

# Mozambique peace process bulletin



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To be published irregularly until the first multi-party election in Mozambique  
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## Forced march to 27-28 Oct election

The election has been set for 27-28 October, but the country will not be ready. Voter registration, demobilisation and formation of the new army are all taking place – but at much too slow a pace.

The new unified army will be only partly organised and there is a real danger that Mozambique may still have three armies on election day. Some Renamo-controlled areas are still closed to the government and may not be fully reintegrated with the rest of the country by October.

Three armies and lack of access were exactly the factors which allowed the return to war after the Angola election.

But the international community, led by the United States, has adopted a high risk "forced-march" approach, saying that election must be held in October no matter what. United Nations Special Representative Aldo Ajello says flatly: "There is no way we can postpone the election; there is no way we can stop the machine."

Although some diplomats and UN officials feel that the election should be postponed, most argue that Mozambique will be unprepared no matter what date is chosen. They claim that if the date were allowed to slip, then both Renamo and government would fill up the

extra time with new delays.

Privately many diplomats now argue that the only way to prevent chaos and confusion after the election is for the government and Renamo to make some kind of deal. The South African example of a mix of deals before and just after the election is cited, and the US has been pushing hard for a prior agreement to form a "government of national unity".

The UN Security Council is scheduled to discuss Mozambique again on 15 July, and is likely to express concern at the "continuing delays", as it did in its resolution of 5 May.

### Military: New targets and new delays

Government delays in sending soldiers to assembly areas were attacked in an unprecedented statement from the international members of the Supervision and Control Commission (CSC) on 22 June. The statement warned that with government troops going into assembly areas at the rate of only 100 a day, it would be impossible to get the remaining 11,000 men into assembly areas and out again by 15 August, the date set by the government itself – which, the statement noted, was already a month later than the 15 July date set by the Security Council on 6 May.

Dates have been set back with great regularity. The Security Council set 1 June as the target for assembly of all troops and 15 July for the completion of demobilisation. On 13 June the Cease Fire Commission (CCF) agreed a new schedule: both sides would complete assembly by 1 July, Renamo would finish demobilisation and close assembly areas by 29 July, while the government would complete demobilisation and close assembly areas by 15 August. The first

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**Voters registered: 2.7 mn (36% of those eligible)****Government troops to assembly areas:  
41,974 (85%)****Renamo troops to assembly areas:  
17,402 (91%)****Government troops demobilised: 23,007  
Renamo troops demobilised: 2,584**

assembly area (AA) closed on 18 June; it was a government AA at Boane.

Meanwhile, on 17 June the CSC finally agreed to new lower troop figures for the government: 49,638 to be sent to assembly areas.

But the process continued to move slowly. By 23 June, the government had sent 38,467 soldiers (77.5% of those expected) and Renamo 16,592 (86.7%) to AAs.

Ajello met with Mozambique's president Joaquim Chissano at the end of June, and he agreed to speed up assembly. It was agreed to extend the assembly from 1 to 8 July and that ONUMOZ would give logistic help to the government. But in the first five days of July, only 1711 troops moved to AAs.

By 5 July, government had sent 41,974 (84.6%) to AAs, of whom 23,007 had been demobilised and 2,584 sent to the army, leaving 16,383 people in the AAs. Renamo had sent 17,402 (90.9%) to the AAs, of whom 5,099 had been demobilised, 2,268 had gone into the new joint army, and 10,035 remained in the AAs.

Renamo movements to AAs were quite steady at an average of 120 per day from December through March.

Government movement has been more erratic: 8,000 soldiers in three weeks in December followed by a month-long pause, followed by 16,000 troops in a four week period from mid-January to mid-February. Between mid-February and mid-March it assembled 8,000 soldiers. But in the subsequent three months the government sent only 6,000 soldiers to AAs – a rate of less than 70 per day.

A realistic deadline for closing assembly areas is probably 31 August, because AAs must be closed before campaigning starts and while soldiers can still register for the election. With full cooperation, demobilisation could be done in four weeks. That means the government really has until the end of July to assemble its remaining 8,000 troops – which is possible since the government sent troops to AAs at that rate earlier this year.

## Demob resumes

The on-off demobilisation was on again in late June. Demobilisation had been virtually stopped for three weeks, then 4878 government and 1977 Renamo soldiers were demobbed in 17 days: 19 June - 5 July.

Demobilisation of government troops had begun in earnest on 10 March and for four weeks the government demobilised more than 2500 soldiers a week. But government stopped in early April when it became clear that Renamo was demobilising only 100

1000 soldiers in three days (4-6 May), so government responded by demobbing 3100 in nine days (16-25 May). Early June saw only small numbers demobbed by both sides.

Government demob was also delayed when the government discovered that some soldiers destined for the new national army were being demobilised by mistake, so they had to review their lists.

Formation of the new army has also been very slow, with no one going for army training in May or June. This means large numbers of people have been staying in assembly areas for unexpectedly long periods. Some assembly areas are now significantly overloaded.

## 12,000 troops lost

In late April, the government began a three week moratorium on demobilisation and announced there was "a mistake" in UN figures. The UN had "misinterpreted" their figure of 61,638 government soldiers as the number meant to enter assembly areas, when in fact it included 13,776 soldiers who had been identified for demobilisation before the October 1992 Rome peace accord but who were only actually demobilised, with UN help, last year. Government then produced a new figure of 49,638 troops as the total meant to enter assembly camps.

Technical staff of the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) said there was never any doubt about the government's original figures. There were 61,638 soldiers to enter assembly camps and this number was presented complete with a breakdown of how many soldiers would enter each of the government's 29 assembly areas through-out the country.


Renamo immediately accused the Government of deliberate manoeuvring to hide 12,000 soldiers, in flagrant violation of the peace accord. A few high ONUMOZ officials backed Renamo's claim, alleging that the government had sent thousands of soldiers home and told them just to wait, and was keeping other thousands in secret barracks.

Most ONUMOZ officials and military attaches in Maputo reject this claim as ludicrous. ONUMOZ chief Aldo Ajello said he was prepared to accept that the government had made mistakes. "I don't think there's any tricky game going on, or any hidden troops. Mistakes can be made by anyone", Ajello said.


The most likely explanation, military analysts suggest, is that these men no longer exist. Well before the peace accord was signed, there were numerous reports of corruption in the army. One widespread practice was that of keeping dead or discharged soldiers on the wages list, so local commanders could pick up their salaries. Furthermore, local recruitment practices and communications between local army bases and the central command were increasingly disorganised towards the end of the war. A western military attaché said that "most government battalions were well under strength; some were down to half strength."

Western diplomats suggest that government did not know how many soldiers it had when the war ended, and that it picked the highest possible estimates at the time of the peace accord in the hope of maximising donor support for the demobilisation process.


### % of troops in assembly areas



### Renamo troops



### Government troops



We noted in Mozambique, number 1 (January 1993) the problems of corruption and the wide variation in the number of soldiers estimated by the government. At that time we said "foreign military attaches suggest there are fewer than 50,000 active soldiers" on the government side – remarkably close to the 49,638 eventually chosen by the government.

Two months of haggling followed in the Cease Fire Commission (CCF). Increasingly impatient with this and other failings of the CCF, Ajello announced that the supreme peace-keeping body set out in the peace accord, the Supervision and Control Commission (CSC) which he chairs, would deal with the numbers problem directly. This led to more arguments. Government CCF members complained that the body's ONUMOZ chair, Brazilian Colonel Pier Segala, had acted outside his authority by passing the matter to the CSC.

