The neoliberal legacy of the Paris Declaration: 
Different responses, practices and outcomes of implementation in Tanzania

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Abstract

The Paris Declaration (PD) is a seminal international agreement which binds donors and recipients to standardised and simplified practices in aid delivery. However, it also carries in its design certain neoliberal characteristics such as quantitative monitoring and evaluation, targets and forms of co-opted participation. It serves to delegitimise generic public accountability for aid which would otherwise flow through parliaments. The compliance with the PD and the degree to which donors have adopted it has differed between the four countries cases discussed in this paper: Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK), South Korea and China in Tanzania. Likewise, the degree of donor harmonisation with their recipient partner (Tanzania) is uneven. Further, it seems that Western donors tend to emphasise neoliberal approaches, for instance new public management (NPM), in recipient countries in order to achieve the PD, whilst emerging donors seem to be indifferent to either neoliberal standard or NPM-style reform. At the same time, while the implementation progresses and required changes by the PD in public management systems in Tanzania are relatively greater than in other African recipients, the achievement of the PD indicators has not been linked to actual development and poverty reduction in Tanzania. In sum, the PD can be viewed as a neoliberal mechanism which has changed the organisational culture of public management in recipient countries, bringing to the fore NPM practices which seek to quantify performance. However, the quality of aid actually received by its recipient populations has arguably not improved. Thus, the central achievement of the PD is an alignment of cultural practice across governments so that southern governments work similarly to their northern ‘partners’, rather than an improvement in aid effectiveness per se.

1 This paper is modified from my PhD thesis.
Introduction

The Paris Declaration (PD) has set five principles with twelve indicators to monitor progress, and these were set out to be achieved by 2010. Under the theme of ‘joint progress toward enhanced aid effectiveness’ the PD called for a collective action for donors and a partnership commitment between donors and recipients based on the five key principles. As the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines aid effectiveness as about ‘improving the management, delivery and complementarity of development cooperation activities to ensure the highest development impact’ as entailed by DAC members (OECD, 2006a), the re-emphasised aid effectiveness is not only about ‘aid amount and growth’ but also about ‘how aid is given’ and ‘how far objectives are accomplished by aid’ especially within a new approach in the effectiveness of development cooperation in the 21st century (OECD, 2010b). New focus has moved from aid and economic growth to the management of aid delivery. The PD is a seminal international agreement which binds donors and recipients to standardised and simplified practices in aid delivery. Given that the PD carries in its design certain neoliberal characteristics such as quantitative monitoring and evaluation, targets and forms of co-opted participation, this paper examines the neoliberal norms in the PD, and how donors and recipients have responded to them in the aid context.

Neoliberal policies and the Paris Declaration

A New Aid Agenda has become hegemonic: it combines neoliberal economic and institutional reforms with poverty reduction under an overarching umbrella of ‘good governance’ (Oya, 2008: 2).

Neoliberal policies coupled with structural adjustment programme (SAP) and donor conditionality were criticised in the 1980s and 1990s, and thus the aid regime in the new millennium has given efforts to reduce donor power in aid relationship and to increase recipient ownership. On the basis of several international aid initiatives such as the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Rome Declaration, in 2005 aid stakeholders agreed to implement the five principles (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability) by reforming management of aid delivery for greater effectiveness of aid (OECD, 2005). Since 2005, there have been two
monitoring surveys by the OECD DAC, and the results showed uneven implementation progress amongst donors (OECD, 2007b; OECD, 2008c).

Given this, studies found that it has been difficult for donors to achieve the PD target because it is ‘inherently contradictory’ in terms of good governance and good policy as one of prerequisites for development of recipients (Stavenhagen, 2010). So-called good policy is central to the PD model, but it is not clearly stated which policies are best to achieve outcomes of the PD indicators (Stern, 2008). In relation, while some claim that the PD can contribute to aid delivery process, as a paradigm shift in aid delivery mechanism for aid effectiveness, in a way to improve aimed outcomes (for instance, Chigunta and Matshalaga, 2010), others have questioned if the PD really wiped away old practice that reduces recipient ownership because the Paris framework has been reflected by neoliberal inspiration (Lundberg and Palmgren, 2008; UBUNTU and World Campaign, 2008; Hyndman, 2009; Godoy, 2011). For instance, the PD endorsement is not very different from the conditionality mechanism in the 1980s and 1990s. That is, the implementation and commitment process to the PD principles can be interpreted as donors’ collective attempt to intervene recipient countries’ political environment, and as a result, some have perceived the PD as a bilateral agreement based on top-down hierarchical character (Booth, 2008, cited in Wennmann, 2010: 13; Lundberg and Palmgren, 2008). In sum, the Paris indicators and measurements are built on by neoliberal norms and concepts (Godoy, 2011), as will be elaborated herein.

**Conditionality**

As a matter of fact, the PD does not see conditionality as inherently negative. Instead, the issue of conditionality and limit use of it were not discussed during the Paris negotiations (PRIDE, 2008). The ‘new’ conditionality that donors provide under the PD seems to be modified when compared with the conditionality of the 1980s and 1990s. While ‘old’ conditionality is contradictory to improving recipient ownership, donors under the PD context have rethought aid conditionality as a way to promote country-led approaches by benchmarking measurements of progress when it comes to poverty reduction while also focussing on good practices (OECD, 2008b). However, there is still a continuing practice of old style in terms of conditionality even after the Paris meeting as observed in some cases, for example donor behaviour in Bangladesh (Parnini, 2009).
Country policy and institutional assessment

It has been viewed that the PD is mainly driven by the OECD and also by the World Bank. For instance, the DAC monitoring survey measurement for recipients’ progress in the PD implementation has used methodology developed by the OECD Joint Venture on Procurement and the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). According to the World Bank (2011), CPIA carries out a set of 16 criteria within four criteria: economic management; structural policies; policies for social inclusion and equity; and public sector management and institutions. While these criteria emphasise: ‘deregulated markets; conservative macroeconomic and fiscal policies; and public administration and other institutional structures that provide transparency and accountability’ (Rosser, 2009: 383), the measurements encourage recipient countries to adapt neoliberal norms in the PD implementation process (Venter, 2008). Given that CPIA was designed by the World Bank with an absence of recipients’ participation (Bissio, 2007), the Paris intention for both donors and recipients to ‘work together to establish mutually agreed frameworks that provide reliable assessments of performance, transparency and accountability’ of recipient systems (paragraph 19 of the PD) seems to be forgotten by using CPIA as an assessment tool.

Poverty reduction strategy paper

Ownership is the first of five key areas of the PD based on the experience that aid can be more effective when recipient countries commit themselves with their own development willingness and policies, and it is less effective when the aid practice is donor driven (OECD, 2007b). Under the PD framework, the evaluations of other four principles of alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability can reflect a practical measurement of ownership (Wood, Kabell, Sagasti and Muwanga, 2008). Aid donors and recipients believe that stronger ownership can be achieved when recipient countries have operational development strategies such as poverty reduction strategy (PRS) that is linked to a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) and reflected in annual budgets (OECD, 2005). More specifically, ownership in PD contexts means that recipients ‘exercise effective leadership over its development policies and strategies’ and ‘coordinate the efforts of various development actors working in the country’ (see paragraphs 14 and 15 of the PD). By using the PRSs, recipients can ‘incorporate’ other stakeholders into a planning process while owning their national strategies (Stern, 2008). Hence, developing countries are encouraged to own and develop PRSs as national strategies and produce poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) based on donor support. For example, the National Strategy for Growth and
Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP/MKUKUTA in Swahili) was launched as a second generation of Tanzanian PRS in 2005 (URT, 2005), and it has been linked to the budget through participatory public expenditure reviews (PERs) and a three-year rolling MTEF (World Bank, 2006).

