Africa & Global Relations/Studies: lessons from/for the continent

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Africa has always been impacted by but also responded to ‘global’ relations. This paper looks at salient contemporary pressures & opportunities: from BRICs/NICs as well as the G8 to international mafias/militias & diasporas/remittances: will Africa by 2010 consist of mainly ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ or ‘developmental’ states…and why?

‘Sub-Saharan Africa has always been a challenge of International Relations (IR) theory, and this is also true for Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)’ (Buzan & Weaver 2003: 219)

‘The global is not only more inclusive of transnational relations in general – which in one sense is true by definition – but it is also constitutive of them in a way which they are not of it. Increasingly, transnational, regional - & international – relations are informed by a sense of the world as a social & cultural context, more than this global sense is informed by the international, regional or transnational. (Shaw 1999)

‘..many of the current generation of wars can be considered new...

Today’s prototypical war differs from the archetypical interstate war in six aspects...- the locus of war, the agents of war, the economics of war, the prevalence of civilian victims, the means of war & new technologies, and media coverage.’ (Hoffman & Weiss 2006: 57 & 58-59)

‘In the contemporary world, Africa is the continent where the demand for peacekeeping is most acute...African conflicts in the post-Cold War world are complex & multidimensional. Most often they are protracted intra-state conflicts in which peacekeeping missions based on the principles of consent, impartiality & minimum use of force seem doomed to be insufficient dressings for large open wounds. Warring factions may consist of militias, armed civilians & parts of regular armies...civilians are the main victims & often the main targets of the conflicting parties.’ (Bergholm 2007: 147-148)

African states & economies, societies & diasporas face a world in flux, one in which their collective impact is minimal but not non-existent. Moreover, by contrast to their assumed marginality, their analytic challenge or contribution may be greater than their existential place. This paper suggests that as their diversity is increasing so their conceptual potential in a number of fields is growing even if not all analysts so recognise to date. As Barry Buzan & Ole Weaver suggest in the first citation above, the continent poses challenges but not only in the security sector & not only in the way they suggest. The subtitle to their chapter on Sub-Saharan Africa is ‘security dynamics in a setting of weak & failed states’ (Buzan & Weaver 2003: 219); but not all of Africa’s states can be so categorized.
Box: Global versus International/Transnational Relations

Cross-disciplinary Global Studies at the start of the second decade of the 21st century capture & reflect a half-dozen interrelated contemporary factors:

a) changes in the structures of global interactions towards extensive, comprehensive yet uneven globalizations;
b) proliferation of state & non-state actors, formal & informal, legal & illegal;
c) multiplication of global issues to include brands, certification/regulation, civil societies & social movements, coalitions, codes of conducts, cultural industries, diasporas, drugs, ecology, energy, gender, health, mafias, multinational corporations, norms, religions, supply chains, SWFs, viruses, water etc;
d) development, definition & recognition of new interdisciplinary fields through university programmes & named professorships; professional associations/conferences/networks; academic journals & books series; websites etc; &
e) recognition of global studies graduates through job definitions & internship opportunities.

Furthermore, the continent’s political economies, civil societies, myriad diasporas etc are increasingly divergent: at least several ‘developmental states’ (Mbabazi & Taylor 2005) if not yet ‘emerging economies’. So the following quote from Buzan & Weaver (2003: 252-253) constitutes a nice ‘straw-man’ as the continent’s ‘security’ is not separable from other sectors & its development direction is not uniformly regressive or negative:

‘The security problem in Africa since decolonization has been dominated by the widespread failure of postcolonial weak states...leaving the field open to other players...A more detailed explanation of the security dynamics among these actors...may be the key to knowing how “regional” security dynamics in Africa really work, and research along these lines looks like becoming increasingly necessary for understanding African security during the coming decades.’

After a troubled first decade, ‘human security’ (MacLean, Black & Shaw 2006) is more elusive than ever as indicated in my concluding section # viii). This paper suggests that the growing impacts of the ‘emerging economies’ on the global political economy may further its elusiveness. Following the reduction in the impact of & attention to the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) after the Asian ‘crisis’ of the mid-1990s, recognition of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India & China) in the new century has served to further destabilize established assumptions about global development & dichotomous North-South relations. These assumptions have been reconsidered as established academic & policy institutions such as IDS (www.ids.ac.uk) & SIDS (www.sidint.org) celebrate four & five decade anniversaries, respectively (Haddad & Knowles 2007, Harcourt 2007). The ebullient global ‘middle’ – the central dimension of a ‘new’ trio of ‘worlds’? - poses
profound challenges for inter- & non-state development policy & theory, including for human development/security, as indicated in Hubert Schmitz (2007).

