‘Environmental mainstreaming
and post-sovereign governance in Tanzania’

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Abstract
Tanzania’s experiences of development aid partnerships and environmental mainstreaming have been widely praised in recent years, yet the country continues to suffer from considerable problems of poverty, food insecurity and ecological degradation. As such it constitutes an interesting case study through which to examine hypotheses on global environmental governance. Looking specifically at claims that environmental governance is increasingly ‘post-sovereign’, this article assesses the degree to which environmental planning and management in Tanzania is becoming ‘non-exclusive’, ‘non-hierarchical’, and ‘post-territorial’. It argues that evidence for non-exclusivity is plentiful, given the extent of foreign donor, private sector, and civil society penetration of governance processes. Clear hierarchies in environmental governance are hard to discern, but rather than the absence of hierarchy the research suggests the existence of multiple hierarchies produced by both the transnationalisation of environmental politics as well as the complex nature of the Tanzanian state. Finally, rather than a trend towards post-territorialisation, the research suggests that environmental governance should be seen within a longer trajectory of greater state penetration, monitoring, surveillance and intrusion into rural life. It concludes that environmental governance is significantly transforming the Tanzanian state and that, contrary to assumptions that the most important innovations are occurring in the industrialised world, environmental governance is a crucial site of power struggles over the nature of the state in developing countries, in which relationships between the international and the domestic, and state and non-state actors are being recast.

Key words: Planning, sustainable development, food security, sovereignty, hierarchy, territoriality.
Introduction

Tanzania is often lauded as an outstanding example of a developing country which has mainstreamed environmental considerations into development planning, through successive country-owned and nationally-driven poverty reduction strategy papers and sustainable development strategies, within a broader context of a harmonised and productive relationship with international donors.¹ In 2007 a report by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) recorded “an ambitious and unprecedented Tanzanian initiative to integrate environmental issues into development policy and practice”, which concluded it was “largely very positive” and “offers an iconic and enduring (and perhaps rather rare) example of a nationally-developed policy process which delivers – in practice – what the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy principles describe in theory.”² Indeed, Tanzania is regarded – at least in the public pronouncements of donor organisations – as a ‘model recipient’ of development aid, and the economic growth of the past decade, combined with political stability, multiparty democracy, and some progress in tackling corruption, means that Tanzania regularly basks in the warm glow of international approval. According to the IMF, “twenty years of successes have made Tanzania one of the leading reformers in Africa.”³ This warm glow has material consequences: Tanzania receives a disproportionately large volume of development aid, which in 2009 was almost $3bn, the third largest on the continent and representing 6% of the total aid flows to Africa.⁴ It is a favoured location for capacity-building programmes and environmental initiatives, and it is beginning to slowly position itself as an emerging player in ‘green’ finance schemes such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD and REDD+).⁵ The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor (SAGCOT), a public-private initiative to develop climate compatible agriculture in Tanzania, was proudly showcased at the 2011
Durban Climate Change conference (COP 17) as a landmark partnership to achieve food security and climate change adaptation.6

Yet actual environmental and development improvements ‘on the ground’ are less inspiring. Tanzania is unlikely to achieve the Millennium Development Goal targets for poverty reduction, food security, maternal mortality or access to potable water.7 In 2008 33% of the mainland population was still below the basic needs poverty line; 60% of under-5s were underweight or stunted from lack of food; and 43% of the rural population lacked access to potable water.8 Food security is further threatened by predictions that climatic changes will result in a 33% fall in maize yields nationally, and up to 84% in central regions.9 This has become a highly charged political issue linked to allegations of ‘land-grabbing’ by foreign companies for biofuels and agricultural exports, with activists alleging state investment-friendly policies are “cultivating hunger”.10 This culminated in a government decree in mid-2008 putting biofuel development projects on hold until further guidelines were developed.11 Furthermore, chronic power shortages over the last 20 years have been blamed on declining hydropower resources in the country’s dams resulting from climatic changes to rainfall, although political interference in the policy planning process and high-level corruption are more fundamental causes.12 Allegations of chronic mismanagement, rent-seeking and pervasive corruption in the forestry, fisheries and wildlife conservation sectors further contribute to substantial doubts over the efficacy of the much-lauded environmental mainstreaming.13

As such Tanzania represents a fascinating case study of a country seeking to strengthen its planning and management capacities for sustainable development and food security, in the face of considerable challenges. This article examines the Tanzanian case in the light of
broader trends and hypotheses in the literature on global environmental governance. The first section sets out these trends and hypotheses, and contests the frequent assumption that the most interesting transformations in environmental governance are occurring in the industrialised world. On the contrary, developing countries like Tanzania have some of the most interesting and contested developments in environmental governance. Three specific claims frequently made about global environmental governance are then examined in the Tanzanian context: that environmental governance is increasingly non-exclusive, non-hierarchical, and post-territorial. After briefly mapping the context for the environmental mainstreaming processes of the 2000s, these claims are examined drawing upon examples from environmental planning, food security policies, resource management and decentralisation, and sustainable development strategies. The article concludes that whilst environmental governance in Tanzania is certainly non-exclusive, there are both hierarchical and non-hierarchical dynamics at play. Furthermore, rather than becoming post-territorial, some of the transformations in environmental governance are actually strengthening central state capacity to monitor and govern the country. Whilst the emergence of new forms of transnational state can help to understand some elements of these transformations, they must also be seen in a longer history of contested power relations between Tanzanian society and the state.

**Post-sovereign environmental governance in the developing world**

Literature on global environmental governance has tended to focus on the so-called developed world. Some authors blankly assert that there is little of interest or value that can be gleaned from environmental governance in the developing world. Keohane, Haas and Levy assert that developing countries “have typically lacked adequate capacity on both the governmental and societal dimensions – governments have often been unable either to
understand or to regulate the impact of their citizens and industrial enterprises on the natural environment; and groups within civil society that could have been the source of information or criticism either do not exist or have been repressed.”

