Gas for development or just for money? is on http://bit.ly/MozGasEn

London Public Lecture Wed 16 March, LSE
Fraud at polls: can journalists and statisticians check?
The Mozambican experience
Joseph Hanlon, Johan Ahlback
Wednesday 16 March 2016; 6.30-8pm
Hong Kong Theatre, Clement House, Aldwych, LSE

In every Mozambican election, Frelimo won, and Renamo cried fraud. Now it appears Renamo has gone back to war.
But who really won the elections? This is a first report on a unique project to put journalists and statisticians together - and test the official outcome of five presidential elections.

http://www.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/events/2016/03/20160316t1830vHKT.aspx
http://bit.ly/1LzpeLc

Also in this issue:
Police head replaced
Huge obscure gas deal

Two Renamo attacks;
Dhlakama no to talks

There were attacks Friday and Saturday near Honde, Barué, Manica on the N7 road north to Tete, about 120 km north of Chimoio. These are the 4th and 5th attacks in this spot. This is not a zone covered by armed convoys. Meanwhile, President Filipe Nyusi has set up a team to organise talks with Renamo head Afonso Dhlakama, who in turn says no talks can take place until he has taken power in six provinces.

On Saturday morning 5 March gunman near Honde shot at a Nagi Investimento bus carrying more than 60 passengers from Tete. The driver was shot and killed and the bus ran off the road and crashed into a tree. One passenger was killed and eight injured. Lusa (6 Mar) reports that there was a confrontation between Renamo and government soldiers near Honde on Friday, and some soldiers were injured and hospitalised.

A broadcast by the Barué Community Television showed the bus and had an interview with Armando Canheze, the provincial police commander, in which he said it should be easy to identify gunmen along the road, but local people do not talk to the police. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IGYG32_QPHQ) This could indicated support for Renamo in this area.

On Friday 4 March Renamo issued a statement saying that the government had mobilised 4500 soldiers, riot police and police in Manica and Sofala provinces to "prevent Renamo installing its
governments there." CanalMoz (3 Mar) reported 2000 troops near the Gorongosa mountain and Dhlakama's base. On 1 March Renamo issued a statement confirming its intention to govern in six provinces: Sofala, Manica, Tete, Zambézia, Nampula and Niassa, and that this "will take place from March". (A Perdiz, 4 Mar, http://macua.blogs.com/files/perdiz-n%C2%BA-166.pdf) So far this month there has been no evidence of Renamo attempts to govern; Lusa reports increased security in provincial capitals.

**Talk only after taking power**

On Friday Nyusi again invited Dhlakama to talks, and announced his team to prepare the talks:
+ Jacinto Veloso, former Security Minister and a member of the National Defence and Security Council (CNDS) which on 24 February called on Nyusi to make a more serious effort to negotiate;
+ Benvinda Levi, former Justice Minister who is now an advisor to Nyusi on legal matters; and
+ Alves Muteque, an official in the president's office.

A statement issued late last week by Dhlakama's office said "Renamo is available for talks with Frelimo, but demands, in the first place, that it govern the six provinces where it won the elections. Thus all dialogue will be in the future when Renamo is effectively governing those provinces." (Lusa 26 Feb, O Pais 29 Feb) Dhlakama also demands that the talks be mediated by the Catholic Church, South African President Jacob Zuma, and the European Union.

**Background**

Dhlakama's demand is not new. After the 1999 election, where he did receive the highest number of votes in those six provinces, he demanded the right to appoint the governors. Talks continued with President Joaquim Chissano until they collapsed in March 2001. But in secret negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo in 2000, Tomás Salomão for Frelimo offered Renamo negotiator Raul Domingos the opportunity for Renamo to nominate some governors. But Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama overruled Domingos and rejected the offer.

Salomão's proposal was complex. In three provinces, Manica, Sofala and Zambézia, Renamo would propose a short-list of three candidates in each province, and President Chissano would appoint one of the three. In the other three provinces, Nampula, Niassa and Tete, Frelimo would nominate a short-list of three candidates in each province, and President Chissano would appoint the one chosen by Renamo. (Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin - 10 April 2001; http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/pics/d75899.pdf)

Dhlakama's stand was "all or nothing", and in the end he gained nothing. In retrospect, it must be one of the worst decisions Dhlakama ever made, because it would have meant three key provinces with Renamo governors. That would have transformed Mozambican politics, and set a precedent for opposition governors. And Frelimo never again offered Dhlakama the ability to appoint important figures.

Dhlakama's list of six provinces is based on the 1999 elections, and does not match the 2014 elections. In 2014 he has the largest number of presidential votes (and thus could say he "won") in Nampula, Zambézia, Tete, Manica and Sofala - but not in Niassa. He gained a majority of votes only in Zambézia and Sofala. For national parliament, Renamo does not have the majority of seats in any province, and has the largest number of seats only in Zambézia and Sofala. For the 10 provincial assemblies Renamo has a majority of seats in Zambézia, Tete and Sofala.

