

# Mozambique peace process bulletin

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## 7.1 million register for 3-4 December election

More than 85% of eligible voters registered in a campaign which drew high praise from both domestic and international observers. This will give renewed momentum to the second national multi-party elections, scheduled for 3-4 December.

Registration was higher, both in number and percentage, than in 1994. This confounded predictions that registration would fall because the 1994 election marked the end of the war, and thus was assumed to have attracted maximum possible participation.

The registration campaign ran from 20 July to 17 September and was to compile a completely new electoral register. The voting age population is assumed to be about 8.3 million. In all, 7,099,105 people registered, which is 85.5% of those eligible. This compares with 6.1 million and 78% in 1994.

Manica and Tete had the lowest registration levels, at just over 78%; Nampula and Cabo Delgado registered more than 90% of eligible adults.

For the first time, there was extensive national observation, with more than 2600 observers by the end of the process. The joint FECIV/AMODE observation team concluded that the process "was a success both from the point of view of the number of people registered and the civic responsibility

shown by the population, as well as by the fact that absolutely no incidents were reported in any province."

The only significant foreign observation was the Carter Center from the United States. Its "delegation was very impressed by what we observed."

Both lawmakers and election officials learned many lessons from the 1994 national elections and the 1998 local elections. Both the National Election Commission (CNE, *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*) and its technical secretariat (STAE, *Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral*) are operating more smoothly, efficiently and confidently than in previous elections; cooperation between the two is good.

There were some problems and several formal complaints by opposition parties, as well as a low-key but steady stream of complaints by the opposition in the press and parliament. (See pages 3,7 for details.) These have been largely dismissed as ill-informed and unimportant both by domestic commentators and by the diplomatic community, who cite the lack of evidence to back up the complaints. One senior diplomat not noted for a bias toward the government told the *Bulletin* "any way you look at the registration, it was a success. There was not one substantiated complaint".

A European ambassador commented that "Renamo should be happy with the registration. But it might not say so in public, because Renamo must be critical of the government in public - and we accept that."

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# Parties back December election

After a flurry of comments suggesting that the process was moving too slowly and thus there would not be enough time to have both registration and elections in 1999, the two main parties suddenly showed a new urgency and willingness to push ahead. This perhaps reflected a realisation in mid-August that registration was going very well and that most supporters of both main parties would register.

At a special session in late August, Mozambique's parliament (*Assembleia da República*) on 31 August unanimously passed a number of amendments to the election law in order to permit elections this year. President Joaquim Chissano the next day announced the agreed election days of 3-4 December, and the CNE on 4 September announced the election calendar. The law changes generally reduce the amounts of time between various events in the election calendar.

Under the revised timetable, parties had to register their intent to stand by 30 September, submit presidential nominations by 9 October and submit lists of parliamentary candidates by 14 October. As in 1994, each presidential candidate must submit 10,000 nomination signatures, but this time each one must be notarised. It will prove impossible for many of the small parties to obtain that many notarised signatures in a short time.

The formal election campaign will be 19 October to 30 November; no campaigning is permitted on the two days before voting. Results must be announced at provincial level by 11 December (12 December if voting is extended for a 3rd day) and at national level by 18 or 19 December. In previous elections, results were only announced at national level; changes in the law this year mean preliminary results will be known within a week. This is part of a general decentralisation in this election, with more authority devolved to provincial and district levels.

## Parties recognise urgency

Although there are clear disagreements and the main opposition party, Renamo, accuses the government party, Frelimo, of abusing its dominant position, both parties have declined to take any action which would delay the election process. Both sides seem strongly motivated to have elections before the rains start in December.

For its part, Renamo strongly opposed limiting the registration to 60 days, saying that 90 days were allowed

### Observer access to computers

The count in the provincial capitals after the election will be done with computers. But each provincial computer will have a terminal set aside for press, party monitors and non-party observers. Beside the terminal will be photocopies of the reports (*editais*) submitted by each polling station, and observers will be able to use the computer terminal to confirm that the data put into the computer for any polling station is the same as the numbers in the written report.

in 1994. Renamo also opposed the use of old 1994 and 1998 registration cards as an identity document for the new registration, on the grounds that this could not be a totally new registration if it could be based on an old card. Indeed, the CNE has operated entirely by consensus except on this issue, in which Renamo was out-voted. In an angry statement on 7 July, the six Renamo members of the CNE threatened a boycott ("we reserve the right to announce that we are distancing ourselves from incorrect procedures"). Nevertheless, there was no boycott and Renamo took a normal part in the registration process.