Ajello said "I don't think there's a real understanding that the only body with political power is the CSC".

Finally on 17 June the CSC accepted the new numbers "as a working basis" without Renamo accepting their accuracy. As part of the deal, the CCF agreed on 16 June to a verification programme after assembly areas are closed. The CCF will visit all bases and barracks and their surrounding areas to look for any unassembled troops, and ONUMOZ officials believe they have good enough contacts to find a large group of hidden soldiers, if such a thing exists.

This agreement led to a government promise to get all its troops into assembly areas by 1 July.

## Unassembled troops exceed 25,000

As well as nearly 70,000 troops from both sides being sent to assembly areas, more than 25,000 others will be demobilised without being sent through AAs. These are staff at headquarters, logistics units, and air and naval bases, plus special guards and the disabled – as well as women and children in Renamo areas.

Renamo has said it has 6500 people in 22 locations: 897 disabled, 1160 female troops (Renamo is sending no women to the new army), 2269 guards, and 2174 children. Formal registration began on 25 May; by 4 July, 3502 people had been registered. Demobilisation will take place during July.

On 16 June the government turned in an updated but still incomplete list saying it has 14,828 people in more than 150 locations; by 4 July, 9489 had been registered.

Both sides have unassembled troops guarding arms depots and heavy weapons, which will also be recorded and taken under ONUMOZ control during the demobilisation period.

In addition, both sides have asked not to send some soldiers to AAs. Renamo has many more troops in Sofala province than it originally reported and fewer elsewhere. AAs there were already overflowing, and it asked to open two new AAs in Sofala; the CCF was unable to agree on this, and the extra troops will now be demobilised as unassembled. Similarly, at the end of June government asked that 3800 soldiers should be demobilised as unassembled rather than be sent to AAs.

Both sides kept disabled veterans in the army and on the payroll. The government has up to 3000 disabled soldiers in provincial centres; some have been living there for as long as eight years. The Association of Disabled Mozambican Soldiers (Ademimo) is pressing for at least some of the centres to be given to it.

Disabled soldiers receive up to a double pension, depending on impairment. In mid-June an ONUMOZ team including a doctor began visiting centres for disabled soldiers, and is doing disability assessments on the spot. Disabled soldiers from both sides are being sent to provincial rehabilitation centres.

The government did not want to pay disability pensions to Renamo disabled on the grounds that they had not put anything into the contributory pension scheme. Ademimo, which still represents mainly government disabled, pressed hard for the pension to be given to all disabled, but the government resisted.

Meanwhile, the government had promised that the extra 18 months demob money would also be paid to the 13,776 government soldiers selected for demobilisation before the peace accord but only demobbed after. Renamo refused to agree this unless its disabled received pensions. The stalemate continued from March through June, until hundreds of the 13,776 began demonstrating outside the ONUMOZ offices in the Hotel Rovuma in Maputo in mid-June. Finally, on 21 June the Council of Ministers agreed to give equal rights to Renamo disabled and on 22 June the CSC ratified demob payments to the 13,776.

Ajello stressed the importance to the resolution of the dispute of the strong support given by government disabled soldiers to their Renamo counterparts.

## **New army: half-trained, half-hearted**

Mozambique's new army will be half-sized, half-trained, and half-hearted. The peace accord (Protocol IV) calls for the "formation" before the beginning of the election campaign of a new national army of 30,000 soldiers, half each from ex-government and ex-Renamo forces.

In fact, even by the end of October, Mozambique will not have a new operational army. Fewer than 10,000 will have completed the most basic training, there will be no logistics or support system, and no equipment. This will leave 20,000 untrained soldiers just sitting around waiting at the time of election.

On 7 June the first three infantry battalions of the new Armed Defence Forces of Mozambique (FADM) completed their (compressed) six weeks training under British and Mozambican instructors at training camps in Dondo (Sofala province), and Boane and Manhica (Maputo province). Each battalion has 741 soldiers.

The start of training was delayed by a range of logistic problems – it took much longer than planned to renovate the training camps and to provide weapons, other equipment, and uniforms (which were delayed in transit from Portugal when the containers were lost in South Africa). Other delays include continued slowness by both sides in providing lists of people to go to the

meant to start the course, refused. A further six infantry battalions are due to begin training in July, with the help of 90 Zimbabwean instructors who arrived in Maputo in mid-June. Both sides were very slow in nominating people for training, and only turned in their lists at the beginning of July.

The already compressed six-week course provided only the most limited basic training, but it may be cut further to only four weeks. "It's a pity. The training could have been much better. But if the two parties don't provide lists of new soldiers, then it's hard to train them," Ajello commented.

A further six infantry battalions will be trained after this six, but delays mean they will still be in training camps on election day.

Meanwhile naval forces, special forces and commanders had already finished their crash training programmes under Portuguese instructors.

## **15,000 waiting**

Britain, Portugal, France, Zimbabwe, and Italy have so far agreed to train only half the army. This leaves 15,000 supposed FADM soldiers with nowhere to go and no one to train them. The government is looking desperately to Italy, Portugal and elsewhere for money and technical staff to complete the new army training, but training for 1000-2000 more seems all that is on offer.

Government officials argue that the peace accord only requires that the new army be "formed" before the election campaign starts on 10 September, which they say means that men have been put together into joint units before training. Assembly areas will close in August, but the government said at the beginning of July that it has barracks for 20,000 men. Both the British government and Renamo suggest the extra men should simply get their pay and go home until after elections.

Ajello has suggested that the second 15,000 be demobbed now and fresh men recruited after the elections. He argues that young men would volunteer, which would be better than forcing people to stay, and that new people are likely to be fresher and better educated. Standards for the new army have had to be sharply lowered to accommodate Renamo officers and men, some of whom are barely literate.

There are indications that Renamo will contribute as few as 12,000 instead of its full 15,000 men to the new army. But suggestions for a smaller army have been rejected out of hand by the government.

Government officers seem the only ones who want to stay in the new army, and they need men under them to justify their existence. They may fear that if they allow a smaller army to be created now, it will never get up to full strength as the new government tries to keep spending down. As an ONUMOZ official commented, "you can't take the toys away from the boys."

But the irony is that the government is creating a situation where the election is held without full demobilisation, which is more favourable to Renamo than the government. Indeed, Dhlakama suggested this some months ago and Ajello rejected the proposal, but he may have to accept it now.

Although the joint heads of the FADM were sworn in on 6 April, the 80 officers for the high commands were only appointed in June. The new army has no transport or communication equipment, no headquarters staff, and only a newly appointed officer corps, so it will be virtually inoperational at the time of the election. Indeed, it had been planned to use the new army for security of the election process, but it has already been decided that this is impossible.

Early signs seem to confirm the suspicion of many conscripts that the new army will be little better organised or better paid than the rag-tag armies they were used to. British trained Mozambican instructors went on strike more than once over late wages and one or two apparently left. FADM accounting systems were not computerised and seemed to risk being inadequate and inefficient. And even at this early stage, government was struggling to find money for FADM and places to house its soldiers.

## Not voluntary

The new army will not be made up of volunteers, and unwilling conscripts have provoked a series of uprisings in assembly areas.

Government soldiers arriving in Maputo on their way to start training for the new army said they were forced

### ***3 parties to negotiations***

ONUMOZ officials and other peace process observers are increasingly suggesting that there are three parties to the negotiations now: Renamo, government politicians and the government military. They suggest, for example, that the CCF-CSC tension reflects a wider rift between the political and military wings of the government.