To contribute to such a dynamic & unanticipated but not uncontroversial perspective, this paper attempts to juxtapose several relevant literatures not often so contrasted, especially human security & health of the world/global health; ie the former as the broader ‘freedom from want’ rather than narrower ‘freedom from fear’ (cf sections i) & ix) below). In so doing it complicates simplistic, interrelated projections of exponential growth in the BRICs versus endless decline in the fragile economies. It also begins to examine the impacts of each on the other as neither can be insulated from unanticipated consequences, such as growing inequalities within & between African states (eg for a comparative study of HIV/AIDS & the Indian & South African armies see Barnett & Prins 2005).

Conversely, the BRICs cannot be isolated from contemporary global health issues, such as HIV/AIDS (Barnett & Whiteside 2006) & SARS – NB xenotropical diseases an emerging focus for global security? - along with growing awareness of the costs of disregard of respect for the global ecology (Lee 2004). Such an approach is compatible with the recent sceptical reaction to Jeffrey Sachs’ uncritical definition & advocacy of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as well as with the IDS (Haddad & Knowles 2007) & SIDS (Harcourt 2007) anniversary reflections. Meanwhile, the continent is quite central in the emergence of innovative, flexible, heterogeneous coalitions for global governance such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) (www.ice-cpi.int) & Kimberley Process (KP) (www.pacweb.org & www.kimberleyprocess.com), the latter leading to the Diamond Development Initiative (www.ddiglobal.org)

Many of the contemporary development issues around the continent are highlighted in the special mid-2007 issue of Vanity Fair (www.vanityfair.com) guest-edited by Bono (2007) which features some of its celebrity advocates: from Brad Pitt to Desmond Tutu, Sach’s Millennium Villages Project & the Global Fund for ATM, along with Princess Diana’s anti-landmine campaign which was centred on Angola:

‘Diana’s land-mine commitment was not, to use one of the Queen’s favourite pejoratives, a “stunt”... The Red Cross had decided that it was too dangerous to go to Cuito, believed to be Africa’ most heavily mined town...But Diana would not hear of cancelling...

Bringing to bear all the reckless bravery she’d once used to defy the royal family – but in a much better cause – she walked through a half-cleared minefield.’ (Bono 2007: 209)

And the dramatic Product (Red) branding brings ‘Africa’ into a variety of consumer sectors from cards (Hallmark), sneekers (Converse) & clothing (Gap) to mobile phones (Motorola), Macintosh I-pods & credit cards (AmEx) (www.joinred.com). This further innovative initiative of Bono has served to reconfirm his celebrity status (Cooper 2007: 124-127) (Richey & Ponte 2007): but how ‘African’?

Below, I treat the range of possible implications & impacts of a novel factor not treated in Vanity Fair - the BRICs (www2.goldmansachs.com) - for the +/-50 states out of some
200 that are now categorized as ‘fragile’; ie those in which ‘development’ has been most elusive.

In so doing, the paper juxtaposes three sets of insights, drawn from a variety of perspectives that are not often so contrasted. Firstly, it contrasts global integration (Shaw 1999) with uneven impacts, drawing from the disparate literatures on the BRICs on the one hand & fragile states on the other (Shaw, Cooper & Antkiewicz 2007), with a pair of particular focii: on China & India amongst the former & on fragile states in Africa amongst the latter. Symptomatically, among the fastest growing economies globally in the new millennium have been hitherto overlooked (but not by the Economist’s annual World in 2006, 2007, 2008 publication) oil producing micro-states like Chad, Equatorial Guinea & Sao Tome as well as larger African countries with problematic records & regimes like Angola & Sudan: all equally ‘fragile’ (DFID 2005)?

The emerging economies, whether the four BRICs or the larger set of 10 or 14 in BRICSAM (ie BRICs plus ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines & Thailand), Mexico & South Africa plus regional powers like Egypt, Iran, Indonesia & Turkey) (Cooper, Antkiewicz & Shaw 2006, Shaw, Cooper & Antkiewicz 2007), or the four plus N-11 (Goldman Sachs 2005) (www2.goldmansachs.com) (ie 15, excluding South Africa!) may be coming to constitute the new global middle between the established OECD industrialized economies & the ‘new’ Third World of the LDCs, especially the fragile states. The growing demand, especially from the large, booming economies of China & India, for energy & raw materials like coal, copper, iron ore etc has begun to increase prices as well as concentrate attention on emerging limitations of supply & reserves. Such possibilities have particular implications for fragile states with newly discovered resources which may be least able to resist or manage such pressures, leading to enhanced opportunities for corruption as well as flows of foreign exchange.