Frelimo, for its part, pointed to a gap between the constitution, which allows everyone aged over 18 to vote, and the law, which allows people to vote only if registered and to register only if they are over 18. This disenfranchises young people who reach 18 between 17 September and 4 December. Frelimo had wanted to change the law to account for this, but Renamo was opposed, so Frelimo did not press this issue.

## 13 groups stand for parliament

Ten parties and three coalitions registered their intentions to put up candidates for parliament. At present two parties, Frelimo (129 seats) and Renamo (112), and one coalition, the Democratic Union (UD, *União Democrática*, 9 seats) are represented in parliament.

The most important new coalition is the Renamo Electoral Union (*Renamo-União Eleitoral*), which is a joint list of Renamo and 12 small parties which all agreed to support Renamo head Afonso Dhlakama for president in exchange for a guarantee of one or two winnable seats on the electoral list. This could significantly increase the number of small party representatives in parliament. UD will stand again and the third coalition is the Mozambique Opposition Union (UMO, *União Moçambicana da Oposição*). The Directive Council of Renamo-União Eleitoral consists of Afonso Dhlakama; João Alexandre, secretary general of Renamo; and Manecas Daniel of PRD. Máximo Dias, who as a presidential candidate in 1994 gained 2.4% of the vote, heads the General Assembly.

As well as Frelimo, there are nine other parties: Pimo, Palmo, *Partido Trabalista* (Workers Party, the only small party to win city council seats last year), Verdes (Greens), Padelimo, Panaoc, Sol, PPLM and Pasomo.

The parliamentary election is on a party list system, with separate lists for each province. No party can gain parliamentary seats unless it wins more than 5% of the national vote. In 1994, the UD won 5.2% of the vote, but no small party gained more than 2%.

# Law error causes seat allocation problem

The election law makes an arithmetic error in the allocation of seats (as noted in *Bulletin* 22), which forced the CNE on 2 October to improvise a method to resolve the problem.

The law says the total number of registered voters should be divided by the 250 places in parliament, to give a number of voters per seat, and then the number of voters in each province should be divided by this number to give the number of seats per province. Necessarily this leaves a remainder, and the law says that if this remainder is more than half the number of voters per seat, then the province gains an extra seat. But this need not add up to 250; indeed, in this registration the method gave 251 seats.

It is precisely because this error is probable that the more complex d'Hondt method is used to allocate seats to parties after the election.

With 7,099,105 registered voters, this gives 28,396 voters per seat. To take one example, Nampula registered 1,434,746 voters. After allocating 50 seats, there is a remainder of 14,943 registered voters "left over". As this is more than half of 28,396, Nampula should gain an extra seat, to give it 51.

STAE recommended and CNE agreed, that to reduce the number of seats from 251 to the 250 set by law, the province with the fewest number of voters "left over", even though it was more than half, should not gain an extra seat. In this way, Nampula lost one seat.

The number of parliamentary seats this year, in 1994, and the change this year, are:

Province	Seats 1999	Seats 1994	Change
Niassa	13	11	+2
Cabo Delgado	22	22	
Nampula	50	54	-4
Zambézia	49	49	
Tete	18	15	+3
Manica	15	13	+2
Sofala	21	21	
Inhambane	17	18	-1
Gaza	16	16	
Maputo prov.	13	13	
Maputo city	16	18	-2

## Up to \$3 mn for parties

Donors and the government expect to give up to \$3 million to parties for campaigning, but after the lack of accounting in 1994, money will only be given under very rigid rules (which have still to be finalised).

Up to \$1.5 million is on offer from at least four donors - the United States, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands. The government will put in \$1-1.5 million.

The law says that money must go through a party fund

## CPE wrong on campaign start

The Gaza provincial election commission has apparently wrongly accused the small party PIMO of violating the election law. The Sunday newspaper *Domingo* (26 Sept) reports that the Gaza provincial election commission issued a statement saying that PIMO had "flagrantly violated" the election law by distributing pamphlets with the party symbol and picture of its president Yá-Qub Sibindy before the start of the official campaign on 19 October.

This is a clear misinterpretation of the law. There are no restrictions on the distribution of party material at any time, except for the two days before the election. The official campaign period gives parties and candidates extra rights, but the election law imposes no restrictions outside that period on normal rights assured by freedom of speech and association.

managed by the CNE and distributed based on two criteria - the number of seats in parliament and the number of candidates in this election. It seems likely that one-third of the money will be divided among presidential candidates, one-third among parties with seats in the present parliament, and one-third among the parties standing for parliament.

The money can be spent on campaign material, office rent and food and travel costs, but not on salaries or car purchase. The initial money will be advanced by the government, but donor funds will only be released for specific expenditures for which receipts are provided. All party accounts will have to be audited.

