

# Mozambique peace process bulletin

Issue 8 - February 1994

To be published irregularly until the first multi-party election in Mozambique  
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Published by AWEPA, the European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa

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## Half speed ahead

**Continued delays are putting the October election date into question. Since the new timetable was agreed on 22 October, following the visit of United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, each step in the peace process has taken at least twice as long as planned.**

Assembly of troops should have been completed by the end of 1993, but by the end of January some assembly areas still had not opened. Demobilisation, due to start in January, will begin in late February at the earliest. Training of the new army should have started in January but has not. Demobilisation of paramilitary forces which was scheduled for completion in December only began in January. The National Election Commission, due to be created in November, only began work in late January.

Although it is theoretically possible to catch up and meet the new timetable, this would require a degree of haste which neither side has shown.

Public pressure from both the UN mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and the international community is increasingly being put on the government. But privately diplomats and ONUMOZ officials says Renamo is equally -- or more -- to blame for foot-dragging. But one frustrated diplomat said "it seems as if each side can always rely on the other to throw up an obstacle."

The government has come under heavy international pressure for its slowness in moving troops to assembly areas (AAs). For the first three weeks of January almost no government troops arrived, and Renamo is assembling troops twice as fast as the government.

UN figures for 27 January showed that Renamo had assembled 7,199 soldiers of 19,140 is said it has -- 38%. The government had assembled 11,567 of 61,638 troops -- only 19%.

The government side was also blamed for delays in paying soldiers and for general indiscipline in its assembly areas, for failing to provide fresh food it promised, and for failing to renovate training centres for the new army.

But the government provided the first lists of soldiers to be demobilised or sent to the new army in early January, while by the end of January Renamo had failed to do so. UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello does not consider this serious: "I'm not too worried about demobilisation on the Renamo side; most of them will go to the new army".

Renamo has regularly failed to turn up at meetings, seriously slowing the peace process.

Renamo head Afonso Dhlakama in late January repeated his warning that the election could not go ahead unless Renamo received more money. And Renamo has failed to open its areas to the government, as called for in the peace accord signed in Rome in October 1992.

## 2 assembly points blocked

Of the 49 planned assembly areas (29 government and 20 Renamo) which should have opened before the end of last year, only 35 have been opened (21 government and 14 Renamo). Another 12 are ready to open, but this cannot happen until the dispute over the remaining two is solved.

Renamo nominated Salamanga in Maputo province and Dunda in Manica province as assembly areas (AAs), but the government objected, saying Renamo had occupied those areas after the cease fire. In both cases, the Supervision and Control Commission (CSC) backed the government, ruling the Renamo had violated the cease-fire by occupying the two villages and that Renamo should withdraw and choose other AAs. The CSC is the highest body established by the peace

## Would donors withdraw?

Aldo Ajello predicts a strong reaction from the UN Security Council to the continued delays. Under United States pressure, the Security Council last year only extended the ONUMOZ mandate for six months, to April. The US has repeatedly stressed it will not agree to any continuation beyond the scheduled October 1994 election date. If delays continue, the US may only allow the UN mandate to be renewed for three months, up to July.

The US argues that any letting up in the pressure would lead to even further delays. A US official said that if the Security Council accepts a postponement of the election to June 1995, "does anyone believe that the date won't slip again?" The official added that if delays continue, "it may be better for the UN to show it can walk away from a failure." And a visiting US congressional delegation in January said no money would be available after October.

The US may be politically important, and it is paying the biggest single slice of the ONUMOZ bill, but it isn't the biggest player in Mozambique. The Nordic states have a much longer and closer relationship with Mozambique, and they have always given much more aid than the US. The Nordics have less money than before to spend in Mozambique, but they appear to have considerable patience.

Thus, if the peace process continues to move forward, however slowly, it seems likely that most donors will remain -- despite noises from the US.

accord, and is chaired by the UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello.

Renamo agreed to withdraw, but only a short distance -- 700 metres in the case of Salamanga. Government was not satisfied, and the stalemate ensued. The government argues that it has allowed the opening of AAs planned for 72% of its troops compared to open AAs for 61% of Renamo soldiers, and says that balance requires the opening of more Renamo AAs before further government ones.

The dispute over Salamanga may relate to the state farm there, which is due to be privatised. With the continued restrictions on access to Renamo zones, the side with control might be able to influence who is able to take over an important farming area.

The issue also may be related to the way ONUMOZ is reporting assembly figures. In an attempt at openness intended to keep pressure on both sides, ONUMOZ has been releasing daily figures of the number of troops in assembly areas. But it reports percentages as a portion of troops expected only in those assembly areas which are *open*. Thus Renamo is said to have assembled 61% of troops expected in open AAs compared to only 25% for government. This makes the government position look even worse than it is: 38% and 19% of all troops.