So, secondly, I also juxtapose literatures drawn from security as well as development studies (Kurtz 2007). That on the ‘political economy of conflict’ suggests that violence is more the result of greed rather than grievance (Collier & Hoeffler 2001). Similarly, the ‘political economy of resources’ genre indicates that, as demand grows, so conflict is likely to increase (Klare 2002). Such perspectives resonate with cautionary analyses of the impacts of the BRICs, especially China & India, on demand for & price of energy (Shaxson 2007) & minerals (see section iii) below). And I refer in section v) below to emerging perspectives on the ‘securitization of development’ & the ‘privatization of security’ (Wulf 2005). Such approaches are of particular salience to fragile states & those agencies - state & non-state, formal & informal, local to global - which seek to advance human development/ rights/security despite their fragility. As Tom Weiss (Weiss 2005: 25) suggests in his overview of contemporary ‘military-civilian interactions’:

‘This, then, is the substantially altered post-Cold War & post-September 11 context: growing numbers of civil wars with heightened fragmentation & state collapse; an increasing demand for UN military & civilian services; a growing reliance by the world organization on military & NGO subcontractors; and a substantial normative change that emphasizes the rights of affected peoples & the legitimacy of UN decisions.’
And thirdly, I contrast the generic BRICs/fragile states & political economy of
conflict/resources literatures with the more explicitly ‘African’ debate about ‘African’
international relations (IR) which has been animated by two recent review articles in
major IR journals on the two sides of the Atlantic: first, Douglas Lemke (2003) in World
questions about whether contemporary ‘African’ IR is different & if so whether it
presents challenges & changes for the comparative field of IR elsewhere. In particular,
they query whether IR in Africa which, reflective of fragile states, is mainly non-state &
informal, poses insights for trans-national relations outside the continent; ie does the
general, comparative field need to evolve away from a lingering over-emphasis on formal
inter-state relations towards belated recognition of non-state, both civil society &
corporate, rather than cast the continent in the role of being different or subversive.
Traditional ‘realist’ blinkers blind orthodox state-centric analysis to the richness of non-
state ‘African’ economic, social & strategic relations, with profound implications for
empirical & analytical approaches, data collection & policy responses. As Lemke (2003:
116 & 138) cautions:

...African international relations constitute the developing world activity most likely to be
excluded from international relations research...

...standard international relations research describes the interactions of official
states...In contrast, Africanist international relations scholars describe interactions
between & among a variety of types of international actors...in the developing world
international relations are more varied than standard international relations research
recognizes.

Such a useful critique could go beyond crime, drugs, ecology, economics, ethnicity, guns,
migration, religion & remittances to aspects of health, like viruses.

i) ‘Fragile States’ & R2P

‘The security problem in Africa since decolonization has been dominated by the
widespread failure of postcolonial weak states...leaving the field open to other
players...A more detailed explanation of the security dynamics among these actors...may
be the key to knowing how “regional” security dynamics in Africa really work, and
research along these lines looks like being increasingly necessary for understanding
African security during the coming decades.’ (Buzan & Weaver 2003: 252-253)

The development of the doctrine of ‘human security’ (MacFarlane & Khong 2006) in the
post-bipolar period constituted a concerned response to novel forms of conflict as well as
an idealistic extension of overlapping notions of ‘citizenship’, ‘cosmopolitan’ &
‘globalization’. It was defined by international agencies like the UNDP (1994: 22-40) to
include some/all of community, economic, environmental, food, health, personal &
political dimensions, in a rank order to be determined by agency, case, community,
region etc; in reality, preferences/sequence were informed by analytic
assumptions/approach as well as national and/or personal interests. It was initially
popularized by a set of mainly Northern ‘middle powers’ like Canada & Norway, seeking a role in a post-bipolar era characterized by a multiplication of small states & a proliferation of conflict – ‘new wars’? (Kaldor 1999) - much of which was small-scale & ‘internal’ (Hoffman & Weiss 2006). Human security was particularly associated with the deliberations of the International Commission on Intervention & State Sovereignty (ICISS) whose late-2001 report was overshadowed by 9/11 that fall. The ICISS (2001: xi) reformulated related concepts around ‘humanitarian intervention’ into ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P):

Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.

But any optimism about the realization of ICISS redefinitions faded rapidly as the US declared ‘war’ on ‘terrorism’ in the first half of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, its relevance & resilience have since become increasingly apparent in the second half of the decade as the ‘coalition’ got bogged down in Iraq & Afghanistan & the US becomes increasingly isolated. Unfortunately, US unilateralism has made the articulation & implementation of human security & R2P more problematic as is apparent in Darfur. However, after the debacle of ‘desert storm’, a return to such relatively enlightened multilateralism is imperative, hopefully inevitable, even if China among the BRICs shows little interest or inclination. As Mary Kaldor (2004) suggests, an enlightened, inclusive ‘global civil society’ is imperative if anti-war coalitions are to be animated & effective as around landmines & blood diamonds, as indicated in ix) below

In addition to multiplying applied difficulties, human security also encountered conceptual disagreements before the end of the 1990s: ‘freedom from fear’ and/or ‘freedom from want’ (MacFarlane & Khong 2006); ie narrower, more security-specific or broader, more development-related? These debates were articulated through 21 short essays in a special edition of Security Dialogue in the early part of the new millennium (Burgess & Owen 2004).