Here, the PRSP is not a new approach; it predated the PD. The PRSP was created as the action plan of the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) in 1999 (Stern, 2008), and has been led by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The PRSP has been employed in the Paris mechanism because it can improve recipient ownership in national policies and strategies, as discussed above. However, on the contrary, PRSPs seem to be ‘donor documents’ that are led by the Washington consensus, rather than possessed by recipients, due to the ‘real political process’ of recipient countries with donors (Brown and Jackson, 2009). The PRSP and its link to the MTEF along with the emphasised prerequisite of good governance under the Paris agenda are ‘fundamentally a continuation of the SAP’ of the 1980s (Parnini, 2009: 564).

Public financial management and procurement systems and budget support

While the principle of alignment is meant by that ‘donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures’ (see paragraphs 16-31 of the PD), aligning with national development strategies, and using recipient country public financial management (PFM) and procurement systems are encouraged in order to enhance donor alignment in the context of the PD (OECD, 2005). CPIA is used in order to measure the progress of recipient in reforming PFM systems (OECD, 2008c). Here, critics argue that the PD indirectly imposes liberalisation of trade and privatisation of public services in recipient countries by adapting CPIA as a measurement of recipient performance of public management system reforms (Godoy, 2011).

In terms of aid modalities, general budget support (GBS) has become main modality especially with respect to using PFM and procurement systems (De Renzi, 2006a; OECD, 2008c). While donors are encouraged to provide budget support, recipients are required to undertake public management reform in order to develop capacity to manage national budget with budget support. For instance, before, each donor used to provide project money to all levels of government at all ministries, and now, most of the aid flows and finance in Tanzania have been coordinated and managed by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs.
Budget support in Tanzania has been operated mainly through GBS within the poverty reduction budget support (PRBS) scheme, and the poverty reduction strategy credit (PRSC). PRBS is a ‘platform’ based on grant money and other support, such as policy suggestions provided by donors, while PRSC represents a World Bank ‘loan scheme’ (URT, 2002a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2006: 9). As of 2006, 14 of Tanzania’s aid donors channelled GBS through the PRBS as a common mechanism, which equated to roughly USD 540 million, or 15 percent of the overall budget (Sida, 2006c: 16).

**Programme-based approach**

Not only the budget support, but also programme-based approaches (PBAs) are carried out in order to reduce aid fragmentation and transaction costs, under the principle of harmonisation. It has been said that the harmonisation of donor actions can help enhancing ownership and alignment (OECD, 2007b). In other words, there can be causal dynamics as ‘ownership would create a development framework to which harmonised donors would align’ and ‘harmonisation by leading to improvements in aid, especially reductions in transaction costs, could itself strengthen ownership’ (Stern, 2008: 13). Aid can be more effective if donors use common procedures by harmonising aid delivery both by reducing fragmentation and rationalising the division of labour (OECD, 2008b). Finally the PD identifies harmonisation as ‘donor actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective’ (see paragraphs 32-42 of the PD), and thus the use of common arrangements or procedures within PBAs, and sharing analysis and having joint field missions among donors has become dimensions in achieving harmonisation (OECD, 2005).

Even though the PD itself does not directly indicate to use budget support as a funding modality of PBAs, donors increasingly use budget support, including both direct budget support and GBS (see OECD, 2007b; OECD, 2008c), which predates the PD. In addition, it is also found that although the PD provides no specific aid modalities, donors increasingly use sector-wide approach (SWAp) which also predates the PD, as one of PBAs (see OECD, 2007b; OECD, 2008c). The SWAp is one of two forms of programme aid along with budget support that allows donors work together in a particular sector such as agriculture, health or education to achieve government expenditure programme goals and objectives through the pooled funds and to establish a policy framework by sector based on the common pool (Munro, 2005; Riddell, 2007). The SWAp emerged out of the dissatisfaction of donor project approaches in the context of donor cooperation and coordination (Andersen, 2000). It is
known as a ‘powerful instrument’ to improve the aid management and coordinated donor support delivery because donors should ‘compromise on internal procedures’ to make SWAp work properly (Maxwell, 2003: 18; Cramer, Stein and Weeks, 2006: 416). In Tanzania, the government and the donor community have strengthened donor coordination and harmonisation based on the government priorities, and as a result, sectoral and thematic multi-donor programmes have been developed (Sida, 2004a). However, in many cases, aid harmonisation and following policy reforms are seen to be neoliberal orthodoxy imposed by donors, and actually is believed to reduce ownership by offering donor-driven solutions (Hannan, 2007; Venter, 2008).

**Result-based management, mutual accountability and new public management**

According to the PD, managing for results (fourth principle) means ‘managing and implementing aid in a way that focuses on the desired results and uses information to improve decision making’ (see paragraph 43 of the PD). It has been recommended that recipients develop results-oriented reporting and assessment frameworks for progress in the national and sector development strategies, while donors are encouraged to align country programmes and resources with recipient country performance assessment frameworks (PAFs). The PD sets results-oriented frameworks for both donors and recipients to work together in achieving development results, assessing progress transparently, and delivering a framework to make monitoring possible against the national development strategies and sector programmes (OECD, 2005). Likewise CPIA measurement, the PD has adapted World Bank’s Results-Based National Development Strategies of the Aid Effectiveness Review (AER). The Results-Based National Development Strategies scores are included in both DAC monitoring surveys of the PD implementation progress and World Bank CDF Progress Report (OECD, 2011). By reflecting these neoliberal strategies, the PD encourages donors, and also recipient countries, jointly commit to ‘reform procedures and strengthen incentives for management and staff to work’ in order to improve harmonisation, alignment and results (paragraph 36 of the PD).

The result-based management (RBM) is not a new to the PD, but is originated in the 1990s by adapting private sector management styles to aid agencies, especially with new public management (NPM) (Obser, 2007). Before the PD, the international aid community already adapted RBM approach in order to meeting the MDGs, especially introduction NPM-style reform within the aid organisations (Obser, 2007; Davis, 2009). For instance, Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA) has emphasised organisational reform by RBM (Obser, 2007), and has conducted NPM in order to promote an organisational culture for greater accountability (Brown and Jackson, 2009). Briefly, the main feature of NPM lies in the idea of public management reform by decentralisation of public services and using market-oriented approach in the provision of public services, such as privatisation and introducing outsourcing, with the emphasis shift from traditional public administration to public management (Larbi, 1999). NPM has also brought paradigm shift in the public sector by inviting the civil society organisations (CSOs) and the private sector to the public service and to the public management (Sarker, 2006).

Given that accountability can be improved by public management reform, donors and recipients are required to strengthen public support for national policies and development assistance (paragraph 47 of the PD). In relation to managing for results, the PD emphasises mutual accountability (fifth principle) for development results. The concept of mutual accountability has been developed based on the belief that aid can be more effective when donors and recipients are accountable both in terms of development results and to their ‘constituencies’ at home (OECD, 2007b; OECD, 2009). In addition, mutual accountability can be defined as a ‘process of donors and recipient countries holding one another to account for mutual commitments’ based on shared agendas, performance monitoring, and dialogues and negotiations, in the context of better partnership (OECD, 2009; Steer, Wathne and Driscoll, 2009: 13).