The high levels of mistrust between the two sides means that assembly, disarming and demobilisation were always going to be the most difficult parts of the process. Each step has been fraught with problems.

The initial movement of forces on both sides involved units of little strategic importance. On the Government's side, the first men moved to assembly centres belonged to small units which, although they escaped the unilateral demobilisation at the end of last year, were not part of any strategic plans.

The nine main government brigades and the special forces, the so-called "red berets" and "Nyangas", remained intact and stationed at the same posts as they were when the peace accord was signed.

Similarly, Renamo only sent units of little military importance to the assembly camps.

And the arriving soldiers are only bringing in old and light weapons. By 17 January 8346 government troops had turned in 9662 weapons, while 6044 Renamo fighters turned in only 5728 guns. ONUMOZ military officials openly admit that guns are being cached outside the assembly areas. An article in *The New York Times Magazine* on 2 January quoted Ajello saying "I know very well that they will give us old and obsolete material, and they will have here and there something hidden. I don't care. What I do is create the political situation in which the use of those guns is not the question."

Meanwhile, although the Cease Fire Commission (on which Renamo is represented) agreed that half of the weapons turned in at AAs should be transferred to regional warehouses, Renamo commanders on the ground have refused to allow this. AAs do not have adequate storage facilities for this number of weapons.

## Volunteer army?

Serious doubt hangs over whether or not the new national army will really be voluntary, as the peace accord says it should be.

The UN gives new arrivals at AAs a questionnaire which asks if they want to join the new unified army. Of the government's first arrivals, 90% of soldiers said they did not, while their commanders simply refused to answer the question, saying they lacked enough information on conditions in the new army. And when the government returned its first lists of people to be demobilised or not, it named some for the new army who had said they did not want to go.

Renamo commanders are rumoured to be telling their soldiers not to answer that question on the UN form. A UN source also reported that "Renamo men are told to say they are single -- their leaders want to keep their men mobile, and get as many as possible into the new army".

And of the 540 instructors for the new Armed Defence Forces of Mozambique (FADM), half from each side and trained by British officers in Zimbabwe, 74% said they did not want to stay in the new army.

take a closer look at the new army, since they leave the crowded and highly charged assembly areas. The same sources suggest that on government's side, pay expectations are higher, while Renamo soldiers can look forward to salaries and professional army careers they never experience before, and are more strictly disciplined by fear.

Ajello seems to be turning a pragmatically blind eye to the issue of choice. He said if soldiers did not want to join the new army, but later were persuaded to change their minds, he would let it pass.

The alternative could be long delays and possible failure to get enough soldiers for the new army.

## Election Commission begins

The newly constituted National Elections Commission (CNE) was finally due to hold its first working session 31 January. The new national elections law was finally approved by parliament in December, after a last minute summit meeting to iron out differences between President Joaquim Chissano and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama.

Government appoints 10 members, Renamo seven and the non-armed opposition three members to the CNE. As vice-presidents of the CNE, the government appointed Leonardo Simbine and Renamo named Jose De Castro. The 20 members are to agree on a president, and if they cannot they must submit a list of five candidates to Chissano, who will select one.

At the last minute Renamo presented two new candidates to fulfil its quota of CNE appointees, after two of the seven people it appointed bowed out. Renamo claimed they were forced out by government security-force intimidation. The non-armed parties also did some reselecting, when they found two of their candidates were Frelimo members.

Part of the Chissano-Dhlakama deal was that the Technical Secretariat for Elections Administration (STAE) -- the body which will do the practical work of organising the election -- should not be a purely technical body as government had wanted, but should like the CNE have representatives of government, Renamo and the non-armed opposition.

Labour Minister and government negotiator Teodato Hunguana admitted that "the commissions have been politicised much more than we would have liked". He said government had made most concessions on the issue, and warned the decision had stored up problems for later.

President Chissano chose Jose Muchine as General-Director of STAE. He will be assisted by two deputies, one each chosen by Renamo and the non-armed opposition. The government appoints the directors of provincial and district level electoral commissions, again each with assistant directors to be named by Renamo and unarmed opposition.

Setting up of the CNE was delayed when Jose de Castro failed to turn up for a meeting on 14 January in which Renamo was to name its members to CNE and

## Dhlakama says: no cash = no election

Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama warned that "Renamo could cancel the elections -- I mean, we could decide not to participate in elections -- unless, by February, the international community honours its promise of financial support".