The donor group has been negotiating with the CNE for several months over this money. For its part, the CNE was reluctant to say anything publicly about money until after the registration of parties, so as to not encourage tiny parties to register just to gain money.

## Is Frelimo taking unfair advantage?

In response to Renamo's deep distrust of Frelimo and of the government, this election process has been made more transparent and Renamo nominees have been integrated at all levels of the process. Nevertheless, Renamo continues to express disquiet at what it sees as Frelimo taking unfair advantage of the privileged position held by any governing party.

In the 1994 elections, Renamo was given posts at all levels of the election process, but the 1998 local elections were run on the belief that elections were "normal" and could be run by the state machinery. Renamo never accepted this. So the 1999 elections return to a model closer to 1994.

The parties in parliament (Frelimo, Renamo, and the small UD) nominated members to the national, provincial and district election commissions. Renamo and Frelimo also named deputy directors to the technical secretariats

## Helping Frelimo?

Perhaps the most serious charge of misconduct which was backed up with evidence was a letter on 18 June from the Gaza provincial office of STAE to district offices saying "you will be contacted by the Frelimo party with a list of individuals interested in being part of registration brigades. You must accept the list and submit the names for the training course. These people can only be selected if they pass the training course."

Renamo filed a formal protest about the letter. CNE has replied, but said on 29 September that the reply was secret. Gania Ali Mussagy of Renamo's election office in Maputo said the Gaza letter was proof that there was no open competition for posts on the registration brigades and that "there could only be Frelimo members in the brigades." She went on to ask: "What other secret instructions have been issued which we have not seen? Because of this letter, our starting point in any discussion is that we know this is not a transparent process."

STAE director António Carrasco stressed that the law encourages parties to participate and put people forward for such posts, and requires STAE to assist them. Thus he sees the letter as having been written in this spirit of promoting party involvement. He added that a month later, on 10 July, a similar letter was circulated in Gaza saying the Renamo would put forward people to accompany the civic education.

Nevertheless, whatever the intention, the initial letter can be interpreted in various ways, even by the district STAE directors that received it.

(STAEs) at all three levels.

Renamo remained concerned that a single deputy director could not watch over the entire process, and eventually it was agreed that Renamo and Frelimo could name technicians as well - 9 at central level (5 Frelimo, 4 Renamo), 5 at provincial level (3-2), and 2 at district level (1-1). The extra salary cost, estimated at \$141,000, is borne by the government.

The agreement was that these people would only work during the "electoral period", but the election laws are contradictory on when this is. Renamo argued that this meant whenever the CNE was functioning, while Frelimo argued it was only after the President announced the election date. Renamo complained of deliberate delays, and made a formal protest on 22 July. The Carter Center in its report argued that "it will be critical to integrate Renamo into the technical staff of STAE in advance of the electoral period." Nevertheless, the government only agreed the incorporation of the party technicians into STAE on 3 September.

Joaquim Castro do Castelo, the Renamo deputy director general at the central STAE in Maputo, said that several Renamo people who had been named deputy

directors found that their employers were refusing to give them leave. He complained that his own employer allowed a Frelimo member of parliament to keep their car and salary even while serving in parliament, but this was not allowed for him in the temporary post as deputy director of STAE. "There is tremendous discrimination in the public sector against Renamo members," he said.

Two Renamo deputy directors have been charged with fraud. In Pemba the deputy director was arrested and then released on bail; do Castelo said he was arrested on a charge dating back to 1982 and the arrest was "clearly political", while the local police claim he was arrested for a fraud last year.

The Frelimo deputy director general, Ratxide Akyiamungo Gogo, sees the presence of party people as a "guarantee of credibility". He admits the government did not want it, and only succumbed to strong pressure. "But for me it is an advantage. Our parties can ask us directly, 'is this article in the newspaper real or not', and we can tell them informally. We really are serving to reduce tensions." He also argues that "it is important that people can be close to the process. This is different from simple transparency; it means people come to understand the process."

## Keeping an eye on registration

Party monitors and domestic observers closely watched the registration process. There were more than 2600 domestic observers and a team from the Carter Center in the United States. No statistics are available yet, but these non-party observers reported that nearly all polling stations had at least one party monitor and that the vast majority had monitors from both Frelimo and Renamo.

Observation in all provinces except Sofala was divided between Feciv (*Forum de Educação Civica*) and Amode (*Associação Moçambicana Para o Desenvolvimento da Democracia*, an offshoot of the US agency NDI, the National Democratic Institute). In Sofala, two local groups, Foreciso (*Forum de Educação Civica - Sofala*) and the Catholic University, did observation.

Feciv and Amode pooled their training and reporting. They began late, only training observers in August, but they had people with most registration brigades for the last two weeks of registration. Observers made daily reports, which are notable for the lack of problems observed.

