

Mozambique peace process bulletin



Issue 14 – February 1995

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Published by AWEPA, the European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa

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Winner takes all

Frelimo and its President Joaquim Chissano won Mozambique's first multi-party election 27-29 October. The election was widely praised by international observers; the outcome was accepted by all parties.

The new parliament met first on 8 December; Chissano was inaugurated on 9 December and named his new government in late December. The new government took office on 23 December.

Chissano selected only Frelimo stalwarts as ministers and Frelimo set the procedural rules for the new parliament. This came as a shock to Renamo, which seems not to have understood the power of the winners in a Western-style democracy. During the two years when the United Nations held sway, Renamo only had to walk out and the international community immediately gave in to its demands; when Renamo walked out of parliament, it continued to sit without Renamo there.

Renamo still has arms caches and remains in effective control of some territory. Renamo head Afonso Dhlakama said that Chissano had gone back on a promise by Chissano to include non-Frelimo people in government. And Renamo is demanding governorships of the five provinces where it gained more votes than Frelimo, as well as other concessions. But it remains unclear if it will try to back up the demands with force.

The post-election period has been very peaceful. Most of the international community have publicly thrown their weight behind the new democratically elected government. But the new government faces huge problems in rebuilding a country shattered by war, and it will be dependent on donor funding for many years. The first test for the new government will be the annual donors' conference, which was postponed from December and will now probably be held in March. The United States is rumoured to want to use the conference to put pressure on the government to make concessions to Renamo.

Meanwhile, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) is to be wound up by 31

January. Most UN staff had left by the end of November. The last meetings of the peace process commissions were on 5 and 6 December; UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello left on 13 December.

Boarding the plane for UN headquarters in New York, Ajello entrusted the uncompleted tasks of his mission, and correction of its mistakes, to Mozambique's newly elected government.

Although the 23 December final report of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali heaped high praise on the ONUMOZ mission as a success, he admitted that several aspects had not been completed. He cited:

- "the existence of arms caches in the country" (Renamo, in particular, never allowed the UN to visit some of its arms dumps.)
- "the incomplete integration of territorial administration" (In violation of the peace accord, Renamo never permitted government access to some of its areas.)
- "the continued presence of mines throughout the country" (Infighting between UN agencies delayed mine clearance for more than a year.)
- inadequate training and equipping of the new army and national police.

Painful birth of parliament

The inaugural session of Mozambique's first ever multi-party parliament was immediately disrupted by an opposition walk-out which stretched into a three week Renamo boycott.

At its first session on 8 December, after swearing in its deputies, the first task of the new assembly (parliament) was electing the president (speaker) of parliament. With President Joaquim Chissano in the chair, Frelimo nominated former Attorney General Eduardo Mulembwe, a member of Frelimo's ruling 15-member Political Committee; Renamo nominated Raul Domingos, head of its political affairs

department.
Renamo demanded that the vote on the speaker be secret, while Frelimo called for an open vote. Chissano ruled that the vote should be open. Renamo and the small União Democrática (Democratic Union, UD) boycotted the vote and then walked out, so Mulembwe was named speaker.

Before leaving the hall, Renamo deputy Manuel Pereira told the assembly: "This is not the kind of parliament we expected. Just because it has the majority, it seems Frelimo rules here!"

The Parliamentary Permanent Commission, which handles business when parliament is in recess, was defined as having 7 MPs from Frelimo, 5 from Renamo, and 2 from the UD. Frelimo and the UD nominated members (see page 10); Renamo did not.

Renamo claimed it would not rejoin the parliament until voting procedures were changed. After two weeks of consultations between Mulembwe and the Frelimo and Renamo benches brought no progress, Frelimo and UD deputies went back to wind up the first session of parliament. The next sitting was announced to begin on 21 March.

Eventually Dhlakama climbed down. "We will participate, as not joining in parliamentary debates only gives Frelimo the grill to fry its own sardines, because there is no opposition in parliament," he said. On 28 December Renamo named its five members to the permanent commission.

Mulembwe was a controversial choice as speaker. He is seen as having failed as attorney general to fulfil his public promise to the out-going parliament to fight against corruption (giving up after he received death threats).

Apparently Renamo got wind of internal Frelimo dissension over Mulembwe, and thought it might divide the vote, if votes were cast in secret.

Political observers in Maputo were divided over the issue. Some argued Frelimo should have been more flexible and agreed to a secret ballot, to appease Renamo in a spirit of "national reconciliation". Others argued that Renamo needed to be shown that its minority position in parliament did not give it the same powers as the equal status it had on the nation's peace-keeping commissions which for two years were responsible for guiding transition to from war to elections. Whenever Renamo disagreed with Frelimo on the commissions, it resorted to boycotts.

Everyone agreed on the lack of prior education for Mozambique's political parties on the workings of a pluralist assembly and on the role of the opposition.

The new(ish) government

Mozambique's constitution attributes wide-reaching powers to the President of the Republic, who names the cabinet, the ten provincial governors and the mayor of Maputo city (who has governor status).

Following the official announcement of his victory on 19 November, it took President Chissano another month of consultations to select his new cabinet. He promised to choose his new team on the basis of competence, renewal and recognition of the need for national reconciliation, and not on party allegiance.

But there were no radical changes, although there were some significant shifts. The new line up looks like a reshuffle combined with a renewal, as a

younger generation of former deputy ministers replaces some of the old guard. Chissano's pledged concern for competence is reflected in higher level technical qualifications among new appointees. Women members have risen from one to five (four deputies and one minister). Nearly all provinces are represented and there is a better ethnic mix, although 9 of 20 ministers come from the south.

