in our new media ecology. In this way, we see McNair’s articulation of a chaos paradigm as an articulate of the connective turn. Others envision a similar shift, if emphasising different elements and terms. For instance, John Urry (2005: 1) on ‘complexity’ suggests: ‘There is a shift from reductionist analyses to those that involve the study of complex adaptive (‘vital’) matter that shows ordering but which remains on ‘the edge of chaos’”; Mike Featherstone observes: ‘Terms such as ‘new media’ and ‘multi-media’ seek to grasp this move towards greater mobility, flexibility and interactivity. At the same time they fail to adequately capture the proliferation of media forms, the new modes and media of dispersal, linking and integration’ (2009: 2); and Sonia Livingstone considers the resurgence in the ideas of ‘mediation’ and ‘mediatization’ to argue that whereas once the ‘mass media’ could be usefully analysed as a separate but influential institution, today social analysis occurs in an environment in which ‘everything is mediated’ (2009: 2). Of course, if everything is mediated, and we are not interested in mediation for its own sake, then the question becomes: what functions and purposes do different forms of mediation fulfil? What difference does uneven but increasingly ubiquitous mediation make to practices of journalism, citizenship, inter-cultural relations and
so on? And which concepts and theories can we renew, discard or create, at this juncture of ‘chaos’ and ‘control’?

Can gatekeeping, with its resonance of ‘channels’ and ‘messages’, somehow be reconciled to the relative flux and chaos necessarily implicated in approaches to the new media ecology? That is to say, news is radically connected and diffused through networks, nodes, and by the emergent generation of produsers, but does this produce outcomes familiar from the mass communications era? Our case study analysis that follows aims to illuminate and make intelligible some of these tensions. On the one hand texts move through digital networks being translated, remediated and trans-edited at various moments in ways beyond the control of the original producer; on the other, we find that despite this process being ‘on the edge of chaos’, order is achieved: a recurring pattern of gatekeeping by terrorism-monitoring organisations and news media emerges.

**Methodology: Multimodal, multilingual nexus analysis**

Given the empirical and conceptual impossibility of collecting a complete corpus of media content around a given issue or event, we proceeded to follow a set of texts through communication networks to illuminate how meaning is created through the remediation and translation of a given text as it is passed or diffused through a range of linguistic, cultural and institutional contexts. A systematic study of the translation of jihadist texts into all mainstream media, all UK national broadcasters or some other ‘comprehensive’ measure, would have been doomed
because the validity of claims would be undermined by the necessarily incomplete corpus: what counts as a ‘mainstream’ corpus is problematic when people consume news from multiple countries through multiple mediums on a daily basis. Instead, we have chosen to follow a small selection of jihadist texts as a first examination of the mechanisms through which networked gatekeeping might operate in a multilingual media ecology. This more modest remit may offer greater explanatory insight.

The analytical framework we employ is ‘nexus analysis’ (Scollon and Scollon, 2004; Awan et al., 2010). A nexus analysis maps the ‘semiotic cycles’ (the circulation of symbols, including media content) generated in the formation of a social network or institution such as a ‘public sphere’, ‘sphericule’ or ‘issue public’ or the semiotic cycles generated in response to a mediated event such as a major television broadcast, terrorist attack or sporting event. Nexus analysis explores the past, present and future trajectories of meaning implicated in the sum of communications around the phenomenon. Scollon and Scollon later argued they arrived at this methodology after realising, in a study of racism, ‘that there was no single point at which we could address problems of societal discrimination, institutional structure, and social change with any sense that this point was the fulcrum point around which everything else rotated’ (2007: 615). As mentioned above, we have conducted a broader nexus analysis of the culture of jihadist media to which government, journalists and others have attributed a ‘radicalising’ effect in the past decade (Awan et al., 2010). Radicalising
communications by jihadists involve semiotic cycles featuring religious imagery, historical references, the legitimation of contemporary violence and complex relations between on- and offline behaviour. The latter involves a series of statements about threats, extremists, resilience and vulnerability, a number of security practices, and emerging norms of ‘security journalism’. In this article we witness the procedures and networks through which three Arabic texts and one German text by jihadists become mainstream news reports in English about texts by jihadists. Nexus analysis offers an essential openness to new and emergent phenomena rather than a reification of existing institutions and structures and is thus appropriate for studying communication networks in flux.