Similarly, delays with assembly and demobilisation can be seen as the government military staking its own claims. Ajello is known to believe that the army is being deliberately obstructive and is trying to delay or even prevent the election.

In part, this may just be soldiers pressing for a bigger slice of the pie and to safeguard their own interests. One high ONUMOZ official commented: "the government objects that the UN is building up Renamo, which didn't win the war. The government army feels it did not lose, and should get at least as much as Renamo."

This leads to demands that the new army should be as large as possible, with the highest possible salaries and the best possible equipment, and to foot-dragging now when donors are not providing enough equipment and training for the new army.

But the government army also seems to be positioning itself to ensure it retains enough strength to block any Renamo rejection of the election results.

Renamo soldiers said their leaders had sent them, but had not explained what for.

One high ONUMOZ official admitted "by tolerating the forcing of people into the new army, we are involved in a major human rights violation."

There have been violent incidents in nearly all assembly areas (AAs). At first, incidents were over food and conditions, later over back pay, and most recently and seriously over demands for demobilisation. Some soldiers have been in assembly areas for more than four months, much longer than intended. Ajello said the obvious: the best solution to the problem would be immediate completion of the demob process and closure of the over-crowded camps where soldiers languish in rudimentary conditions.

In May alone, in Catembe 50 government soldiers armed with machetes went out on the street to demand their demob date, at the Rio Save most soldiers and officers went on strike to press for demobilisation, in Quelimane a mob of 500 soldiers blocked a road, and so on. At Mohiua 300 Renamo soldiers demanded that they be demobilised or sent to the new army, and if they were to be kept in the AA any longer they must have electricity and music.

There were two serious incidents in early June in Zambezia. Hundreds of soldiers at an AA in Mocuba town mutinied. They stormed out of their AA, destroyed the flimsy huts of three local civilians and a car, and rampaged through the central market place. When neither the national police nor the ONUMOZ assembly camp observers took action, furious local civilians picked up their rudimentary weapons to hound the soldiers back out of town. Hundreds of local residents hit back with axes and sticks, killing two government soldiers and wounding a host of others.

The 2000 Renamo soldiers gathered at Mocubela AA stripped naked and severely beat one of their leading commanders, according to ONUMOZ witnesses. The victim was Renamo's chief delegate to the CCF, Brigadier Raul Dick, who went to Mocubela when ONUMOZ called for someone to calm the already mutinous men. The riots apparently started when soldiers found too little money in their demobilisation pay envelopes.

## Holding the best for last

Both sides have been holding back their best soldiers and weapons for last – hardly surprising considering the degree of mutual mistrust. The first groups to be assembled had a higher percentage being demobilised and a higher average number of dependants. Later groups sent to assembly areas had more soldiers the two sides wanted to keep for the new army.

Weapons brought into assembly areas have generally been old, light, and less serviceable, although there have been significant regional variations: 93% of weapons in the north have been unserviceable, half in the centre, and virtually none in the south.

By 18 June, 18,010 Renamo fighters had brought in 14,191 weapons, while 37,400 government soldiers had brought in 39,069 weapons (and another 7,156 had been collected from the 13,776 pre-peace accord soldiers demobbed under the earlier programme).

inspections of weapons stores, which contain the newer and more modern weapons and which must be handed over to ONUMOZ before elections. The government was initially unwilling even to provide weapons for training for the new army. And a US military source involved in weapons destruction said government still had two mechanised battalions complete with tanks stationed just outside the capital, maintaining its security ring around Maputo.

Renamo sources allege that the government has failed to report all its weapons and in December 1993 even imported a planeload of Czech weapons, both in violation of peace accord, but Renamo has not made a formal complaint so the allegations cannot be checked.

- ONUMOZ has been disarming and demobilising the large number of paramilitary militias since January. About two-thirds of the 155,000 militia members have now been demobbed; 35,000 of an estimated 50,000 weapons have been collected.

## Post-election: Will the outcome be accepted?

"I'm sure both sides are holding back some troops and weapons as an insurance policy," said a knowledgeable Western diplomat. And with a growing awareness that the new army will not be operational and that access problems will not have been resolved, fears are increasing as to what will happen if elements on the losing side do not accept the outcome of the election.

There is a consensus that a full scale war will not be resumed, as happened in Angola. Ordinary soldiers on both sides are too exhausted to resume fighting. One military attaché said: "The soldiers on the government side would not accept orders to go back to war."

But there will not be a new army to enforce the outcome of the election, and the loser of the election could easily demand further political negotiations, as happened in South Africa.

A long stalemate could be enforced by the small groups of more committed and better trained troops held back by both sides, combined with continued Renamo control of its zones and government control of the state machinery.

What would happen then?

One diplomat suggested that "Mozambique could degenerate into a rather unstable, bandit-ridden country" in a reduced version of the pre-peace accord period.

A high ONUMOZ official agreed that the Angola scenario was unlikely, because the relative disorganisation in Mozambique means that it would take too long to rebuild supply and command lines. But he warned that the military leaders of the two sides could get fed up with the politicians, and simply take over. "Military men everywhere in the world have a funny way of combining in their own interests," he noted.

There is a consensus that it will be impossible to enforce the outcome of the election, and that some political agreement will be needed between the two sides. But what form will it take?

"In times of crisis, European countries have agreed to governments of national unity. Mozambique's parties should agree now to set the rules for forming such a government. Otherwise you get the kind of accusations and eventual disaster you had in Angola," one United States diplomat argued.

The US has been pushing particularly hard and publicly for the two sides to agree to the post-election formation of a Government of National Unity (known locally even by English speakers by its Portuguese acronym GUN).

From original demands that a GUN be formed regardless of the election outcome, Dhlakama returned from the US saying that it should be based on the percentage of votes each party achieves in elections.

This brings the Renamo proposal closer both to the arrangement reached in South Africa and to ideas about a GUN supported by several of Mozambique's leading non-armed opposition parties, notably PCN (Partido de Convencao Nacional) and MONAMO (Movimento Nacional Mozambicano).

However ONUMOZ officials are privately angry at the US for, as they argue, "holding a GUN to the government's head"; they consider public pressure counter-productive.

There remains a widespread assumption that Chissano will be elected president and that Frelimo will be the largest party, and thus the pressure from the US and UN is to ensure a role for Renamo. But there is also wide agreement that the election is necessary to actually test the support of both sides and thus to work out the post-election balance.

Even Renamo's strongest backers accept that a formal pre-election accord on a GUN is not necessarily right. One pro-Renamo official in ONUMOZ said "we must ensure people have a future after the election. There has to be some sort of 'gentlemen's agreement', and if one is not reached by October there will be a mess."

Another high ONUMOZ official argued that the number of qualified Renamo people was small and that jobs in government, embassies, and the civil service should be provided for all of them. He said discussions had already begun with the World Bank, which controls government spending, to allow it to expand the civil service for this. ONUMOZ officials also expect the US to put pressure on the World Bank to allow Mozambique to increase spending to accommodate Renamo.

ONUMOZ remains convinced that Renamo's main interest is money and security rather than political power, and that the final deal need not involve political power sharing. There are widespread reports of a deal between Dhlakama and a US timber company for logging in Manica province, and UN officials argue that these sorts of deals should be encouraged to give Renamo leaders an economic interest in a settlement. These officials also argue that continued lack of access to Renamo areas, particularly for business people, has an economic rather than political base.