Eckersley and Barry’s volume on green states focuses almost exclusively on Western Europe, North America and Australia, justifying this since “most of the promising developments are emerging from the developed world.”

Sonnenfeld and Mol suggest that “developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa are barely touched by emerging global political institutions and agreements aiming at environmental reform.” This focus on the developed world misses out on some of the most interesting and important transformations in environmental governance and statehood that are occurring in other parts of the world.

In contrast, transformations in African statehood have been a central theme in Africanist literature. Recent studies have tended to emphasise the many different sides and dimensions of the African state, its split or hybrid character, and the difficult of identifying clear boundaries between the domestic and international, public and private, and state and non-state. Graham Harrison, for example, argues that transnational governance states are emerging in the field of development policy, where the degree of penetration of state apparatuses, policy goals, technical capacity and civil society mobilisation by external agencies is such that “governance can now be said to constitute a historically unprecedented reconfiguration of state forms in post-colonial Africa.”

What he describes as “post-conditionality aid regimes”, of which Tanzania is a paradigm example, include processes whereby “donor/creditor involvement in reform becomes qualitatively more intimate, pervading the form and processes of the state.”

Latham, Callaghy and Kassimir use the term “transboundary formations” to highlight the difficulty of conceptually separating the internal from the external in African politics, and to emphasise “the wide range of institutions shaping
order and exercising authority in Africa.” Abrahamsen and Williams observe that international financial institutions (IFIs) and donors “have achieved an ever-stronger ability to influence policy formation and decision-making on the continent”, and similarly “international NGOs are increasingly ‘state-like’ in their functions and influences.” But do these transboundary formations exist in the area of environmental governance?

The answer to this question seems quite likely to be affirmative, given that the literature on global environmental governance has also tended to emphasise the transnationalised and hybrid nature of environmental governance. Environmental issues cross national boundaries, as has been often noted, and environmental governance is often regarded as a ‘soft’ policy area likely to be contracted out by states to other actors. Non-state actors, transnational networks, scientific bodies, international agencies and institutions, and transnational corporations are all prominent and often leading actors in environmental governance, alongside nation-states. These developments have led authors such as Bradley Karkkainen to argue that we are witnessing the emergence of “post-sovereign environmental governance”, in which states play a role alongside other actors in governance formations which are non-exclusive, non-hierarchical, and post-territorial. This marks, he argues, a substantial departure from existing conventional assumptions of rational states acting in international anarchy to resolve global commons dilemmas, towards the emergence of “hybrid, polycentric, problem-solving institutional constellations”. The rest of this article examines these claims in the Tanzanian context, beginning with a brief historical contextualisation of Tanzanian development and environment policy.
Environment and development politics in Tanzania

The foundations of the colonial state in Tanganyika (as elsewhere in Africa) were intimately bound up with practices of resource management and conservation. On taking over what is now mainland Tanzania in 1891 the German colonial administration established regulations for controlling wildlife utilisation by both Europeans and Africans. Both German and British colonial occupiers established particularly coercive, command-and-control styles of environmental planning and management, as elsewhere in the colonies. However, the symbolic importance of ‘wilderness’ areas like the Serengeti (the first national park in British colonial Africa), the Selous (known and marketed as ‘Africa’s last wilderness’), and Mount Kilimanjaro meant that Tanganyika acquired a particular visibility and prominence within the English speaking world.

In many respects this style of statist environmental management was inherited and perpetuated by the independent post-colonial government of Tanzania under President Julius Nyerere. The importance of agriculture and rural politics to Nyerere’s vision of African socialism meant that the management and development of the countryside could not, ultimately, be left to chance. The policy of ujamaa and villagisation represented one of the largest exercises of rural social engineering of the twentieth century, and epitomised the command-and-control style of rural planning. The forced removal and resettlement of perhaps as many as 11 million Tanzanians led to disastrous ecological consequences as well as political and social injustices, and huge food imports were necessary between 1973 and 1975. A recent review of contemporary environmental mainstreaming referred to this history somewhat euphemistically as “Tanzania’s famed planning expertise”.

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Independence did not lead to the end of international influence over environmental management and development planning in Tanzania. Even as Nyerere was implementing his form of African socialism and *ujamaa*, Western donors were eager to fund development and conservation in Tanzania.\(^{34}\) The increasing influence of major international environmental NGOs – such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) – was reflected in their prominence in Tanzanian conservation, and they (alongside expatriate teams of consultants) helped the government to draft major speeches and policies on environment and development issues.\(^{35}\) Despite Nyerere’s public admission that “I do not want to spend my holidays watching crocodiles”,\(^{36}\) Tanzania quickly became a world-leader in terms of the proportion of its territory with officially protected status, facilitated, funded and often directly managed by international conservation organisations.

This international presence was deepened and extended by the impact of the economic crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and Tanzania’s eventual transition to liberal democracy and economic neo-liberalism.\(^{37}\) In the 1980s WWF began to fund government anti-poaching activities in Tanzania, and by the end of the decade they were directly supporting the budgets of the Wildlife and Forestry departments.\(^{38}\) Tensions over the degree of this foreign involvement and penetration across Tanzanian politics prompted a fall-out between Tanzania and international donors in the mid 1990s, which eventually was resolved when donors agreed to harmonise their activities and allow Tanzanian political elites more autonomy.\(^{39}\)