In sum, the PD is built upon neoliberal characteristics and the feature of NPM has been reflected into the public management transformation, both for donors and recipients. However, the neoliberal PD principles have not been prevailed in all aid agencies (Wood et al., 2008). For instance, donors are encouraged to align aid disbursement by using recipient national systems while recipient countries are required to make changes in their PFM and procurement systems. However, the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) of the United States (US) has set a high priority to ‘stop the use of country procurement systems’ because it considers recipient systems are ‘inferior those of donor countries’ and tend to increase corruption (Bissio, 2007: 12). While the PD encourages recipient governments to include qualified foreign firms in their tendering processes in accordance with the Methodology for Assessment of National Procurement Systems designed by the OECD DAC/World Bank roundtable, the NFTC doubts if using country systems can ‘guarantee US corporations
competitive access to tendering and bidding in recipient countries (Bissio, 2007: 11-12). On the other hand, critics have claimed that there is lack of considerations on actual impact of the PD in terms of aid effectiveness and poverty reduction in recipient countries (Brown and Jackson, 2009). While donors give more emphasis on neoliberal agendas in public sector reform in the aid context, actual link between organisational reform for aid management and development of the poor seems to be dismantled (Parnini, 2009).

Based on the review of existing literature, this study has found that the PD was built upon the neoliberal norms and values, and the main motivation of the PD creation, which is improving ownership in recipient countries, seems to be undermined by imposing donor-driven indicators and measurement. Given this, this paper will examine how a recipient country (Tanzania) has implemented the PD, in the context of neoliberal transformation, and look at whether the outcome of the PD implementation has linked to poverty reduction in Tanzania. At the same time, by comparing donor aid practice in the education sector in Tanzania, this paper analyses the donor (Sweden, the UK, Korea and China) response to the PD and its neoliberal characteristics. The investigation has conducted mainly based on document analysis and interviews in the field, mainly from aid workers at donor aid agencies as well as the government official at the GoT.

The Paris Declaration in Tanzania

Based on the evaluations of the World Bank’s Results-Based National Development Strategies and the CPIA, and the Joint Venture on Procurement of OECD DAC, Tanzania is regarded as one of leading recipient countries in terms of the PD implementation progress (OECD, 2008a). However, as will be analysed herein, this achievement under the PD context is not accomplished because of the PD implementation, but is rather seen to be accumulative results of efforts of the GoT in order to adhere donors’ guidance (conditions such as PRS and government system reform) in aid practice.

To begin with, as donors enhanced their support to PRSs in recipient countries, the first PRSP was published in Tanzania in 2000. Tanzania was the second country in Africa to initiate a PRSP, following on from Uganda (OECD, 2006b). On the back of continuous support by donors, Tanzania published its second PRS of the NSGRP/MKUKUTA and the Zanzibar
Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (ZSGRP/MKUZA in Swahili) in 2005. Both NSGRP/MKUKUTA and ZSGRP/MKUZA are developed as ‘home-grown’ and ‘outcome-based’ poverty reduction strategies based on a highly consultative process, and they were set to achieve goals by 2010 (URT, 2005; URT, 2006b; Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2007).

Prior to PRS, Tanzania produced the National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) as a long-term strategy in 1998 (URT, 1998), and the GoT launched another long-term policy, the Tanzania Development Vision of 2025 in 1999 in order to end its status as a least developed country and to upgrade its status to a middle-income country by 2025 (see URT, 1999). In the Vision 2025, the need for a culture of self-reliance and a competitive development mindset is emphasised (URT, 1999). At the same time, the Vision 2025 emphasizes education as a high priority sector when it comes to ‘bringing about the desired social economic transformation’ in order to achieve pre-defined targets (URT, 2001c: 2). The Vision 2025 is strongly aspired to the GoT in contemporary Tanzania. For instance, the NSGRP/MKUKUTA has been built based on the Vision 2025 as well as the first PRS, the NPES and the MDGs (URT, 2005).

In between the first and second PRSs, the GoT introduced the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) in 2002. It is necessary to overview TAS because it is an important development process towards key elements in efforts to achieve the PD targets and aid effectiveness in Tanzania, particularly in developing NSGRP/MKUKUTA, MTEF, public expenditure review (PER) and Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST). The TAS was published as a framework for the delivery of aid to the PRS that was developed to reduce poverty in Tanzania (MoFEA, 2007). Between 2002 and 2004, the strategy for developing aid management was formalised through the TAS in Tanzania as it was a ‘coherent national development framework’ for managing external resources transparently and effectively based on the development goals and objectives stated in the NPES, the Vision 2025 and the PRS, and was a government initiative for restoring ‘local ownership and leadership’ based on partnership in development programmes (URT, 2002b: 1; MoFEA, 2007). The TAS was also intended to promote strengthening donor coordination, harmonisation, partnerships and national ownership that were introduced later by the Rome Declaration in 2003 (DPG, 2006; MoFEA, 2007). It has been said that TAS presented ‘the national vision of how to strengthen national ownership and improve aid delivery’ (URT, 2004b: 8). At the beginning, a joint TAS
Secretariat and a TAS/Harmonisation Group were created and chaired by the MoFEA of the GoT (World Bank, 2006). Over time, the TAS became related to issues in PERs and GBS processes, and the functions of the TAS secretariat were integrated into the Aid Coordination Section in the External Finance Department of the MoFEA (World Bank, 2006).

The government adopted the PER instrument of the World Bank (Booth, 2005) because the GoT recognised the PER as a ‘key guiding process in implementing public expenditure management (PEM) reforms’ in Tanzania (URT, 2006d: 3). Both the GoT and donors have identified PER as an important factor, especially in carrying out the PD commitments in Tanzania because it links budgets to NSGRP/MKUKUTA (OECD, 2008a). This allows clear monitoring process and helps to achieve the PD targets through the joint and coordinated country analytic work (OECD, 2008a). Throughout the national PER process, donors and the GoT have achieved more joint and coordinated country analytic work based on the enhanced dialogue and the use of common implementation arrangements (Booth, 2005; URT, 2006d).

While implementing the PER, the GoT intended to promote more support from development partners and to bring a ‘fully-functioning’ MTEF with a ‘technically advanced’ financial information system (Booth, 2005: 5; URT, 2006d). At the same time, the GoT has linked PRS and NSGRP/MKUKUTA to the budget through participatory PERs and a three-year rolling MTEF (World Bank, 2006). The MTEF has been another core element that helps donors to implement the PD principles in Tanzania (OECD, 2008a). At the local level, the GoT created a database, the Local Government Planning and Reporting Database (PlanRep) for local government authorities to link their MTEF plans and budgets to NSGRP/MKUKUTA and to monitor their expenditure and implementation (World Bank, 2006). By linking agency budgets to specific NSGRP/MKUKUTA targets and cluster strategies, a software tool called Strategic Budget Allocation System (SBAS) has been used for the budget process as well (URT, 2006d; World Bank, 2006).

Upon the GoT’s request for one form of assessment of the process, external PEM and fiduciary risk assessments have been operated within a single instrument, the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Review (PEFAR) (URT, 2006d). Previously, the external PEM and fiduciary risk assessments were managed independently by the development partners (URT, 2006d). According to the public expenditure and financial accountability (PEFA) Secretariat, it aims to ‘strengthen the ability of partner countries and
donor agencies to assess the condition of country public expenditure, procurement and financial accountability systems, and to develop a practical sequence of reform and capacity-building actions’ (PEFA Secretariat, 2010). For instance, the UK has supported the use of PEFAR with other donors in order to diagnose recipients’ systems (Lee, 2010). The PEFAR also plays an important role in Tanzania in achieving the requirements of the PD for donors, since it has helped enhancing Tanzania’s procurement and financial system (OECD, 2008a).