If we are to make claims about how meanings are generated in different contexts, we must account for the aural and visual dimensions. As we have found elsewhere in our analysis of the ‘persuasive effect’ of jihadist texts (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, forthcoming), individual news consumers are engaged through songs, poetry and imagery as much as by linguistic claims. We draw upon the multimodal approach to textual analysis devised by Kress and van Leeuwen (2001; cf. Chouliaraki, 2006), in which the researcher analyses how verbal, visual and aural aspects of a medium combine or are intentionally combined to achieve particular meanings (for analysis of audience interpretations of both the Arabic and English texts analysed here, see Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010 forthcoming).
We examine the translation from Arabic into English of four major Al-Qaeda messages. The messages were by four different figures and delivered on different occasions and addressing different audiences. The first is by A-Qaeda leader Usama Bin Laden addressing the American people. This is related to 9/11, released in October 2004 and titled: *The Best Way to Avoid another Manhattan*. The second is by second in command in Al-Qaeda, Aymen Al-Zawahiri addressing mainly the British. This is related to 7/7 London bombings, released between September and November 2005 and titled: Wills of the Knights of the Blessed London Raid. The third is by third in command in Al-Qaeda Abu Yihya Al-Libi. The message is related to the Gaza conflict in 2008/2009, released on 22 January 2009 and titled: *Palestine, Fierce Fighting is Now*.

Figure 1. Harrach Bekkay addressing Germany

The last is a message by Al-Qaeda’s German operative Harrach Bekkay, aka Abu Talha Al-Almani addressing Germans. The message is related to German
elections and German troops in Afghanistan, released on 17 September 2009 and titled: Security is a Common Interest (See figure 1. above, and note that while the first three productions present speakers in conventional ‘jihadist’ clothing, Harrach is presented in ‘Western’ attire and smart haircut so as to look German – see Al-Lami and O’Loughlin 2009 for analysis) All four messages were chosen because they had received much publicity on jihadist forums and Western media alike upon their release.

Table 1. Original texts and sites hosting translations (references in appendix)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech</th>
<th>Original posting examined</th>
<th>Terrorism-monitoring translations examined</th>
<th>News media translations examined</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bin Laden (2004)</td>
<td>Not accessible but video later available</td>
<td>n/a4</td>
<td>CNN BBC (took from Al-Jazeera)5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Best Way to Avoid another Manhattan</td>
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<td>Wills of the Knights of the</td>
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4 When this analysis was undertaken in 2009, accessing the main terrorism-monitoring sites for 2004-05 speech transcripts required paid membership, which we did not have.  
5 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3966817.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3966817.stm)
<table>
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<th>Text</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Al-Fallujah Islamic Forums</td>
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Having decided on these texts, the original materials relating to the texts were identified on the internet. The process of locating some of the material was time-consuming as some had been removed from the links and file-sharing sites that once hosted them, especially for older files like Bin Laden’s 2004 video, which even when found was of very poor audio-visual quality. We also sought to
identify the online context of the original texts on jihadist sites. These included pages dating back to the time these messages were released. These were useful as they provided the audio, visual, and textual material surrounding (and endorsing) a given message and were at least secondary components in the overall legitimacy and persuasion attempts exerted by media jihadists. Again, this was not the easiest of tasks as the majority of forums that once hosted these media productions are today closed. This meant looking for other jihadist sources as well as dig into the database of saved webpages held by our research team. After locating the original material (three of which were in Arabic language and one in German) it was necessary to find more material in English to compare with to find out what was lost or added in translation as the initial text passed through various news ‘gates’. The comparison was with translations of the messages done by terrorism-monitoring sites such as MEMRI and the NEFA Foundation, and reports and transcripts of the messages by Western media. For the purpose of comparing translations, our researcher translated and annotated the audio, visual, and textual elements of the video. Such audio-visual details were important as they were absent in all published English transcriptions of the video. Finally, it was possible to compare the original Arabic material and personal translation on the one hand, and the English translated texts of the videos obtained from Western media and terrorism-monitoring groups.

Though this was a comparison of remediation, translation, and trans-editing it was quickly apparent that the key differences lay not in the quality of the
translation in Western media and terrorism-monitoring sites, which tended to be accurate linguistically, but in what was transcribed and made available to the wider public – the culling and crafting described in Shoemaker and Vos’ definition of gatekeeping earlier and the concept of trans-editing. The question arising then is not whether audiences received a good or bad translation linguistically, but whether these translations and remediations successfully convey the intended information and meaning. Below, we interpret the re-working of the internal (within-message) and external components (images and texts on pages that hosted them, status of speaker) that have the potential of achieving the intended meaning and persuasive effect.