But all are Frelimo stalwarts. Only 3 ministers kept their posts, but 13 of 20 were ministers, deputy ministers, or governors in the previous government, and 5 others had important government posts.

This is a government run by doctors. Chissano was a medical student, Prime Minister Dr Pascoal Mocumbi was a former health minister, and he was replaced as Foreign Minister by yet another doctor and former health minister, Leonardo Simão.

The most radical change is the creation of an inner cabinet with three ministers in the president's office: Minister for Economic and Social Affairs Eneas Comiche (promoted from Finance Minister) who will be the central economic figure in the new government, Parliamentary Affairs Minister Francisco Maderia, and a Minister of Defence and Security Affairs. Intriguingly, this last post remains vacant.

Other important changes include the Defence Ministry passing from military to civilian leadership, under former Minister of State Administration Aguiar Mazula. Old war horses from Frelimo's liberation struggle against the Portuguese, notably General Alberto Chipande, Mario Machungo, Mariano Matsinha and Jacinto Veloso, have dropped from the scene. Frelimo's chief peace process negotiator, Armando Guebuza, was retired from cabinet to parliament where he heads Frelimo's bench.

Minor changes include:

- the abolition of the ministries of cooperation (integrated into foreign affairs), information (reduced to a directorate-general in the Prime Minister's office), and industry & energy (industry merged with commerce and energy merged with minerals);
- the creation of new ministries of environment and social welfare; and
- renaming ministries of construction & water as housing & public works, agriculture as agriculture & fishing, and culture & youth as culture, youth & sport.

Some critics argue there is little sign of commitment to fighting corruption, with some allegedly compromised figures still prominent in government and parliament.

Chissano apparently met reluctance from non-political figures to joining his government. The most public example was National Elections Commission President Brazão Mazula, who turned down Chissano's offer on the grounds that his status as a neutral figure would seem to have been compromised all along.

What place for Renamo?

Chissano dashed Renamo's hope that, in the interests of national reconciliation, he would name some of their members as ministers or to governors in the five central region provinces. By early January, the President was yet to name provincial governors, but he made clear that "there is absolutely no question of my appointing any Renamo members." To do so, he

said, "would mean a total division of the country."

Dhlakama said that Chissano's first "error" was to go back on his "promise" to include non-Frelimo members in the government. Declaring himself "extremely disappointed" at Chissano's "undemocratic" decision to name no Renamo governors, Dhlakama said in early January that he would submit a formal letter to Chissano pressing for Renamo governors in five provinces: Sofala, Tete, Nampula, Zambézia and Manica. Any Renamo governors, he pledged, would be willing to carry out Frelimo's programme of government.

Yet Chissano seemed unimpressed by fine words. Saying he needed governors loyal to himself and Frelimo's programme, Chissano said naming opposition members to government would "demand a very complicated political posture – just imagine if the impasse in parliament were to happen within government."

Certain diplomats in Maputo argue Chissano in victory has been arrogant, alienating Renamo by exclusion and thus risking further instability, when he could have co-opted them. But others stress his right as victor to do as he has done.

In government, Frelimo has always functioned by consensus within the party leadership; there is no precedent for public debate by ministers on policy issues. Thus it would have been very difficult for Chissano to have headed a coalition government, and his appointment of Frelimo members who will be loyal to him and to agreed decisions is not surprising.

During Chissano's long consultation on the shape of his new government, he must have been closely watching Renamo's post-poll performance. With Dhlakama's military force disbanded, his foreign backers gone and his money all spent, the Renamo leader has recently used the most compromising language. "My role as opposition leader is to help and give the government constructive criticism", Dhlakama has repeated.

Dhlakama recognises the post-war weakness of his party. "The question putting a rope round my neck is: How will the party survive? The [UN] Trust Fund [which provided Renamo with US\$ 17 million in donor money] no longer exists. Renamo must make a huge effort or achieve a miracle for our survival."

Chissano has also announced that he would establish a Presidential Consultation Forum. No details will be given until after the January holiday, but it will apparently give him a place to consult with opposition leaders and key figures in civil society. This would give Renamo a place to voice its opinions, but as just one part of a larger civil society.

With no place in government and no alternative political platform, Renamo's future in opposition looks uneasy. Already there is speculation that it could fall apart.

Will access improve?

Chissano has also not given jobs in the new government to the 30 Renamo assessors appointed to liaise with provincial governors last year. Luís Maune, one of the assessors in Sofala, issued a veiled warning in an interview with the daily *Notícias* (29 December).

Maune noted that in formerly Renamo-controlled

areas, Renamo officials "retain a certain influence". He admitted that before the election government officials "had not felt safe in these places" and had only been able to go to there when accompanied by the assessors. He suggested that it would be "easier" for government officials to go to those areas now if there were Renamo governors or Renamo assessors. If not, there could be "problems with the people", Maune warned.

The elections: Frelimo's victory

Mozambique's first multi-party elections were on 27-29 October 1994. Joaquim Chissano, president since 1986, won 53% of the presidential votes, ensuring his convincing re-election on the first round. (A second round would have been needed if no candidate received more than half, as occurred in Angola.) Renamo head Dhlakama came second with 34%.