If the second half of its first decade was troubled (MacLean, Black & Shaw 2006), hopefully its second decade will be more promising for such conceptual & applied innovations. Certainly the UN Commission report (2003) & debates around the UN Millennium summit in 2005 served to revive the standing of human security even before the difficulties of the Iraq intervention had become so palpable. The post-bipolar & -9/11 pre-summit panel report for the UN (2004: 11) on ‘A More Secure World: our shared responsibility’ recognized that:

The threats are from non-State actors as well as States, and to human security as well as State security.

The central challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a new & broader understanding...of what collective security means...
Among the half-dozen clusters of threats identified by the UN (2004: 12) panel were a trio related to the broader, freedom from want conceptualization of human security:

*Economic & social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases & environmental degradation...*

*Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide & other large-scale atrocities...*

*Transnational organized crime.*

In response, Kofi Annan, then UN Secretary-General, reiterated the broader formulation of human security with direct relevance to the misleading data generated by the narrow definition adopted by the HSR 2005: and with resonance for any consideration of the human security as well as human development implications of global health in the new century:

*The Secretary-General fully embraces a broad vision of collective security. The threats to peace & security in the 21st century include not just international wars... but... organized crime & civil violence. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease & environmental degradation.* (UN 2005: 3)

Despite such enlightened, inclusive conceptualization, compatible with freedom from want, the historical overview for the UNIHP complied by Neil MacFarlane & Yuen Foong Khong (2006: 228) lamented its ‘conceptual overstretch’ & instead advocated a narrower, freedom from fear perspective: threats such as those ‘against their physical integrity’ or ‘organized violence’.

The elusiveness of human security in the first few years of the new century poses implications for the prospects of advancing the last Millennium Development Goal (MDG), # 8, on ‘global partnership for development’: how defined let alone effected given the emerging three-speed or –layer world? If the BRICs, especially the very large economies of India & China, continue to grow rapidly, then the prospects of such a global partnership recede, although they have an interest in good relations with OECD consumer markets & LDC raw materials. And if the BRICs & NICs can create a coalition then the global ‘middle’ may be able to exert growing leverage *vis a vis* the North. But whether such a strategic alliance would be employed for the rest of the South is questionable, as indicated in iii) below.

**ii) ‘Developmental States’ & Good Governance?**

Not all states in today’s South are ‘fragile’. Some regimes have been able to manage their engagement with globalizations successfully, claiming & aspiring to be ‘developmental states’. Such political economies are not limited to either Asia or large countries in major continents. Rather, there are such states in Africa (eg Botswana) & some are islands (eg Mauritius or Trinidad). Indeed, following the conceptual framework proposed by
Thandika Mkandawire (2001), unlike Asia, Africa’s developmental states may be democratic rather than authoritarian, with positive implications for good governance.

But, in the last decade of the last century, not only did conflict become more ubiquitous, it also became more complex. Thus relatively simple & safe ‘peace-keeping’ operations became ever more complicated & dangerous, as well as problematic, ‘peace-making’ or ‘peace-enforcing’, involving increasingly robust rules of engagement as well as equipment. Initial PKO strategic alliances with partners like INGOs (Weiss 1998) became more complex as such partners came to require enhanced security. Thus INGOs now recruit security advisors for such operations, typically from major militaries like the British army. And peace missions came to entail dealing with gangs of militias rather than standing national armies. This has, belatedly, begun to be reflected in official analyses & responses, but only in more enlightened & realistic global agencies. (IPU/GCDCAF 2003, SAS 2006) Some of these challenges derive from the growing conflict over many global resources treated in the next section.

iii) BRICs & the PE of Resources in Fragile States

The BRICs, especially the booming economies of China & India, have already impacted global demand & prices for energy, minerals etc (Shaw, Cooper & Antkiewicz 2007). If the increasingly established literature on the PE of resources has salience (www.globalwitness.org) & if China & India in particular continue to grow at +/- 10% per annum, then inter- & non-state conflict over such scarce raw materials may be unavoidable. And the impact of such conflict may be especially intense in fragile states in Africa as suggested in case studies of emerging oil sectors in some micro-states in West Africa by Nicholas Shaxson (2007) such as Equatorial Guinea & Gabon, along with Kurdistan in northern Iraq. So some energy ‘juniors’ are beginning to specialise in exploration & production in such difficult environments; eg Canada’s Addox in Sao Tome (www.addoxpetroleum.com).