He said Renamo faces serious funding problems. So far it has no means to conduct its electoral campaign. "A campaign is a contest. I was a military man and I will never go into battle without being logistically prepared," he said.

Although Ajello was pursuing efforts to raise more money for Renamo's trust fund, Dhlakama said the ONUMOZ chief gave him no concrete information and could only say donors were "concerned" by the problem.

To further his cause, Dhlakama said he was planning a visit to the United States in February, when he would take up a personal invitation to visit UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali at UN headquarters in New York.

So far, only Italy has provided money to a UN managed trust fund for "Renamo's transformation from a guerrilla movement into a political organisation." This US\$ 6 million was all but spent by January -- apparently nearly all the money on lodging, food and transport, with little actually going to Renamo's political transformation. The contract with Lonrho to rent its Cardoso Hotel for Renamo staff accommodation in Maputo is nearly finished and Lonrho is said to want to double the rent if it extends the lease.

Ajello considers financial support for Renamo to be "the single most important problem" facing the peace process, and ONUMOZ officials have been searching both privately and publicly for funds. But the donors remain unwilling to cough up, for a mix of practical and political reasons. Most countries are banned from giving aid to foreign political parties.

ONUMOZ is costing \$850,000 a day, and the UN is asking for \$30 million more to bring in police observers. A US official commented privately that "the problem would be solved if we simply gave that \$30 million to Renamo. It is economic madness not to. Yet we cannot. During the cold war it would have been easy to provide that money covertly; now it's impossible. No one is willing to take shady route now; no one risk trouble for Dhlakama. It's too late; Mozambique is not important enough."

country trying to win support from members to win its quota on the two bodies. De Castro later denied this, but ONUMOZ officials privately confirmed the story, saying it had supplied him with a helicopter for the tour.

- The CNE has also been given the task of resolving the political controversy over the emigrant votes. The government says all Mozambicans, both at home and abroad, should have the vote. Renamo said that for these first elections, only nationals living within the national borders should cast their ballot. Renamo argues that Frelimo would use its control of embassies to manipulate the emigrant vote.

If Renamo's view prevails, as is expected, hundreds of thousands of refugees still living over the border, as well as migrant miners and others, could be disenfranchised. Political analysts suggest that, as people who fled the country and have bitter memories of war, Mozambicans abroad are most likely to vote against Renamo.

- Although formation of the CNE and STAE was delayed, the government's own technical unit has been continuing election preparations. For example, tenders have been issued for registration material, and civic education material is ready for printing once it is approved by CNE. This means that from a technical standpoint, it is still possible to hold the election in October.

## Renamo still restricts access

Public access to Renamo held areas has significantly increased in recent months. For example, "chapa 100" -- passenger carrying lorries and minibuses -- now link Nampula city with some Renamo zones in Nampula province. Traders and others move quite freely in and out of Renamo zones. But government officials, including health workers, cannot enter many Renamo zones.

Many Renamo areas remain tightly controlled. Traffic passes through without difficulty, but if someone stops they are immediately questioned by a Renamo official.

On 31 January the daily *Noticias* reported that two government staff were taken captive by Renamo in Canda, Gorongosa district, when they went to visit their families.

There are recent reports from Nampula, Zambezia, Sofala, Manica and Gaza provinces of government officials, particularly health workers, being prevented from entering Renamo zones.

A Renamo provincial official travelling with a UNOHAC (UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination) team in January gave a talk to local Renamo people in which he openly told them that they should not allow government people to enter their area -- even to provide services. Instead, Renamo would provide services.

The Frelimo party secretary in Sofala, Raul Jequessene, also reported that party officials were sometimes being taken prisoner by Renamo leaders. In other areas, the Mozambican Women's Organization

Dhlakama that areas under his movement's control were now open to all political parties.

Renamo is drawing on non-government organisations (NGOs) and UNOHAC to rebuild schools and health posts, carry out vaccinations, and create alternative health and education systems. When UNOHAC or NGO vaccination teams arrive, Renamo often holds a small rally modelled on the old Frelimo rallies, with chants of "Viva Renamo". The Renamo officials stress that it is Renamo and not the government that has brought the health workers. At least one NGO complained and forced the Renamo officials to tone down the speeches.

NGOs are also providing short training courses for Renamo health workers and helping to set up Renamo health posts. This is part of a broader pattern in some areas where Renamo has recently begun to create a whole new civil administration structure with the old regulos (chiefs), Renamo appointed non-military officials, and health and education workers.

The picture remains very mixed. Informal contact between government and Renamo health workers and other officials is clearly increasing, for example in efforts to reunite children with their families. And many people, including Renamo officials, leave Renamo areas to attend government health centres.