But some who voted for Chissano rejected Frelimo, which gained only 44% of the parliamentary vote compared to 38% for Renamo. Frelimo has only a small majority in the new parliament with 129 seats, compared to 112 for Renamo and 9 for the small União Democrática (UD)

Mozambicans registered and voted in huge numbers: more than two-thirds of all Mozambicans over 18 years old voted. Voting and registration took place in all parts of the country, with specially built huts and even open-air voting in remote areas. Some people walked more than 20 km to vote; some waited patiently for two nights at polling stations.

More than 50,000 registration and polling station staff, as well as 60,000 party monitors and thousands of members of district, provincial and national elections commissions and technical secretariats, worked hard and conscientiously under very difficult conditions to make the elections succeed.

The two big parties and their presidents dominated the campaign and the voting. Of the 12 presidential candidates, only three (beyond Chissano and Dhlakama) gained more than 2% of the vote: Wehla Ripua, Carlos Reis and Maximo Dias. There were 12 parties and two coalitions in the parliamentary race, but there was a 5% national threshold – any party had to gain more than 5% of the national vote to obtain seats in parliament. In addition to Frelimo and Renamo, only the UD did so, scraping through with 5.15%. None of the others passed 2%.

The UD did not run a major national campaign, and surely gained some votes because of its location on the ballot paper. Placement on the ballot paper was determined by lot, separately for each of the two ballot papers. Chissano was the last candidate on the presidential ballot paper, and much of Frelimo's campaign was telling people to "vote for the man on the bottom". Many people probably also voted for the bottom party on the parliamentary ballot paper, which was the UD.

High praise

More than 3000 international observers were present during the polling days, and Mozambique won high praise from them.

UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 23 December report said that "although some irregularities were recorded, most were of an administrative nature, and no event or series of events occurred that could have had an adverse effect on the overall outcome."

On 19 November UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello declared the elections "free and fair", saying the outcome "reflects the will of the Mozambican voters."

Ajello accepted that "problems have occurred, irregularities were recorded and disruptions did take place. However, throughout the entire process there has been no event or series of events which could affect the credibility of the elections."

"Some political parties alleged intimidation, fraud and irregularities such as false identification, registration of minors and foreigners as well as misuse of electoral funds. Only a limited number of cases could be substantiated," Ajello said. The UN had more than 2000 observers in Mozambique during the voting, and more than 100 through the entire registration and campaign period.

AWEPA, which had 167 observers in Mozambique for the polling, "found the electoral process as a whole sufficiently free and fair for the outcome to be a valid expression of the electorate's choice. Polling is assessed as having been free and fair, but in the pre-election phases a number of breaches of the rules have occurred, leading to a certain qualification of the overall assessment." A number of the breaches were mentioned in previous issues of the *Bulletin*, and some are noted below.

Nevertheless, the overwhelming international impression of the election was positive. Observers praised the voters and election officials for the way they participated in and conducted the elections, sometimes under difficult conditions.

• A more detailed report on the election is available on request from AWEPA.

Election statistics

Presidential results

In order as candidates appeared on the ballot paper:

Maximo Dias	115,442	2.34%
Carlos Jeque	34,588	0.70%
Casimiro Nhamithambo	32,036	0.65%
Mario Machel	24,238	0.49%
Carlos Reis	120,708	2.44%
Afonso Dhlakama	1,666,965	33.73%
Ya-Qub Sibindy	51,070	1.03%
Padimbe Kamati	24,208	0.49%
Domingos Arouca	37,767	0.76%
Campira Momboya	58,848	1.19%
Wehia Ripua	141,905	2.87%
Joaquim Chissano	2,633,740	53.30%
Registered electors:	6,148,842	
Electors who voted:	5,402,904	87.87%
Blank votes	312,143	5.78%
Invalid votes	149,282	2.76%

Parliamentary results

In order as parties appeared on the ballot paper:

AP	93,031	1.95%
UNAMO	34,809	0.73%
PT	26,961	0.56%
FUMO/PCD	66,527	1.39%
FRELIMO	2,115,793	44.33%
SOL	79,622	1.67%
PIMO	58,590	1.23%
RENAMO	1,803,506	37.78%
PRD	48,030	1.01%
PACODE	52,446	1.10%
PADEMO	36,689	0.77%
PPPM	50,793	1.06%
PCN	60,635	1.27%
UD	245,793	5.15%

Registered electors:	6,148,842	
Electors who voted:	5,404,199	87.89%
Blank votes:	457,382	8.46%
Invalid votes:	173,592	3.21%

Parliamentary seats

	FRELIMO	RENAMO	UD	total
Niassa:	7	4	0	11
Cabo Delgado:	15	6	1	22
Nampula:	20	32	2	54
Zambezia:	18	29	2	49
Tete:	5	9	1	15
Manica:	4	9	0	13
Sofala:	3	18	0	21
Inhambane:	13	3	2	18
Gaza:	15	0	1	16
Maputo-prov:	12	1	0	13
Maputo-city:	17	1	0	18
Total	129	112	9	250
<i>Women MPs</i>	48	13	1	62

Election problems: Dhlakama boycott

Late on the night before polling began, Renamo announced its withdrawal from the election on the grounds of alleged widespread irregularities. This had no legal standing, as it was too late under the electoral law for a party to withdraw officially. Nevertheless, it was treated as a major challenge to the entire electoral process.