ONUMOZ continues to push donors to contribute to the trust fund for Renamo, which now has \$8.2 million and promises of another \$6.1 mn. Italy remains the largest donor to trust fund, having put in \$6.3 mn and

Netherlands (\$1 mn), Sweden (\$300,000), South Africa (\$290,000), Switzerland (\$210,000), Luxembourg and Namibia. Outstanding pledges include the European Union (\$1.5 mn), United States (\$1 mn), Britain (\$750,000), Denmark (\$500,000) and Portugal (\$300,000).

But ONUMOZ officials complain that the trust fund is being frittered away by Renamo on huge hotel and telephone bills. With the money it has been spending it could have bought hotels and other buildings in Maputo.

## Access: improving slowly

Reunification is progressing slowly and quietly. Many Renamo areas remain closed and it seems unlikely that all will be under a unified state administration before 27 October. Renamo has been very slow to identify areas it claims and name administrators; election registration teams and government health workers were barred from some Renamo zones in June.

But in an unexpected twist, the government suddenly began foot dragging on reunification. It failed to formally appoint the new administrators and refused to send government police to Renamo areas.

Renunification comes under the National Commission for Territorial Administration (CNAT). Set up under the peace accord, CNAT has four government and four Renamo members, and is the only commission with no ONUMOZ representation; the chair rotates. The CNAT meets every Wednesday afternoon.

CNAT was named in November. It originally hoped to have lists of Renamo controlled areas by 20 March, to name administrators by 31 March, to have training sessions for the new administrators in April and May, and to begin economic studies in June.

But progress has been very slow. As one CNAT member admitted, "the two sides have not yet succeeded in creating an atmosphere of trust. Both sides see hidden agendas." Thus it was May before any progress was being made, and members began to tour Renamo areas.

Lists of Renamo areas were not provided until the three Renamo "advisors" appointed to assist each of the 10 provincial governors began work in March. In mid-May they began handing to CNAT lists of Renamo controlled areas and people they proposed to administer those zones. By mid-June, lists had been submitted for Manica, Sofala, Nampula and Gaza provinces only.

In mid-June, Minister of State Administration Aguiar Mazula announced the names of four administrators in Manica and Sofala and then set off on a courtesy visit to these first Renamo administrators to be recognised by the state.

Unexpectedly, however, they only signed their contracts and Mazula did not formally install them in office, for what was explained as narrowly bureaucratic reasons. The actual appointments must be made by President Chissano and published in the official journal, *Boletim da Republica* – a process which takes several weeks. Then the actual investiture must be done by the provincial governor. Without the administrator being in place, nothing can be done to integrate other aspects of

education. Thus observers were surprised that the government had not gone out of its way to speed up the process.

## No police

A joint meeting in late May of the CNAT, the Commission for Police Affairs (COMPOL), the Mozambican Republic Police (PRM) and the UN's Civilian Police (CIVPOL) contingent called for immediate extension of all government structures into Renamo zones, including the national police network.

Police coverage, they argued, was a vital complement to the process of voter registration and elections themselves, to guarantee the security of both materials and people involved.

The peace accord calls for the creation of a new army but not a new police force. Thus the existing 18,000 person PRM, monitored by CIVPOL and COMPOL, is to extend its coverage to the whole country.

CIVPOL leads the way into Renamo areas. Dhlakama made the CIVPOL presence a pre-condition for letting PRM into "his" zones, on the grounds that government police could not be trusted. Ajello saw the presence of both CIVPOL and the PRM as the key first step is reasserting government control over Renamo areas.

CIVPOL opened its first police post in a Renamo area on 30 May and by late June had opened eight, including Mavago (Niassa), Quinga and Lurio (Nampula), and Inhaminga, Muanza and Maringue (Sofala). At the same time, PRM General Staff Head Superintendent Benedito Zinocacassa, said "We are putting out an order to immediately re-open all district commands and police posts closed in the war and found in Renamo zones".

But, unexpectedly, government police did not go with CIVPOL to open PRM police stations in Renamo zones. The Minister of Interior ordered his men to go, but they refused. On 13 June the government asked ONUMOZ for transport for the following day to take police to Maringue; this was granted but on 14 June the trip was postponed to 15 June and on 15 June it was called off.

The problem seemed to be a dispute within government as to whether police or administrators should go first, which effectively delayed resumption of government control by two months.

Ajello wanted the police to go in first, followed by the administrator, and said that police could have gone in April. Ajello said that the "main reason" he wanted a civilian police presence "was to open up Renamo areas." He feels the Mozambican police are afraid to go to Renamo zones. He has offered joint patrols with CIVPOL police in UN vehicles, and said that the "presence of CIVPOL is a guarantee to the police that nothing bad will happen to them."


The government has said nothing officially, but apparently argues that the police cannot go in until the administrator is in post, which cannot occur until after the publication of the name in *Boletim da Republica*.

Finally government police did go to Muanza, Maringue and Cheringoma on 4 July.

The issue has also delayed voter registration. By law, registration teams must be accompanied by the government police, who are declining to go to some Renamo areas.

# Republic of Mozambique

(Provincial and District Divisions)



## Renamo holds 25% of land

This map shows the *Bulletin's* estimate of Renamo control, based on both UN and government sources. We estimate that Renamo controls about 25% of the territory and only 6% of the population.

When the peace accord was signed on 4 October 1992, Renamo claimed to control 85% of the national territory.

According to a recently publicised plan for national reunification drawn up by the Ministry of State Administration, Renamo had complete control over seven of Mozambique's 128 administrative districts, and 53 of its 393 lower-level "administrative posts". The seven districts are: Chigubo, in Gaza province; Cheringoma (Inhaminga), Maringue and Muanza in Sofala; Macossa and Tambara in Manica; and Mavago in Niassa.

Even this list is not official or agreed. Some Renamo officials say Renamo does not control all of Tambara, but does control Erati (Nacaroa) district in Nampula province.

The UN Security Council in May called on Renamo "to allow unimpeded access to the areas under their control to all political forces in the country." Renamo says that its areas are open; publicly and privately, Aldo Ajello continues to insist that there are no problems of access to Renamo areas.

Privately most ONUMOZ staff disagree. An internal ONUMOZ report in early June said "many Renamo areas remain inaccessible." One CIVPOL official said: "there is still no freedom of movement in Renamo areas. It is no better than six months ago." He said access was a political issue and not part of CIVPOL's mandate.

In June, government vaccination teams were barred by Renamo officials from at least two districts. In Inhaminga the Renamo head was quoted as saying that because they had the support of NGO health workers, they did not need government vaccinators.

At the start of the registration campaign, registration teams were barred from Renamo zones in Nampula, Zambezia, Sofala and Gaza. Two weeks after registration started, Renamo delegates in two localities in Malema district in Nampula province would still not allow the registration brigades to come in. In the Zambezia province district of Gile, according to radio reports, the Renamo delegate was arrested when he tried to burn down the registration post. (Renamo leaders said it was an accident).

In June a Frelimo official from Dondo in Sofala was arrested and held for two days by Renamo when he attempted to go to Savana.

Renamo is still barring logging in Manica.

At his press conference on 24 June Ajello told the press and government "you should go to these areas. You should try to force the situation. These should be denounced." He said if incidents like this were proven he would insist Renamo take action.

