‘Mend me’: the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the empowerment of violence

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Introduction
The description by the Willinks Commission in 1958 that the Niger Delta is ‘poor, backward and neglected’ is still an accurate presentation of the conditions in this part of Nigeria. The Niger Delta is, despite the recent amnesty offer by the Nigerian government,¹ still a dangerous witch-brew of poverty, marginalisation and under-employment, combined with environmental problems, crime, corruption and local communities who see few benefits from oil production. This has fuelled a militant uprising that not only threatens Nigeria’s oil production, but also the country’s fragile democratic transition. During the last years, different insurgency groups have fought against the army, destroyed oil installations, and taken oil workers hostage.

There is, however, also little doubt that connections exist between militia groups and local political elites in the Delta (see Eberlein 2006). During previous elections, armed groups, mainly consisting of young men, have been used to harass other candidates and their supporters as well as fighting armed groups controlled by political opponents. This was vividly illustrated both in the 2003 and the 2007 election (see Human Rights Watch 2007, 2008). The aim of this chapter is therefore to unpack the contradictions of the armed insurgencies in the Niger Delta – their relationships of attachment and disattachment to the various manifestations of the Nigerian state, and thereby suggesting some alternative frames for understanding the conflict and the situation prevailing in the Niger Delta.

Attempts to explain conflicts such as the one in the Niger Delta commonly stress the problem of state recession, combined with the emergence of warlords and warlordism (see Thomas, Kiser and Casebeer 2005; Lezhnev 2005; Green and Ward

2004; Mackinlay 2002; Rashid 2001; Shawcross 2000; Rich 1999; Reno 1998). Much less examined is the behaviour and actions of the nonstate armed groups fighting these conflicts, and how these tend to change over time.\(^2\) Why do movements that began as a social – albeit violent – rebellion against an authoritarian and deeply corrupted state end up as a perverted mirror-image of the state they originally set out to destroy? Greed and increased access to resources provide one explanation for the mutability of armed groups’ behaviour over time (Keen 2000) and a greed-based approach may capture groups’ increased reliance on resource extraction and marketing over the lifetime of the conflict. However, the profit motive itself does not explain why or to what extent groups turn away from their original political agendas – and why many end up replicating certain pathologies of the states they contest.

Thus, in this chapter, it is suggested that the process by which rebel groups forsake political agendas to become profit-seeking, market-based entities may best be understood using a dual analysis. The first aspect of this analysis is to contextualise the insurgency with regard to the pre-conflict levels of structural and actual violence in society. The analysis in this chapter is therefore in line with Richards's (2005:1) contention that the violent character of these movements needs ‘to be understood in relation to patterns of violence already embedded in society’. The second aspect builds outward from the first. It centres on the questions: did the state structures – specifically, the particular logic of dysfunctional neopatrimonialism – place insurgencies in the affected countries on a path-dependent track to a violent profit-seeking warlordism? More specifically, the question this chapter seeks to explore is to what extent militia structures in the Niger Delta are grounded in meta-narratives that reflect and expound collective experiences of corruption, abuse of power and position, and poverty (see Boås 2004).

Thus, the chapter will discuss how situations of marginalisation and exclusion, in a neopatrimonial society such as the Niger Delta with the possibility of natural resource extraction, seem to lead to a rebellion characterised by the same features as the society against which the original grievances were targeted. The argument is not that this is bound to happen, but rather that a certain path-dependency exists, and that the strength of this dynamic depends on local, national, and international responses to the conflict. Thus, the extent to which an armed movement

\(^2\) Two exceptions are Clapham (1998) and Boås and Dunn (2007).
with an agenda for social and political change can sustain, and act consistent with, that vision arguably depends to some degree on how the group is treated by the system and society it is rebelling against. Currently, dispatches from the Niger Delta tend to downplay the very real social causes that the armed groups put forth, and focus on the piracy tactics they employ. This is worryingly evident in the Nigerian state's approach, which officially treats the armed youth as bandits that can legitimately be crushed using the full force of the state. Their only alternative is to hand in their arms and accept they governments offer of amnesty.