Three typical reports of incidents show how little there was to report. In Chimoio a brigade photographer was caught selling photographs, and then ran short of film to take pictures for the voters cards. In Inhambane a party monitor was accused of being too hard on a young man who the monitor believed was younger than 18; the young man was forced to go home and get his father to prove his age. In Chokwe a woman registered and later her husband arrived to say he would not allow her to register and that she must be removed from the list; he prevented others from registering until the police were called.

Observers reported a few cases of double registration but no evidence of registration by foreigners. Party

monitors were present in virtually all registration posts.

Feciv/Amode stressed the importance that had been placed on using radio to inform people about the need to register, and noted that many people still cannot afford a radio, suggesting that other means also need to be used.

The Feciv/Amode observation was funded with \$600,000 from USAID, Germany and Denmark. Observers and trainers were paid \$2.50 per day and trainers received an extra \$60. This was acceptable except in Zambézia, where trainers went on strike and Feciv organised a new group of trainers from the Christian Council (*Conselho Cristão de Moçambique*).

So as to minimise travel and lodging cost, observers were recruited locally. In Maputo, there were too many applicants, but there was trouble finding sufficiently educated people in some rural districts.

The main foreign observation group was the Carter Center from the United States, which had a 13-person team in Mozambique for 10 days. They visited 96 registration posts in nine provinces. The Carter Center said its "findings were very positive". It said that registration "brigade members appeared well-trained, efficient, well-organised and dedicated to their work." Party monitors were present in all posts visited. One post of the 96 was closed for lack of materials when visited.

## Observation planned for voting days

Extensive observation is expected for the elections on 3-4 December. Feciv/Amode expect to have more than 1000 observers - enough to cover every polling centre but not every polling station. Local civil society groups are also expected to field hundreds of observers.

Between 200 and 300 foreign observers are expected, including 60 from the European Union, 60 from the Carter Center, and some people already working on projects or in embassies in Mozambique.

The donor election working group has established a secretariat to support international election observers on planning, logistics, accommodation and background materials. It is headed by Maria Ana Dominguez and is based at Travessa Faria de Sousa 14. Telephone: 49 44 19/20. Fax: 49 07 40. E-mail: mariana@virconn.com.

## Totally new register for this election

An entirely new electoral register has been compiled and voters have been issued with new voter identification cards. There were 1930 registration brigades, of which 1902 started work on the first day and the rest within the first week. In rural areas, mobile brigades were used; these moved from one place to another to register people. Even some of the fixed brigades moved to other locations during the registration process.

By the end of the registration period, Manica province, which has a very dispersed population, had 85 mobile brigades compared to only 35 fixed ones; by contrast, densely populated Nampula had 360 fixed brigades and only 10 mobile.

## Decentralisation means problems and gains

The rigidity and centralisation that caused such difficulties in local elections last year has been reversed, both in law and attitude, by a much higher degree of flexibility and decentralisation. This has proved effective, but with some teething problems, as the registration of observers showed.

Non-party observers and party monitors were to be registered at local rather than national level, and by much simpler procedures than in local elections. Non-party observers were supposed to obtain credentials before registration began, but Feciv/Amode started late and CNE head Jamisse Taimo instructed that they should be granted credentials whenever they applied. Observers were supposed to present photographs, but this is impossible in many districts, so registration brigades were authorised to take the photos. This flexibility meant that nearly 3000 non-party observers and thousands of party observers were given credentials.

But Feciv/Amode found that decentralisation also meant a wide variation in the interpretation of the rules. Initially, some provincial election commissions insisted that observers be over 21, the age for brigade members, rather than over 18, the age for voters. Initially, some required that observers present an identity card (which is impossible to obtain in many rural districts) rather than just a voters registration card. In the end, most provincial election commissions agreed to accept 18 year olds with only voters cards, but the Zambézia election commission never did. Zambézia was also accused of being very slow, with the provincial election commission taking more than two weeks to issue credentials. In Tete, by contrast, the process was decentralised further, and credentials were issued in one day by district election commissions. In Niassa, the provincial election commission refused to give credentials to more than one observer per registration brigade.

At least one party faced a similar problem with its monitors. The law is clear, and only requires that the party give the name of the monitor; nevertheless, at least one provincial election commission demanded an identity card, and some monitors were not registered.

There are election commissions and technical secretariats at provincial and district levels, and the registration brigades of 6 people were hired locally. Staff were expected to have seven years of primary school and speak the local language. The location of the fixed

brigades and the trajectory of the mobile brigades was determined by provincial officials based on census data and local knowledge. If party officials or others said that people had been missed out, mobile brigades were sent.