At the same time, divisions between the two zones are hardening, and the idea of two independent administrations is being strengthened.

Even government vaccination teams are barred from

### *Schoolkids sing 'Viva Dhlakama'*

In the new school in Savana the children were singing "Viva Dhlakama, our father" and other Renamo songs. The children were in school during what was normally the January holiday because of delays in opening the school, built with the assistance of the Norwegian NGO Redd Barna.

This part of central Sofala province had been an area of heavy fighting, and the people had fled to Dondo in the protected Beira corridor. There they had been helped by Redd Barna, which decided it had a responsibility to follow the people back to Savana in a Renamo-controlled area. Health workers have had short courses given by another NGO in Inhaminga, a Renamo-held town further north.

A government team from the Rural Water department has installed a pump in the village and comes to maintain it. But the team cannot enter Savana on its own because government staff are barred; the water team can only go to Savana with Redd Barna.

Thus an NGO has ensured that returned displaced people have water, a health post and a school -- while also creating a new Renamo administration.

## Will the watchdog fail to bark -- again?

The United Nations bears a heavy responsibility for the failure of the peace process in Angola. It was widely seen as supporting the Unita opposition, it denied that Unita was violating the peace accord in ways that were later shown to be true, and it made no commitment to enforce the results of the election.

Is the UN following the same path in Mozambique?

The UN publicly and correctly castigates the government for its failures, notably its recent slowness in sending troops to assembly. But UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello acts like a tolerant uncle in explaining away and minimizing Renamo's cease-fire violations, missed meetings, and other delays.

Even *The New York Times Magazine* in its 2 January article on the UN reported: "Most observers principally blamed Renamo for the delay." Yet ONUMOZ publicly heaps most of the blame on government.

In both Mozambique and Angola, a key issue is government access to opposition held areas as agreed in the peace accord. In Angola, the government never did gain access to some Unita areas and the MPLA was unable to campaign effectively in those zones. In Mozambique, Ajello claims that there is progress on freedom of movement and access to Renamo-held zones. But as we report in this issue, many Renamo zones remain closed to the government. Indeed, there is evidence that actions by the UN and non-government organisations are actually helping Renamo establish independent administrations in areas it controls.

As in Angola, the UN is refusing to look at opposition violations of the accord. The watchdog is failing to bark -- again.

When we raised the question of what responsibility the UN has to enforce the outcome of the election, a high ONUMOZ official said that "the UN has no mandate to anticipate a disaster". That sort of head-in-the-sand attitude made the Angola disaster more likely.

The chances of renewed fighting are much lower in Mozambique than in Angola. But that does not ensure a favourable outcome. If Mozambique remains divided into two separately administered territories, it will be all too easy for the loser in the election to reject the outcome and do nothing - continuing to run the territory it controls.

If the UN is not to fail again, it must

- ▶ be even-handed;
- ▶ ensure that the peace accord is followed by both sides and that the entire country is open; and
- ▶ make a commitment to enforce the outcome of the election. jh

many Renamo zones. In one district, the vaccination team was told it could only enter if it had a letter from Renamo's "provincial governor".

Often, government staff can enter Renamo zones only if they go with an NGO -- sometimes being forced to pretend to work for the NGO or wear NGO T-shirts.

Some NGOs are actually trying to prevent government entry; in one province where an NGO had provided a car to the provincial department of health, they said it could not be used to go to Renamo zones. A provincial health workers said that in that zone there was actually informal contact between Renamo and government health workers, but "the NGO forbade us to take their car to the Renamo area. They said 'we are the ones who work with Renamo, not you'. They are blackmailing us, saying we have to accept this if we want children to be helped."

ONUMOZ and UNOHAC are pushing NGOs to help Renamo deliver services. But this means that NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in creating parallel

and independent administrative structures in Renamo areas. People are coming to accept a new authority that is not the government. Such structures can continue to operate even after Renamo guerrillas go to assembly areas.

- Not all Renamo zones allow free movement of civilians. There are reports of refugees returning to Renamo-held zones of Sofala not being allowed to leave.

In Milange district in Zambezia, a local Renamo commander asked for help to return more than 150 children to their families, but he said he would only release the children in exchange for an equal number of adults from government zones.

- In both Gaza and Zambezia provinces, the governors have tried to block government health and other workers from having informal contacts with Renamo. Other governors, however, seem to encourage such contacts.

It remains unclear why, after an initial avalanche of government soldiers into assembly areas, the government slowed down the sending of troops.

There were no public statements, although government variously blamed the January holiday when many government officials and military commanders were away, or blamed communications problems. Dhlakama rejected the latter explanation saying "I can't see how government could have such difficulties. It has cars and planes, and most of its assembly centres are in towns and district capitals".