In line with the TAS, the development partners group (DPG)\(^2\) has been organised in order to improve the harmonisation process in Tanzania. The DPG has worked in Tanzania in response to rising concerns on coherence, efficiency and effectiveness at the country level and to avoid fragmentation, duplication and competition among donors. The DPG emerged out of an informal local DAC in 2004. As stated by the Terms of Reference in 2007 of the DPG Tanzania, ‘the DPG was formally established in 2004 in order to build a coordinated development partner response to the government’s TAS, within the overarching framework of the PRS’, and later it was revised to ‘promote the implementation of the Paris principles on Aid Effectiveness in Tanzania in order to support national efforts to achieve Tanzania’s growth and poverty reduction goals’ (DPG, 2007: 1).

Currently, there are two chairs in the DPG as co-facilitators in Tanzania: a permanent facilitator (the UN Resident Coordinator) and a rotating bilateral facilitator. Based on routine data from the official development assistance (ODA) commitments and projections for the coming financial year provided by the development partners, the MoFEA circulates the ODA data of donors for a review and implements it into the preparation of the MTEF and the national budget estimate. About 15 percent of DPG assistance has been channelled through common arrangements and procedures, including pooled and basket funds, and commitments to budget support and basket funds are further emphasised by the DPG. At the same time, members of the DPG are decentralised on decision-making process by giving authority of decision making to their country offices in participation of the PRBS group, PER working groups and sector and thematic groups, and they also decentralise their responsibilities for their programmes in terms of division of labour. For example, Department for International

\(^2\) The overview in this section about DPG is elaborated based on the context provided by the DPG Tanzania website (http://www.tzdpg.or.tz), and the Tanzania National Website (http://www.tanzania.go.tz), which is developed by the GoT. Not only the contents in websites, but also the documents provided in these websites are used in this section. These websites are where detailed information of DPG is officially uploaded, including documentations.
Development (DFID), the European Commission (EC), Denmark and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) country offices design, manage and implement the programmes they support, and the World Bank programme is performed by a Country Director in Dar es Salaam. In addition, the DPG’s strategies are aligned with the NSGRP/MKUKUTA led by the GoT.

In 2006, the JAST was established as a national medium-term framework. Initially, the Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS) was proposed in the TAS Annual Implementation Report FY 2003 (URT, 2004b), and implemented later as a part of priority actions for mutual accountability based on the PD (OECD, 2007a). The JAS was designed to improve donor coordination by identifying ‘donors’ comparative advantage’ and introducing a ‘single review cycle’, and to ‘replace’ the individual country assistance strategies of donors (Menocal and Mulley, 2006: 12). In 2007, the GoT and the EC signed on the Joint Programming Document/Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period from 2008 to 2013. According to this document, the JAST plays a central role in the process and to the commitments of the aid effectiveness goals and donor harmonisation (Government of Tanzania and European Commission, 2007). As the GoT introduced the JAST, DPG alignment has been reinforced through the JAST, and the DPG has produced a joint programme document (JPD) for the NSGRP/MKUKUTA and the JAST. JPD entails a common analytic framework used by the development partners and describes development achievements and challenges in Tanzania by providing a joint country analysis that is one of the PD indicators to be achieved.

In fact, the JAST has been intended to achieve the international commitments to aid effectiveness, such as the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development in 2002, the Rome Declaration in 2003, the Marrakech Memorandum on Managing for Results in 2004 and the PD in 2005 (URT, 2006a). The JAST emphasises the priorities discussed in the PD, such as high level dialogue, division of labour among donors that is led by the GoT, technical assistance, predictability, governance and corruption, and measuring and communicating progress (JAS Core Group, 2005b). Moreover, through the JAST, the GoT and donors have strengthened the national capacity of project management, and have phased out parallel project implementation units (PIUs), which has been required by the PD (OECD, 2008a).
In addition, according to the NSGRP/MKUKUTA in 2005, Tanzania pursues the principles of the TAS and the JAST to increase effectiveness within the harmonisation and alignment of aid modalities (URT, 2005). Both TAS and JAST are a reflection of GoT’s efforts to strengthen national ownership and government leadership in the development process as well as aid effectiveness (World Bank, 2006). Hence, JAST has been important in Tanzania in order to improve the quality of aid effectiveness, and it has been also important for donors in Tanzania to achieve the PD targets.

In 2007, the GoT published MKUKUTA Annual Implementation Report (MAIR) in order to contribute to the government’s reporting system for its second PRS, the NSGRP/MKUKUTA (URT, 2007b). The MAIR is ‘one of the outputs of the government’s monitoring system’ (URT, 2007b: 7). Prior to the MAIR development, the GoT revised the original monitoring system of Poverty Monitoring System (PMS) to strengthen the reliability of data and for the outcome-based results in 2005, and created the MKUKUTA Monitoring System (MMS) in 2006 (URT, 2006b; URT, 2006c; World Bank, 2006). The PMS was originally developed for the first PRS monitoring and evaluation in 2001, and generated reports and data used in the preparation of the NSGRP/MKUKUTA (World Bank, 2006: 13). While reviewing the PMS, the National Survey Plan was also updated in 2005, the year-by-year timeframe has been scheduled for the national surveys, and data produced in the new national surveys have been applied into the MMS (URT, 2006b). The MMS was established as a ‘part and parcel of overall government planning and reporting systems’ and ‘complements of the strategic planning and budgeting and the PER’ (URT, 2006c). The GoT aims to provide a transparent PAF for the NSGRP/MKUKUTA throughout the MMS (OECD, 2008a).

Along with the MAIR, the GoT and development partners created the JAST Action Plan and Monitoring Framework Matrix which is structured under specific objectives of ‘strengthening national ownership and government leadership of the development process’, ‘aligning development partners support to the GoT priorities, systems, structures and procedures’, ‘harmonising government and development partners processes’, ‘managing resources for achieving development results, in particular on NSGRP/MKUKUTA and ZSGRP/MKUZA’ and ‘strengthening domestic and mutual accountability’ (URT, 2007a: 5). Based on these objectives, the matrix is arranged into JAST commitments (URT, 2007a). Recently the matrix has been revised due to the suggestions made by the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA)
in 2008, while the GoT and development partners, along with non-state actors, review their performance on implementing JAST each year (URT, 2007a).

The GoT and development partners were required to jointly commission the Independent Monitoring Group (IMG) during the mid- and final-term of the implementation process of the PD in order to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the implementation performance of the GoT and its donor partners (URT, 2007a). For instance, during the first PD monitoring survey in 2006, it was seen necessary to integrate the IMG process with aid strategy development (OECD, 2007c). According to the Helleiner Report in 1995, which redefined development cooperation relations in Tanzania, the assessment of received information was problematic in Tanzania because of inconsistencies in statistics from both donors and the GoT (Helleiner, Killick, Lipumba, Ndulu and Svendsen, 1995). On the basis of this, the IMG was proposed under the TAS, and the GoT and development partners agreed to establish the IMG to institute monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for progress in the aid relationship, particularly for mutual accountability (ESRF, 2002; ESRF, 2005).

The proposal of the IMG suggested that the GoT, donors and CSOs should begin to include their information resources as well as to conduct workshops and conferences for better analysis (URT, 2002a). The IMG has evaluated the GoT-donor relations biennially since 2002. The IMG Report of 2005 is the final TAS review, and it has continued to review the implementation progress of the JAST (World Bank, 2006). The IMG report provides its analysis based on seven categories, such as government leadership and ownership in the development and policy process, ownership, policy dialogue and harmonisation with sectors and local governments, development partners and dialogue processes, participation of broader constituencies, budget process and PFM and accounting systems, aid delivery in efficiency and effectiveness, and technical assistance and challenges of capacity building (ESRF, 2005). According to the IMG report, the national ownership and government leadership in the development process have been strengthened and relationships of development cooperation have been improved in Tanzania (URT, 2006a).