**Neopatrimonialism as social practice**

Neo-patrimonialism is usually seen as a system of rule in which bureaucratic and patrimonial norms co-exist (see Médard 1991, 1996; Braathen, Boås and Sæther 2000). If such a system of rule exists on a nationwide scale, the outcome is a state able to extract and redistribute resources. However, this extraction and redistribution is privatised. This circumstance is not unique to Niger Delta and Nigeria, or even to Sub-Saharan Africa: neopatrimonial aspects can be found in political systems worldwide. Yet there are important distinctions between systems, both in the degree to which the neopatrimonial logic has penetrated the political system in question, and in its functionality.

In essence, neopatrimonialism is a system of rule like any other: it lays the foundation for the political game of distribution and redistribution and, as illustrated by the longevity of many African regimes, can provide both stability and order. Yet neopatrimonial systems are also prone to extreme vulnerability. For example, Mobutu's regime in Zaire shows how rapidly state fragmentation occurs once the system can no longer reproduce itself. Dysfunctional neopatrimonialism follows the same logic as before, but without the same ability to deliver.

Even when functioning, however, a primary consequence of this kind of rule is that the various patrimonial paths of redistribution divide the population along regional, ethnic and, at times, even family lines. This has obvious implications for the regime, state institutions, and competing elites, but is equally important for the population as a whole. Thus, for the purpose of this chapter, the questions that arise are: what are the conditions for resistance within and against such a system? To what degree is it possible to design an alternative political organisation when such logic is embedded, not just in the state and its macro-institutions, but also in people's daily life
– when it has become the order of things, the main principle of socio-economic interactions at all levels of society? It is the social system that all are implicated in and part of, willingly or not; it forms the fabric of daily life and practices even for those far removed from the spoils.

Thus, instead of seeing neopatrimonialism only as variant of Weber’s ([1921] 1947) typology of rule, it is perhaps more fruitful to interpret it as an iterated social practice that creates an informal institutional structure, which is not easily broken or bent. The argument is not that resistance is useless and change impossible. Yet in examining why projects for change morph into distorted agents of the status quo, one explanation is that pervasive and increasingly dysfunctional neopatrimonial systems have created a machine-like character of African politics. This machine-like character may recreate itself in various armed insurgencies, particularly those that are long lasting and occurring in an environment where resource extraction is possible, and victory (in any meaningful sense of the word) more and more unlikely. The consequence is that resistance in the broad sense is only possible within and between the nexus of crime and politics: turning militia structures into some sort of social banditry (see Crumney 1986); operating along the lines of Corsica’s venerable bandit honorable – men forced into a life beyond the law, stealing from the state (‘bleeding Satan’), but also at the same time also preying on the very same population as they come from. Thus, taking us back to the ambiguous relationships between armed insurgencies and local host communities introduced above.

Social banditry and neopatrimonial structures
If we accept that there is a relationship between pre-war state structures and the character of the armed insurgency, we must then ask: what kind of social norms are internalised, and what kind of mind-sets and cosmologies developed, under such circumstances as those described above?

The case of the Niger Delta rebellion vividly illustrates this point: all social relations between groups and interests in the Delta region revolve around oil and oil revenue. Nonetheless, despite mismanagement of oil resources, corruption, poverty and marginalisation, some sort of order still prevails in the Delta (ICG 2006). This order enables oil production, but at a cost. Oil companies conduct their business in an uneasy co-habitation (or co-operation) with a range of actors, including rebel movements like the Movement for Emancipation in the Niger Delta (MEND); other
armed factions; bandits; local politicians; private security companies; the Nigerian Army; and national politicians (Yates 2006; ICG 2006). Yet local communities that receive few benefits from oil production – and struggle under the weight of poverty, underemployment, environmental problems, crime and corruption – have fuelled a militant uprising that threatens both Nigeria's oil production, and the country's fragile democratic transition (see Omeje 2006; Kaldor and Said 2007).