From complex multimodal persuasion to brief, threatening screeds

Western media omit what could be the most persuasive aspects of the four jihadist texts analysed. Each text talks at length about sufferings of Muslims in conflict zones and constructs emotional representations of tragedies as a result of Western interference in Muslim affairs. These are omitted in media reports. The texts also each contain sections in which the main speaker, adopting a conciliatory tone, tries to appeal to his Western addressees through praising some of their stances. For example, Harrach praises Germany’s stance in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and ‘non-colonial past’, and bin Laden acknowledges that many Americans were against President G.W. Bush’s foreign policies and had warned him against invading Iraq. The speakers each tell these publics that they are being victimised as a result of their governments’ policies. Bin Laden
connects a US economic downturn with its wars and speaks of the numbers of troops killed, saying ‘you (Americans) are the real victims’. Zawahiri tells Britons that the 7/7 London bombings in 2005 were a result of their government’s interference in Muslims countries. These more conciliatory political claims are also omitted in the Western media reports.

Figure 2. Still image of Abu Yihya Al-Libi in CBS

On the other hand, Western media reports retain the parts where the speaker makes specific threats and incites violence against a country or group of people, even though such threats constitute a small part of the whole message. In terms of media reporting, ‘tough talk’ seems to overshadow whatever positive tone or words the speaker adopts to win points with his addressees. In terms of images, we see consistent selection of visual moments in the video productions in which the speaker looks angry and raises his index finger defiantly. For instance, a still image of Abu Yihya Al-Libi was included in CBS’ report on his speech (Figure 2., above), and a clip of a segment of his speech from which that image was taken.
was included in Fox News’ and Reuters’ reports. Such images offer a visual illustration of the strong threats reported in the news story. The selection of direct threats and tough talk and exclusion of soft and conciliatory tone and words in media reports reshape the texts into challenging and, we might imagine, repulsive addresses. But more importantly, such gatekeeping permits only an imbalanced and incomplete understanding of the production and its potential impact. Those who only witness or only find intelligible the English-language remediated versions, and hence are not exposed to parts of the productions that include images of suffering Muslims, political appeals and conciliatory tones would be mystified as to how such speeches might be appealing to Arabic-speaking audiences or indeed Muslim audiences who consume the visual imagery despite not being able to understand the words.

Second, in all transcriptions of the productions by the terrorism-monitoring sites, even those indicating ‘full transcription’, any words said by anybody other than the main speaker are omitted. These include religious scripture to support statements and arguments, poetry, guest speakers, and nasheeds (songs). Neglect of such secondary yet important elements of a jihadist message suggests ignorance about what is deemed important to Muslims. The ultimate source of legitimacy to Muslims is the Quran. This is why jihadist figures repeatedly support their statements, especially controversial ones, with words of the Quran and Hadith. Also, the more religious scripture they recite, the more knowledgeable and scholarly they seem to sympathizers (Awan et al., 2010).
Hence, such references are a strong means of persuasion: what better to persuade than the words of God? Yet this is gatekept out.

We are not arguing that such nasheeds are radicalising or drive young Muslims to join the ranks of Al-Qaeda. Rather, we suggest that being exposed to these songs and accompanying still and moving images sets a context and mood among those to whom the songs and images hold a resonance. In that context and mood, the texts as a whole may become more appealing and persuasive. Al-Zawahiri’s speech on the London bombings opens with a nasheed that boldly declares: ‘I am a terrorist’. Rather than the conventional statement ‘I am a mujahid in path of Allah’, the nasheed employs a controversial and catchy concept, ‘I am a terrorist in the path of Allah’, which immediately became a viral hit among jihadist online fora. The virality and reasons for this popularity, and thus the significance of this communication, are again culled when passing through the gatekeeping of Western media.