These agreements were accompanied by the proclamation of a new era of partnership, post-conditionality, and country-ownership. Tanzania once again seemed ahead of the curve in development policy, a shining example of “effective, transparent partnerships”.\(^{40}\) This new
era of ‘post-conditionality’ and partnership was encapsulated by Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and although Tanzania’s first National Poverty Eradication Strategy in 1997 was rejected by the World Bank, a more intimately donor-driven Poverty Reduction Strategy was agreed in 2000.\textsuperscript{41} Subsequent reiterations of PRSPs have stressed the need for mainstreaming environmental concerns within government planning, driven largely by international agreements such as the inclusion of environmental sustainability in the Millennium Development Goals, and the promotion of national strategies for sustainable development at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002.\textsuperscript{42}

The rising prominence of environmental issues within formal Tanzanian politics was signalled by the creation of the Division of Environment in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism in 1991, and its subsequent move to the Vice President’s Office to give it more “political clout” in 1995.\textsuperscript{43} The development of the National Environment Policy in 1997 was regarded positively by donors,\textsuperscript{44} but the desire to integrate environmental considerations more fully across development policy prompted a DFID and UNDP-sponsored review of the environmental implications of the first PRSP in 2003.\textsuperscript{45} In a bid to address concerns including rather narrow public participation and the limited attention given to environmental issues a new PRSP – this time called the National Strategy for Growth and the Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), or in Swahili, \textit{Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania} (MKUKUTA) – was developed in 2005, aimed at addressing these earlier deficiencies.\textsuperscript{46} It was scheduled to run for five years, at which point it was succeeded by MKUKUTA II.\textsuperscript{47}

A great deal of attention, both national and transnational, was devoted to the environmental mainstreaming of MKUKUTA, which has been held up as an “inspiration to other developing countries, especially in Africa.”\textsuperscript{48} Reviewers of the environmental mainstreaming process
optimistically concluded that “with the environment established as central to the MKUKUTA, Tanzania’s development is now following a more secure and sustainable path”, whilst admitting there was still a significant “implementation gap”. Reflecting the increased prominence of environmental issues in development planning, the official environmental budget has grown significantly and rapidly, from just over 1 billion Tanzanian shillings in 2005-6 to almost 5.7 billion Tanzanian shillings in 2006-7. MKUKUTA I included 15 directly ‘environmental’ targets (out of 108 targets in total) which are quantitative and measurable through specific national indicators, and the strategy was motivated by a broader vision of sustainable development, in line with Vision 2025, Tanzania’s national development strategy. However, progress against these indicators has not been as significant as hoped. MKUKUTA II, which began in 2010, noted that despite impressive economic growth rates in the previous five years, progress against targets on income poverty (especially rural poverty) and food poverty were disappointing, and much progress remains to be made in providing clean water and sanitation.

Indeed, the impact of these innovations in environmental governance on the state of Tanzania’s environment is a somewhat open question, and one frequently encounters scepticism as to whether these plans have had any real impact. Yet these strategies do illuminate important developments and transformations in the form of environmental governance in Tanzania, whatever their impact on environmental quality itself. Tanzania is therefore a particularly interesting case to examine some of the claims made in the global environmental governance literature regarding the rise of post-sovereign environmental governance. Does environmental management and development planning in Tanzania manifest post-sovereign characteristics? If so, to what degree? These questions are addressed in the following sections.
Non-exclusivity and environmental governance in Tanzania

Karkkainen argues that environmental governance is increasingly “non-exclusive”, in “its departure from the conventional state-centric understanding that sovereign states hold exclusive authority over environmental and natural resource policies within their territorial jurisdictions.” The state, he argues, becomes a co-participant rather than the sole or central participant in environmental governance, and all interested stakeholders are (potentially) included in the management of sustainable development. Similar claims have been made or debated by other authors in the field.

Non-exclusivity is relatively easy to evidence in the Tanzanian case. Indeed, as noted above, from the earliest colonial formulations of state conservation policy, non-state actors, public bodies, scientific bodies and others have been central players. This has expanded exponentially in recent years, as international donors, agencies, transnational NGOs and advocacy network have become ever-more deeply implicated in Tanzanian environmental planning and governance. For example, policy discourse on climate change funding and adaptation in Tanzania has been almost entirely donor-driven and donor-funded.

The mainstreaming of environmental concerns in the MKUKUTA process is an excellent example of this diversity of stakeholders beyond the Tanzanian state. It was achieved with substantial support and assistance from donor and international actors, primarily DFID and UNDP. Although the mainstreaming process was driven by the Vice President’s Office, their key Integrating Environment Programme was funded by a diverse range of actors including Danida, DFID, the UNDP Poverty Environment Initiative, the UNEP Poverty Environment Programme, and the Royal Norwegian Government through the UNDP Drylands Development Centre. The MKUKUTA drafting team was chaired by the VPO and
included individuals from government and the private sector, CSOs, and academic and research institutions, and it was predominantly Tanzanian, with only three non-Tanzanian residents and (unusually) no foreign consultants.\textsuperscript{59} Despite the absence of foreign consultants, the impact of pervasive global discourses of development planning, such as the ubiquitous logical framework approach (or ‘log-frame’), are clearly evident.\textsuperscript{60} Through a range of participatory and consultative processes many civil society and local organisations also engaged with formulating government policy, and this has been regarded as one of MKUKUTA’s biggest institutional innovations and legacies for Tanzanian governance.\textsuperscript{61}

Such processes have sought to build upon existing attempts to decentralise natural resource management, and involve local village authorities more directly in environmental governance.\textsuperscript{62} On the one hand such processes could be seen as the Tanzanian state encouraging the principle of subsidiarity in environmental governance, and thus as evidence for non-exclusive governance, even if we should be cautious about assuming that this necessarily results in increased legitimacy, accountability and transparency. On the other hand, most accounts suggest that these decentralisation efforts have been quite limited in both their scale and effectiveness so far – although different speeds of progress are noted in different policy areas (such as forestry compared to wildlife management).\textsuperscript{63} In 2007 Assey et al noted that “participatory forest management still covers only 1% of forest reserves and community wildlife management areas are still only at a pilot stage”.\textsuperscript{64}