Diplomats, United Nations officials and the National Elections Commission (*Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, CNE) worked through the night to try to get Renamo to reverse its decision. At 5 am on Thursday 27 October the CNE issued a statement confirming that the election would continue. During the day (Thursday), Renamo head Afonso Dhlakama came under intense international pressure, including two telephone calls from President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. The president of the United Nations Security Council, the UN Secretary General and the

European Union issued strong statements calling on Renamo to return.

The EU, for example, said it viewed Renamo's decision "with great alarm" and that Renamo's explanations for the boycott "cannot convince". It also stressed that the presence of the large number of international observers provided some guarantee.

Most dramatically, the boycott had no visible effect on voters. Except in the few areas tightly controlled by Renamo, no voters went home and queues remained long and orderly. People who were unable to vote on the first day returned as expected on the morning of the second day, and by mid-day on Friday turnout was already well over 70%.

Voting stopped at only a handful of polling stations in Renamo-controlled areas of Manica and Sofala, such as Meringuè (Renamo headquarters, where Renamo officials went around on motorcycles telling people to stop voting, then later went around telling people that they were now free to vote for Renamo), Macossa (where the Frelimo party delegate had been forced to flee), and Dombe (a major Renamo base).

Renamo removed its party monitors from some polling stations in provincial capitals as well as a few other large towns; they left late Thursday afternoon or did not arrive Friday morning. In rural areas few monitors even heard of the boycott and none received instructions to leave.

Negotiations continued during a second night. The foreign members of the Comissão de Supervisão e Controle (CSC, the Supervision and Control Commission), the most senior of various joint commissions which oversee the peace accord, met during the night and negotiated with Renamo.

Finally on Friday morning Renamo agreed to tell its party monitors to return, and those who left were back in place by late Friday morning.

The international members of the CSC issued a statement later that morning in which they "recognise that thus far the CNE has not been able to satisfy Renamo" with respect to "potentially serious irregularities". They undertook to "make every effort to ensure that these complaints are fully investigated". But this was purely a face-saving device. Renamo's complaints were widely seen as unjustified and there was no CSC investigation.

But this satisfied Renamo. At 1120 Friday morning Dhlakama went on Radio Moçambique to announce Renamo's return to the election (and to use the live broadcast to urge people to vote for him, in violation of a ban on campaigning during the voting period).

AWEPA observers noted that the boycott had no obvious impact on voters, who remained at polling stations and continued to vote in huge numbers. But they did note a certain disquiet, with some voters being worried that it might mark the beginning of a return to war. There was concern that this may have caused some voters to vote for Renamo and Dhlakama as a way of keeping them out of the bush, to try to prevent renewed fighting.

The Renamo boycott cast a cloud over the election. Speaking just before he left, Aldo Ajello admitted that "the worst moment of the whole peace process was the night when the president of Renamo announced his sudden withdrawal from elections. It was as though two years work had all been lost."

Accord not fulfilled

"The persistence of a 'dual administration', whereby Renamo limits freedom of movement in and out of areas it controls, undermines constitutional rights, including the right to freedom of expression, and could substantially affect the outcome of the elections," warned Article 19, the London-based International Centre Against Censorship, in a report issued just before the election.

Renamo went into the election not having fulfilled some of the October 1992 Rome peace accord. Renamo continued to restrict access to the areas it controlled. They were not, in general, closed for ordinary people and election officials, but were off-limits for government staff and political parties.

In the month before the election, Renamo halted the process of handing over arms, and refused to identify the locations of arms caches; in Namanjavira, in Zambézia province, for example, shortly after the election the government discovered a Renamo cache containing three lorry loads of arms.

Renamo kept its military radio system and after demobilisation more than 1000 Renamo troops returned to Renamo military camps. ONUMOZ officials made clear this was not their problem – once soldiers were demobilised they were officially "civilians" and no longer covered by the peace accord, even if they choose to return to the old bases and take up arms again.

One AWEPA election observer discovered that the polling station to which he was assigned, in Calé in the mountains of Nampula province, was effectively a Renamo military camp. The Renamo party monitor at the polling station was the camp commander; he carried a radio and told the observer that he was waiting for instructions by radio as to what to do after the election. Armed Renamo men wandered openly around the small village. Renamo also had demobilised troops gathered in Inhaminga and Meringuè in Sofala province, Mutarara in Tete, and Gondola and Macossa in Manica.

Article 19 noted that "the failure to complete the disarmament process before the elections is a major intimidatory factor which could greatly limit the exercise of the freedom of expression."


"The major obstacle to freedom of expression in the rural areas during the election campaign remains the lack of freedom of movement in and out of territory controlled by Renamo," concluded Article 19. And it noted that "there is a climate of fear among people living in Renamo-controlled zones."

Media bias

Article 19's other task was to monitor the coverage of the elections by the publicly-funded mass media, especially Radio Moçambique (RM). It concluded that "there is an inbuilt bias in RM's broadcast coverage toward the ruling party, Frelimo, which is reflected quantitatively in the amount of coverage allocated to different parties and qualitatively in the language used. There is, however, no evidence of direct government interference in editorial policy. ... RM editors, managers and journalists have responded

República de Moçambique

Republic of Mozambique



Renamo held 23% of land

This map shows the *Bulletin's* revised estimate of Renamo-controlled areas during the two year peace process, based on United Nations, government and independent sources, and updates the map published in *Bulletin* 10. The map is not official or agreed. We estimate that Renamo controlled 23% of the land and about 6% of the population. Renamo controlled half of Sofala and Zambézia provinces, more than 40% of Manica, and 30% of Nampula.

positively to ensure that the coverage, which has measurably improved in balance since the beginning of the campaign."