Our third finding is that still and moving images are also absent in transcriptions. While a reader of an Al-Qaeda text who obtained the linguistic translation through a media or terrorism-monitoring source gets to read parts of the words in the original text, s/he could not know what non-textual tools are being employed to support the words. A person who obtains the message directly from a jihadist site, or even YouTube, may have a different interpretation of the text, given his or her full exposure to all of its multimodal elements. Al-Zawahiri, on the London
Raid, did not have to compare and contrast, in words, what was happening in Muslim lands and the mujahideen’s reaction to it. Rather, this was expressed through a video clip with split screens for the sake of comparison between Western and Muslim countries and tragedies. The images of Muslim victims in this clip may have an emotional appeal, for instance the images of killing of Palestinian child Mohammed Al-Durra in his father’s arms by Israeli forces, and footage of the night bombs fell on Baghdad in 2003. Again, the absence of this ‘visual language’ (Weber, 2008) from Western news remediations for ‘mainstream’ audiences could inhibit understanding among a majority of news consumers of why consumption of the original or fuller multimodal versions of a ‘radicalising’ text might be persuasive or convincing to some individuals. News reporting functions to obfuscate the ‘radicalisation’ phenomenon it is reporting upon.

**Trans-editing-out the original context of consumption**

When seeking to translate ‘the message’ expressed by a jihadist text, whether journalists seeking to report these texts to mainstream audiences or journalism and media scholars seeking a corpus for content analysis, one can easily overlook the webpages on which these texts are hosted. It is noteworthy that when clicking on a certain link for a jihadist production on a jihadist site, the full upper part of the page will show images, animated advertisements, and slogans of similar productions and supporting jihadist narratives. In addition, as a user scrolls down the page, they always find pages of comments supporting the given
production -- what it calls for, the authority of its leading speaker, the credibility of other actors involved, and so on. We might hypothesise that group-endorsement can carry an undecided or ambivalent user to either be convinced by some aspect of the text or feel obliged to show his or her conviction, for fear of showing dissent and being attacked on the site.

Users entering Al-Faloja forum are immediately met by an audio clip of God is Great, the same that is used in calls for prayer. Accessing the website during the Gaza crisis of 2008-09, one was greeted with invitations by the forum administrators to join the media campaign for Gaza, as well as other slogans adopted by the site to show its solidarity. The linguistic, audio, and visual materials surrounding a given message lend overall endorsement to it. In Western news sources, as we might expect, these aspects are omitted. For example, while Al-Zawahiri’s London Raid video was hosted on a jihadist site where similar productions were visibly present, including images of Muslim civilian victims, the BBC website reported the threatening parts of the message with images of the victims of the London bombings and their biographies. Similarly, Al-Libi’s message was posted on jihadist sites at the height of the Gaza conflict, which meant that the jihadist websites that hosted it were filled with images of Gazan civilian victims. By contrast, the Western news media that reported Al-Libi’s message highlighted only his threat to Britain, failed to mention his talk of Gazan victims, offered only a picture of him raising his index finger
defiantly, and did not show any of the images of Gazan victims that featured around the original production.

Alongside the absence of the online context or surrounding multimodal environment, jihadist text translations in Western media and terrorism-monitoring organisations omit details of the status of its speaker and his authority and appeal in jihadist circles. A simple speech may be more persuasive than richer productions by others because of the respect recipients have for the speaker. In reporting the significance of a new Al-Qaeda address, it is crucial for journalists, audiences and researchers to have at least basic background information on the speaker to know how well the address might appeal to potential and actual sympathizers. Additionally, the speaker’s education, religious scholarly title, jihadist/militant experience, credibility and even vocabulary and eloquence are all factors that we suggest shape his appeal and authority. Again, ignorance about what is deemed important to certain cultures can affect what is considered worthy of translation. Elsewhere in this special issue, Cheesman, Nohl et al. explained how different language bureaus of the BBC World Service edited the title of US political figures to make their roles intelligible to non-US audiences (e.g. ‘chief of staff’). This does not happen with reports on Al-Qaeda figures’ titles. In the case of Harrach Bekkay, for example, jihadist sites and members make sure to refer to him using his title, *Al-Hafudh*, meaning the one who has memorised and has full command of the Quran, i.e. a scholar. Harrach’s
message clearly shows his title. However, it is dropped out in NEFA’s allegedly ‘full transcription’ of the message.

**Conclusions**

Gate is defined here as entrance to or exit from a network or its sections… The existence of a clear gate (conceptual of physical) is almost impossible under network gatekeeping due to the dynamism of networks and information technologies, and therefore the concept of gate is of less importance than the rise of the network gatekeeping components. (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008: 1496)

Contrary to Barzilai-Nahon’s thesis, a gate exists across Western media for the remediation of jihadist leaders’ productions that reflects Barzilai-Nahon’s conception of a network gate since it spans, consistently, the network we understand as Western news and which journalists and news editors who work within this network may presume is reporting and gatekeeping for a set of mainstream national audiences. The remediation, translation and trans-editing done by the terrorism-monitoring sites produces the same shared gate, and it is a question for further research the extent to which journalists – and indeed policymakers – draw upon the translations provided by these intermediary organisations.