The role of the private sector in environmental governance in Tanzania is another significant area of change, and potentially growing non-exclusivity. Despite little direct private sector involvement in the MKUKUTA process, the private sector is increasingly a dominant and driving force in agricultural development, food security, carbon finance and energy supply.\textsuperscript{65}
Development discourse in Tanzania is becoming even more clearly orientated towards the private sector, and MKUKUTA II declared that though it “builds on its predecessor’s strategy, it is oriented more towards growth and enhancement of productivity … and calls for more active private sector participation.”\footnote{66} The Tanzanian government’s 
*Kilimo Kwanza* (Agriculture First) strategy is committed to attracting foreign investment, and the 2006 State of the Environment report confirmed that “the government is promoting and encourages participation of private investments in large-scale agriculture.”\footnote{67} Similarly DFID is promising to “increase its work directly with the private sector”, and predicts that 2011-15 will mark a “rebalancing of DFID Tanzania’s programme” in this direction.\footnote{68}

Through this gradual and more intimate inclusion of these key sectors – foreign donors, local populations, and the private sector – environmental governance in Tanzania is increasingly non-exclusive. Harder tests of the degree of post-sovereign environmental governance are the degree to which they are non-hierarchical and post-territorial.

**Non-hierarchy and environmental governance in Tanzania**

Karkkainen argues that the traditional model of sovereign law-giving states, exercising ultimate authority and jurisdiction over matters within their territory, does not hold in cases of post-sovereign governance. Rather, influence “is wielded primarily through voice and the threat of exit rather than formal voting procedures or hierarchical command structures, although inequalities in expertise and capacities mean that some participants may be more influential than others.”\footnote{69} This is a far stricter test, and at first glance it is hard to argue that environmental governance in Tanzania is non-hierarchical. Whilst the range of actors involved is certainly wide, Tanzania’s history and political culture of statist, centrist control continues to exert an influence on the manner in which environmental governance is
structured. It is certainly difficult to identify any areas in which the state has formally
abdicated ultimate responsibility or authority for environmental governance. In the National
Environmental Policy (1997) and the Environmental Management Act (2004) the Tanzanian
state continues to take formal responsibility for environmental and resource management.
However, there are two ways in which the hierarchical structure of environmental governance
might be thrown into some doubt. The first is through the existence of regional agreements,
international law and global environmental norms; the second relates to the internal structure
of the Tanzanian state.

Whilst state sovereignty and the ultimate responsibility of the nation-state are key elements of
the mainstream discourse of liberal environmentalism – as manifested in key documents like
the Brundtland Report, the Rio Principles, Agenda 21, and the Johannesburg Declaration –
this discourse also implies the existence of higher norms, ultimate natural limits, and
internationally agreed laws beyond state sovereignty. For example, Kevin Dunn notes that
international conservation NGOs who participate in the funding, protection, publicising and
management of African national parks often expressly reject discourses of state sovereignty.
Seeking “to represent those who cannot represent themselves (in this case, the flora and
fauna), these NGOs claim that their mandate comes from global and universal human
interests. Thus, they claim to represent a universal moral call that trumps state power.”
Some global public goods, such as biodiversity, are widely recognised, and the Government
of Tanzania acknowledges that the country is “endowed with several valuable terrestrial
resources that are also unique not only to Tanzania but also to the rest of the world.”
Moreover, Tanzania is a signatory to a wide range of international legal conventions – such
as the Convention on Biological Diversity, or the Montreal Convention on ozone depletion –
which mean that it would be very difficult for any Tanzanian government to revoke the
national park status of the Serengeti, or to start manufacturing CFCs. Furthermore, Tanzania is also a party to regional initiatives such as the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), a NEPAD programme backed by the World Bank, which calls for signatories to increase public investment into agriculture by at least 10%.

Importantly, this is not to argue that an additional layer of hierarchy exists somewhere ‘above’ the Tanzanian state. Rather, environmental management consists of extremely complex and convoluted networks of power relationships, overlapping legal conventions, and norms and discourses, which work on and through a myriad of actors, institutions and nodes. In some cases – such as the overall status of the Serengeti (notwithstanding specific developments within the park) – the Tanzanian state is both constrained and empowered by international law, norms, and conservation organisations; in other cases – such as the requirement to submit national strategies for sustainable development – the Tanzanian state, in conjunction with advisors drawn from the donor and NGO realm, and domestic constituencies, has considerably more latitude and authority to prioritise its own ‘development vision’ and strategy.

The second complicating aspect of the hierarchical elements of environmental governance in Tanzania is connected to the thorny theoretical and empirical ‘problem’ of the African state. The sovereign and unitary nation-state might be a relatively stable (if often over-emphasised) feature of Western political landscapes, but this is less clearly so in the African context. In Tanzania in particular the hierarchical structure of environmental governance within the state is sometimes hard to discern. Researchers from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) note a lack of clarity about what is meant by ‘the environment’, meaning that ‘the question of who is in charge of protecting the environment and through what methods is it done is not a
straightforward one in the Tanzanian case.” Drawing a clear map of the competencies and levels of authority between the President, the Vice President’s Office (containing the Division of Environment), the National Environmental Management Council, the Ministry of Finance, parliament and the judiciary, competing line departments (each who are supposed to have their own environmental unit), regional authorities, and village authorities is almost impossible. Further examples of these ambiguous and contradictory hierarchies are legion: the REDD management model is notable for “the absence of clearly articulated relationships with existing statutory oversight institutions, such as Parliament and the Controller and Auditor General”; the 2006 State of the Environment report acknowledged that “the central-local relationships are still unclear”; and the lack of clarity in the relationship between the Department of the Environment in the Vice President’s Office and the National Environmental Management Council is said to have created a situation of “institutional gridlock”.