It also considered that "the standard of the printed press was generally low and extremely partisan, predominantly in favour of the ruling party."

Administrative difficulties: The 3rd day

The election law was revised in August to allow the two day election period to be extended by the CNE for a third day. This was done, both as a sop to Renamo as part of its ending of the boycott, and because there had been substantial delays in opening polling stations in a few areas.

But delay and confusion dogged the decision to extend voting. It was clear by mid-day of the first day that some polling stations would not open at all on the first day due inability to get voting materials and payments to all polling stations on time, and that at least one province (Tete) would ask for an extension. Yet the decision to extend to the third day was only announced on the afternoon of the second day – too late to be communicated to some rural areas which never heard about the extension and counted votes on the night of the second day.

There was also confusion about whether to count at night, and a failure by CNE or Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral, STAE) to issue clear instructions. Some district elections commissions said that because of strike threats and lack of light, counting should be deferred until Sunday 30 October.

Thus polling stations counted at four different times: Friday night, Saturday afternoon, Saturday night, and Sunday morning. Results from some areas were available while voting still continued in others.

Delayed results

The election law required results to be announced within 15 days of the close of the polls, which was 13 November, but it soon became clear that there were serious logistic problems in getting ballot papers to provincial capitals and getting results to Maputo.

Under the law, all invalid and contested votes were returned to Maputo for reconsideration by the CNE. There were few contested votes. The initial number of invalid votes was never officially stated, and probably exceeded 700,000 for parliamentary and presidential elections.

The law states that "the ballot paper on which the cross or the fingerprint mark has not been perfectly drawn or placed, or exceeds the limits of the square, shall not be considered invalid when it unequivocally expresses the will of the voter." This sentence is ambiguous: must the mark touch the boundary of the small square to the right of the name of the candidate or party, or will a mark be accepted anywhere in the larger rectangular section of the ballot paper containing the name and party symbol or candidate picture? What is to be done where the voter puts a fingerprint over the photo of a presidential candidate or a cross over a party name, when the will of the voter is clear?

and was discussed before the election by the CNE, which only took decisions by consensus and proved unable to reach a conclusion. Thus the manual for polling station staff carefully avoided the problem – it had four pages of drawings of valid votes with marks in or near the small square, while never saying what to do with marks elsewhere in the rectangle.

Not surprisingly, polling stations made very different choices as to what to accept. After polling closed, Dr Mazula told a press conference that the CNE would accept all ballots with marks in the larger rectangle and where the intent was clear. Faced with a requirement to have a result within 15 days of the election, STAE began reconsideration of the invalid votes without any orientation from the CNE, but broadly following the Mazula line.

Although it had been warned that insufficient civic education would lead to a very substantial number of blank and invalid votes, the magnitude of the problem seems to have caught CNE by surprise. STAE placed a newspaper advertisement to recruit university graduates to do the reconsideration; they had to start that same day. Work went on 24 hours a day for two weeks. Parties and international observers were invited to send monitors to watch; eventually Frelimo and Renamo set up teams of people to watch all four counting rooms 24 hours a day.

But even after a week of reconsideration, the CNE had not approved the new guidelines. The recount continued. But only on Monday 14 November, the day after the deadline for announcing results, did the CNE finally agree that ballot papers would be counted "with a fingerprint or pen mark put in any part of the area of the rectangle with the name of the candidate or party symbol" including marks put over the photo of the candidate or the candidate or party name. This was a sensible decision, but it was slightly narrower than the rules being used up to then by the STAE, so all the ballots had to be reconsidered once again.

Eventually, at least 400,000 ballot papers were accepted, as the number of invalid votes was reduced to 323,000. But two weeks of all night working and the haste of the re-recount led to sloppiness and errors toward the end. Even so, the announcement of the final result – originally scheduled for 1600 on Friday 18 November – was repeatedly delayed because the recount was not completed, and only took place at 1200 on 19 November.

Poor civic education

Civic education was limited and very weak, and was the subject of substantial criticism. This put a substantial burden on polling station staff, who had to explain the voting process to each voter. The way they did this varied substantially from one polling station to another, even within the same centre, and the quality and style of explanation had a clear impact on blank and invalid votes.

Blank votes were nearly 6% in the presidential race and over 8% in the parliamentary; invalid votes were initially a further 8%, although after the recount this was cut to 3% in both contests. Although some blank parliamentary votes may have been people who wished to vote for a president and not a party (particularly Chissano and Frelimo), most reflect

voters not knowing what to do. And there was a wide variation between polling stations.

In most polling stations the presiding officer gave some kind of explanation. These were scrupulously fair but the quality of the explanation varied. Many presiding officers only gave explanations if asked, even when it was clear that a voter was too embarrassed to ask.

Many observers noted a problem of arrogance by some presiding officers, who were impatient with people who did not understand – particularly with older people. One AWEPA observer in Niassa did a study, taking careful notes on the style and content of the explanation by the polling station staff and then later collecting information on blanks and invalid votes. The correlation is striking, with blank votes ranging from as low as 2% to as high as 15% being clearly affected by how supportive and friendly the polling station staff were and by whether or not the voters felt rushed.

Payment and strikes

Strikes, disputes and other demands for money dogged the election, sometimes dominating Maputo television news.

In Angola and Malawi, election staff and party agents considered the election far too important a political event to have done anything to disrupt the process; in Mozambique it was seen as a golden opportunity to gain more money, even if it was necessary to disrupt the electoral process. Indeed, the whole peace process was frequently seen as an opportunity to make quick money out of the massive presence of the international community.