## Election: Registration open

Mozambique's first multi-party elections have been set for 27-28 October, to simultaneously select a new parliament and president. Registration is from 1 June to 15 August (likely to be extended to 9 September). The campaign will be 10 September though 24 October.

The newly constituted National Elections Commission (CNE) began work in February and its embryonic network of provincial and district level committees began in March and April, although not all district committees function yet.

Registration began on 1 June and within five weeks 2.7 million people had registered. The CNE was pleased and was registering people at 100,000 per day – double the rate achieved early in the registration campaign in Angola, although still not fast enough to register all 7.5-8.5 mn eligible voters. The CNE has already said the registration will continue into early September for extra-ordinary cases.

There had been plans for mobile registration brigades, but these have been abandoned, which will make it difficult for people in remote areas to register.

unarmed opposition parties registered in Maputo to extensive TV and press publicity. (People must vote in the same place that they register.)

## Serious logistic problems

The registration campaign had an uneven start and the CNE faced immense logistic and political problems. The CNE had hoped to start with 1600 brigades of five people each but by late June only 1412 were functioning. In a number of areas it had proved impossible to find enough local people with six years of primary schooling.

A major problem was lack of transport. The CNE had only 20 cars plus two light planes and six helicopters outside Maputo; more had been ordered but 120 were tied up in the port awaiting customs clearance. The CNE hopes to have 400 road vehicles, 15 helicopters and seven small planes by October.

In the south registration posts opened in most districts. In other areas, including half the districts of central Sofala province and some in the north, there was no registration in the first weeks. In the nation's second biggest city, Beira, would-be voters on the first few days went home without their cards, as registration material failed to show up at the posts. Logistic problems meant there was no immediate action in six Sofala districts, principally in Renamo-held zones. Further delay was blamed on the provincial police command, which by late June had not sent police to supervise registration in three Renamo held districts.

The war caused even more serious destruction than many election officials had realised. In some areas there were no standing buildings which could be used for registration or for the overnight secure storage of materials. Many districts have no place to stay and no where to buy food, which became a more serious problem when the CNE found it could not hire local staff with a primary education and had to bring in people from outside. Staff are paid MT 200,000 (US\$ 30) per month plus MT 5000 per day for food.

But registration officers and the police meant to

### *How many people?*

The CNE continues to work with the official population projection from the 1980 census, which projects nearly 18 million, of whom 8.5 mn are 18 years old or over. But at least a million people were killed in the war, and many more became refugees.

The government's Direcção Nacional de Estatística in its February 1994 projection gives a more realistic population which assumed no population growth in the period 1985-89. This gives a present population of 16.6 mn, of whom 7.9 mn would be of voting age.

Because there are still many people outside Mozambique, UNOHAC is working on a basis of 15.8 mn people, which would give a voting age population of 7.5 mn.

## Observers gagged

International observers are banned from making **any public** statements about the election, according to an unexpected change in the Regulations for International Observation published by the National Electoral Commission (CNE) in June. The regulations state that observers must "refrain from making any public statement about the electoral process" and instead must make all comments in writing, in Portuguese, to the CNE.

The rules come as a surprise, because international observers are normally encouraged to make public statements pronouncing the election free and fair. Also, the widely circulated draft of the regulation only banned public statements which could threaten electoral activity or raise questions about the institutions of the electoral process.

ensure security at the posts complained they had no food and could not buy any, and would not carry on. The UN proved unable to release money to buy food. Then the World Food Programme agreed to provide food aid to 6,672 voter registration officers for three months.

## Political disputes

The CNE itself has moved very slowly because of the need to act by consensus. In particular, a decision on voting by people outside the country was repeatedly deferred.

Voting rules stipulate that each person may vote only at the place where they first registered. Concern focused on the hundreds of thousands of refugees still living outside the country, and the thousands of soldiers still waiting in assembly camps for demobilisation.

Government wants to allow people to vote if they register outside the country, as spelled out in the election law; Renamo is opposed, fearing most refugees would vote for Frelimo, and argues it was promised as part of a deal last year that only people inside the country would vote this time.

## Little civic education

Civic education only began on 20 May, 10 days before the start of registration, so many Mozambicans do not know about voting. The delay was caused both by the slowness of CNE decision-making, which did not approve education materials until March, and because of the slowness by the UN which took two months to pay for printing.

By mid-June, 90% of the estimated \$60 million needed to run elections was already guaranteed, mostly from foreign aid, according to sources from the Elections Administration Technical Secretariat (STAE). But these funds are managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and all purchases must be approved by UNDP in New York, which can take several weeks.

For training of registration brigades, the CNE was unable to get to the UN money and had to use funds

has also been slow to provide its matching funds.

There have also been complaints about high salaries and bonuses of CNE and STAE staff. According to Justice Minister Ussmane Ali Dauto, many of their top salaries surpassed those of ministers. According to unofficial information, the President of the Republic receives a monthly salary of around MT 4 million (\$700). The CNE originally proposed that its president should earn double that.

- The British firm Thomas De La Rue won the \$8.7 mn contract for registration materials. Tenders are now being considered for \$9 mn of electoral material.

## Election tribunal named

President Chissano formally appointed an Elections Tribunal of international judges on 8 June. Its job is resolving cases where CNE decisions are contested.

The tribunal consists of Mozambican judges Joao Trindade and Joaquim Madeira, plus Michel Coat (France), Joao Camilo (Portugal) and Mariano Fiallos (Nicaragua). Walter Ramos (Brazil) and Juan Rodriguez (Chile) are to serve as substitutes.

## Demining scandal: UN delays kill

UN bungling and infighting delayed demining for more than a year, and bureaucrats are still trying to hold up the launch of the mine clearance school.

Hundreds of people have been needlessly killed or maimed as a result; resettlement and the return of refugees has been delayed because border roads are still mined and many people will not get back in time to register. Yet \$13 million remains unspent, causing a scandal that is putting the UN system into increasing disrepute.

By the end of 1992, within weeks of the peace accord, an initial mine clearance plan had been drafted and \$14.2 million had been made available for demining – \$7 mn as part of the ONUMOZ budget and \$7.2 mn from the Netherlands, Sweden and Italy as part of a special UN trust fund. Plans called for clearing more than 2000 km of priority roads, setting up a training school and carrying out a detailed survey.

By May 1994, only \$1.5 mn had been spent or committed, and the little demining which had been done had been accomplished only by bypassing the UN.

Finally in May the Secretary General's officer intervened. A highly controversial \$4.8 million contract was signed between the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and Royal Ordinance, Lonrho and Mechem to clear mines from 2000 km of roads. And the remaining \$7.5 mn was taken away from UNDP's Office for Project Services (OPS) in New York and given to UNOHAC (UN Office of Humanitarian Assistance Coordination) in Maputo, which is rushing to have a mine clearance programme functioning before the UN pulls out in November.

At the heart of the delay seems to be turf battles between UN agencies both in New York and Maputo. A key problem was that the creation of two new UN

UNOHAC, meant that existing UN agencies in Maputo and the resident representative lost staff and power to the people dispatched from New York and with a direct line to the Secretary General. But the very creation of ONUMOZ was delayed by infighting in New York, and Ajello's appointment and budget were only confirmed after a long battle (see *Bulletin 3*).

Three battles seem to have been important in delaying demining: 1) between Maputo and New York; 2) within UN headquarters in New York, notably between the UNDP OPS and the Department of Humanitarian Assistance (DHA); and 3) in Maputo between UNDP and ONUMOZ/UNOHAC.