To further complicate matters, the pervasive presence of donor, NGO and university/Third Sector advisors and authorities within state governance structures runs deep. Gould and Ojanen’s study of the PRS process in Tanzania concluded that the process led to a select group of locally based NGOs and transnational agencies being invited to “merge in the circle” of the national policy-making elite – in effect to become part of the state itself. Harrison argues that through such processes “the national-international boundary has been rendered so much more porous by a historically embedded ‘mutual assimilation’ of donor and state power and ideas”. There is a further profusion of authorities and actors in terms of the actual implementation of environmental projects ‘on-the-ground’, including the donor sector, international NGOs, externally-funded national or local NGOs, community organisations, transnational capital (with their own murky networks of fund managers, investment advisors,
contractors and sub-contractors, etc), and personal patronage links. In any specific case – such as the Agrisol development of agricultural land in Eastern Tanzania on land occupied by Burundian refugees due to be evicted; or the over-fishing of Tanzanian coastal waters by EU trawlers; or the development of road and railway links between Uganda and Tanzania through the Serengeti; or the biofuel plantation run by Swedish development agencies in Southern Tanzania – it is almost impossible to discern clear hierarchies or lines of authority. Indeed, this degree of opacity is one way in which the system “works” for those skilled enough to negotiate it, and as Gould and Ojanen note, “the higher echelons of decision-making authority are buffered against the direct influence of non-state actors (or ‘the poor’) by an ambiguous and multi-staged chain of bureaucratic reporting procedures.”

Eirik Jansen recounts an anecdotal story circulating in Dar es Salaam involving an accountant who had been hired to go through a government institution’s financial management system. When presenting his report and recommendations to the director of one of the departments, the director murmurs in dismay: “But this new system will bring clarity!” Jansen observes that “much creativity and energy have been spent on keeping the financial systems incomprehensible.”

This complexity of the African state has generated its own body of sociological and political literature: on the neo-patrimonial state, the predatory state, moral economies of corruption, economies of affection, shadow states and shadow economies, and so on. The relevance of these literatures in this case is simply that the orderly, hierarchical state is a doubtful prospect in some areas of natural resource management in Tanzania. The mining sector, for example, has been described as “a matter of loose and rival informal coalitions competing for control of the state apparatus through opportunistic rent-seeking and state plunder”. Complex networks of powerful individuals, local and international private companies, political parties
and state institutions have contributed to what appears to be endemic and apparently “long-term private sector ‘capture’” of the Department of Wildlife in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, producing an overall picture of “uncoordinated and collectively dysfunctional rent-seeking” in Tanzania’s natural resource sectors. In these sectors rents are channelled through “ad hoc alliances of politicians, officials (including members of the armed forces), and private brokers”. In most of these cases the sheer opacity of business relationships and practices prevents easy identifications of clear hierarchies of governance.

The agricultural sector is an excellent example of this complexity. During the 1990s Matthew Costello noted that the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development was so spatially and organisationally divided that even at the centre “offices are housed in five different locations within Dar es Salaam, some of which cannot be reached by telephone from Ministry Headquarters”. Cooksey describes the ambiguous evolution of crop marketing boards:

In theory, marketing boards have been stripped of their former powers as ‘crop authorities’. Prior to formal liberalisation in the early 1990s, crop authorities oversaw the production, marketing and export of Tanzania’s main export crops. These authorities have been replaced by crop boards with radically reduced mandates. In theory, they are responsible for market regulation, including issuing trading licences to private crop buyers and ensuring competition and quality control, but not for crop financing or marketing. In practice, the picture is much less clear. Crucially, boards continue to be players as well as regulators, and enjoy formal powers over producers and middlemen that far exceed simple regulatory functions.

These marketing boards have, in practice, extensive and pervasive power over who grows what crop, where, at what price it is sold, and to who. The relative autonomy of sections of the state bureaucracy (local and national) from other branches of the state prevents an easy
distinction between public and private, state and non-state, or an easy ascription of national or state interests.\textsuperscript{91}

Overall therefore, it is difficult to claim that environmental governance is Tanzania is non-hierarchical, as the Tanzanian state is reluctant to formally cede authority in any area. However, it is also impossible to assert convincingly that a unified and homogenous Tanzanian state has ultimate authority over environmental management and natural resources in the country. Both international norms and laws, and the internal complexity of identifying a singular ‘Tanzanian state’ give environmental governance a degree of what might be termed neo-hierarchy, or multiple hierarchies. This agglomeration of multiple hierarchies incorporates what Dan Brockington has termed an “environmental-conservation complex” consisting of the national and local state, international agencies and NGOs, political parties, and business and private interests.\textsuperscript{92} This complex is not confined to the conservation arena, however, but rather encompasses a diverse range of actors straddling all areas of environmental governance.

**Post-territoriality and environmental governance in Tanzania**

The third dimension of post-sovereign environmental governance that Karkkainen identifies is post-territoriality. This means that environmental governance “is problem-driven, and its spatial and conceptual boundaries are defined not by reference to fixed, territorially delimited jurisdictional lines, but by reference to shared understandings of the nature, scale, and causes of the problem to be addressed.”\textsuperscript{93} It is certainly true that some forms of environmental governance in Tanzania have transboundary or post-territorial aspects: such as climate change mitigation and adaptation, participation in regional governance initiatives such as the
UNEP-administered Partnership for the Development of Environmental Law in Africa, and the protection of ‘global’ biodiversity through transboundary conservation areas.\textsuperscript{94}