From our analysis emerges a model that explains why a rich multimodal political culture, albeit an abhorrent one in its ideology and advocacy of violence,
becomes systematically simplified. This simplification is an obstacle to understanding how the original jihadists productions may be appealing to some Muslim and Arabic-speaking audiences who access either the originals or the other remediations and viral, user-diffused versions which are consumed on the internet. Western media present ‘their’ audiences with decontextualized footage of angry pointing men, absent the political claims, religious and historical narratives, and songs, poetry and scripture through which such communications attempt to persuade. As we have explored elsewhere, these multimodal dimensions and contextualisation are important in producing a particular mood of reception among audiences of these original productions (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, forthcoming).

In our very brief sketching of the origins of gatekeeping as applied to news, above, we cited White’s (1950) work as indicative in attaching greatest significance to the ‘the terminal “gate” in the complex process of communication’. In contrast, we drew on the work of Scollon and Scollon in developing a nexus analysis approach, who were motivated in their work through their realisation, to repeat: ‘that there was no single point at which we could address problems of societal discrimination, institutional structure, and social change with any sense that this point was the fulcrum point around which everything else rotated’ (2007: 615). It is important to follow texts as they move between contexts through our connective media ecology as we begin to construct methodologies adequate to this altered environment. The connective turn demands a reconfiguration of
media ontology. Confronted by the diffused prolificacy of digital media Christine Hine could write five years ago that there is a perpetually ‘preparadigmatic’ situation insofar as there is no stable object around which a research paradigm could cohere (Hine, 2005, italics added). Old concepts and theories appeared inadequate, as Barzilai-Nahon, Merrin and others argued, but as we have shown, the concept gatekeeping can still be useful if we acknowledge its transformed ontological constitution as networked and dependent upon diffused, collaborative gatekeepers.

Of central concern in attempting to identify translations amidst ubiquitous media, is that in the new media ecology, despite or because of the complex and voluminous media data readily-available through the connective turn, and the very awareness of this fact, there remains a powerful delineation is that of the mythical ‘mainstream’. In other words, this is the still impressively controlled audience that news organizations (and governments) still imagine they ‘gatekeep’ for and speak to (with the delusion that Shirky alludes to, above). This raises questions about who media regulators presume to regulate for, political dilemmas regarding whose media consumption patterns may straddle ‘radical’ and ‘mainstream’ media, and, consequently, a particular perpetuation of a vision of ‘the mainstream’, that still may function to serve the needs of a still powerful broadcast-era set of journalistic, policy and academic discourses.
References


Appendix: Material analysed for the four jihadist productions

Production 1: Bin Laden (2004) *The Best Way to Avoid another Manhattan*


Terrorism monitoring translations examined:

- When this analysis was undertaken in 2009, accessing the main terrorism-monitoring sites for 2004-05 speech transcripts required paid membership, which we did not have.

News translation sites examined:


Video can also be downloaded from http://www.archive.org/details/7-7-will-mohammed-sadeeq and http://www.damasgate.com/vb/t64558/
Terrorism monitoring translations examined:

- MEMRI

News media translations examined:

- BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4443364.stm;
- Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/nov/14/monarchy.alqaida;
- Timesonline: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article589702.ece;
- Fox News: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,168207,00.html

Production 3: Al-Libi (2009) *Palestine, Fierce Fighting is Now*


Terrorism-monitoring translations examined:

- SITE
- IntelCent

News media translations examined:

- Fox News: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,481706,00.html
Production 4: Harrach (2009) Security is a Common Interest


Terrorism monitoring sites examined:

- NEFA
- Jamestown Foundation

News media translations examined:

- Deutsche Welle ‘New terror threat against Germany’, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4708562,00.html
- Der Speigel Online: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,649987,00.html
- BBC Online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8269995.stm
• CNN:

• Fox News:  http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,552507,00.html

• Sky News:  http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Al-Qaeda-Issues-Threat-To-Germany-Ahead-Of-Elections-And-Calls-For-Troops-To-Leave-Afghanistan/Article/200909315384537?lpos=World_News_First_Home_Article_Teaser_Region_5&lid=ARTICLE_15384537_Al_Qaeda_Issues_Threat_To_Germany_Ahead_Of_Elections_And_Calls_For_Troops_To_Leave_Afghanistan