Additionally, in Tanzania, the Aid Management Platform (AMP) has been implemented as a monitoring framework (Development Gateway, 2009). The AMP was launched by the MoFEA in 2008 by replacing an excel-based data management to the web-based database system in collaboration with the DPG based on the needs to improve ODA information for
decision making on donor funding (Development Gateway, 2009). Currently, the Tanzanian AMP provides information of more than 300 activities with over USD 6.5 billion in donor commitments (Ashbourne, Kuil, Leger and Kolker, 2008: 66). These activities are linked to NSGRP/MKUKUTA, and the data has been distributed to ministries and donor agencies after a comprehensive and cross-checking process (Ashbourne et al., 2008). However, it remains a challenge because all stakeholders should make sure that the data shown is correct (Interview F, 2009).

Overall, the international aid programmes in Tanzania are organised around stronger partnerships with donors when compared to those pertaining in other recipient countries, and the GoT has developed its own national targets to eradicate poverty, albeit within a strong relationship with the donor community. Tanzania has ‘largely developed’ medium- and long-term operational development strategies such as the NPES, the Vision 2025 and the NSGRP/MKUKUTA, especially for ownership improvement, along with the PER, the MTEF and the PEFAR. The GoT has implemented the JAST that has played an important role in improving alignment, harmonisation and mutual accountability in Tanzania, and with donor support, has developed the national MMS to manage aid for results. The IMG has worked in Tanzania for stronger accountability mechanisms (OECD, 2008a), and the DPG has supported harmonisation process in Tanzania based on strong coordination and coherence among donors (DPG, 2005; OECD, 2008a). In the end, it can be said that the PD implementation progress in Tanzania can be greater than other recipient countries because the neoliberal norms were already embedded in the government systems prior to the PD, especially in terms of measuring required indicators and objectives. However, the gap remains between the PD indicators and actual progress in poverty reduction. In other words, while the GoT accomplishes to satisfy the PD measurement which indicates government system reformation that is similar to DAC donors’, it has not satisfied with actual measurement of poverty reduction in the country. In fact, there is no such measurement that can assess the level of poverty reduced from the beneficiaries’ end.

**Donor Aid Practice in the Education Sector in Tanzania**

In Tanzania, the education sector is an important sector along with the health sector. Julius Nyerere (Tanzania’s first president) famously asserted the importance of ‘education for self-
reliance’ and development in Tanzania and education has since been seen as central to poverty reduction in Tanzania (Cameron and Dodd, 1970). The GoT and development partners are highly coordinated with each other under the Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP) (URT, 2001c). Prior to the launch of ESDP there was donor coordination in the education sector but only in terms of the sharing of information, rather than coordinating sector activities in Tanzania, and major donor coordination began by preparing the ESDP in donor support to education in Tanzania (Sida, 2001). When the ESDP was initiated during the mid-to-late-1990s, Tanzania was experiencing an education crisis, with low enrolment rates at primary and secondary schools, and it was difficult to implement the ESDP into the governmental system due to the multitude of ministries and education related institutions, and the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) \(^3\) failed to adequately respond to the appraisal report (Sida, 2000b; Sida, 2001; Sida, 2002). The ESDP reform initiatives were built on the basis of experience and lessons learned over the years (DPG, 2009), and thus, the ESDP is now seen as a way to promote stronger partnership between donors and the GoT and to pool the resources for better use (Sida, 2000a; Interview F, 2009).

When the ESDP was revised in 2001, the initiatives such as SWAp to education development and decentralisation of the management of education and training were included in the education system of Tanzania (URT, 2001c). For instance, it was found that project-based education development resulted in problems for the education system and highly centralised planning resulted in non-participatory attitudes and ignored localities (URT, 2001c). Based on these experiences, the GoT and development partners have implemented a SWAp in the education development process and have begun the planning reform process between bottom-up and top-down approaches (URT, 2001c). In addition, based on the demand for enhanced coordination and sharing information between the government and donors, the Education Management Information System (EMIS) was initiated under the SWAp of the ESDP (URT, 2001c).

Under the ESDP, the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP) was initiated in 2001, and development partners have committed to the PEDP by integrating their individual projects into it (Terme, 2002). The PEDP was intended as a step towards the gradual

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\(^3\) The Ministry of Education (MOE) in Tanzania was converted to the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) in 1989, and again to current Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) in 2005 (MoEVT, 2005).
achievement of the PRSP, Local Government Reform Programme, universal primary education (UPE) and Vision 2025 (URT, 2001a). For instance, the PEDP included PRSP objectives of improving quality, raising enrolment, optimising the effective use of available resources, reinforcing capacity to manage schools at grass-root level, and addressing gender, environment and HIV/AIDS concerns (URT, 2001a; URT, 2001b: 21; URT, 2005). To complement the PEDP the Secondary Education Development Plan (SEDP) was formulated in 2004 (URT, 2005). According to the MoEC, there is a strong nexus between education and economic growth, with secondary education seen to have particularly strong multiplier effects, both on the education system and on the economy (URT, 2004a). In a similar vein to the PEDP, the SEDP has been formulated based on the Education and Training Policy of 1995 and the ESDP (URT, 2004a). Meanwhile, the government introduced the Adult and Non-Formal Education (AE/NFE) Sub-Sector Medium Term Strategy in 2003 (URT, 2003). The AE/NFE Strategy has been implemented to complement the PEDP and to strengthen the ESDP in accordance with the Education and Training Policy of 1995, PRSP, Vision 2025 and the education for all (EFA). In 2005, when the GoT established the NSGRP/MKUKUTA, the goals and objectives of government’s efforts for educational development including PEDP, SEDP and AE/NFE Strategy under the ESDP were incorporated into the NSGRP/MKUKUTA. As the ESDP scheme is now carried out with the NSGRP/MKUKUTA, it is expected that donors utilise the ESDP in the aid provided for the education system in order to deliver the PD requirements. For instance, by adapting ESDP in donor aid practice, the level of division of labour amongst donors has been boosted (Andersen, Packer and Ratcliffe, 2008).

**Sweden**

Sweden has been a major donor partner in the education sector in Tanzania, particularly focusing on basic education (Sida, 2000a). Sweden has focused on basic education not only based on its own policy but also based on the emphasis of the ESDP (Sida, 2006a). According to Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the organisational roles and responsibilities of Sida in Tanzania have been very influential and consistent with both the NSGRP/MKUKUTA and with the overall aid architecture (Andersen et al., 2008). Not only that, higher education and research, teacher education, and vocational training are also part of Swedish aid programmes in Tanzania by reflecting its need to ‘upgrade human resources’ as a capacity building effort to reduce poverty (Sida, 2000a; MFA, 2006: 11). In Tanzania, Sida provides GBS to the GoT including the financing of education sector development (Interview G, 2009), and operates separate education projects in Zanzibar.
by education specialists (Andersen et al., 2008; Interview G, 2009). Sida’s support is not aimed at any specific project but at the ESDP which covers the whole of the education sector at all levels (Interview G, 2009).