However, on closer inspection, and despite the much-vaunted transnationalism of environmental issues, many aspects of environmental governance in Tanzania are actually quite territorially bounded. The most pressing environmental issues for the vast majority of Tanzanians, and the Tanzanian government, are food and water security (largely defined in terms of agricultural and infrastructure provision for a territorially bounded population), which are closely linked to problems of managing resource degradation in forests, agricultural land and fisheries.\textsuperscript{95} Further high priority issues include energy security (providing enough energy to meet the needs of a territorially bounded population, although with one eye on the regional market),\textsuperscript{96} and urban environmental health (waste, housing, pollution, transport, etc).\textsuperscript{97} By and large, these issues are territorially bounded, and focussed on a territorially bounded population. Moreover, this is reinforced by a strongly nationalist discourse in popular and governmental Tanzanian politics, sometimes manifested as a populist suspicion of ‘foreigners’ or transnational capital, which means that environmental governance is actually firmly orientated towards Tanzanian national priorities and Tanzanian territory.\textsuperscript{98}

Indeed, the argument can be pushed even further, to the point where environmental planning and management in Tanzania can be seen in terms of a longer dynamic set of power relations between the central state bureaucracy and the rural population.\textsuperscript{99} The establishment of conservation and resource management policies under colonialism were an attempt to secure more state control – over valuable resources and territory – beyond the urban and coastal regions. Nyerere’s \textit{ujamaa} sought to extend statist penetration and control over the
“uncaptured peasantry”. Environmental discourses of land degradation, over-grazing, conservation, food security and resource management have always been, and continue to be, deployed to justify closer state management of tensions between settled and pastoralist communities. Michael Sheridan’s research on North Pare has revealed that “most farmers now say that the Kiswahili term *hifadhi* (conservation) really means government ownership and mismanagement”. Contemporary environmental governance has been characterised by an intensification of state monitoring, evaluation, auditing and surveillance over the Tanzania natural environment and rural population. Sometimes this has even involved direct violence, such as the attacks by state forces against villagers living in or near conservation areas and forests in 1997 and 1998.

This tendency for environmental governance to mean, in practice, greater state control and penetration over rural populations can be seen in two very different examples. The first is the Tanzanian government’s latest policy for agricultural development – *Kilimo Kwanza*. This policy has identified large tracts of under-utilised “virgin land” in Tanzania, which is being made available for agribusiness and biofuel investment, inspired by visions of mechanised farms in Iowa. In reality of course there is very little ‘under-utilised’ or ‘virgin’ land in Tanzania, and pastoralists, Burundian refugees, and ‘out-of-place’ villagers and ‘squatters’ are being removed. As such the agricultural sector has been characterised by what Brian Cooksey described in 2003 as “the recent recrudescence of statist legislation, policies and practices”, albeit in alliance with favoured private investors. Local activists’ perception of these processes is that “the state, at the central government level in collaboration with centralized appendages at the local governments’ level, has continued to exert its statist arms in managing agriculture, albeit, through privatization rather than nationalization.”
The second example of the intensification of statist control over land and territory, through processes of environmental governance, comes from the monitoring and data analysis dimensions of the MKUKUTA process itself. Much of the focus of MKUKUTA I and II has been on improving capacity for data monitoring, analysis and evaluation. Donors have increasingly targeted their support on improving standards of data collection, analysis and assessment processes, and evaluation and reporting systems. The repeated stress on the very existence of quantitative and measurable targets and indicators – rather than success or failure in meeting them – is evidence of this focus. An official in the MKUKUTA Secretariat claimed that there have been massive improvements in terms of Tanzania’s capacity to monitor and evaluate data on the indicators, and there is now a “coherent and harmonised monitoring system”. Moreover, the 2011 five year development plan promises that “elaborate mechanisms will be put in place to improve data collection and data flow mechanisms to ensure quality, validity and accuracy of data”.

This flood of data, arising from surveillance, surveys and monitoring, is driven by and reciprocally fuels the proliferation of reviews, plans, strategies and policies that are required from developing countries like Tanzania. These include National Environmental Plans, State of the Environment reports, National Biodiversity Strategies and Actions Plans, sustainable land management plans, climate change vulnerability and capacity assessments, environmental impact assessments (EIAs), integrated development plans, rural and urban land planning frameworks and many more, each with demands for quantifiable, verifiable data.

This reflects the increasing dominance of what is sometimes referred to as the ‘new managerialism’ of development aid. This trend is being driven by the international
development institutions, such as the World Bank, which desires “quantified, time-bound, costed, realistic targets and indicators relating to environment.”\textsuperscript{115} What this tends to achieve in practice – given the dominance of Dar es Salaam-based state institutions such as the Ministry of Finance over data collection and analysis – is the reinforcement and deeper penetration of central state power over rural areas and non-state actors. Rather than a de-territorialisation of the state, therefore, environmental governance in Tanzania has often been characterised by the extension of state control throughout the national territory, including into areas which it has only irregularly penetrated.

**Conclusion**

Whilst elements of post-sovereign environmental governance can be identified in Tanzania – most notably in terms of the wide range of actors beyond the state involved in environmental governance, as well as the existence of multiple hierarchies in the sector – there are also ways in which the transformation of environmental governance is contributing to processes of state-building and greater state penetration of the Tanzanian territory.

This recrudescence of the state is a very different process, however, to earlier colonial and post-colonial command-and-control statist dynamics. The nature of the state is fundamentally changing, as donors, civil society groups, and private actors in effect become “part of the state itself.”\textsuperscript{116} Moreover the role of the state itself in environment and development planning and management is changing. The 2009 Poverty and Human Development report stated that “Tanzania’s Vision is to achieve a vibrant, developed market economy, which implies that the role of the state is facilitative rather than directive.”\textsuperscript{117} This shift – sometimes described as moving from ‘rowing to steering’,\textsuperscript{118} is best described in MKUKUTA II:
The private sector has an important and critical role to play in achieving poverty reduction outcomes because of its central role as the engine for economic growth. The government is reducing its role to core functions of policy formulation, economic management, provision of economic and social infrastructure, and legal and regulatory framework, maintenance of law and order as well as selected areas of public-private sector partnership.\(^{119}\)

As such, the Tanzanian state is not the only ‘winner’ through processes of capacity-building for environmental governance – so too are the international donor agencies, consultants and analysts who fund, support, deliver training, and assess results. So too are those civil society organisations who are willing to be supportive partners, to be ‘consulted’ and ‘empowered’ in the proper manner, and to act as a conduit (or replacement) for involving and representing broader local communities. So too are the private sector actors who gain legitimacy and policy influence, as well as access to lucrative natural resources.