Prior to the global economic meltdown in 2009, this was easily observed in world market prices. As a consequence of attacks on oil pipelines in Isaka and Abonema in Rivers State in April 2008 oil prices crossed $117 a barrel for the first time (see BBC 21 April 2008; This Day 22 April 2008). Nigeria is Africa's largest oil exporter and the eighth-largest oil producing country in the world, but since early 2006 rebel activity in the Niger Delta have disabled the output with as much as 25 percent.3 Barely hours after this attack the main insurgency group, MEND, put out a statement claiming that since they had been pushed to the background after the Nigerian elections in 2007,4 they had nothing to lose or protect and would fight to destroy all oil facilities until their demands were met. According to MEND, the new series of attacks (that they named Operation Cyclone) was the insurgency's answer to the illegal government of President Umaru Yar'Adua, dispelling the impression that the government had tried to create that peace and security was restored in the Delta, and to protest against the detention and secret trail of Henry Okah (the alleged MEND leader arrested in Angola).5 Moreover, as a comment to the increased military cooperation between Abuja and Washington D.C., MEND said that this was their way of welcoming the USS Swift transiting in the Gulf of Guinea. Clearly obvious to the increased attention paid by both U.S. policymakers as well as American oil companies to Nigerian and West African oil, MEND expressed its readiness to fight U.S. forces if they tried to intervene, while simultaneously asking for peace talks to be lead by former President Jimmy Carter (This Day 22 April 2008).

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3 Violence and conflict in key oil-producing countries facilitated a series of records since the beginning of 2008, as the market feared that supply would be insufficient to meet the demand from China and other glowing economies in Asia. Investors moving into oil and other commodities as a hedge against the weakening dollar also caused part of the increase.

4 The 2007 Nigerian elections are generally seen as a violent farce and an orgy of corruption and electoral rigging. See EU (2007) and Human Rights Watch (2008).

5 After spending almost two years in prison awaiting the outcome of his trial, Okah was released in the spring of 2009 to boost the credibility of the government's amnesty offer. How much credibility this has added can however be questioned as there is every reason to believe that the part of MEND that most vocally has argued against accepting the amnesty offer is the section that Okah belonged to.
The nature of the insurgency

There is clearly a tendency, both in international media as well as from oil companies to downplay the socio-economic causes behind MEND and instead focusing on the piracy tactics that the insurgency employs, and the terrorist card if not played yet, is lurking around the corner. This is, however, not a conflict that can be solved with military means solely, and foreign involvement under the banner of the ‘war on terror’ could have disastrous effects (see also Boâs 2009).

After a wave of hostage taking in August 2006, President Olusegun Obasanjo threatened to crush the so-called ‘criminal elements’ in the Niger Delta. However, the most tangible result was the razing of hundreds of slum houses in Port Harcourt, in proximity to where a soldier was killed during the kidnapping of foreign oil workers (BBC 2006a). These heavy-handed tactics have been tried in the past: they did not produce the desired outcome then, nor is there reason to expect they will be effective now (Lindsay 2006). The growth of militias, whether defined as armed factions with a political agenda, bandits, or something in-between (e.g. social bandits), are a consequence of local grievances that must be addressed.

Two aspects of the situation in the Niger Delta are particularly noteworthy. First, there is little doubt that connections exist between militia groups and local political elites in the Delta. The second notable aspect of the Niger Delta rebellion is the degree to which the young armed men wear different hats (BBC 2006b).

Militia groups and political elites

The link between militia groups and political elites were amply illustrated in the conduct of the 2003 and 2007 elections. The ‘convergence of militancy and politics’ (ICG 2006:21) is not foreign to Nigerian elections in general, but in the Delta this has reached extreme proportions. Here previous elections have featured the harassment of candidates and their supporters by armed groups, mainly consisting of young men, in the service of another candidate; and clashes between armed groups controlled by different political opponents. This type of political behaviour started to emerge after the death of Sani Abacha and in the Delta it exploded around the time of the 2003 election.
The starting point was Rivers State, and its capital Port Harcourt that is also the hub of the oil industry, making this state in theory the wealthiest in Nigeria. Here state governor Peter Odili, spearheaded a strategy of violent vote rigging in favour of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) with the help of Asari Dokubo's Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and Ateke Tom's Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV). Election violence therefore became widespread in Rivers, but also successful for those that had initiated it as this strategy saw Odili receive 98 percent of the popular vote in 2003.

However, as soon as the elections were won, the 'patrons of violence' such as the aforementioned Odili, tried to distance himself from the most prominent gunmen that he had hired for his campaign. Some militias men and their leaders accepted this 'remarginalisation' as a fact of life in the Delta, but others reacted with anger threatening violence and rebellion against their former masters. One of these was Asari Dokubo and the majority of his NDPVF fighters. The result was that Asari and the NDPVF suddenly were out of favour and as they threatened to resume the violence of the election campaign, their former political sponsors responded by attempting a strategy of 'divide and rule' by encouraging Ateke Tom's group who had remained loyal to subdue Asari's men by force.