Before polling there were strikes and disputes by polling station staff all over the country. It was agreed that money would be distributed to polling staff on the morning of the first polling day, and many stations did not open until the money was handed over – often at the same time as the register and the key to the kit of polling station material.

There were further disputes when the election was extended for a third day, with elections commissions claiming that the fee was for the whole task and not by the day.

AWEPA observers saw no instance of slackness or misconduct by polling station staff in furtherance of their pay claims; they always conducted themselves correctly. But many openings and counts were delayed by the disputes.

Polling station staff were to be paid between MT 100,000 and MT 300,000 (\$15-45), plus MT 20,000 (\$3) per day for food. Because of an unclear statement of the rates, some polling station staff thought that the salaries were per day, rather than for the entire job. When the election was extended by a day, the only extra pay was to be an extra MT 20,000 for food.

Eventually all polling station staff were offered an extra MT 100,000.

In the days after the elections, there were demonstrations at most provincial elections commissions by polling station staff demanding more money. In Dondo in Sofala province, the district elections commission was held hostage for nine hours by polling staff; in Chimoio in Manica province, more

than 200 polling station staff were held in jail for 48 hours and some were beaten by police after they sat in at the provincial legislature.

In most countries, monitors are party members who volunteer for this critical service. They may, perhaps, receive a small food allowance. Exceptionally in Mozambique, party monitors were paid, which may have compromised their key role.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) made a \$1.8 million contract with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), which was already transporting demobilised soldiers and some refugees, to assist in training, transport, and payment of monitors. To receive their money, each party monitor had to have their IOM card signed at the end of each day (and at the end of the count on the final day) by the presiding officer to show that they had completed their day's work.

Monitors were to earn MT 150,000 (\$22), which is considered good pay. Indeed, it was widely reported that most monitors were only doing this for the money.

When polling was extended for an extra day, many monitors went on strike or threatened to strike. USAID put forward an extra \$400,000 and the monitors were promised an additional MT 50,000 (\$7).

A further problem was that IOM registered and agreed to pay only the 32,017 party monitors who had succeeded in getting both party and elections commission accreditation to IOM by 17 October. This left 25,000-30,000 monitors unpaid. This caused widespread protests after the election. It was later agreed that parties would pay them from the UN's political parties trust fund, but by the end of 1994 some had still not been paid.

How many registered?

More than 6 million people registered between 1 June and 2 September, which is between 78% and 85% of voting age adults – a very high level of participation.

There is confusion about numbers on two grounds. First, because of the large number of people killed in the war and the huge number of refugees, no one knows the actual population of Mozambique. The national statistical office estimates the voting age population at 7.9 million, while UNOHAC (UN Office of Humanitarian Assistance Coordination) estimates only 7.5 million.

Second, the CNE published two different figures for the number registered. In October it said a total of 6,396,061 people registered, giving an 81% or 85% registration. But when it announced the election results on 19 November, it said only 6,148,842 people had registered, giving a 78% or 82% registration.

All this means the 4.9 million who voted for the president were 75% or 77% of these registered, and between 62% and 66% of voting age adults.

A problem caused by a miscalculation of the number of registered voters in Zambézia, which was known well before the election, was only solved very late. The CNE reported that Pebane district had 89,596 registered voters, but this involved some double counting and the correct number was around 56,000. Thus Zambézia was credited with 33,000 too many voters, giving it one or two extra parliamentary seats. Nothing was done, but when the final results were announced, Nampula unexpectedly was given

one extra seat and Zambézia one less.

There has been no official explanation of this correction, or of the reduction in 250,000 in the number of officially registered voters.

Election budget

US \$ million

Staff and office	8.
Registration materials	9.5
Voting materials	11.6
Other equipment	2.7
Air transport	10.7
Other transport	6.7
Civic education	3.6
Training staff	1.1
Training party agents	3.4
Foreign technical assistance	6.1
TOTAL	63.5

Who paid the election bill

US \$ million

Austria	.3
Canada	.9
Denmark	1.2
European Union	26.2
Finland	1.2
France	.7
Italy	10.0
Netherlands	1.0
Norway	3.2
Portugal	.4
Spain	.3
Sweden	3.4
United Kingdom	.9
UNDP	.2
USA	9.2
Mozambique:	
state budget	3.4
counterpart funds	1.2

End of war:

No \$ for demobbed?

Mozambique has received only 28% of the money needed to pay demobilised soldiers, warned the UN Secretary General in his 23 December report. The government agreed to give all demobbed fighters six months money. In order to keep demobbed soldiers quiet, the donor community agreed to provide another 18 months money, and each soldier received a book of nine coupons which can be taken to a local bank every two months and cashed.

But the money is quickly running out. The 18-month scheme will cost \$31.9 million, of which only \$27.6 million had been pledged, and only \$8.9 million actually received by Mozambique. Boutros-Ghali "strongly appealed to donors" to come up with the missing money.

Soldiers go home

At the time of the peace accord, there were more than 105,000 soldiers, according to final figures from the Cease Fire Commission (Comissão de Cessar Fogo, CCF). Renamo had 24,646 fighters (compared to 21,000 claimed at Rome); of those, only 3662 went into the new army. The government had 80,818 soldiers, compared to 92,000 it said it had on the payroll. Of those, only 8,533 went into the new army.