From the 1990s onwards, Sweden has been involved in the ESDP at primary, secondary and tertiary education levels including research based on ‘very active’ and ‘extensive’ sector dialogue with the GoT through the Embassy of Sweden in Dar es Salaam and with other development partners, through Sida’s education sector programme support (SPS) – Swedish term for SWAp - in Tanzania (Sida, 2000a: 5; Sida, 2002; MFA, 2006; Andersen et al., 2008: 150; Interview G, 2009). The SPS has been used as a key aid modality in education cooperation (McNab, 2003; Andersen et al., 2008), and it has been implemented in accordance with the ESDP in the education sector (Sida, 2002). Sida’s education cooperation based on SPS has been recorded as 30 percent of total aid in the education sector by Sweden (Andersen et al., 2008). Under the ESDP, GBS and other grants are also provided as financing interventions in the education sector in Tanzania (MFA, 2006). For the financial year of 2008/09, Sweden has disbursed SEK 425 million as GBS, which is about USD 53 million, while roughly 18 percent of the GoT's budget goes to education, which means that about 18 percent of the Swedish budget support goes to the education sector amounting to SEK 76.5 million, about USD 10 million (Interview G, 2009).

When all donors approved the PEDP under the ESDP in 2001 Sida joined the first group that signed the PEDP support agreement together with the World Bank, CIDA, EC, Ireland, Netherlands, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), while Finnish International Development Agency (FINNIDA) and Belgium signed the agreement in 2003 (Sida, 2003). Previous Swedish project support to teacher education is now included in the PEDP (Sida, 2006a). Sida has noticed that the financial support to the PEDP has affected the increased number of enrolment at primary school level, but the quality of education still remains a problem (Sida, 2004a; Sida, 2006b). Related to the PEDP, the GoT and Sida signed a new agreement on SEK 455 million covering the 2003-2006 period (Sida, 2003). Specifically, in 2005 Sweden provided SEK 120 million for PEDP support through the basket arrangement (Sida, 2006b).
United Kingdom

According to the UK, education is vital ‘to improving the equality of human life and for the promotion of sustainable development’ which can help to reduce poverty (COI, 1993: 52). Based on this, DFID’s aid policy in the education sector is focused on achieving the EFA and the education MDGs with a priority in the UPE, and there has been an increasing awareness on the importance of secondary and higher education and vocational skills training (DFID, 2009b). Education projects and programmes of the UK tend to be focused on improving the efficiency of education systems in developing countries (COI, 1995). For example, based on coordination and cooperation with other bilateral donors including Sweden and with multilateral organisations, DFID works on activities for abolishing primary school user fees in Tanzania (DFID, 2007b). The education TROIKA has been highly productive due to donor coordination and cooperation (Interview H, 2009). In this, DFID has played a major role in promoting sector result monitoring tools and offering economic advice to donors that are in the education sector development group (Andersen et al. 2008).

In Tanzania, DFID intends to increase its aid spending on education (DFID, 2009a). In 2008, half of DFID’s aid support to education was for primary schools, and about 4,000 primary schools have been built in Tanzania (DFID, 2009a). In order to deliver access to quality education, DFID has supported the increase of teachers by 40 percent, equivalent to a 97 percent net enrolment rate, in 2008 (DFID, 2009a). In terms of the Country Assistance Plan (CAP) in Tanzania, DFID provides budget finance to two sectors of education and water and sanitation, especially in regard to the medium-term programmatic changes (MTC) 4, to enable ‘all Tanzanians, particularly the poor and vulnerable, to access quality basic services and social protection’ (DFID, 2007c: 13). The UK provides six MTCs in line with the MDGs in Tanzania (DFID, 2007c).

DFID’s aid in Tanzania is in aligned with the NSGRP/MKUKUTA, and it provides GBS to the education sector on the basis of the ESDP. According to DFID staff, the UK is providing its aid to the education sector in Tanzania mainly throughout GBS under the PRBS scheme (Interview H, 2009; Results UK, 2010). DFID’s support to education programmes in Tanzania recorded GBP 26 million between 2006/07 and 2007/08 (DFID, 2007b; Results UK, 2010). DFID ensures that GBS to the education sector should be executed by the GoT on the basis of the ESDP (Interview H, 2009). About 80 percent of total aid to Tanzania has been allocated through GBS, and about 18 percent of GBS is used in the education sector by the
GoT (Interview H, 2009). In general, DFID’s PRBS has provided more resources to Tanzania’s primary and secondary education sectors (DFID, 2006a).

As mentioned above, the GoT has set secondary education as a priority because it is seen to have positive effects on the economic growth. Accordingly, DFID supports the GoT’s scaling up of secondary education through the education SWAp (DFID, 2006b). In the education sector in Tanzania, DFID tends to give special attention to girls’ education, particularly since the GoT emphasises gender equality in its long-term education plan (Rose and Subrahmanian, 2005; DFID, 2006b). Throughout the SWAp, DFID intends to improve donor harmonisation and coordination on gender issues within the education system (Rose and Subrahmanian, 2005).

**South Korea**

Korea has established its ODA strategy by sector based on its own development experience and on the recipient’s development agenda. In the education sector there are two strategies in providing grants: to ‘support human resource development by expanding educational opportunity for the poor and the neglected of developing countries, eradicating illiteracy, and training technicians’; and to ‘build, improve, and expand training facilities improve education, training policies and systems, develop curriculums, and provide educational materials’ (ODA Korea, 2008). Korea does not provide budget support due to the comparatively low volume of aid it provides to developing countries, and therefore, it does not provide GBS in the education sector in Tanzania (Interview I, 2008). Instead, Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) provides a project aid programme in the education sector based on textbook supply, information and communication technology (ICT) support, building construction including schools and training centres, and vocational training support (Interview J, 2008).

In Tanzania, there has been one recent project by KOICA in the education sector. KOICA executed an ICT education capacity building project, a ‘Project for effective ICT education at the College of Engineering and Technology (CoET), University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’ which ran for three years from 2006 to 2008 (KOICA, 2007). This project aims to support the human resources development in the education system so that it meets the industrial requirements in Tanzania, to contribute to the development of educational infrastructure at CoET by developing advanced curriculums and strengthening the ICT capacity by providing
educational equipment, and to develop required core competence for ICT capacity operations through staff exchange and expert dispatch (KOICA, 2008c). Based on a budget of USD two million, the Korean government has provided equipment and materials for the project, renovation of the ICT centre, invitation of Tanzanian trainees to Korea, and has dispatched the Korean experts to Tanzania (KOICA, 2006; KOICA, 2008c). At the same time, administrative measures, provision of utilities for renovation, provision of goods tax exemptions, clearance and storage, identification of staff for training in Korea, and promotion of understanding and support for the project have been implemented in Tanzania (KOICA, 2008c). The stakeholders in this project are KOICA on behalf of the Korean government and the MoEVT of Tanzania on behalf of the GoT (KOICA, 2008c). Here, one of the MoEVT officials said that Korean approach (project aid) in the education sector is more likely welcomed than budget support which gives less flexibility to the MoEVT in terms of ‘spending aid money’ (Interview C, 2010). As will be discussed in the following section, the line ministries tend to have less power in ‘budget negotiation’ against the MoFEA. With this in mind, the MoEVT is in need of ‘extra aid money’ in preferred projects.

It is not easy to conclude which modality is more effective between budget support and project aid due to the mixed views and evaluations by donors and by line ministries of recipient. However, it is evident that budget support, including GBS, can results in drawbacks in some cases, and other kinds of aid modalities can also bring positive effect. For instance, when it came to the evaluation of the CoET project, the director of the college expressed that the project has been very productive since it brought practical support to the college (Interview J, 2008). However, one of respondents of the interview at KOICA pointed out that we cannot expect to achieve a long-term vision and de facto capacity building of Tanzania from this project since current evaluation matrix of KOICA does not reflect outcomes of the project and the effectiveness (Interview I, 2008).