This had two immediate consequences. First, it started a 'small civil war' in and around Port Harcourt as rolling battles – in the streets as well as in the creeks and the local communities – not only killed militia members, but also local civilians and created large scale displacement. The second consequence was a general proliferation of guns, gangs and violence in the period between 2003 and 2007 as the original insurgents fragmented into new groups.

In this period, various gangs and militias therefore acquired wealth through a series of violent activities such as 'bunkering', bank robberies and kidnappings, turning some of its leaders into figures of real authority in the Delta. Some of these

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6 In 2007, Rivers State government had a budget of USD 1.4 billion. This was roughly five times the national average across all state governments. The tremendous wealth pouring into the coffers of the major oil producing states as Rivers has been mirrored by an equally high amount of waste and graft. In Rivers state, primary schools and basic health care services has been left to crumble even as the state government budget has increased fourfold since 1999. Graft and patronage is the signature of the government, not development and human security, see also Watts (2008).

7 Sometimes also referred to as the ‘Icelanders’.
groups were new, others old, but both old and new alike were related to the Nigerian 'cult' phenomenon.\textsuperscript{8}

This is a phenomenon worth considering in some detail as its very existence reveals the embedded history of co-optation between elites and marginalised youths. The 'cult' term refers in the Nigerian context not to specific religious practices, but to the criminal gangs that originally appeared as fraternity organisations among students at university campuses. However, since the establishment of the first 'cult' at the University of Ibadan in 1952, such groups has not only multiplied, but also morphed into violent and highly sophisticated criminal organisations, sowing terror on university campuses and beyond, particularly in the southern part of the country. Membership to the cults is only open to students on the campuses where the groups operate, but most has formed 'street wings' by recruiting off-campus members. As most leading politicians are university graduates it also means that many of them belonged (or even still belongs to cults), suggesting that the relationships they cultivate with militias today is not a novelty for them, but in fact a continuation of an intimate relationship between politics and violence that they internalised in the formative campus-years of their life.\textsuperscript{9} Conversely, many prominent militia leaders therefore started their careers as the off-campus hired thugs of these soon-to-be political and economic leaders. Some later rebelled – or at least partially as experiences of betrayal led to the development of political grievances – whereas others by and large returned to the service of their original masters when called for (during elections and at other times when their services were in demand). When not operating under such 'command' these latter groups were 'allowed' to cater for their own needs as they saw fit with the tools at their disposal (guns and the readiness to use them) as long as their actions did not prevent the business of the elite too much.

The very same period and the events within it therefore also indirectly constitutes the birth of MEND as the betrayal that many militia member and leaders felt that events after the 2003 election exposed them to, led some – obviously, not all – to develop political grievances against their former political sponsors who they saw

\textsuperscript{8} This section draws on Small Arms Survey (2007) and Human Right Watch (2008).
\textsuperscript{9} For example, the 'Vikings' (aka Supreme Vikings Confraternity) was originally founded at the University of Port Harcourt in 1984. It has since expanded, and has members in universities all over southern Nigeria. Its current and past members have been elected to high places, including the Rivers State House of Assembly (according to rumours in such high numbers that the Assembly should be renamed the 'Viking House'. Ateke Tom's NDV (Icelanders) were originally the 'street wing' of the 'Vikings'. Similarly, the campus-based cult the 'Klansmen' started the 'Deebam' as its 'street wing'.
as having refused to fulfil promises of money, employment and education. Local communities and civilians also felt betrayed, but they could be ignored, whereas this was not as easy with the effective 'insurgency machines' that they politicians created in order to win the 2003 elections. The tools of violence once handed over, is not too easily subdued into a position of obedient patronage as violence not only can kill, it may also empower. Groups like NDPVF and men like Asari therefore have a past as violent supporters of the regime that they later would claim to be rebelling against, but that does not in itself make the grievances they articulate any less real.

This may sound strange, but there is nothing particularly unusual about this (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire's Jeune Patriots), and the alliances and what happened later can be seen as first a marriage of convince and later as the inability of the elite to control the 'monster' they had created. Either due to the unwillingness or inability to provide sufficient spoils or that the young men they initially hired and organised as a militia later developed agendas and interests of their own.