"My men sometimes have to cover hundreds of kilometres to get to an assembly camp, but they are arriving at a regular rate", he added.

The underlying causes for the slowdown in government arrivals remain unexplained. However, the unwillingness of government troops to join the new army could be one reason.

"The Government has not managed to publicise information about the new army or about the whole process of demobilisation. And so when the time comes to deal with elite units, their commanders are either showing iron fists, or trying to negotiate the terms of demobilisation", said a Government military source.

Apart from demanding clarification about the new armed forces, the Government's young officers and soldiers consider the six months compensation pay government has guaranteed demobilised soldiers as too small. And they fear that once demobilised, they will never recuperate back-pay still owed to them.

Just a few days after assembly started, apparent disorder among government troops grew worse and ended in riots in Cuamba and Mutuali, in the northern provinces of Niassa and Nampula, and in Massinga and Magude, in the southern provinces of Inhambane and Maputo. In almost every case, the soldiers demand payment of late salaries.

In contrast, there seem to be few problems with Renamo soldiers and their commanders, perhaps because the guerrilla force is relatively small (of the total of 19,000, 15,000 will go to the unified new army), and had relatively poor conditions in their own military bases.

A senior UN official suggested Renamo's much quicker move into AAs could be related to their perceived benefit in joining the new army. Compared to their likely weakness in the electoral field, the official suggested, they stand a good chance of a strong presence in the military.

Another problem is related to government army officers with administrative functions, notably provincial commanders and those in the Ministry of Defence.

"Administratively, it is not possible to say the commander is demobilised. First, he must cease his functions, and can only be assembled or demobilised afterwards", said head of the government army staff, General Hama Thai.

Finally, Thai also pointed to Renamo's continued failure to withdraw from two areas it occupied after the

● The government has registered 14,734 troops who will be demobilised or moved to the new army without passing through assembly points. These are medical, technical and administrative staff. By contrast, Renamo has only named 317 who will not be assembled, including 50 staff at its Maringue headquarters.

## Unrest fears

Initially, both government and Renamo commanders complained about logistic conditions and capacity of the assembly areas and the behaviour of ONUMOZ soldiers stationed there.

Renamo's General Mateus Ngonyamo complained that ONUMOZ soldiers did not respect his men and tended to treat them as "prisoners", besides complaining of the "dreadful food and lodging conditions they have to put up with".

Late in January, Ajello revealed his growing fear over the prospect of military unrest which might block demobilisation. He cited indiscipline, "particularly among government troops". He said this was linked to pay demands and "unfortunately high expectations of what camp conditions would be like". The result had been army riots and violent protests in numerous incidents across the country.

Ajello said that "to provide the accommodation expected would cost a fortune, and be a pure waste of money as these are transit camps, meant to close in a few weeks".

## For and against higher pay

"Only a well trained, well paid, well fed army can guarantee democracy --- a bad army would be the source of continued trouble and destabilisation," warned UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello.

Ajello said the Defence Ministry had a big enough budget (40% of the national budget) to ensure soldiers are paid on time and offer high incentives for joining the new army. "I would like to know what happens to all that money", said Ajello.

Ajello's challenge did not go down well with the government. Its chief delegate on the CSC, Armando Guebuza accused ONUMOZ of hypocrisy. "We proposed ages ago to raise army salaries, and we wanted to extend demobilisation pay, but our creditors said 'no!' -- now they accuse us of not paying enough".

"The UN says we should offer better conditions to soldiers, so they don't disrupt the peace process -- but the World Bank says we must cut the budget, tighten credit and limit defence spending".

In these conditions, he said, he could see no way for government to answer all the demands, of paying compensation to two demobilised armies, re-equipping a new national army and paying its 30,000 soldiers a "professional wage" -- while also paying the police force, trying to rebuild destroyed education and health services, stimulate business, etc.

stop losing money to the army as army money and realise the key role of a good army in preserving a stable democracy".

## Officers object

The government is apparently having difficulties placating the moody officer class, whose intransigence may be what is holding up assembly and demobilisation.

Guebuza admitted that "these are very emotional issues. Our army is different to others, in that it was a very politicised army -- people fought without shoes, they were carried by their conviction. Now we have to pay the price of a new policy -- in a multi-party society, they no longer see the need to work without good rewards."

Officers are apparently also behind the government's adamant opposition to reducing the size of the new army, despite the paucity of volunteers. By contrast, Renamo will have serious trouble filling its quota of 15,000, and said it could accept a smaller national army.