UNDP in New York won control of the mine clearance money and then sat on it. During all of 1993 it refused to approve projects and programmes proposed by UNOHAC for vital demining, and instead argued over wording of documents, how many companies should be allowed to bid, quality control and other issues.

Complaints grew about the delays, and the donors early this year threatened to withdraw their money. At first, UNDP blamed government and Renamo for failing to agree the demining plan, but when that happened last November it did nothing to speed the process.

By mid-1993 the two sides had agreed that there should be a mine survey, but for six months the UN did nothing. Finally in December UNOHAC moved to break the logjam by unilaterally (without consulting UNDP) appointing the Halo Trust to carry out a national mine survey for \$420,000. But mine clearance remained stalled.

Word of the scandal reached New York, and in March 1994 the DHA sent Felix Downes-Thomas, a DHA deputy director, to head UNOHAC and clean up the mess.

Downes-Thomas has spent most of his time since arrival on mine clearance, often being forced to construct his own files because UNDP's mine clearance office in Maputo did not cooperate with him.

Negotiations with Lonrho, Royal Ordnance and Mechem had been underway for some months, but a contract was only signed when the matter was raised with the Secretary General.

On 20 May the Secretary General agreed that all remaining money for mine clearance should be passed to UNOHAC, but by mid-June UNDP was still trying to reverse this decision and block UNOHAC demining programmes.

## Few roads cleared

So far, two mine clearance projects have been completed. Lonrho and Gurkha Security Guards in 1993 cleared a series of roads in Sofala. In December a vehicle hit a mine on a road cleared by GSG.

Norwegian People's Aid bypassed the UN completely and began training mine clearers and clearing roads in Tete province in June 1993. It is now operating in other provinces bordering Malawi to clear tracks for returning refugees and has trained 276 mine clearers.

USAID awarded a \$ 3.9 mn contract last September to the US-based RONCO Consulting to clear 2170 km of road in the three central provinces this year, and work has begun.

mostly demobilised soldiers trained in Mozambique, are now working on priority roads.

The \$ 4.8 mn contract with Lonrho, Royal Ordnance and Mechem to clear 2000 km of road was finally agreed in May. So far, no start date has been agreed. And the contract remains highly controversial, because Mechem is a South Africa firm which made (and may have planted) some of the mines to be cleared. Traditionally, mine-makers are not paid to clear up their own products, and the contract was front page news in London (*Independent* 6 June).

## Demining school

Mines will remain a problem in Mozambique for decades, so the most important task to develop Mozambican mine clearance and training capacity. It was always intended that the UN should establish a Mine Clearance Training Centre, which should have become operational in August 1993.

Because of the UN delays, the centre was only formally opened in Beira in January 1994. Its first students arrived on 4 April and 30 graduated on 9 May. But the facilities were shared with Ronco, which was training its own mine clearers, and were totally inadequate.

The school is part of the package taken away from UNDP, and UNOHAC is setting up a larger school at Tete Airport based on facilities used by Norwegian People's Aid for its demining programme. The school will move there in July, and will have purely UNOHAC-hired staff.

UNOHAC now plans a crash programme to try to train 15 Mozambican demining teams before the end of the year and set up an organisation to direct and pay them. Having wasted one and a half years, the UN now only has a few months left for the entire programme.

Each team will have 30 Mozambicans, including two supervisors and three dog handlers with three mine sniffing dogs. The government will also need help setting up regional mine clearance bases, and will need the capacity to plan and administer mine clearance programmes.

## 8000 amputees

At least 8000 amputees injured by land mines have received medical treatment in Mozambique, according to *Landmines in Mozambique*, researched by Alex Vines and published by Human Rights Watch/Africa (90 Borough High Street, London SE1 1LL). Thousands more have been killed, did not seek medical treatment, or did not require amputation, but no records have been kept. The total number of land-mine casualties is probably at least 15,000.

Halo Trust estimates that 500 people were killed or maimed by land mines in the first year after the ceasefire.

The UN initially guessed that there were 2 million mines in Mozambique; the real figure is probably in the hundreds of thousands, which is more than enough to cause serious problems.

Mozambique during February-May 1994, using six mobile teams which both used sophisticated equipment and camped in the areas being studied and talked in detail with local people.

As provincial reports and maps are completed, they are being published by UNOHAC. So far, only the Maputo province survey has been issued. It identified 90 sites "ranging from small stretches of road closed by a single mine to large defensive minefields of many thousands of mines" and sometimes several kilometres in extent.

Most land mines in Mozambique are anti-personnel mines, mainly planted by the government for defensive purposes – to protect installations such as bases and railways – and by Renamo to disrupt transport routes and the economy. Mines were also planted by Rhodesia before 1979 and by the Portuguese colonial authorities before 1974.

Human Rights Watch says that 32 different types of anti-personnel mines and 19 types of anti-tank mines have been deployed; Halo Trust has visually identified 15 kinds of anti-personnel mines and 4 anti-tank mines.

## Political parties: Unofficial campaigning begins

The ruling Frelimo party officially chose Joaquim Chissano as its presidential candidate at the end of March. Two weeks later Renamo followed suit by selecting Afonso Dhlakama. They were joined by four other pretenders: Domingos Arouca (Mozambican United Front – FUMO), Ya-qub Sibindy (Independent Party of Mozambique – PIMO), Padimbe Kamati (Peoples Progress Party of Mozambique - PPPM) and the independent FUMO dissident, Carlos Jeque.

Chissano and Dhlakama remain the only serious contenders.

In April and May, Chissano dedicated himself to a tour around the provinces, officially described as a "working visit" but widely seen as a pre-elections campaigning tour – even more so since he reportedly took his Brazilian public relations advisors along as well as top members of the Frelimo Central Committee.

The first leg of his trip was on home turf, in Gaza province where Chissano and many other Frelimo top members were born. He got a warm welcome. In central Mozambique, his visit was marred by a small group of Renamo hecklers. In the north he met accusations of neglecting the nether half of the country and ignoring the fate of poverty-struck war veterans.

Back in the capital early June, Chissano met further biting criticism from his own party faithful. At an extraordinary session of Frelimo's 162 member Central Committee in Maputo, he faced charges of weak leadership and of failing to stop the cancerous spread of corruption.

Political analysts repeated the charge that many government politicians had given up governing, at least until elections, and were more concerned with providing for their own, material future. This limbo was possible to maintain in the absence of any strong challenge on policy from either the armed or the non-armed opposition.

## Renamo seeks cleaner image

Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama launched his campaign with a visit to the United State in early June and his first public visit to Beira in 16 years. He arrived in Beira on 21 June to be greeted by a crowd of 10,000

After his 10-day trip to the US, a confident and beaming Dhlakama told journalists: "My first official trip to the United States was a success – I managed to transmit the message Americans wanted and were hoping to hear."

A quiet spoken, besuited Dhlakama apparently made progress in replacing his former mask in some US circles as the "butcher of Mozambique" with a new one of political leader in favour of national reconciliation and peace.

He travelled around the offices of US government staff, although he failed to gain an audience with any senior officials despite intense pressure by US ambassador Dennis Jett, who accompanied Dhlakama through-out his US tour.

In a carefully delivered speech to the Washington Institute of Strategic Studies, Dhlakama was quick to assert that he wished Mozambique to follow South Africa's election example and not Angola's. He confidently claimed that questions put to him about Renamo human rights abuses and its use of child soldiers "were all well explained", and he came back visibly convinced that he'd made a good impression.