Boge et al (2006) (www.bicc.de) nicely juxtapose the literatures on conflict with those on corporate governance especially codes of conduct. If the BRICs’ roles in markets for raw materials continue to increase, then multi-stakeholder coalitions like www.publishwhatyoupay.org, which facilitated the development of EITI (www.eitransparencyinitiative.org), may become ever more imperative, even if some of them (eg China) may be disinclined to participate. Indeed, China’s emerging ‘unilateralism’ based on its demand & price for raw materials may undermine burgeoning multilateral coalitions & negotiations as it is less concerned about the ecological & ethical dimensions of global energy & mineral sectors. By contrast, Indian & Brazilian multinationals are more connected into global networks which juxtapose national & global civil societies & private capital (Pedersen 2008).

iv) Good/Bad Supply Chains & Good/Bad Governance?
‘The illegal trade in drugs, arms, intellectual property, people & money is booming. Like the war on terrorism, the fight to control these illicit markets pits governments against agile, stateless & resourceful networks, empowered by globalization’ (Naim 2003: 29)

Globalizations would not be possible without supply chains, which have both physical (eg containers/airfreight/couriers etc) & virtual (eg internet/cell-phones/computer tracking etc) dimensions. While the majority of such interactions are formal & legal – indeed, most occur within corporate structures for just-in-time production etc - some are informal & even illegal; eg illicit but widespread supply chains around drugs, guns & other small arms, forced migration, diasporic remittances for terrorist groups etc as in the blood diamonds nexus. So the terminology around the growing literature on global value/supply chains needs attention if it is to be extended to the informal & illegal. (Ponte & Gibbon 2005, Wiegratz 2007)

Whether supply chains are good or bad for development/people, or neutral, they impact the character & quality of governance; ie relations amongst state & non-state actors. They have begun to receive attention in terms of development possibilities & policies (Barrientos & Dolan 2006), from global to local dimensions in a variety of sectors, especially newer ones like fresh flowers, fruits & vegetables. Informal & illegal chains can reinforce fragility while formal & legitimate can advance good or better governance. The increasing centrality of such chains is recognised in the Global Value Chains Initiative which advances informed, international research, communication & policy development (www.globalvaluechains.org).

The governance of local/global supply chains is becoming recognized as a salient development & security nexus: whose rules/interests? Who evaluates certification & regulation? Analysts & advocates around global value chains have been associated with the Ethical Trade Initiative (ETI) intended to upgrade labour & environmental conditions for supply chain workers, families & communities (www.ethicaltrade.org). Major global logistics corporations & networks are likewise becoming more concerned about & focused on such matters with implications for stakeholders & shareholders alike.

v) Securitization of Development/Privatization of Security?

An undeniable feature of globalizations around century’s turn is that guns & their holders have been increasingly privatized as indicated in Wulf’s (2005) informed & judicious yet revealing monograph. Even before the massive contracting-out of ‘security’ in Iraq, divisions of labour had begun to be arranged for post-bipolar peacekeeping arrangements in part as responses to their growing complexity (Weiss 2005 & 2007) & in part as reactions to declining formal military budgets everywhere, in turn, partially as an IFI SAP conditionality: ie caps on such expenditures.

Despite continuing global & regional efforts, as with child soldiers, there is no effective global regime for the regulation let alone reduction in small arms (Lumpe 2000). The annual Small Arms Survey, the latest being 2006 on ‘unfinished business’, catalogues & analyses the global challenge (www.smallarmssurvey.org). Unless the plague of small
arms is addressed, human development/security will remain elusive as indicated in the final section ix) below.

The ‘other’ side of the security nexus now stretches from global guerrilla/terrorist networks to private military companies/militias, although some orthodox realist analysts have yet to so recognize or admit. Thus Robert Muggah (2006) cautions about the dangers & implications of ‘refugee militarization’ in Africa & elsewhere.

In turn there are pressures for the ‘privatization of security’. Meanwhile, there is concern about the possible ‘securitization of development’ (Conflict, Security & Development 2004): PKO expenditures to count as ODA under OECD DAC rules? Such debates have been prevalent in Europe around the OECD (Christian Aid 2004).

One correlate is that ‘civil-military relations’ (Weiss 2005) become ever more challenging as the ‘civil’ dimension is no longer just parliamentary oversight but, rather, civil society evaluation? And the military is no longer official state forces but also private security companies & informal/illegal mafias/gangs. (IPU/GCDCAF 2003) IBRD & OECD official structures about maximum percentages to be allocated to the military in the South are but one dimension of the ‘liberal peace’ which is beginning to attract critical attention as indicated below.