Government has the problem that there cannot be officers without soldiers, and it is proving hard to reduce the officer class. Data compiled by the UN from the Ministries of Defence and Finance show the officer class represents 26% of all Government troops, but 62% of total salaries.

A government delegate to the CCF suggested three solutions to tame the officers. The government will continue to pay retirement pensions "as a reward for long and selfless service." Under the terms of the peace accord, army property cannot be alienated before general elections, but officers will be allowed stay in their houses and simply pay their own rent. Finally, he said that donor-supported management training and credit schemes would be needed to help officers start their own businesses.

## 2 years demob pay

Mozambique's demobilisation process is among the most poorly funded on record, according to UN documents. Since ordinary soldiers (the majority) earn little more than pocket money -- a private gets US\$ 6 per month -- the six months compensation works out at less than US\$ 40, for a man suddenly deprived of accommodation, army rations and employment. For many, this is not sufficient, and this may also be slowing demobilisation.

Donors meeting in Maputo on 31 January approved US\$ 20 million to cover 18 months supplementary support, meaning demobbed soldiers (including the 13,500 demobbed last year) will be paid for two years. The pay will range from 85,000 mt (US\$ 15) per month -- the minimum wage -- to a top pay of 700,000 mt (US\$ 120) per month.

The money will be paid through the BPD, the People's Development Bank, which has branches in

demobbed soldiers, even if they obtain employment within the two year period.

Indeed, there is some hope that the BPD might be willing to give loans to help demobbed soldiers begin farming or trading, and allow the demob money to be used for repayments.

- The start of demobilisation also depends on the Ministry of Finance making the initial three months pay available at the assembly camps. Ajello claimed he had no guarantee from government that this was ready.

An angry Finance Minister Eneas Comiche countered that everything was in place; he was only waiting for ONUMOZ to say "pay". And ONUMOZ sources confirm that payment of the 13,500 demobbed last year was impeccable -- the first three months money was ready for the soldiers as they boarded transport to leave their camps, and the second three months money was ready on time in district administrators' offices.

## No re-integration funds

Ajello announced the extra 18 months pay for demobbed soldiers while donors were still juggling money and moral obligations.

According to a source at the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC), when Ajello spoke in late January there was only enough donor money pledged to fund the scheme for one year.

Ajello either let a premature cat out of the bag when he announced the scheme, or he was taking sides in UN infighting. In the event, money was switched from UNOHAC programmes planned to ease the soldiers' re-integration in civilian life.

It was a fitting epitaph for the tour of UNOHAC head Bernt Bernander, who left at the end of January. He chaired the Re-integration Commission (CORE), which had approved his four point strategy to aid soldiers re-integration in civilian life.

Starting with an Information and Referral Service, this would have lead on to three further options:

- ▶ financial support for vocational, technical and business training courses;
- ▶ an employment creation fund for community projects, to provide seeds and tools to the majority of the demobbed soldiers expected to go into agriculture, and to offer a wage subsidy to employers of other demobbed soldiers; and
- ▶ a "kits and credit" scheme to offer tools and artisanal kits, plus loans for starting self-employment ventures like carpentry and tailoring, particularly for those who had been trained.

Bernander argued that simply extending soldiers' pay after demobilisation was essential to prevent unrest and discontent, but that severance pay did nothing to help reintegration, and that the three-year programme was essential.

Bernander was bitter about the donors' unwillingness to fund the programme. "Donors have been harping on about the need to help people with aspirations, yet they won't provide the money for a programme."

both of combat personnel and of UN and donor. fighting. The US opposed his programme and pushed for a hasty six month foreign-run programme which totally bypassed the government; this drew no support from other donors.

Some donors called re-integration plans costly and unworkable, and even UNOHAC employees admitted it failed to make a convincing case and win support for its plans.

The Swiss Co-operation in Maputo argued demobilised soldiers should not get special treatment. "Credit facilities, training and job opportunities are needed, not just for soldiers but for everyone. They should be offered through existing, local institutions, not by UNOHAC".

- UN officials designing the reintegration programme estimated that 65,000 troops would be demobilised, including the 13,500 last year. Of those, 35,000 are expected to return to farming in their home districts. The rest will want training and employment. South Africa is spending US\$ 2.5 million to set up three trade schools; the International Labour Organisation has promised US\$ 1.5 million to help existing institutions take ex-soldiers.

Between 2000 and 4000 ex-soldiers will be trained for mine clearance, and private security firms are expected to take on at least 2000 ex-combatants. But the formal economy is still contracting and layoffs continue, while refugees are streaming home, so it seems unlikely 30,000 ex-fighters will be able to obtain jobs and training.