Dhlakama told his US critics that if human rights abuses occurred, these were just aberrations in the struggle for freedom.

## Opposition remains divided

On 26 April, 14 of Mozambique's mainly marginal political opposition parties opened the first National Congress of Opposition Parties in Xai-Xai. It was initiated and funded by Renamo, showing a new, reconciliatory face to the collective non-armed opposition. Renamo's principal objective, according to well-informed sources, was to get Dhlakama elected as the single presidential candidate to represent the entire opposition.

Dhlakama failed to get his mandate, and the opposition remains divided.

But it was the first opportunity for the parties to get to know each other and exchange campaigning ideas.

Participants at the Xai-Xai conference did agree to join forces in monitoring the work of voter registration brigades. The election law says all parties have a right to monitor registration to prevent fraud and to avoid dispute after the elections.

Of all the opposition parties, however, Renamo is the only one potentially able to cover most of the country. The non-armed opposition agreed that where they have no active members, Renamo could monitor for them. CNE President Brazao Mazula seemed troubled by the implications, and said it was essential to ensure this agreement was well understood at the level of every district.

• The disappointing congress result for Renamo was further tarnished by a public outrage, after Renamo

## Behind closed doors?

For two days following the election in Malawi in May, the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation was on the air 24 hours a day transmitting the result of every single polling station.

The general public knew the outcome an entire day before there was an official announcement. Voters had confidence in the election because they had heard the results of the polling station where they voted and knew them to be accurate. Openness and the MBC gave people confidence in their first election; they knew that the electoral commission and the parties could not cook up a deal behind closed doors.

But officials in Mozambique point instead to Angola, where they argue that the publication of initial partial results favourable to the MPLA may have provoked Unita into rejecting the outcome. Better, they argue, that the results should be compiled totally in secret, and be announced only when the electoral commission is sure they are correct – even if people must wait several days.

The danger of mistakes is real. Initial exaggerated registration figures were published for Nampula province in early June, causing some confusion.

But it is better to make mistakes in public and correct them quickly, than to hide behind closed doors. No matter how honest are the members of the electoral commission, people will *assume* that if they are working in secret then they are doing something dishonest.

The CNE should work with the press to ensure maximum openness at all levels. By law, at each and every polling station the results must be posted as soon as the count is finished; district and provincial electoral commissions should help the press and radio to compile and publish those results as quickly as possible. jh

heavies badly beat up two local government officials, apparently on orders from Dhlakama, for allegedly intimidating opposition party supporters.

## Little prospect of third force

With elections fast approaching, by late June it seemed that early non-armed opposition talk of forming a collective “third force” against their armed rivals was already a forgotten dream.

Out of 15 parties officially registered, some remain little more than a front man and a handful of cronies. (Not one party has a female president.)

Meanwhile the three or four parties that looked strongest a year ago and seemed to have potential for a meaningful coalition are now divided by internal rifts and afflicted by indecision.

The United Front of Mozambique (FUMO), led by presidential candidate Domingos Arouca, stuck out like a sore thumb. FUMO declined to participate in the Xai-Xai meeting and Arouca was clearly determined to

resignation of former vice-president Carlos Seque who is to stand as an independent candidate in the presidential elections. Meanwhile Arouca's own election campaigns director resigned in May.

Jeque enjoys support from some members of the National Convention Party (PCN), while other PCN members favour Dhlakama. PCN's support comes from the central region of the country and analysts have often speculated over a possible Renamo-PCN coalition, with the urban-rooted PCN providing educated personnel that Renamo still lacks.

PCN's collective leadership apparently remains split over whether or not backing Renamo is the best option.

Meanwhile, Maximo Dias, the formerly very vocal president of the National Union of Mozambique (MONAMO), fell almost silent, leading to speculation that he had given up on the third force idea and made some kind of compromise with Frelimo. MONAMO is said to have strong support among a small elite of professionals working in certain government ministries.

## Pocketing \$200,000

Mozambique's mainly marginal non-armed opposition parties will pocket \$200,000 each, following a surprise decision to simply hand out money allocated to the parties.

The parties' joy comes from a special UN trust fund. The parties clearly lack the resources to fight an election campaign, and ONUMOZ deputy head Behrooz Sadry went specially to New York, where UN officials drew up and approved the statutes of the new fund to be disbursed to any eligible political party in Mozambique for their elections campaign.

Contributions to the fund now exceed \$3.5 million – just over \$200,000 each for the 17 parties.

But by mid-June the funds were still completely inaccessible, due to a deep disagreement over who should do disbursements. ONUMOZ argued that the CNE must decide the rules and criteria for handing out funds to applicants. The CNE argued it was not initially consulted on this, had no such mandate, and refused to do it.

“If the CNE won't accept to establish the rules”, Ajello warned, “we'll have to send the whole thing back to New York, and rewrite the statutes, and that would waste an awful lot of time”.

Finally at the end of June the parties met, and the small parties all demanded that each registered party should get the same amount, and that it should be handed out as a lump sum immediately.

Both Renamo and the government argued that the money should be given out in several tranches, and should be based in some way on the size of the party – for example according to how many candidates actually stand for election. They noted that some of the registered parties are tiny, with just a leader and very few supporters, and that some of the small parties will simply pocket the money and disappear back to Portugal.

Nevertheless, the small parties demanded cash in hand and equal shares, so this was agreed by the CNE on 2 July.

More than 1 million refugees have returned from neighbouring countries, leaving 450,000 who still hope to return; at least 100,000 will stay outside. Remaining refugees hoping to come home include at least 250,000 in Malawi, 80,000 in South Africa, 70,000 in Zimbabwe, and smaller numbers in Zambia and Tanzania.

The UN High Commission for Refugees still estimates 800,000 refugees outside the country, but this is seen as inflated in an attempt to raise money for UNHCR.

But whatever the actual figure, as UNHCR Maputo representative Alfredo del Rio Court said, accelerated repatriation is urgent if refugees are to register for the election by 15 August. Yet UNHCR officials only hope to be moving 1,000 refugees a day from Malawi by the end of June. And returning refugees and UNHCR field workers testified to poor co-ordination between UNHCR offices in Malawi and Mozambique, which could undermine the efficiency of this operation.

Official repatriation of 17,000 refugees from Swaziland ended on June 3. A spokesperson for the International Migration Organisation (OIM) arranging their transport said "we have completely cleared Swaziland of refugees".

After an earlier false start, UNHCR co-ordinated repatriation from Zambia is to be relaunched on 8 July. UNHCR Information Officer in Maputo, Yussuf Hassan, said delay was due to Zambian refugees wanting to gather their harvest before returning. The World Food Programme offered to buy maize from refugee farmers in Zambia, in the hope the earnings will help them start a new life back home.

Earlier this year, the UNHCR planned to launch a mass repatriation programme to bring 250,000 Mozambicans home from South Africa. And from January to March, thousands signed up for the programme. When in May they were eventually offered transport home, however, only a handful showed up.

UNHCR suggested that many refugees signed up as an insurance policy against possible trouble around the time of South Africa's elections. With peaceful elections and an ANC victory in South Africa, but drought and continued political uncertainty at home, by May there was little incentive for refugees in South Africa to move.

## Renamo admits child soldiers

Under intense pressure from the international community and its own commanders, Renamo admitted that it had more than 2000 child soldiers, and demobilisation of them has begun

Renamo's use of children was well documented, but was repeatedly denied and dismissed as government "propaganda". Then at a press conference during his US visit in early June, Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama totally reversed his position. He said Renamo had used children, and "reading the history of Frelimo, MPLA, Swapo, ANC and other independence movements, we see that children were used by everybody."