Finally, questions of global health & national as well as human security are unavoidably juxtaposed when viruses & militaries are joined, as in peace-keeping & HIV/AIDS. Not only is there a difficult issue around peace-keepers & gender (eg sexual violence) but this is exacerbated by the spread of HIV/AIDS by such soldiers, whether blue berets/helmets or not. Tony Barnett & Gwyn Prins (2005) have begun to bring global health & human security together for UNAIDS, initially with a trio of case studies – India, Russia & South Africa - with profound relevance for both genres. This constitutes a significant extension in the scope of traditional civil-military relations.

vi) Uneven Globalization & the Elusive ‘Liberal Peace’

‘For all practical purposes, the conflict in the region has split Uganda into two countries – the one, the southern Uganda of economic development & growth, and the other, stretching north Lake Kyoga, a theatre of war for the past two decades.’ (Ajulu 2004: 274)

The growing set of problems confronting humanitarian intervention (Weiss 2007) at the turn of the century has generated increasing critical recognition & sceptical reaction. The revisionism of those critics of a ‘liberal peace’ like Roger Mac Ginty (2006), Roland Paris (2001) & Oliver Richmond (Mac Ginty & Richmond 2007) centres on the incompatibility of standard neo-liberal economic & social prescriptions with the definition & establishment of a sustainable security environment; generic ‘good governance’ does not necessarily facilitate a lasting peace in each circumstance. The orthodox Northern prescription whatever the case, let alone history, is western-style
formal, multi-party democracy & open liberal markets; ie simultaneous political & economic ‘liberalization’ no matter the character, duration or intensity of the violence.

Globalization has tended to intensify inequalities within & between states & regions. Inappropriate peace processes like demobilization, disarmament & reconstruction (DDR) may be highly problematic in such circumstances. People survive such difficulties by returning to informal sectors, which can be illegal & violent as well as global & developmental. Hence, the infrequency of successful peace negotiations & agreements & the frequency of returns to conflict, along with de facto the division of some states like Congo, Cote d’Ivoire & Somalia plus, possibly, Uganda (Shaw 2006).

Such unanticipated & unacceptable outcomes from peace-building & humanitarian intervention are exacerbated by the myriad Northern international agencies involved, both inter- & non-state. These range from the intergovernmental establishment in the North such as the G-8/EU/OECD to major INGOs like Christian Aid, Oxfam, SCF & World Vision & think tanks like Amnesty, ICG & ODI. And they typically include major military establishments like MOD in the UK along with growing numbers & types of private military companies (Wulf 2005). Such scepticism or revisionism arising from a particular, problematic process, reinforces the imperative of rethinking of the canon of ‘international relations’, an imperative that is all too apparent from the vantage-point of Africa, the continent where most ‘experiments’ around peace-building occur.

vii) Insights from/for ‘African’ International Relations

‘Africa’ has again been the focus of international attention in 2006/7, but because of global films rather than genocidal or viral deaths: ‘Blood Diamonds’ then ‘The Last King of Scotland’. Symbolized by the special issue of Vanity Fair (Bono 2007), these ‘African’ issues pose a range of global implications: from conflict diamonds from alluvial mines in West & Central Africa to Idi Amin’s bloody rule in Uganda in the 1970s. Africa was also the centre of intergovernmental attention in 2004/5 around Britain’s hosting of the G8 when PM Blair established an international Commission on Africa which led not only to major deliberations & report but also to media attention to Bono & Geldof around Live 8 concerts for the continent etc. And international civil society used the occasion to campaign to ‘Make Poverty History’, a goal which Jeffrey Sachs claims is possible in his 2005 monograph on The End of Poverty, which has an Introduction from Bono, although Unwin (2007) is highly sceptical of Sachs’ methods as well as intentions. Such superstar attention to African & related development issues, symbolized by Princess Diana’s association with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which led through the Ottawa Process to a global regime as well as to the award to the Campaign of a Nobel Peace Prize, reinforces Andrew Cooper’s (2007) extension of ‘international relations’ to Celebrity Diplomacy: a distinctive, glamorous but not risk-free form of ‘public diplomacy’.

Such popular media attention to ‘Africa’ reinforces the claim of Lemke (2003) & Brown (2006) that the continent holds insights with relevance to the field of IR as a whole. This is so because so much of its cross-border relations are ‘informal’, often ‘illegal’ & thus
are not counted in orthodox IR data. So a significant proportion of Africa’s external trade is unrecorded, in part as, like other regions such as the ‘new’ Central Asia & Central Europe, it contains a high percentage of landlocked states. Likewise, any calculation of violent deaths through conflict which ignores ‘internal’ numbers would disregard the substantial death toll in, say, Congo’s seemingly endless wars (+/- 3 million over the last decade?), all of which have ubiquitous ‘external’ connections. Such a ‘transnational’ perspective could be further extended by reference to global health factors such as cross-border viruses like HIV/AIDS, ebola & SARS, where again the African dimensions are especially telling?