Some of those who joined the new army then dropped out, so its strength on 9 December was only 11,579 compared to the 30,000 called for in the peace accord. The UN Secretary General reported that some units "are not yet fully operational, mainly as result of financial and logistical constraints." So Mozambique is a country virtually without an army.

Of those demobilised, 88,851 soldiers and 94,870 dependants were transported home by the International Organization for Migration (IOM); 63% stayed in the same province where they were demobilised, 18% went to a neighbouring province, and only 19% went further away. One-third of all soldiers and dependants were moved in August.

Verification incomplete

In his final report on 5 December, CCF president Col Pier Segala confirmed that the CCF was unable to complete verification of Renamo bases and arms dumps, effectively because Renamo refused to permit it. On 22 September Renamo halted CCF verification, in violation of the peace accord, and permitted only a limited resumption from 10 October. Thus, when the ONUMOZ mandate ran out, there were still 116 of 287 declared Renamo locations – mainly arms dumps – which had not been visited. Most were in the central region, where Renamo had most of its bases; in Manica and Sofala, the CCF was able to visit only 30% of Renamo sites.

By contrast, the CCF visited 99% of the government's declared locations.

The CCF also found 141 undeclared arms caches and other military sites on both sides.

As part of its demobilisation, the CCF collected and turned over to the new army more than 180,000 weapons and destroyed another 24,000. The CCF collected 7.4 million rounds of ammunition, 29,276 land mines, and nearly 5000 hand grenades. The CCF also found 5.7 tonnes of explosives; most was blown up on site as it was too unstable to be moved.

Segala warned that the quantities handed to the new army exceed its needs and are a potential source of insecurity, so that some of it should be destroyed.

Demining continues

Faced with the debacle of a more than one-year delay to demining because of UN infighting, a shame-faced ONUMOZ agreed to leave behind enough money to allow the demining programme to run until November 1995. By then, it is hoped that main roads will be cleared, demining teams trained, and a central organisation created to coordinate demining. Donors and the government continue to argue as to whether such a body should be government controlled or not.

This list gives: post in English and Portuguese and name of person, followed by (where known): province of origin, age, profession and education, and prior post. (UEM is Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo.)

Government

President: Joaquim Chissano (see next page)

Ministers in the President's Office:

Economic and Social Affairs (Assuntos Economicos e Sociais): Eneas Comiche — Inhambane; economist; ex-Finance minister.

Parliamentary Affairs (Assuntos Parlamentares): Francisco Madeira — Sofala, 40; lawyer, UEM; ex Diplomatic Advisor to the President.

Defence and Security Affairs (Assuntos de Defesa e Seguranca): still to be named.

Other Ministers:

Prime Minister (Primeiro-Ministro). Pascoal Mocumbi — Inhambane; 53; gynaecologist, Lausanne University, Switzerland; ex-Foreign Minister.

Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Negócios Estrangeiros e Cooperação): Leonardo Simão — Inhambane; doctor, UEM & MA London; ex Health Minister.

Defence (Defesa Nacional): Aguiar Mazula — Niassa; 48; 2 years of law at UEM; ex Minister of State Administration.

State Administration (Administração Estatal): Alfredo Garnito — Cabo Delgado; ex Governor of Nampula.

Justice (Justiça): Ibraimo Abudo — Nampula; law UEM; ex-president of Sofala provincial tribunal.

Interior (Interior): Manuel António — Sofala; 53; 5 years secondary school; retains post.

Finance and Planning (Plano e Finanças). Tomas Salamão — Inhambane; 40; economist, UEM; ex Deputy Minister of Planning.

Health (Saúde): Aurelio Zilhão — Zambézia; doctor; ex Director of Maputo Hospital.

Education (Educação): Arnaldo Nhavotso — Inhambane; 37; MA economic sciences and applied management in education, Bourgogne University, France; ex Deputy Minister of Education.

Agriculture and Fishing (Agricultura e Pescas): Carlos Agostinho do Rosário — Inhambane; economist; ex Governor of Zambézia.

Culture, Youth and Sport (Cultura, Juventude e Desportos): Mateus Katupha — Cabo Delgado; MA, linguistics, London; retains post.

Housing and Public Works (Obras Publicas e Habitação): Roberto White — Tete; construction engineer.

Transport and Communications (Transportes e Comunicações): Paulo Muxanga — Maputo; mechanical engineer, UEM; ex director of National Traffic Institute.

Industry, Commerce and Tourism (Indústria, Comércio e Turismo): Oldimiro Baloi — Maputo; economics UEM; ex Deputy Minister of Co-operation

Mineral Resources and Energy (Recursos Minerais e Energia): John Kachamila — Niassa; MA philosophy and geological sciences; retains post

38; economist, UEM; ex Deputy Minister of Labour Environment (Coordenação Ambiental): Bernardo Ferraz — Zambézia; ex-director National Environment Commission (Comissão Nacional do Meio Ambiente)

Social Welfare (Coordenação da Acção Social): Alcinda Abreu — Sofala; child psychology; ex-president of National Youth Organisation and founding member of independent women's organisation Muleide.

Deputy Ministers

Foreign Affairs and Cooperation: Francis Rodrigues and Daniel Antonio — ex- ambassadors to EU and OAU.