Registration was highest in the first week, and then peaked - particularly in the cities - at the very end. Early in the final week there was no wait to register, but on the final day there were huge queues in many places; some registration brigades handled more than 400 people on the final day. National STAE said that the law was clear, that registration ended on 17 September, and thus that posts had to close at midnight. Some people who had left registration to the last minute were unable to register before midnight. The daily *Notícias* (20 September) reported that in Beira some registration brigades continued working after midnight.

"People here are accustomed to extensions," commented Mário Ernesto, STAE director of organisation. "Perhaps we should have only announced a 45 day registration and then given a 15 day extension," he joked.

## Supplier causes confusion with local printing

Probably the most serious problem in the registration was caused by CODE, the Canadian company which supplied registration material. CODE won the \$4.8 million contract to supply pre-packed kits with registration books, forms, film etc. These kits were to be distributed by CODE to provincial capitals.

When some registration brigades opened their kits, they found two different types of registration book. When STAE investigated, CODE admitted that 905 registration books had gotten wet in a warehouse in Maputo, and that without telling anyone, CODE had 905 new books printed in Maputo. The contract called for security printing and numbering which can only be done outside Mozambique, and thus the locally printed registers look different than the Canadian ones.

"CODE did not realise the seriousness of the problem, and they only made it worse by trying to resolve it in secret without telling STAE and CNE," said STAE Director General António Carrasco. CODE's secrecy went directly against extensive efforts to make the whole registration process as transparent as possible, and could have threatened the registration process.

Officials are particularly angry because the problem could have been easily resolved if CODE had come to STAE and explained. There was enough time during the two-month registration period to print new books in Canada, and damaged ones could have been replaced at the start by reserve books which were being held back for the second month of registration.

A key form of control is that each register has a unique number, but CODE had the books reprinted locally with the same series of numbers as the damaged books - meaning 905 numbers appeared twice. Responding to CNE demands, CODE printed 905 new books, in Canada, with new numbers. Meanwhile CNE members (in pairs to ensure full party involvement) went to the provinces to

## Books and polling stations

The voters roll is in registration books (*cadernos eleitorais*) of up to 1040 voters each. Each book corresponds to a polling station (*assembleia de voto*) and polling stations are grouped into polling centres. Typically a school will be a polling centre and each classroom will be a polling station. Normally, the polling centre is in the same place in which the person registered. During the actual election, each polling station is independent, with its own staff and observers; the count is done within the polling station.

retrieve the locally-printed registers. More than 400 books were quickly located and returned. But because the problem had not been clearly identified at the start of the registration, some brigades had begun using the locally-printed books. It was decided that where registration had begun using a locally-printed book, that the registration brigade should immediately stop using that book and transcribe all of the names into a new Canadian-printed register - under the supervision of CNE and party representatives. Although the book numbers will no longer correspond to the book number on the voters card, voters will not need to register again because a note is being put into the new register giving the old register number.

Secrecy on the part of CODE caused hundreds of hours of extra work for CNE members and STAE officials, with numerous flights to provincial capitals to sort out the problem. STAE says all 905 water-damaged registers and all 905 locally printed books have been accounted for.

Joaquim Castro do Castelo, Renamo deputy director general of STAE, says: "The problem has been resolved".

## Long distances and logistic problems

The registration programme had to overcome a number of logistic problems caused by long distances, by an inevitable shortage of vehicles, and by areas so remote that they cannot be reached by road. Three helicopters were hired and boats were used in some places; some brigades were forced to travel on foot.

Some election vehicles were still available from last year's local elections, and provincial governments also provided vehicles. The European Commission funded the transport part of the election, paying for both car hire and new cars. Only 12 of the new cars arrived in time to be used. But after first insisting that car hire be done by international tender, the European Commission agreed that cars could be hired locally, and this was done at provincial level. This helped to ensure that most brigades started on schedule.

Brigades were expected to keep track of their own materials and give advance warning to district STAEs if there was a danger that they would run out. Some did not do so quickly enough, so there were instances of registration brigades running out of material and having to

stop work for several days. No one reported any serious breaks in registration, however.

There were complaints of people having to walk very long distances to register. Although this may have been true in a few cases, it seems likely that most instances were resolved by the use of mobile brigades.

One initial STAE decision with a view to being fair actually had the effect of making the problem worse at the start. To be equitable, brigades were assigned to provinces in direct proportion to population, without taking account of distances. This meant they had to cover greater distances in less densely populated provinces.

The actual assignment of brigades was done at provincial level, and a complete list was published before the registration started. STAE director António Carrasco noted that no one from any party objected to the distribution of brigades when the list was published; complaints only arose later.