**China**

Chinese aid support to Tanzania, particularly in the education sector, can be categorised as cultural and language exchange, school building construction, facility supply and human resource development through the exchange programme (People’s Daily Online, 9 June 2000; FMPRC, 2006; Embassy of China in Tanzania, 2008; Interview M, 2008). Chinese human resources development started from the 1960s by accepting students from Tanzania, and there have been internship programmes for Chinese students in Tanzania as a part of Chinese aid
projects (Interview M, 2008). China has provided training courses for Tanzania technicians and officials for short-term training, but due to the different cultural backgrounds, teacher training has been difficult (Interview M, 2008). Chinese volunteers are basically dispatched for Chinese language courses, and now China has opened 13 Confucian schools in African countries, including Tanzania, for Chinese cultural and language courses (Interview M, 2008). Also, the Chinese government has provided a scholarship programme as part of its aid to education for exchange programme (FMPRC, 2006). For example, from 2005 to 2007, China provided 100 full government scholarships to Tanzania each year, and in turn Tanzania offered five government scholarships in 2006 and four government scholarships in 2007 to China (Embassy of China in Tanzania, 2008). In 2000, the Chinese Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education of Tanzania signed an agreement for a cooperative project to higher education in Tanzania (People’s Daily Online, 9 June 2000; Embassy of China in Tanzania, 2008). Since then China has provided micro-computer teachers to the Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT) for the training of lecturers and students, and has supported DIT in developing teaching and research in the micro-computer area (Embassy of China in Tanzania, 2008).

As Tanzania has developed the ESDP under the NSGRP/MKUKUTA in the education sector, donor division of labour has increased by using ESDP (Andersen et al. 2008). Accordingly, Sweden emphasised ESDP of Tanzania in its educational policy of aid support, and the UK through DFID takes the ESDP as Tanzanian government policy. Both donors have provided GBS and PRBS to the GoT under the ESDP context, and the execution of the budget to the ESDP has been conducted by the GoT as recommended in the PD. However, given that Korea and China have both provided project aid, they hardly participated in DPG and GBS allocation in Tanzania. In addition, these two emerging donors did not consider ESDP in their aid policies and practices when it came to the education sector in Tanzania. The illustration in this case study makes it obvious that Sweden and the UK have used GoT’s country systems in their aid practices as mandated by their domestic aid policies in the education sector, as well as by the PD. On the contrary, Korea and China do not use recipient country systems. At the same time, while both Sweden and the UK have cooperated with other donors for the division of labour in the education sector, Korea and China continue to carry out aid projects independently from the donor group. With this in mind, it seems that the PD is considered in aid policy and practice only by traditional donors when non-traditional donors use different mode of aid from the PD.
What works and what doesn’t

For Tanzania

While the GoT has improved the requirements of the PD, it has barely addressed how to measure the actual impact of aid. In other words, even though the Tanzania has made reforms in public management system in aid context, the agenda of how it has linked to the poor remains ambiguous. Hence, it is necessary to re-think whether these indicators and achievements are equivalent to the degree of actual impact of the PD and aid effectiveness at non-government level. According to the PD, recipient countries are expected to accomplish ‘real progress’ by implementing the Paris commitments; however, it seems that ‘country level’ used in the Paris statement means ‘government’ level, not the actual beneficiaries of aid:

Because demonstrating real progress at country level is critical, under the leadership of the recipient country we will periodically assess, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, our mutual progress at country level in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness. In doing so, we will make use of appropriate country level mechanisms. (paragraph 10 of the PD).

For instance, when it comes to GBS, aid workers tend to focus on its impact on the management system, not actual impact to the beneficiaries of aid. With regard to this, the MoFEA officials in Tanzania stated that GBS in Tanzania has been helpful for administrative reforms, particularly for PFM systems (Interview A, 2009), and has been important in Tanzania especially in order to achieve the Paris goals:

When it comes to GBS, it is important because it brought mainstream of systems in national budget based on the concept of the PD and donor coordination (Interview B, 2010).

However, when this official (Interview A, 2009) was asked how the GoT intends to examine actual progress in terms of poverty reduction, especially at local level, he responded that:

Tanzania is very poor, and we are in need of help. […] To be honest, we are tired of doing paperwork required by each donor with different measurement of their aid, including internationally required documents like MDGs and PD. It is beyond our capacity to think about how to measure the actual degree of poverty reduction with new measurement, I am afraid (Interview A, 2009).
Given that Tanzania experienced non-aid period shortly in the mid-1960s and conflicts with international financial institutions (IFIs) during the late 1970s (Crouch, 1987), it seems to be important for the GoT to cooperate with donors in order to attract continuous aid (Wangwe, 2006).

At the same time, it can be questioned if GBS has helped capacity development of line ministries, as required by the PD, because officials from line ministries claimed that GBS has increased the power of the MoFEA (Interviewees G3 and G4, 2010):

> It has been unfair for us that donors give budget support to the MoFEA. The MoFEA uses it as a bargaining power when they ‘negotiate’ annual budget disbursement with line ministries (Interview C, 2010).

> Sometimes, I feel desperate as a person who executes budget in my office. The MoFEA takes so much time to give us money with many requirements, which are not unnecessary as I see. Because of the GBS, the MoFEA becomes the most powerful ministry, except president’s office, vice president’s office and prime minister’s office (Interview D, 2010).

As a matter of fact, increasing power within government ministries of finance has been discussed as concerns because they are prone to limit aid transfers through budget support (for example, Evans, 2007; Gatete, 2007). The concentration of aid budget seems to result in power concentration in the GoT, and this can be also questioned how GBS can promote transparency and reduce corruption if the authority of the government is increasingly centralised.

While donors (herein, now advanced donors who have led the PD mechanism in global development system) support the GoT to monitoring and evaluate the PD progress, they seem to disregard the importance of the capacity of the government. It can be questioned to what degree GoT data is reliable. There is a doubt that the GoT may manipulate outcomes in order to show a ‘progress’ in national plans. For instance, it was found that the data given to donors from the MoEC regarding to the PEDP in Tanzania, including budget and plans, was not consistent with the data given to MoFEA from the MoEC (ESRF, 2005). This can be confirmed by the research of HakiElimu, Tanzanian CSO which has financial support from DFID and Sida, that reveals the differences between the real status of social development in Tanzania and distorted statistics produced by the GoT (HakiElimu, 2005; HakiElimu, 2006;
Sida, 2006b; HakiElimu, 2007). However, interestingly, when this was queried with two aid workers, on the other hand, one from a bilateral donor institution and the other from a multilateral donor organisation, in terms of how they can trust the evaluation and monitoring data from the government when there is a lack of capability to perform reliable data collection and analysis, both interviewees answered identically that from time to time they visit field sites to confirm if the data matches to the real situation in the field (Interview Q, 2009; Interview P, 2009). They also added that government produced data has been quite reliable (Interview Q, 2009; Interview P, 2009).

It seems that the PD reform requirements in the government system do not address the need to produce reliable outcomes based on the transparent process of evaluations. Another example can be found in the birth rate data; in a district of Kisaware, only a single small hospital, which was built by Irish aid, gathers the number of new born babies in the wards and reports it to the District Medical Office (DMO), then the DMO reports the data to the local authority for final data gathering at the Ministry of Health (Interview Q, 2009). A doctor in this hospital admitted that it is very difficult to produce accurate numbers of new born babies since less than 50 percent of pregnant women give birth at a hospital; rather, they give birth at home and because they even do not visit the hospital during the whole pregnancy, it is even more difficult to figure out how many pregnant women are expecting delivery in the wards (Interview Q, 2009). It has been said that this is a common practice when the government authority gathers data for national statistics; that is, data in most national statistics has the possibility of distortion since data collection at village or ward level is hardly accurate (Interview R, 2009).