Defence: Antonio Hama Thai — retains post

Justice: Acucena Duarte — ex-Procuradora Provincial na Cidade de Maputo

Interior: Edmundo Carlos Alberto

Finance and Planning: Luisa Dias Diogo — ex national budget director

Health: Abdul Razak Noormahomed

Culture, Youth and Sport: Joel Libombo and Salomão Manhiça

Housing and Public Works: Agostinho Salvador Mondlane

Transport and Communication: Antonio Fernando

Industry, Commerce and Tourism: Mahomed Rafik Jussob Mohamed and Abilio Bichinho Alfino

Mineral Resources and Energy: Castigo Jose Correia Langa

Labour: Adelaide Anchia Amurane — ex National Director for Demobilised Soldiers

Social Welfare: Filipe Mandlate

Parliament:

Speaker (Presidente): Eduardo Mulembwe — Niassa; 40; lawyer, UEM; ex Attorney General (Procurador-Geral); member of Frelimo Political Committee.

Party leaders:

Frelimo: Armando Guebuza — ex Minister of Transport and Communications and key Frelimo negotiator

Renamo: Vicente Ululu — Cabo Delgado; Renamo secretary general

UD: Antonio Palange — Zambézia; doctor trained in former East Germany; vice-president of Palmo, one of three parties in UD coalition

Parliamentary Permanent Commission (Comissão Permanente da Assembleia da República):

Frelimo: Abdul Carimo, Abdulah Mussa, Alcido Nguenha, Ana Rita Sithole, Armando Guebuza, Carlos Moreira Vasco and Salomé Moiane.

Renamo: Vicente Zacarias Ululu, Raul Domingos, Albino Faife, Manuel Fonsecas and Prof Jose Leopoldo.

UD: Antonio Palange and Marcos Juma.

Maputo addresses:

Parliament (Assembleia da República), Av 24 de Julho, CP 1516; tel: 400826-33.

Frelimo, Rua Pereira do Lago; tel: 490181-9, fax: 492087

Renamo, Av Ahmed Sekou Toure 257; tel: 421293, 492125

UD: 3rd floor right, Av Olof Palme 956; tel: 424422

President Chissano key dates

22 Oct 1939: Born in Gaza
 1950s: Secondary school in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) and participant in African Secondary Students Association.
 1960: Began medical studies in Portugal; participated in founding UNEMO.
 1962: Participated in founding of Frelimo.
 1963: Elected to Frelimo Central Committee (and re-elected at all party congresses); abandoned medical studies in favour of Pascoal Mocumbi, a friend and colleague.
 1964: Secretary to President Eduardo Mondlane; military training.
 1965: Became Frelimo Security Secretary.
 1969: Elected to Frelimo Political-Military Committee (later Political Committee, Politburo; re-elected at all party congresses).
 1974: Member of delegation negotiating with Portuguese on independence; 20 September named prime minister of transitional government.
 1975: Named foreign minister in new government (held post until 1986)
 1977: Elected foreign secretary of central committee.
 1986: After the death of Samora Machel, named 3 November as president of Frelimo and 6 November as president of Mozambique.
 1994: Re-elected president of Mozambique at first multi-party election.

Demob data

The two armies

	Renamo	Frelimo	Total
To assembly areas			
Claimed	17,912	45,554	63,466
Actual	17,524	43,409	60,933
Unassembled locations			
Claimed	4,666	18,912	23,578
Actual	7,125	23,633	30,758
Total			
Claimed	22,578	64,466	87,044
Actual	24,649	67,042	91,691
Demobilised	20,537	57,507	78,044
To new army	3,662	8,533	12,195

Note: these figures do not include the so-called "16,000", a group of 13,776 government soldiers identified for demobilisation before the peace accord and which were demobilised during the peace process without going through assembly areas.

Claimed at time of peace accord	21,000	92,000	113,000
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Arms

	Renamo	Frelimo	Total
Weapons turned In			
Assembly areas	14,627	60,937	75,564
Unassembled loc.	2,841	33,126	35,967
Paramilitary forces		43,491	43,491
From the "16,000"		12,736	12,763

Weapons collected, by type

	Turned In	Found*	Total
Tanks, armoured cars,			
personnel carriers	157	247	404
Artillery	30	93	123
Collective arms	6,786	2,189	8,927
Individual arms	160,833	19,540	180,373

Note: * = found during verification missions

Unstable and unuseable weapons destroyed

	Total
Collective arms	4,798
Individual arms	19,326

Verification

Visits by CCF verification teams

	Renamo	Frelimo	Total
Total locations			
claimed	287	435	722
visited	171	432	603
not visited	116	3	119
% visited	70%	99%	84%
Other sites visited	75	68	141

Locations in Manica/Sofala

	Renamo	Frelimo	Total
claimed	109	56	165
visited	33	56	79
not visited	76	0	76
% visited	30%	100%	48%

Demining (to Oct)

	cleared area (m ²)	roads (km)	mines found
UN/Lonrho	-	868	6
USAID/Ronco	-	700	16
Norwegian People's Aid	1,083,590	48	309
Halo Trust	126,701	49	190

Source: Cease Fire Commission (Comissão de Cessar Fogo, CCF).

For further information:

For those readers who wish to keep up on post-election Mozambique, the Agência de Informação de Moçambique (AIM) produces two regular newsletters in English: *AIM reports* is published fortnightly in London (£14/23/28 sent to UK/Europe/elsewhere from AIM, 52 High Holborn, London WC1V 6RL) and *Mozambiquefile* is published monthly from Maputo (\$28 from AIM, CP 896, Maputo). Finally, there is a weekly summary of the Mozambican press available in Portuguese on e-mail (contact wenke@adam.uem.mz)