Similarly, SIDS’ diplomacy (see next section, #viii) among the subset of island communities has to bring more & less successful or resilient together; in terms of ComSec members: a ‘nurtured’ response (Bruguglio 2007) included the NICs/near-NICs & now emerging economies: Barbados, Cyprus, Malta, T&T & Singapore - by contrast to the less nurturing, also concentrated in the South; eg Jamaica or PNG not nurturing status any time soon?

Furthermore, ‘Africa’ challenges traditional assumptions & definitions of inter-state diplomacy by drawing attention to informal, non- or semi-state communications, economic, ecological, social, strategic & other relationships across borders. Such relations constitute the core of contemporary interdependence or ‘globalization’, stretching to inter-continental migrations, diasporas, remittances etc, symbolized by sales of phone-cards for diasporas in corner stores in the North & the proliferation of Western Union & Money Gram facilities along with second-hand RH-drive European cars & trucks in West Africa & LH-drive Japanese vehicles in the East & South. The other ‘region’ of vulnerabilities, albeit more structural or longer-term, is islands, especially in the Caribbean & South Pacific; ie mainly small members of the Commonwealth.

viii) ‘New’ Vulnerabilities & Island States

Concern for island & ocean development & governance rose during the Law of the Sea debates in the 1970s & 1980s only to decline by the 1990s. But they have become more salient again because of the catalyst of the Xmas 2004 tsunami & the growing recognition of the myriad impacts of global warming & ocean rise. The analysis & discourse has been advanced by a few Maltese analysts & advocates – from Elizabeth Mann Borgese to Lino Bruguglio (2007) & Godfrey Baldacchino (Baldacchino & Milne 2006) – and the majority of members of the interstate Commonwealth. These have progressed from a concern with the vulnerabilities of smallness to a recognition of the possibilities of resilience, at least for some.

Small island developing states (SIDS) may be vulnerable to external ecological & economic shocks, but at least some may also be resilient because of their own variety of ‘social capital’, what Bruguglio (2007) characterises as a ‘nurtured’ response? Bruguglio (2007) characterizes Barbados, Cyprus, Malta & Singapore (also T&T?) as ‘nurtured’ in their responses but others like Jamaica & PNG as not so.
Island states – both formally independent & those happily still ‘Overseas Territories’ (OTs), face a mix of opportunities & threats arising from globalization. Some ‘new’ island economies are being built around the opportunities of globalizations: from financial & energy centres & resort or retirement destinations to cruise ship hubs; see, for example, (plus Bermuda, BVI & Caymans), Dubai, Mauritius & Trinidad & Tobago as well as those identified by Bruguglio as being ‘nurtured’ responses.

By contrast others – the majority – are threatened by a variety of internal & external pressures: an unwelcome mix of ‘natural’ disasters; the migrations & diasporas & remittance syndrome; drugs, gangs & guns, especially among young males; but also unique social threats like returned convicts from the North. Island instability, including threats from non-independent OTs, constitutes a distinctive, resilient form of human insecurity with profound implications for the definition & realization of global governance in the new century. I turn in conclusion to the imperative of human security if such governance is to be both good & sustainable.

ix) Continued Imperative of Human Security for Global Governance

The fall-out from uneven globalizations (Naim 2003 & 2005) has generated not only a host of ‘new’ issues but, also increasingly, a set of heterogeneous global coalitions to treat them. These vary from the more successful like Ottawa & Kimberley Processes to the less successful like child soldiers & small arms. (Hubert 2000, McRae & Hubert 2001) The former was a function of the pioneering, extensive International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL); the latter of much more modest beginnings in the analyses & advocacy of Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) & Global Witness, the latter being awarded the prestigious ‘Commitment to Development “Ideas in Action” Award by Foreign Policy & Center for Global Development in 2007. Each of such coalitions are distinct & dynamic with NGO & think tank roles evolving as coalitions are or are not successful: from advocacy & attention to implementation & evaluation (eg PAC in Ottawa from KP only onto it along with DDI?) (www.pacweb.org & www.kimberleyprocess.com to www.ddiglobal.org).