Whether such transformations in environmental governance are normatively desirable, and serve the interests of Tanzanian national development and environmental sustainability, is beyond the scope of this article. The assumption in much of the environmental governance literature seems to be that these transformations are a good thing.\(^{120}\) On the other hand the literature on the transformation of the African state raises many concerns related to the impact on African sovereignty, legitimacy, and accountability.\(^{121}\) From this review of environmental mainstreaming and post-sovereign governance in Tanzania it is possible to conclude that much of the international praise for the Tanzanian experience conceals ways in which vested interests are entrenching their control over natural resources, and new power relationships are emerging between global and local capital, the Tanzanian state and civil society, and the international donor industry. Neither is it evident that transformations in environmental governance are generating impressive improvements in ecological
sustainability and food security in Tanzania. What is clear is that, contrary to the assumptions of mainstream literatures on ecological modernisation and ‘green’ states, environmental governance in countries like Tanzania is a crucial site of power struggles over the nature of the state, and the form of relationships between the international and the domestic, and state and non-state actors. Far from being a marginal topic on the fringes of global governance, African environmental politics reveals that contestations over the location of authority and the role of the state go to the heart of global environmental governance.

End notes

1 See, for example, an IMF report on Tanzania in 2009 which praised its “remarkable turnaround” since the mid-1980s. Nord et al, Tanzania. See also Harrison and Mulley with Holtom, ‘Tanzania’, 271.
2 Assey et al, Environment at the heart of Tanzania’s Development, iv. See also Dalal-Clayton and Bass, The Challenges of Environmental Mainstreaming, 54 & 69.
3 Nord et al, Tanzania, 7.
5 Norrington-Davies and Thornton, Climate change financing and aid effectiveness, 6-7; The United Republic of Tanzania, The Tanzania Five Year Development Plan, 70; interview with Kyaaruzi Ladislaus; interview with Patrick Ndaki.
7 The United Republic of Tanzania, Millennium Development Goals Report, iii.
8 Ibid, iii.
9 The United Republic of Tanzania, National Programme of Adaptation, 7.
10 Chachage and Mbunda, The state of the then NAFCO, NARCO and absentee landlords’ farms/ranches in Tanzania, 96. See also Chachage, Land acquisition and accumulation in Tanzania; Kamanga, The Agrofuel Industry in Tanzania.
11 Vice President’s Office, Poverty and Environment Newsletter, Volume 7.
12 Norrington-Davies and Thornton, Climate change financing and aid effectiveness, 12; The United Republic of Tanzania, National Programme of Adaptation, 11; email exchange with Brian Cooksey.
13 A recent case in which between US$25-30m (about half of the total) of Norwegian aid money for the Management of Natural Resources Programme (MNRP) in Tanzania was allegedly misspent is discussed by Cooksey, Public goods, rents and business in Tanzania, 32-3; and Jansen, Does Aid Work?
14 This research has primarily involved reviews of Tanzanian planning and strategy documents, informed by the theoretical and secondary literature. It was supplemented by a fieldwork trip to Dar es Salaam in August 2011, supported by the British Institute in Eastern Africa. Semi-structured elite interviews and follow-up emails were conducted with 12 government officials, academics, donors and civil society activists. A list of these follows the endnotes.
15 Interesting exceptions relevant to this paper include Broch-Due, ‘Producing nature and poverty in Africa’; Kimani, ‘A collaborative approach to environmental governance in East Africa’; Lecoutere, ‘Institutions under construction’; and Ribot, ‘Democratic decentralisation of natural resources’.
Barry and Eckersley, ‘W(h)ither the green state?’, 272.
Abrahamsen and Williams, Security beyond the state, 87.
Karkkainen, ‘Post-sovereign environmental governance’.
Ibid, 75. Karkkainen, like much of the global environmental governance literature discussed above, also focuses on the developed rather than the developing world, using case studies from North America.
Dunn, ‘Contested State Spaces’, 436; Levine, ‘Convergence or convenience?’ 1044-1045.
Nelson, Emergent or illusory? 3; Neumann, Imposing Wilderness, 98.
Neumann, Imposing Wilderness, 129-131; Neumann, ‘Africa’s “last wilderness”’.
Levine, ‘Convergence or convenience?’, 1045; Nelson, Emergent or illusory?, 3.
Couolson, Tanzania; Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania; Scott, Seeing Like a State, chapter 7.
Scott, Seeing Like a State, 239; Shao, ‘The villagization programme and the disruption of the ecological balance in Tanzania’; Sheridan, ‘The environmental consequences of independence and socialism in North Pare’.
Assey et al, Environment at the heart of Tanzania’s Development, 11.
Couolson, Tanzania, 314-315.
Jennings, “Almost an Oxfam in itself”, 527-8; Neumann, Imposing Wilderness, 140.
Levine, ‘Convergence or convenience?’, 1047.
Shivji, Let the people speak. The degree and permanence of this “liberalisation” is questioned by many authors, including Shivji. See also Cooksey, ‘Marketing reform?’
Levine, ‘Convergence or convenience?’?, 1048.
Interview with Amon Manyama; interview with Blandina Cheche.
Interview with Magdalena Banasiak.
Assey et al emphasise the role of local actors and coalitions who ‘owned’ the process: including an (unnamed) “multi-stakeholder group of intellectuals” in the early 1990s who lobbied government on environmental issues, and the leadership role of President Mkapa and the Vice President’s Office. Assey et al, Environment at the heart of Tanzania’s Development, 7 & 13.
Ibid, 11-13; Bojö and Reddy, Status and evolution of environmental priorities in the Poverty Reduction Strategies, 14; The United Republic of Tanzania, National Strategy for Growth and the Reduction of Poverty; interview with Amon Manyama; interview with Blandina Cheche; interview with Magembe Ekingo; interview with Professor Longinus Rutasitara; telephone interview with David Howlett.
The United Republic of Tanzania, National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II.
Assey et al, Environment at the heart of Tanzania’s Development, iv.
Ibid, 2.
The United Republic of Tanzania, National Strategy for Growth and the Reduction of Poverty, chapter 5; The United Republic of Tanzania, MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan and Indicator Information; Vice President’s Office, Poverty and Environment Newsletter, Volume 1.
The United Republic of Tanzania, National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II, chapter 2.
Interview with Professor Benedict Mongula; interview with Brian Cooksey; interview with Magdalena Banasiak.
Karkkainen, ‘Post-sovereign environmental governance’, 75.
Howlett. Indeed a recent Tanzanian review of this process explicitly identified donors as the primary drivers of Shauri, interview with Professor Benedict Mongula; interview with Blandina Cheche; telephone interview with David environmental mainstreaming. Rutasitara, Mainstreaming environment into MKUKUTA II process, 5-7.