## Training yet to start

Training of the new joint army has not yet begun. The 540 government and Renamo instructors for the new army returned on 12 January from their joint training under British army officers at Nyanga, Zimbabwe. They were moved to Dondo training centre, near Beira in Sofala province. Some will be moved on to Boane and Manhica training centres in Maputo province when rehabilitation work is complete, possibly in February.

Total cost of rebuilding work is US\$ 475,000; Ajello said he raised the money from the Italian, Swedish, and Canadian governments.

The rehabilitation provoked another of Ajello's criticisms of the government. He said "the government fails continuously to provide resources which it had earlier committed itself to. These include the rehabilitation of training centres for the new army and the provision of protein items for the soldiers in the assembly areas."

Government retorted that it had agreed to do the rehabilitation only after donors assured it that money would be forthcoming -- then they failed to pay up until Ajello's public criticism.

But with demobilisation still to kick off, and with Renamo still failing to provide lists of who will go into the new army, there was no one for the trainers to train.

trainees from each side for the new army's infantry; they could be sent directly from army bases, even before they went through the demobilisation process. A week later, Dhlakama suggested the trainees could be taken from over-crowded AAs, and Ajello accepted that.

Training could start early February.

## Irregulars demobbed

The dismantling of an estimated 155,000 irregular and paramilitary troops, a Renamo precondition to the start of demobilisation of regular forces, kicked off to a slow start in January. It was to begin in December, but was delayed when Renamo demanded ONUMOZ supervision and more information.

Around 200 guards of four firms in Maputo were disarmed on 5 January. From 13 January, the operation, conducted by the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF), was to spread to the rest of the country. It is expected that the process will take until June.

## Police monitors arrive

The new guarantors of human rights have started arriving. The first 125 of the police monitors requested by presidents Chissano and Dhlakama last September are now in Mozambique.

The UN Security Council is still to decide how many police should make up the full contingent. A UN survey team leaving Mozambique in December recommended 1364, but a review brought the figure down to 1144.

The Chief Superintendent of Civpol, the civilian police monitoring team, is Paul Holmberg, a Swede with UN experience in Cyprus, Namibia and Angola. "We're here to show the UN flag all over the country, to instill confidence and protect the people. We'll monitor the local police, supervise political rallies, and we'll have to be present at polling booths," he said.

Holmberg plans 163 Civpol posts throughout the country, with four officers at each post, although he admitted logistic problems could make the plan impossible. "Even in provincial capitals it's hard to find housing and other conditions we need."

Civpol officially reports to Compol, the joint government and Renamo commission for monitoring police activity. But the Civpol boss said Compol members had not worked out what their job was yet: "They come and ask us what they should do".

So far Civpol has inspected 12 police stations in Maputo and others in Beira and Nampula, leading to 15 investigation cases. "We go by international regulations, and anyway, it's pretty easy to see where human rights have been abused", says Holmberg.

## Malawi links denied

Dhlakama emphatically denied any links with 1000 Young Pioneers -- a paramilitary group linked to

## UN accused of child abuse

A farewell dinner for the Italian Major General in charge of UN troops in Sofala province in September 1993 ended in debauchery, according to Redd Barna (Norwegian Save the Children).

According to a Redd Barna staff member, after dinner the UN civilian toastmaster said "Boys, there is no reason to leave the party yet, we will bring in the girls very soon". Car loads of very young girls arrived, and the Major General stayed till the end of the party.

The alliance of US, British, and Norwegian Save the Children organisations accuse the Italian battalion Albatroz, which has been guarding the Beira Corridor route from Zimbabwe to Beira port, of repeated and continuing abuse of young girls for sexual purposes.

In January, Ernst Schade, Redd Barna representative in Chimoio in the Beira corridor reported further evidence of abuse, citing witnesses include Redd Barna staff and ONUMOZ personnel. He said UN soldiers in Chimoio were constantly calling on young girls of 12 to 14 years old for sexual services. He added that prostitution in Beira had drastically increased since the Italians arrived in April 1993.

Representative of the British Save the Children Fund (SCF) in Maputo, Jumbe Sebunya, said "the girls themselves say they need the money. But we are very worried about the consequences, not to mention the AIDS explosion which could happen any time."

One 15 year old girl in Beira who had an illegal abortion said she was selling herself to UN soldiers, who paid extra for not using condoms.

On 6 December the SCF alliance's Geneva headquarters sent a letter to Ajello stating its deep concern. Two days later Ajello replied to say he would investigate, but asking for more evidence. SCF replied that detailing evidence should be the job of UN military police. The issue resurfaced with the fresh complaints in late January.