Last year the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) began registering children, but then Dhlakama halted the process. Finally on 10 February, Renamo, ICRC, ONUMOZ, UNOHAC, Unicef and two

"Within Mozambique, the current priorities are clearly reconciliation and compromise. Peace must come first, even if it means accommodation with war criminals in the hope they will accept the shift to peaceful political competition. Yet amnesty and reconciliation should not beget amnesia," warn Kathi Austin and William Minter in a new report *Invisible Crimes*.

Its publication was timed for Dhlakama's visit to the US, and it looks at US private support for what a US State Department official in 1988 called "one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War II."

The report argues that "Renamo was responsible for abuses against civilians on a far wider and more systematic scale than were government troops" and that "Renamo abuses, for the most part, were deliberate consequences of strategy and tactics dictated from the top." Thus, even if an end to the fighting in Mozambique requires that there be no "Truth Commission" as in South Africa and thus no identification of the perpetrators of the crimes, at least the supporters of those crimes from outside should be publicly identified.

• *Invisible Crimes* is available for \$6.50 from Africa Policy Information Centre, 110 Maryland Av NE, Suite 112, Washington DC 20002, USA.

NGOs met to discuss the issue, and Renamo agreed to the expanded participation of the international community. In April, Renamo agreed to a Unicef survey.

It was accepted that people aged 16 and over would be demobilised normally, but children 15 and under would be treated separately. By 25 March, over 4000 children had been registered, of whom 1385 had already been reunited with their families. Not all are soldiers. An ICRC list of 3492 unaccompanied children compiled on 5 April showed 60% boys and an average age of just over 12. Some of the girls themselves had babies.

This suggests about 2000 child soldiers. The Unicef report was completed on 3 May and said that "these children are under military supervision, kept in tightly guarded bases within Renamo's strongest military zones". But as the Unicef report commented, "with the approach of elections, and as demobilisation goes ahead, these children are increasingly problematic to Renamo", which did not know what to do with them.

The children themselves were also becoming restless. The Unicef report notes that there were at least two strikes, where children demanded the benefits going to older soldiers.

Three factors pushed Renamo into changing. US embassy representatives met with Renamo leader Raul Domingos and warned him that Dhlakama would have a rough ride from the US press if the problem of children was not sorted out. Second, the Unicef report was leaked to the press.

Finally, in mid-May when ONUMOZ was preparing for the registration of unassembled troops, it simply told Renamo that it would treat children as part of the unassembled group and would take ICRC and Save the

unassembled areas. Renamo unexpectedly agreed, and when it presented its list of 6500 unassembled troops, it contained only 2269 active soldiers. The others were 2174 "orphans", 1160 women, and 897 disabled. Some of the children will be taken home as dependants of women being demobilised and the rest will be taken to centres where an effort will be made to reunite them with their families.

## UN: cut backs

In early May the UN Security Council extended the mandate of ONUMOZ until 15 November, and ordered the total closing down of the ONUMOZ mission by 31 January 1995. It also ordered reduction of its 6,000 strong military contingent, by the immediate withdrawal of 2,000 soldiers and gradual removal of the rest. By then Italy was already pulling out its over-sized battalion from the central Beira Corridor, with Bangladeshi, Portuguese and other soldiers soon to follow.

By the end of June, ONUMOZ had 4261 military personnel, 354 military observers, 806 police, and 200 foreign civilian staff.

ONUMOZ currently costs \$26,900,000 per month, or about \$900,000 per day.

## Police monitors arrive

The UN Security Council in February approved a special contingent of 1,144 police observers, of which 806 were in the country by mid-June. The Civilian Police (CIVPOL) unit has opened eight posts in Renamo zones and 16 in government areas.

Its brief is to monitor human rights violations by the police on both sides, but in reality only on the government side as Renamo does not have a formal police force. It is also to monitor the election, the 1200-member police quick reaction force, and private security firms. CIVPOL is totally unarmed.

When CIVPOL began inspecting police stations and prisons it met resistance from local officers who argued they had not received appropriate orders from the Ministry of Interior.

Behind their intransigence lay bad feeling at the attitude of some CIVPOL officers who, the police claim, rudely pushed into their stations in the small hours of the morning demanding to open all doors and cupboards. Some CIVPOL members complained that police officers would not co-operate. As one CIVPOL agent in Tete put it, "we hate them and they hate us." Ajello confirmed the initial frictions but says relations between the two have "improved enormously".

## CIA helicopters

ONUMOZ was forced by UN headquarters in New York to use helicopters provided by a company close to the US Central Intelligence Agency, disrupting demobilisation and provoking a protest by Ajello, it will be reported in a new book by journalist Paul Fauvet.

In late 1993, New York UN HQ suddenly cancelled ONUMOZ's contract with the Canadian firm SkyLink,

helicopters and pilots with experience in Afghanistan. They were popular and ideally suited for use in Mozambique.

Instead, the contract was awarded to Evergreen Helicopters to use Bell 212 helicopters. Fauvet reports that ONUMOZ head Ajello was livid because the Bells were "useless. They were far too small and didn't have enough range." At a key moment early this year when assembly of troops was starting and ONUMOZ staff were having to fly around to monitor the disarming of militias, Ajello found himself short of transport, and he had to hire alternative large helicopters from South Africa. The 4 May report of the Secretary General complains of "the depletion of ONUMOZ air resources, which brought the process [of disarming paramilitary forces] to a standstill at the beginning of March 1994."

The explanation only became clear with the publication of an article in the journal *Covert Action* (Winter 1993-94). Evergreen Helicopters has a long and close relationship with the CIA, and has been used for a number of its secret operations. In 1993 the US mission to the UN put pressure on the UN to give work to Evergreen. UN Under Secretary General Melissa Wells, a former United States ambassador to Mozambique, then excluded SkyLink from the bidding, despite praise for the Canadian firm from various UN operations. Contracts were instead given to Evergreen.

## New Zambezia armed group

Zambezia provincial authorities say a new armed group set up a military base with 900 armed men near Mount Nicapala in Lugela district in March, and set up other bases in Morrumbala and Milange districts.

The group calls itself "Rombezia" and aims to create an independent state in the northern half of Mozambique, between the Rovuma and Zambezi rivers. The idea of splitting Mozambique goes back to the 1960s when it was tied in with the expansionist ambitions of Malawi's former President, Hastings Banda, and Portuguese colonial efforts to create a buffer against Frelimo.

The President of Rombezia, Elidio Chapala, has an office in Malawi and is accused of having been a collaborator with the Portuguese colonial secret police, according to the new independent newsletter *Mozambique Inview*.

Rombezia emerged around the same time as reports that 1000 members of the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) paramilitary group had fled to Mozambique. The MYP – the much-feared private army of Banda's Malawi Congress Party – was closed down in a series of Malawi army attacks in December.

Renamo had trained in MYP bases in Malawi, and it was claimed that the MYP members were being harboured illegally inside Mozambique in Renamo bases. In May, Mozambique Foreign Minister Pascoal Mocumbi hinted at evidence of links between the two. Renamo denied any connection with either group.

Visiting Mozambique on his first foreign trip, shortly after taking office, Malawi's new president, Bakili Muluzi, invited any remaining MYPs in Mozambique to go home and assured them of security under his new democratic government.