Justina Cumbe, director of Feciv and the organiser of much of the domestic observation, commented that "you have to accept the realities of our country. Clearly the registration brigades had to cover long distances and overcome problems of difficult access. Brigades did sometimes run out of materials. But this is our reality, and it did not prejudice the registration process."

The Carter Center found that "the initial deployment and relocation of mobile brigades and materials in zones of difficult access thus far has gone fairly smoothly". It added, "we are encouraged by the flexibility STAE officials have demonstrated regarding the distribution of voter registration brigades."

Two Renamo complaints about this part of the process do not seem well founded. In an official complaint dated 22 September, Renamo says that in Zumbo in Tete registration had not even begun by 13 September, four days before the end. But STAE data show that in Zumbo, 12,845 people were registered (71% of eligible adults), including 1251 in the first week of registration in July.

The other complaint was made to the *Bulletin* by Gania Aly Mussagy of the Renamo election office, who said that although mobile brigades did sometimes reach people in remote areas, these people would still have to walk very long distances to go to a central polling station. STAE denies this, and says mobile brigades have instructions that no one should have to walk more than 10 km to vote. Thus the brigades register people within a 10 km radius of a central point, and when they move out of that circle they open a new registration book for a polling station that will be based somewhere else. So a single mobile brigade registers people for polling stations in several different places.

## Double registration

A number of people registered more than once, and on 10 September CNE president Jamisse Taímo said that some would be prosecuted. Multiple registration was reported by political parties, observers and registration brigades.

There are no claims, and no indication, of organised multiple registration. It is impossible for people to vote

more than once, because they must dip their index finger in indelible ink after voting. People seem to have registered more than once in order to obtain a second voters card because the voters card is commonly used as an identity card, or in order to have another picture taken. Some national observers claimed young people registered more than once as a joke or game.

## Foreigners registering?

"Hundreds of thousands of foreigners have been registered with the goal of having them vote for Frelimo," said Maneca Daniel, spokesman for Renamo-União Eleitoral, in a formal complaint on 6 September. No evidence is given and no names are given; he only cites districts in which he claims Tanzanians, Malawians, Zimbabweans and South Africans have been registered.

People can be registered either with an identity card or if they are accompanied by two other registered voters who can testify that the person is eligible to register. Daniel says that Frelimo used both methods, and has issued "thousands" of false identity cards to foreigners so they could register.

The claim that foreigners are registering has been the most persistent one by Renamo, which made similar claims in 1994, but which has never produced the name of a single registered foreigner.

The claims are totally rejected by the international community and by observers, who found no indication of foreigners registering. Even Renamo's own STAE deputy director Joaquim Castro do Castelo dismisses the claims, saying registration of foreigners "is not a serious issue." He went on to comment that "politicians play games. Sometimes they take preventive measures. They make strong statements as a precaution - to show the other side it is being watched."

do Castelo said he had talked to the Renamo election office and warned that they must submit complaints "based on fact, because it is essential to maintain our credibility."

Commentators from do Castelo to senior diplomats all make the point that it is really difficult to determine who is a "foreigner". Many border areas are heavily populated and the official border is ill-defined.

People move back and forth on a daily basis, going across the "border" to shop or work their fields. The issue is compounded by the large number of refugees during the war, and even movements back and forth during the colonial era. In the end, a "Mozambican" is someone who says they are Mozambican and whose neighbours agree.

The total lack of formal complaints from party agents monitoring the registration or by non-party observers suggests that local people and the locally-recruited registration teams agreed that people who registered had a legitimate claim to be Mozambican.

Indeed, registration brigades were criticised by some people in Niassa for refusing to register Tanzanian wives who had married Mozambican men while they were refugees in Tanzania and where the family is now living in Mozambique.

## **Warning that false documents threaten elections**

A forged document is the source of the 6 September formal complaint by Renamo-União Eleitoral about "hundreds of thousands of foreigners" being registered, according to the independent weekly *Savana* (1 October). It says that the document was offered for sale to *Savana* which refused to buy it, but later was the basis of the complaint and articles in publications close to Renamo.

It should have been obvious that the document was false, notes *Savana*, because it claims a secret meeting took place between Armando Guebuza, Marcelino dos Santos, Manuel Tomé and Pascoal Mocumbi. "Do these men from Renamo not know that a meeting of that group is impossible in the Frelimo of today?" (Below, the *Bulletin* gives other reasons why the document was obviously false.)

*Savana* warns that this type of document came close to disrupting the 1994 elections. Fake documents are offered for sale by people who claim the papers have been taken from either the Frelimo Central Committee or the security police SISE. *Savana* reports that in 1994

Renamo bought a document claiming that there were 500 hidden and stuffed ballot boxes in Matola. Without ever seeing one of the alleged ballot boxes, Renamo held a press conference saying it would boycott the elections. "Because of a false document with no proof, the entire directorate of Renamo became highly agitated and announced it would not participate in elections."