Assey et al, Environment at the heart of Tanzania’s Development, 17; UNDP-UNEP, Poverty and Environment Initiative (PEI).

Assey et al, Environment at the heart of Tanzania’s Development, 15. The role of a VPO/UNDP-appointed advisor of the Environmental Integration Programme, David Howlett, was central to this process. Much was made of the fact that his role was demand-driven, working principally to VPO and not to external agency (UNDP) or funder (DFID and DANIDA) agendas.


The United Republic of Tanzania, National Strategy for Growth and the Reduction of Poverty, chapter 3; Assey et al, Environment at the heart of Tanzania’s Development, 36-37. See also The United Republic of Tanzania, National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II, 4. However MKUKUTA II has been criticised for failing to live up to the high standards of participation and dialogue established by its predecessor.


Assey et al, Environment at the heart of Tanzania’s Development, 10.

Ibid, 47; Bofin et al, REDD Integrity, 72; Chachage, Land acquisition and accumulation in Tanzania; Igoe, ‘Power and force in Tanzanian civil society’.

The United Republic of Tanzania, National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II, ix.

Ibid, 43; The United Republic of Tanzania, State of the Environment Report 2006, 146; interview with Brian Cooksey.

DFID Tanzania, Operational Plan 2011-15, 6; interview with Magdalena Banasiak. For a similar view from the IMF, see Nord et al, Tanzania, 7.

Karkkainen, ‘Post-sovereign environmental governance’, 76.


The United Republic of Tanzania, State of the Environment Report 2006, 47.

Ibid, 22-23. This does not necessarily mean that governments have no room for sovereign decision making however, as recent debates and revelations about the constructions of new roads and railways through the Serengeti make clear. See http://www.savetheserengeti.org/ (accessed 9 January 2012).


Lutrrell and Pantaleo, Budget Support, Aid Instruments and the Environment, 34-35.

For a recent (partial) attempt see Rutasitara, Mainstreaming environment into MKUKUTA II process, 15.

Bofin et al, REDD Integrity, 60.


Kimani, Reinvention of Environmental Governance in East Africa, 146-147.


Research by NGOs and local activists reveals a wide range of cases of conflict, characterised by shady business relationships, unknown investors, unclear lines of political accountability and responsibility, contested land ownership, and contradictory accounts of village meetings. See Chachage and Mbunda, The state of the then NAFCO, NARCO and absentee landlords’ farms/branches in Tanzania; Chachage, Land acquisition and accumulation in Tanzania; Cooksey, Public goods, rents and business in Tanzania; Igoe, ‘Power and force in Tanzanian civil society’; interview with Bernard Baha; email exchange with Brain Cooksey.

Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works.

Gould and Ojanen, ‘Merging in the Circle’, 72.

Jansen, Does Aid Work? 17.

Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works; Cooksey, Public goods, rents and business in Tanzania, appendix 1; Ruitenbeek and Cartier, Putting Tanzania’s Hidden Economy to Work.

Cooksey, The investment and business environment for gold exploration and mining in Tanzania, 90.

Cooksey and Kelsall, *The political economy of the investment climate in Tanzania*, p. 85. See also Bofin et al, *REDD Integrity*; Ruitenbeek and Cartier, *Putting Tanzania’s Hidden Economy to Work*.


Cooksey, ‘Marketing reform?’ 77.

Long-running tensions between the executive (and the party) and the bureaucracy are discussed in Costello, ‘Administration triumphs over politics’.


Dunn, ‘Contested State Spaces’; Kimani, ‘A collaborative approach to environmental governance in East Africa’; Norrington-Davies and Thornton, *Climate change financing and aid effectiveness*.


Such an argument has many similarities to James Ferguson’s claims about the workings of the development ‘anti-politics machine’ in Lesotho. For a discussion of Ferguson’s argument and its bearing on Tanzanian politics, see Green, ‘Globalizing development in Tanzania’, 125-127; Igoe, ‘Power and force in Tanzanian civil society’, 138.


Shivji, *Let the people speak*, 243-247; Sunseri, ‘“Something else to burn”’, 609-610.


Chachage and Mbunda, *The state of the then NAFCO, NARCO and absentee landlords’ farms/ranches in Tanzania*, 95.


The United Republic of Tanzania, *National Strategy for Growth and the Reduction of Poverty*, chapter 5; The United Republic of Tanzania, *MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan and Indicator Information*.

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