Thus in the 2014 elections Renamo and Dhlakama can claim a clear majority in two provinces, Zambézia and Sofala, and are clearly important in Tete. Dhlakama's claim to Nampula and Manica is more tenuous, and Frelimo won a clear victory in Niassa.
Longstanding Renamo bases in Tete confirmed, as refugees in Malawi top 10,000

TVM reported Sunday (6 Mar) that there are now 10,117 Mozambicans in the Kapise, Malawi, centre, which has become the subject of increasingly acrimonious debates within government. Some of those in the camp have told Mozambican and foreign reporters that they fled Nkondedzi, Tete, because they were accused of being Renamo and were attacked and had houses burned by the army.

Tete Governor Paulo Awade told O Pais (1 Mar) that there are hardly any Mozambicans in the Kapise camp. They are mostly Malawians fleeing the drought there, and those who are Mozambicans are families of Renamo members. But on Thursday (3 Mar) Foreign Minister Oldemiro Baloi, who had visited the camp, told parliament that the people there are “overwhelmingly Mozambicans”. Both Domingo and Radio Moçambique Sunday claimed that there are political representatives of Renamo mixed in with the refugees.

Domingo Sunday (6 Mar) reported that Renamo had bases in Nkondedzi during the 1980s war and some guerrillas were not demobilised and have maintained five bases there until now. Some of the fighters in these bases were used in the 2013/14 attacks on the N1 near Muxungue.

http://www.jornaldomingo.co.mz/index.php/em-foco/7161-verdades-mentiras-e-omissoes-de-kapise

COMMENT: It was well known - and reported - at the time of demobilisation in 1994 that the United Nations knew that Renamo did not demobilise some of its guerrillas and that it maintained a number of bases, generally in more remote rural areas. Over the years, the government took control of some of those areas, which was sometimes obliquely reported, while it was also well know that Renamo was allowed to maintain its base at Maringué, Sofala. But what has become clear more recently is that government knew about Renamo bases in Tete, Zambézia and Nampula, and perhaps elsewhere, and allowed them to remain unchallenged for more than 20 years. jh

Other war news

+ Karim Azamo, a Renamo member of the Sofala Provincial Assembly, was shot and killed last week in Beira, reports Macuablog. And Renamo spokesman António Muchanga accused police in Chimoio of arresting four Renamo members Friday.


Police chief Jorge Khalau sacked

Jorge Khalau was dismissed as General Commander of the Mozambican police force and replaced by a military man, Maj-Gen Julio dos Santos Jane. President Filipe Nyusi was previously Defence Minister and he has appointed someone he feels he can trust to try to bring into line an out of control police force.

Jane had his military training in the former Soviet Union but also has a law degree. He founded and was first director of the Samora Machel Military Academy in Nampula and most recently was commander of the Civic Service, an alternative for young Mozambicans who cannot perform military service. Jane has no police experience, but during the 1980s war he was commander of the Maputo City Garrison and O Pais (4 Mar) credits him with successfully preventing Renamo units from infiltrating Maputo. Nyusi in August appointed Jose Weng San, former head of the riot police, as deputy police commander, and it is assumed he will take operational control, while Jane tries to gain institutional control.
Khalau was appointed by Guebuza in 2008 and allowed the police to become even more infested by organised and political crime networks. Attacks on Renamo head Dhlakama in Manica and in Beira have been attributed to Khalau and elements in the police trying to prevent Nyusi from negotiating with Dhlakama; murders last year of academic Gilles Cistac and journalist Paulo Machava, both critics of the government gunned down in the street, and the attempted murder of Renamo General Secretary Manuel Bissopo in Beira last month, appear not to have been investigated. Equally serious is the extent to which organised crime has infiltrated even higher levels of the police, who have been linked to recent kidnappings and armed robberies. They will resist, so Jane has a fight on his hands.

+ A Maputo shopkeeper, Helder Hemendra, was abducted outside his Supermercado Royal on Av Mao Tse Tung by armed men on Tuesday night.

Controversial $6 billion Chinese-funded gas pipeline agreed

A $6 billion, 2,600 km pipeline to take gas from the Cabo Delgado to South Africa has been agreed, but concerns have been raised about the secrecy relating to the Mozambican partner, and lack of other details. Most of the gas would be sold to South Africa to pay for the pipeline, but it would run along the coast and supply at least coastal cities such as Nacala and Beira, which would allow the development of gas using industries.