*Savana* warns that if Renamo is not careful to check if such documents are true or false, the same thing could happen this year. The newspaper "calls on the opposition parties and particularly Renamo to stop buying false documents, because this could contribute to derailing the election process at the last minute."

## **Impossible claims**

A claim that there are three registration books which were used to register 4500 Zimbabweans in Chimoio, and that the books were kept in the basement of the "Frelimo central committee building" in Chimoio has proved to be almost a joke and an embarrassment to Renamo. The claim is made in the official complaint by Maneca Daniel for Renamo-União Eleitoral, and also gives the numbers of the three registration books as 00B030, 88A125, and 99A012.

Because so much detail is given, the charge proved easy to refute. The government news agency AIM pointed out that the Frelimo building in Chimoio has no basement. STAE officials note that registration books can only hold 1040 names, not 1500.

But it was the numbers that proved the undoing of the objection. All books have been security printed with sequential numbers from 00001 to 10090, but with a letter between the second and third digits. These letters indicate the province (A is for Niassa, B for Cabo Delgado, etc) or an R for a central reserve. The first 495 books were for Niassa, so all books in the first set are numbers 00A001 to 00A495. Cabo Delgado books start at 00B496, and so on.

Thus the first registration book in the Renamo list, 00030 must have an A and not a B, while the other two are far beyond the end of the sequence not only of Niassa books but of all registration books.

## **Register to be computerised**

The new register is also being computerised, which means that a similar national exercise will not be needed in the future. In addition to the hand-written electoral

register, registration staff also filled in a form which is now being read by optical character recognition and which will be used to compile a computerised register which in future can be more easily updated.

Mozambican politicians have frequently worried about computers, and at the last minute, after the equipment had been purchased and installed, the CNE voted to delay the computerisation, at least until after the election and probably beyond. This was the only time that donors exerted pressure, complaining that they had already paid for the equipment and saying they would never pay for another registration exercise like this one. STAE also backed computerisation, and the CNE eventually agreed.

The computerisation of the registers began at the end of September and should be completed by February. This election will be conducted on the basis of the hand-written registers, although the STAE computer department hopes to have enough registers printed to allow both to be available at some polling stations, in order to provide a check on the computerisation process.

## **Election to cost \$41 million**

The election and registration will cost about \$41 million, with the government paying \$12 million, the European Commission (EC) \$21 million, and other donors \$8 million (Norway \$2.5 mn, Denmark \$1.5 mn, Switzerland, Finland and Sweden \$1 mn each, and Canada and Ireland less). Donor funds for civic education, observation and political parties are in addition to this.

Of the EC money, \$11.5 million for transport, training and civic education has been given to STAE to administer via a "cost estimate" system, under which STAE can do restricted tenders, make expenditures and then present receipts. The EC has provided a team of three people as

"technical assistance" to help STAE meet EC accounting requirements and ensure that provincial officials provide the correct documentation.

A new flexibility by the EC has helped; for example, an initial request for an impossibly detailed plan for the use of cars was later withdrawn. But as a high EC official admitted, "we are less flexible than other donors, in order to be fair to our 15 member states, which means that Mozambique must start earlier when they use our money." STAE has not always planned far enough ahead.

Despite putting up most of the money, the international community has had a much lower profile in this election, compared to 1994 and 1998. On key issues such as the election date and whether or not to compile a new register, they offered no opinion. Indeed, computerisation seems to be the only issue on which donors brought any pressure. One senior diplomat commented: "Mozambicans really are in control this time."

## Cars are trouble

Importing cars for the registration and election has proved particularly difficult. UNDP decided to do a local tender for 10 cars, and Maputo firms in May promised delivery in two weeks. The cars took 3 months to be delivered and were available only days before registration started in late July; they also tried to charge STAE up to 40% more than the price for which they offered the same cars to the UN.

The European Commission did an international tender for 60 cars, and despite promises, only 12 arrived before the end of registration. This forced the hiring of extra cars during the registration period.

One part of the delay was caused by complex importation processes. In a series of unprecedented statements in press conferences in early September, STAE director António Carrasco said that "some entities are withholding their support from the process." This was an oblique reference to the Ministry of Planning and Finance, where staff were failing to issue essential tax exemption certificates; cars remained in the port and could not be used. Within two days of the press conference, the certificates were issued. In another press conference he complained about customs staff - "it is lamentable that these institutions, which belong to the state, don't understand the nature of the electoral process." He noted that "we have motorcycles for registration brigades that have been in Mozambique for more than 10 months and we haven't been able to get them out of customs yet. I don't understand how this is possible."