One obvious example in this regard is again Asari who started off as a gang leader, but ended up charged with treason as he declared that the Delta should secede from the rest of Nigeria. In this regard there is also another line of continuity from Asari's NDPVF to MEND that first emerged in 2005. The latter being just as much an idea as it is an amalgam of several groups operating across the Delta. It is much less a cohesive force than a brand for a large groups of insurgents, militias and gangs (see Eberlein 2009), and due to its networked and fragmented nature also very hard to crush with one decisive military blow.

As much as many militiamen undoubtedly experienced grievances of the betrayal they felt exposed to after the 2003 elections, the pattern of 2003 repeated itself in the 2007 elections. The 2007 polls were universally condemned by foreign and domestic monitors as completely lacking credibility. More than 300 died in election-related violence, and election day itself saw gangs of thugs hired by ruling PDP stealing ballot boxes, chasing off voters and fabricating results – official results even indicated massive turnout figures in areas where no voting took place at all. Nowhere was this more evident that in the Niger Delta states. The history of 2003 did not only repeat itself in the 2007 elections, but also in the violence that followed after the elections were completed.

In 2005, a large part of the ‘Icelanders’ led by Soboma George broke away from Ateke Tom's leadership, forming their own militia, the ‘Outlaws’. Swiftly, the
Outlaws under George's leadership managed to establish itself as the preferred ‘thugs’ of high-ranking government and PDP officials, doing such a high number of the dirty work needed during the 2007 elections that they almost had received a monopoly on government patronage and state sponsored violence. Among other things, it was reported that George had received control over a busy filling station owned by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), whose daily revenue therefore went directly into George and the Outlaws' pockets.10

The consequence was the formation of an alliance between different gangs and militias seeing their income drop as George and the Outlaws monopolised the networks of state patronage. Thus, under the leadership of Ateke Tom a diverse range of cults and gangs — e.g. Axemen, Klausmen, Deebam and the Bush Boys — started to attack both Outlaws' members and areas perceived to be under the control of that group. The consequence was both deliberate and random violence in the form of 'turf wars' that created havoc, death and destruction in Port Harcourt as well as neighbouring communities. Several dozen civilians were killed and at least 150 more shot and wounded, and this situation was allowed to continue for over a month before the Joint Task Force (JTF) intervened on 12 August 2007.11 The JTF operation restored some nominal form of order in and around Port Harcourt, but apart from killing some militiamen and also some civilians caught in the crossfire, the only thing this operation accomplished was to increase the bitter grievances of young men with militia connections who once more realised that after the dirty business of elections were completed the political and economic elite had little if any concern for them. The result was therefore not less, but renewed attacks on oil installations and infrastructure in the Delta under the banner of MEND.

The many faces of MEND

The violence of the Niger Delta is therefore not only some sort of crude resource war between different political and illicit elites; between the 'cults' and the 'boys in the creeks'. The very same young men involved in this ‘war’ also use the banner of MEND to attack oil installations and take oil workers as hostages in order to put

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10 Presumably to prevent them from 'bunkering'.
11 The Joint Task Force is made up by a combination of personnel from the police, military and the State Security Services, headquartered at Bori Camp (an army base in Port Harcourt). One can only speculate why it took so long time before the Nigerian state intervened — one possible answer is that letting the armed groups 'kill' each other was seen as a cost-effective way of dealing with armed groups that had started to develop agendas and interests contrary to those of their 'masters'.

forward political demands for increased regional autonomy (e.g. 'true federalism') and control of oil revenues (e.g. 'resource control').

In addition, the same people also sometimes deploy as the armed wing for the grievances of local communities – taking hostages for local communities, as a means of addressing – or at least highlighting – local company-specific grievances. This was for instance the case with four sailors taken hostage in August 2006. The hostages were taken by a group of armed young men, who then handed them over to a local community that had grievances against a Nigerian oil company, Peak Petroleum. Both the original kidnapping and the subsequent hostage situation leading to negotiations, although different in type and nature, could be considered political acts, stemming from legitimate grievances and demands. This is the same group of men who also take hostages purely for ransom, with no political pretence; and work as we have seen as hired thugs for local strongmen and politicians, especially during election campaigns.