The agreement is between Mozambique’s National Hydrocarbon Company (ENH), SacOil, Profin Consulting, and the China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau (CPP). The CPP will finance and carry out the pre investment studies and secure 70% of the project's budget from Chinese financial institutions. CPP is owned by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China's largest oil and gas producer and supplier, which holds 20% of the ENI-led Area 4 project offshore northern Mozambique, which last month received government approval to move ahead with its floating gas liquefaction project. CPP’s website says that since 2000, it has constructed more than 40 long-distance pipelines, totally more than 50,000 km.

CPP and ENH are the only partners with experience in this area. Profin Consulting was established in Maputo in July 2015 as a “Sociedade Anonima” and its shareholders have not been published; it has no known activities.

SacOil is a South African oil and gas company with exploration rights in Egypt, Malawi and DRC but little actual production and it has not been involved in a pipeline. Its chair is Tito Mboweni, former governor of the South African Reserve Bank and chair of gold miner AngloGold Ashanti 2010-14. Independent nonexecutive directors include Mzuvukile Jeff Maqetuka, a former South Africa State Security Agency director-general, and Vusumzi Patrick Pikoli, former National Director of Public Prosecutions.

In our report last year “Gas for development or just for money?” (http://bit.ly/MozGasEn) we noted that the South Africa company Gigajoule had signed a memorandum of understanding with ENH to investigate the proposed pipeline. Gigajoule (49.6%) and ENH (50.4%) already own Matola Gas Company, which distributes gas from Pande and Temane in Maputo and Matola. Without discussion or explanation, this proposal has been rejected.

We also noted that a pipeline would take all of Mozambique's share of the gas for a long period, which could prevent the development of industries such as fertilisers and chemicals which would be better for Mozambican industrialisation.

Comment:
This agreement will be highly controversial, for three reasons:
1) the decision was taken entirely in secret and without explanation or debate;
2) it uses an unknown Mozambican company, Profin, instead of Mozambique's only operating gas company; and
3) it will probably prevent other uses of the gas which would promote industrialisation and development.

This is probably Mozambique's largest and most important development decision, and there are a variety of viable options. It is both amazing and unfortunate that the decision has been taken entirely in secret, with no public discussion.  

**Other news**

**Elephants.** The latest elephant census showed that between 2009 and 2014, the Mozambican elephant population had fallen by 48%, from 20,000 in 2009 to 10,300 in 2014. And both African species of rhinos, the black and the white, are feared extinct in Mozambique. Minister of Land, Environment and Rural Development, Celso Correia, said that during 2015 the Mozambican authorities detained over 300 people in connection with poaching. (AIM En 3 Mar)

**Mobile telephones.** The three mobile phone companies (M-Cel, Vodacom and Movitel) on 1 March switched off a million clients for failing to register their SIM cards. The government first demanded SIM card registration in the wake of the Maputo riots against price increases of 1-2 September 2010, when it argued that the rioters had been mobilized through text messages, so all SIM cards should be registered. The deadline was forgotten and then extended, several times. (AIM En 3 Mar)

**Chickens and beer:**

*A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique*

by Teresa Smart and Joseph Hanlon

E-book for Kindle and iPad, for $9.32 from US Amazon - [http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00NRZXXKE](http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00NRZXXKE) - £5.14 from UK Amazon.


**Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento**

by Teresa Smart & Joseph Hanlon. Copies are in Maputo bookshops or from KAPICUA, Rua Fernão Veloso 12, Maputo; Tel.: +258 21 413 201 or +258 21 415 451 Telm.: +258 823 219 950 E-mail: kapicuadir@tdm.co.mz / kapicuacom@tdm.co.mz

Outside Mozambique, we have a few copies we can send from London. Please email j.hanlon@open.ac.uk.

**Zimbabwe takes back its land**


*Now in paper at a reasonable price*
Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique?
by Joseph Hanlon & Teresa Smart
is now available in paperback, for £17.99 (+ p&p)
from the publisher http://www.boydellandbrewer.com/store/viewItem.asp?idProduct=13503

Just Give Money to the Poor:
The Development Revolution from the Global South
by Joseph Hanlon, Armando Barrientos, and David Hulme
Most of this book can now be read on the web
_tinyurl.com/justgivemoney

This newsletter can be cited as "Mozambique News Reports & Clippings"
Also on the web: Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on
bit.ly/mozamb

NOTE OF EXPLANATION:
This mailing list is used to distribute two publications, both edited by Joseph Hanlon. This is my own sporadic "News reports & clippings", which is entirely my own responsibility. This list is also used to distribute the Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, published by CIP and AWEPA, but those organisations are not linked to "News reports & clippings"
Joseph Hanlon

Mozambique media websites:
Noticias: www.jornalnoticias.co.mz
O Pais: www.opais.co.mz
@Verdade:http://www.verdade.co.mz
Diario de Moçambique (Beira): http://www.diariodemocambique.co.mz
CanalMoz on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/CanalMoz
AIM Reports: www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news
Carlos Serra Diario de um sociologo: http://oficinadesociologia.blogspot.com

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.