## In brief

- 100,000 voters excluded:** After extensive discussion, the CNE concluded that there was no way to bypass a clause in the law which requires people to vote where they are registered and prohibits any transfers. That means most polling station staff, party monitors, observers, journalists, and STAE staff will not be able to vote, unless they are assigned to a polling station in

the same polling centre as their own. Also excluded are students living at school and university, who registered there, but who will have returned home after the end of the term. An estimated 100,000 people will be unable to vote.

- The number of registered voters** per province is

Niassa	356,693
Cabo Delgado	618,541
Nampula	1,434,764
Zambézia	1,384,626
Tete	503,422
Manica	421,266
Sofala	593,877
Inhambane	495,981
Gaza	465,151
Maputo província	369,234
Maputo cidade	455,640
Total	7,099,105

- Distance correction:** There is an error in *Bulletin 22*, page 5, with respect to the election law. Press cannot talk to voters, and voters cannot reveal how they voted, within 50 metres of the polling station (not 500 as written).
- Constitution revision falls:** Although the proposed new constitution (see *Bulletin 22*, page 7) was unanimously agreed by all parties in parliament, Renamo eventually concluded that it did not support the changes, so the proposal fell at the end of the final parliament session in September.

## Reviews

*Journal of Southern African Studies, Special Issue on Mozambique*, March 1998. ([sales@carfax.co.uk](mailto:sales@carfax.co.uk))

Many foreigners working in Mozambique rarely leave Maputo and accept the received wisdom of the diplomatic and aid circles. An essential antidote is detailed fieldwork and research by academics, who inevitably show that the situation on the ground is much more complicated. This special issue of JSAS has 10 papers with some of the most interesting on-the-ground research since the end of the war. Four articles pay special attention to issues of land, villagisation and the war, and are best summarised by Anne Pitcher's article title "disruption without transformation". What comes out clearly is that local people act in ways which are very different than policy makers and observers expect, and in ways which are very differentiated, which makes summaries and averages ever harder to justify. Furthermore, detailed local research shows just how great are the regional variations.

Other articles, too, undercut the received wisdom on traditional authority, parties and civil society. Harry West reports a study on Mueda who shows that "traditional authority" has been reinvented several times over", and thus he criticises a project by the Ministry of State administration for implicitly assuming that "traditional

"authority" and former *regulos* (colonial chiefs) are the same thing. Carrie Manning looks at Renamo's transformation to a party and notes that "Renamo, not unlike the other opposition parties in Mozambique, seems to have understood party-building primarily as an exercise in acquiring the material and human trappings of party organisations -- offices, houses for party representatives who had to move to Maputo, office equipment, cars ..." And a study of Amodeg, the association of demobilised soldiers, notes that its "dependence on donor and state funding has undermined its capacity to represent the interests of its members."

*Aid to Mozambique: An end to dependence?* by Arthur van Diesen, Christian Aid, London, July 1999. (info@christian-aid.org.uk)

An assessment of British and European Commission aid to Mozambique, which is particularly damning about the EC for slow disbursement of funds, NGO projects done with lack of consultation, and unwillingness to make public evaluations of projects. Promises by the EC of large scale funding for health in Zambézia caused other donors to withdraw, yet EC funds did not arrive for three years, causing breaks in programmes. Britain is criticised for having its aid programme run by non-Portuguese-speaking staff in Harare and for failure to consult Mozambican civil society. Despite attempts at coordination and sectoral plans, fragmentation remains a problem. There are 694 different projects in Mozambique funded by the EC or by EU member states, including 72 in education, causing major management headaches for the government.

Not surprisingly, the London-based NGO Christian Aid calls for more aid for Mozambican NGOs and calls for it to be channelled via northern NGOs.

Christian aid also says that the effect of aid can be maximised only if there is "a one-off, total and unconditional debt cancellation."

*Comportamento eleitoral e causas/razões da abstenção nas eleições municipais de 30 de Junho de 1999*, Carlos Serra, Centro de Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, May 1998.

This was apparently the only detailed study of the local elections. It was carried out by university staff and students in six cities and contains fascinating interview and survey material. Carlos Serra concludes that voters "were not against the state or against politicians, but against a state that is not redistributing and against politicians who 'eat well'." He adds: "People abstained to say 'we are discontent'." Other factors also contributed. Serra points to the "intense symbolic violence" in some of the campaign language, particularly by Renamo and the rest of the boycotting opposition -- their repeated use of words like death, killing, assassination, murder (even if only accusing Frelimo of "murdering democracy"), blood and war.

The study also reports the ballot box stuffing fraud in Dondo (as reported in *Bulletin 21*) and some instances of threats and pressure.