Thus roles and activities overlap. They are conducting an armed political insurgency, but also operating as bandits, and in the latter role actively co-opted by the same elite as they also rebel against. As one role does not seem to exclude the other, the question is rather what logic that will come to dominate the situation in the Niger Delta: the political logic of MEND or the personal economic logic of men like Ateke Tom and Soboma George?

MEND is sophistication – of argument and operation: a rebellion where the gun is mightier than the pen, but the latter still not completely dysfunctional as MEND also pay a great deal of attention not only to its military operations, but also to its verbal communication with the world. Typical in this regard, was the tongue of mockery it used to denounce the Nigerian offer of amnesty in the spring of 2009. In its verbal response MEND wrote:

We call on political thugs, armed robbers, kidnappers, pirates etc., from other states in Nigeria to take advantage of the government's offer by travelling to one of the centres in Niger Delta and trade their weapons for amnesty. Come with the whole gang and get rehabilitated with gains of free education, money to start legitimate

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12 This is how this is argued in MEND-parlance.
13 Two Norwegian and two Ukrainian employees of Trico Supply AS were kidnapped off their ship. Trico Supply AS is a Norwegian affiliate of a U.S.-based company, Trico Marine, which supplies marine support services to the oil and gas industry. The supply boat had been let by Peak Petroleum. The men were later set free, unharmed. See Baås (2006a, 2006b), and author interview with the released Norwegian hostages.
businesses etc. This is a unique opportunity in a country where so many graduates cannot find jobs and girls no longer marry for love.

The statement is not only making fun of the government, the last sentence is also vividly capturing a perception of marginalisation well known to Nigerian youth. The only way to make sense of the rebellion in the Niger Delta is therefore to approach it as a combination of efforts based on tactical as well as strategic agency (see Honwana 2006): an attempt to address social injustice (e.g. strategic), combined with the insurgency as a mode of production and a way to make a living (e.g. tactic).

Whether the Niger Delta rebellion will continue to have a social profile or deteriorate solely into criminality remains to be seen. However, the way in which its participants are embedded in patronial clientelistic relationships with local strongmen, and the multitude of oil money and actors in the region, implies that those rebelling walk a very fine line between ‘greed’ and ‘grievances’. If they overstep this boundary, they may turn what is still a legitimate rebellion into a market-based entity operating in a downward-spiralling, dysfunctional patronial order.

The amnesty offer made by the Nigerian government in June 2009 and MEND’s unilateral ceasefire the same autumn may constitute a political dialogue in its very infancy. However, a meaningful dialogue is only possible if the various elements of the insurgency and its connections to the state it rebels against are sorted out. The question is not how to bring the insurgency under political control, as it was the very control by the political elite that created the context for the rebellion in the first place, but rather to facilitate the creation of autonomous spaces for dialogue as well as legitimate political resistance against the dysfunctional structures of neopatrimonialism that informs politics in the Delta. MEND undoubtedly has many faces, but not only are all of them shaped by the political economy of oil in the Delta, some of its faces are also more legitimate than others.

Conclusion
Based on the discussion above, it is not foregone that MEND will take the path of a total collapse into fatalistic violence, random killing, and profit-seeking warlordism. MEND has put forward legitimate political claims that should be taken seriously, including their suggestion for negotiations on the distribution of oil revenues, under the supervision of a neutral third party.
If these claims are ignored or denied, there is, however, every likelihood that the patrimonial politics in which the armed youth of MEND are implicated will come to dominate the movement – and it will thus end up as another perverted facsimile of the society it rebelled against. It is immensely difficult to predict what the immediate future will bring for the Niger Delta. However, it should be clear that international efforts focusing solely on increasing the military capacity of the Nigerian army are counterproductive, suggesting that external stakeholders should place more emphasis on dialogue and the establishment of a ‘respectable’ face for MEND than offering military support to the government. This may have to include some ‘extreme makeover’, but facilitating the transformation of an insurgency such as MEND to more of genuine and legitimate political force and less a vehicle for violent patrimonialism is in the interest of both the population of the Delta as well as stakeholders seeking to secure the long-term sustainability of the area’s oil production. If not, there is every reason to believe that the lessons in ‘violence as empowerment’ that the young insurgents has learned will continue to be passed on to ever new generations of marginalised young men.

References