Ajello admitted two earlier investigations he ordered his Force Commander to make produced no results, but he said he was taking the allegations very seriously. "I don't want this kind of behaviour in my mission and anyone found responsible will be immediately repatriated", he said.

He declined to make further comment before results from a new investigation being led by his newly arrived Deputy Special Representative, the Iranian UN veteran Behrooz Fadri.

been trained in the past in Young Pioneer bases, and Malawian reports said the Young Pioneers group had taken refuge in Renamo bases in Mozambique. The Malawian government formally asked the Mozambican government to help repatriate them.

Dhlakama further rejected claims in the Malawi press of close links between himself and Malawi security police agents, said to supplied Renamo with food and ammunition until last year.

## Hard life in the assembly areas

*These are first-hand reports from assembly areas in late-January.*

Massinga is a small government barracks in Inhambane province. It was one of the first group of assembly areas (AA), which opened on 30 November. It has an official capacity of 1500 but seems crammed full with 1200 men; their frustration are palpable, emotions run high.

Conditions are rudimentary. The soldiers sleep under canvas, on wooden beds. ONUMOZ supplies the blankets. The water pump broke down causing serious water supply problems.

Dry food was plentiful but fresh food like meat and fish were still not arriving, despite government promises to send it. With little to do at the camp, many soldiers broke the rules by wandering out, UN observers said.

Witnesses say a minor incident sparked riots in Massinga. Two days before bonus payments were due, a pay clerk was seen leaving the camp, and rumour went round the money was cancelled. The riot which followed left one civilian dead.

Massinga soldiers clamour to air their views. Many say they were conscripted into the army, some as young as 15, that they wasted the best years of their lives and see no reason to continue soldiering now war is over. They want to go home, and money to go with.

"If Government comes here and only offers us six months demobilisation pay, I'm telling you there'll be trouble, no car will pass here, no plane will land," warned one.

The atmosphere so electric; you feel they could do anything.

Changanine AA in Gaza province is 40 km from the nearest small town, Maqueze. It was part of the second group of AAs, which opened on 20 December. UN personnel fly in by helicopter. The white UN tents stand out in a clearing to one side. A few hundred metres away, the green canvas shelters which house Renamo soldiers cluster under the trees for shade.

Only 92 of the expected 877 soldiers had arrived. UN observers said discipline was good, while UN volunteers had opened a "school" and were looking for bright candidates to teach literacy skills to the rest. The first task was teaching people to sign their names.

Malawi's ruling party and President Banda -- who were said to have entered Mozambique illegally in December

men of 50 and over, but no one in the middle age group. Some soldiers said they had been with Renamo since the age of five or six.

Medical exams showed most were in good shape, though some 30% had war wounds, especially in the arms and legs.

Weapons handed in were mostly AKMs, plus a pair of mortars and one anti-aircraft gun.

So far, soldiers had come with their families, openly admitted having three or four wives, and most said they didn't want to join the new army.

The Renamo Provincial Commander for Gaza, 29-year-old Brigadier Arlindo Maquivale, checked in to Changanine on 17 January. He said his men want to join the new army, but "we're not telling people who has not been selected, yet, so as not to disappoint them".

At Renamo's nearby Chipanzane AA, however, commanders came in with their men. All soldiers claimed to be bachelors and said they did want to join the new force.

Mohiua AA is erected in the burned out ruins of a small, pre-war settlement; in Zambezia Province, it opened to Renamo soldiers on 30 November. Some 1,200 soldiers had checked in by mid-January -- double its planned capacity.

A newly arrived UN observer described conditions as "worse than a World War Two prisoner of war camp". In reality, physical conditions probably did not differ very much from those in Renamo bases.

The men sleep on wooden beds under canvas roofs; the UN gives out blankets, civilian clothes and food rations. Camp Commander Peter Mhimbo complained that no fresh food had arrived, dry food supplies were irregular, blankets too few, while poor quality water was causing illness.

Nurses said the soldiers are in pretty good health and suffer no nutritional problems, in stark contrast to the local population and soldiers' families.

The soldiers claim they are single and willing to join the new army: "I'll just obey orders. If I'm selected I'll go to the army; if not, I'll go home", is a typical response.

None seem to know what is on offer to compensate demobilised soldiers, or have any idea about conditions in the planned new army.

Lieutenant Fernando Luis said: "We've never been paid before, we'll find out about that when Renamo is in the government".

UN team leader Darren Johnston said Renamo soldiers are just realising how important money will be to them in future. Impatience is growing. Some 600 soldiers left the camp at Christmas, complaining of poor conditions. They came back, but on 24 January, they walked out again, the Camp Commander said, "to fetch their families" -- contradicting the warrior-bachelor doctrine.