Similarly, INGO roles/structures continuously evolve as in strategic alliances with assorted militaries in PKOs (Weiss 1998). Hence ‘security & development’ which has become something of a preoccupation of BOND in the UK & other EU networks around the emerging common security policy of the EU. This may further metamorphose into the ‘securitization of development’? Meanwhile, conversely, to reduce the flow of blood diamonds at source, the Kimberley Process has led to the creative Diamond Development Initiative (DDI) & an innovative World Bank network for artisanal & small-scale mining: Communities & Small-scale Mining (CASM) programme (www.casmsite.org). The latter was established with DFID support in 1995 & has organized annual conferences & other gatherings, such as in London in January 2007 on ‘From Mines to Markets: conflict or cooperation’ (www.pacweb.org). Aside from encouraging the upgrading of the informal mining sector globally, it has a focus on ecology & gender. DDI has been searching for a foundation director to enable it to start operations in 2008.
One World Trust has begun to evaluate & rank accountability practices in leading multinational corporations (eg Anglo American, Dow, Microsoft, Nestle, News Corporation, Toyota, Walmart), international organizations (eg FAO, ILO, IMF, OECD, UN)...and INGOs (ActionAid, Amnesty, Oxfam, World Vision, WWF) in its ‘2006 Global Accountability Report’ (www.oneworldtrust.org). And in mid-decade, a dozen of the major INGOs (including ActionAid, Amnesty, Civicus, Oxfam, SCF, YWCA & Consumers/Greenpeace/Survival/Transparency International) have created a code – INGO Accountability Charter, June 2006 (www.accountabilitycharter.org) - by which their own accountability & transparency can be monitored & evaluated by agencies, donors & recipients alike. In turn, Consumers International is negotiating a global CSR accord - ISO # 26000 - over three years bringing major stakeholders to the table (www.consumersinternational.org). However, the transition from advocacy to policy, adversity to agreement is fraught. And only some, a minority, of well-deserving heterogeneous global coalitions are efficacious.

Don Hubert (2000: xviii) has provided one of the few comparative analyses of more & less successful humanitarian coalitions. He contrasted the Ottawa Process on landmines with no less compelling, yet less successful, campaigns on child soldiers, the ICC & small arms, which together suggest:

‘that a model for humanitarian advocacy is emerging with three broad dimensions. They are the pursuit of stringent standards with widespread but not necessarily universal support; political coalition building among NGOs, states & international organization; & negotiating environments that allow for voting rather than consensus decision-making, access for NGOs & the selection of a supportive chairperson.’

So further investigation into more & less successful ‘public diplomacy’ or ‘Track Two’ or ‘Track Three’ diplomacy would require attention to the anthropology/history/psychology of such extensive, heterogeneous global movements. Thus the role of peak institutions like BOND (www.bond.org.uk) or CCIC (www.ccic.ca) would be instructive, along with less extensive but prestigious groupings around NGO accountability or EITI. Further, today, sustainable peace-making involves judicious, strategic alliances between men in uniform or blue helmets if not blue berets. Such relatively robust coalitions are likely to be necessary into the next decade.

So, notwithstanding the now-established debate about the nature of human security – freedom from fear and/or want? – by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, its realization seemed to be ever more distant. Meanwhile, even if 9/11 led to an unjustifiable & unwinnable ‘war’ on terrorism, 7/7 generated serious reflections in the UK & other immigrant communities, including the anglophone Commonwealth. By the end of 2006, it had established the Amartya Sen Commission on Respect & Understanding – ‘Civil Paths to Peace’ - the latest in a series of UN & Commonwealth global enquiries. It responds more to 7/7 than 9/11; ie to ‘home-grown’ British bombers who hardly reflect the assumption or realization of ‘cosmopolitan’ societies. It reported to CHOGM in Kampala before the end of November 2007, in turn being endorsed by the Commonwealth’s ‘Munyonyo Declaration’. This report could further the global retreat
from US unilateralism & recognition that other less dramatic/coercive measures may yet be required/efficacious.

To return to the review article which triggered much of this welcome revisionism, Lemke (2003: 117) cautions that:

‘...political power is exercised by a variety of state & non-state actors in Africa. Because standard IR research theorizes about & collects data only for official states, much of Africa’s IR are left out.’

Lemke (2003: 116) confirms that his intent is to bring back a range of authoritative, established yet unrecognized ‘non-state’ actors who impact local & regional development & conflict even if they are not officially ‘national’:

‘My goal is to offer specific steps to improve IR research designs so that Africa & the developing world more generally no longer go missing.’

Contemporary conflict & conflict analysis indicate, then, the imperative of a ‘paradigm shift’ at all levels for all actors, including the academy & think tanks? This should include the juxtaposition of BRICs & fragile states, no matter how different or distant they may at first appear to be. Rather, as this paper suggests, they cannot be insulated from each other, especially in terms of global health issues (Lee 2004), but also ecological factors. Symptomatically, both these conceptual categories were proposed not by the traditional academy or even INGOs/think tanks by rather by a global consulting corporation & national aid donor, respectively!

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