For donors

As seen in this paper, it is obvious that Sweden and the UK (advanced donors) have committed to the PD by prioritising GoT’s national development strategies in their aid policies and using GoT’s PFM and procurement systems through GBS and PRBS. At the same time, both donors have provided PBAs through SWAs and budget support. On the contrary, Korea and China (emerging donors) have not conform to the internationally agreed principles. At the same time, while advanced donors emphasise management of aid delivery in the Paris context, emerging donors have different approaches and understanding of aid effectiveness. For instance, by looking at the responses of Sweden and the UK to the use of GBS, it becomes more manifest that the Paris commitments tend to concentration on public
management of aid than the actual results in poverty reduction (see Table 1). While advanced donors, who actually characterised the PD based on neoliberal approaches, tend to emphasise GBS link to aid management, reflecting the PD measurement, emerging donors do not carry out GBS, and also tend to evaluate the effectiveness of aid in a different aspect (See Table 2).

Of course the logic behind the Paris initiatives is that aid can be more effective by transforming aid management; however, indicators do not show the link between the PD achievement and poverty reduction.

Table 1. Advanced donor response and practices to the PD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Interview context</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>GBS is best modality, especially about good data and good analysis. Before, there were fragmented range of programmes and too many projects were there (Interview E, 2009). While providing GBS, donors have been able to improve the division of labour internally and externally, and the sharing of resources is also improved. Discussions in a specific section inform other mainstream sections. In Tanzania development partners and the government have jointly implemented a GBS monitoring process as a part of NSGRP/MKUKUTA (Interview F, 2009).</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>GBS is the initiative in aid effectiveness for the last two decades, and it can be very effective, and the shift from previous sector budget practice to GBS is a progress (Interview Q, 2009). The GoT has seen a huge reduction of transaction costs per se through GBS. As is well-known, through the GBS the transaction cost can be reduced (Interview Q, 2009). In Tanzania, DFID has provided the Annual Performance Reports, a sector results monitoring tool based on 60 indicators which are under development, and a framework that aims to measure policy and achievement against goals such as PRS, MDGs and NSGRP/MKUKUTA with the ministries of Tanzania, in addition to the PAF (Interview Q, 2009).</td>
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Table 2. Emerging donor response and practices to the PD

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Interview context</th>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>[Korea] does not share any GBS, but a little of basket funding as a pooled fund, and it is difficult to share ideas because the evaluation system of outcomes is different. Even though KOICA shares aid policy with other donors, it is very limited (Interview Q, 2009). I feel left out during DPG meetings because most donors use GBS while we do not use it. However, we try to participate more actively than before in</td>
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DPG meetings at a field level since we joined DAC in earlier this year. However, it is limited (Interview R, 2010).

[…] Not only us, but also from others, there is a slight movement of thought that individual project is not just ineffective, compared to some years back. It is due to increasing doubt on budget support (Interview R, 2010).

In terms of the project assessment within the Tanzania field office, for example, education projects are evaluated based on an education statistical report and beneficiary satisfaction survey (Interview Q, 2009).

China

The Chinese government takes the MDGs and the PD as important. But the definition of the effectiveness of aid can be different from countries, and the indicators are not suitable to the situation of China. Chinese goal of aid is to develop developing countries socially and economically. China intends to increase friendship to achieve mutual development (Interview P, 2008).

Chinese projects can be more effective than Western donors’ aid practice. For example, in some African countries, local people have expressed their satisfaction with Chinese aid because we provide them what they need in their daily life (Interview Q, 2008).

Of course, it is good to set goals and indicators as other donors do, but the feasibility is low and they are not easy to achieve. At the same time, it is not easy to evaluate whose aid is effective or not because it should be long-term evaluation (Interview P, 2008).

Chinese definition of aid effectiveness is tangible and short-term based evaluation. Aid effectiveness can be the satisfaction of direct beneficiaries rather than evaluating the achievement of aimed objectives and goals (Interview Q, 2008).

From Tables 1 and 2, it can be seen that not only the approaches to GBS, but also the way to monitoring and evaluation has been differentiated between traditional and non-traditional donors. While Sweden and the UK follow what the PD imposes, both Korea and China do not use Paris approach in the measurement. Both Sweden and the UK use the results chain model as a central conceptual tool of RBM (DFID, 2009c; Sida, 2007). The results chain can show a causal relationship of policy and aid programmes, and can be helpful to measure what has worked and what can be improved in terms of lessons learned (DFID, 2009c; Sida, 2007). This results chain model was introduced in Sweden and the UK and while it predates the Paris meeting (for example, see Sida, 2004b), it has been reinforced in order to achieve the Paris targets.
In comparison, Korea attempts to adopt results-based approach based on the internationally agreed system as it joined the DAC membership in 2010, yet this has been very broad and vague throughout all policy documents. Korea is aware of the importance of RBM system, but it does not provide detailed evaluation plans and does not clearly states whether it provides results-based evaluation system (KOICA, 2008a). At the same time, the current evaluation framework of Korea is different from other donors as seen in Table 2 (Interview Q, 2009). Similar to Korea, China considers the international agenda of aid effectiveness increasingly, but it is still taking measures to improve monitoring and evaluation process of aid projects (Interview R, 2011). At the same time, according to one of Chinese government officials, it can be inferred that the PD measurement is not universal approach in evaluating the effectiveness of aid:

Chinese projects can be more effective than Western donors’ aid practice. For example, in some African countries, local people have expressed their satisfaction with Chinese aid because we provide them what they need in their daily life (Interview Q, 2008).

In terms of donor conditionality under the PD, the UK tends to use recipient PRSs within its aid conditionality, while it is not clear whether Sweden and Korea have conditionality policy in line with the PD. For example, British country plans are based on ‘national PRSs or similar medium-term planning frameworks’, and its approach to conditionality is aligned with these national development priorities of recipient countries (OECD, 2010a). By imposing conditionalities, the UK intends to strengthen recipients’ ‘financial management and accountability’ and to reduce ‘the risk of funds being misused thorough weak administration or corruption’ in recipient countries (DFID, 2007a: 119). As a matter of fact, the DFID model is considered as a good example of new approaches to conditionality as the conditions of the UK are owned by recipients, and the UK is therefore seen to support recipient ownership even with its continuous conditionality (OECD, 2008b; OECD, 2010a). The UK has explained that British conditionality is not for policy choices compared to the 1990s, but for transparency (DFID, 2007a; OECD, 2008e). In comparison, Chinese aid emphasised the ‘One China’ policy rather than the ‘good governance’ conditionality of Western donors (McCormick, 2008).
Conclusion

This study has reviewed that the PD is built in the neoliberal mechanism which has changed the organisational culture of public management in recipient countries, bringing to the fore NPM-like practices which seek to quantify performance. This paper has argued that the PD is a product of the Western donors, and their evaluation matrix seems to be reflected by their own interests of aid while often it hinders the real objectives of aid. The monitoring and evaluation by donors and recipients illustrate that the PD implementation efforts need to address the quality of aid actually received by its recipient populations. At the same time, the lack of capacity in recipient systems represents a challenge for both recipients and donors. The central achievement of the PD is an alignment of cultural practice across governments so that southern governments work similarly to their northern ‘partners’, rather than an improvement in aid effectiveness per se. In conclusion, the GoT seemingly achieved progress in the government system in the Paris context. While the GoT now has neoliberal culture in the government systems, its practice failed to address the actual outcomes of aid practice in terms of poverty reduction, and there is a concern of capacity of the GoT. At the same time, emerging donors have not shown changes against neoliberal attempts of donors in the PD context, while advanced donors carry out neoliberal-style measurement and indicators in line with the PD. The outcome of the PD implementation reflects asymmetric participation of donors in neoliberal-oriented aid architecture.
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