

NEGOTIATING MEANING AND PRACTICE IN THE  
ZAMBÉZIA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT,  
MOZAMBIQUE

Rachel Wrangham

A Thesis Submitted in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

London School of Economics and Political Science

2004

## **Abstract**

In this thesis I look at the ways in which relationships were negotiated within the Zambézia Agricultural Development Project (ZADP) in Mozambique. Drawing on eighteen months of fieldwork spread over nearly three years, and using both ‘development discourse’ literature and writings on clientelism, I examine interactions and interfaces from the level of the donor to the level of ‘beneficiary’ farmers. I show that the way the project worked was affected by different actors’ divergent understandings of key concepts, including ‘community’ and ‘development’ itself. The relationship between DFID (the project’s donor) and World Vision (the implementing agency) mirrored that between ZADP and its beneficiaries. Both were described as ‘partnerships’, but they more closely resembled patron-client relationships.

Relationships and meanings were subject to constant renegotiation over the life of ZADP. In my field sites of Mutange and Mugaveia I show that villagers’ view of the project was shaped by their past experience of outsiders, while for project managers changes in policy discourses were more influential. I look at the practical implications of assumptions made when the project was designed. I argue that there were strongly divergent understandings of the relationship between project staff and beneficiaries; this was not recognised, and the misunderstanding had profound implications. The accusations made against the project, which surfaced at times of tension and were cast in terms of the occult, show both actual and potential beneficiaries asserting their agency over the project, in a realm in which project staff could not claim control.

## Contents

Acknowledgements.....	7
Notes on the Text.....	8
<b>Chapter 1 . Framing the Thesis .....</b>	<b>9</b>
1.1 Introduction.....	9
1.2 Debating ‘Development’ .....	17
1.3 The Setting .....	26
<i>The Zambézia Agricultural Development Project</i> .....	28
<i>Zambézia</i> .....	35
<i>Institutional Context</i> .....	50
1.4 Methods: Ethnography of a Development Encounter.....	55
1.5 Structure of the Thesis .....	64
<b>Chapter 2 . World Vision, ZADP and DFID: Negotiating Relationships .....</b>	<b>65</b>
2.1 Structure and Agency.....	69
2.2 Relationships in the Mid-Term Review: Ownership, Advice and Control.....	72
<i>Advice</i> .....	76
<i>Control</i> .....	79
2.3 Change and Contestation .....	86
2.4 Defining Relationships.....	92
<i>Patron-Client Relationships</i> .....	93
2.5 Conclusion .....	96
<b>Chapter 3 . Change and Continuity: Patterns of External Intervention in Rural Zambézia.....</b>	<b>98</b>
3.1 Ignoring History: Analysing the Project Memorandum .....	100
3.2 Historical Outline.....	104
3.3 Understanding ‘Outsiders’ .....	110
<i>Exploitation, Violence and Flight</i> .....	111
<i>Prosperity, Patrões and Presents</i> .....	120
3.4 Conclusion .....	124
<b>Chapter 4 . Rural ‘Development’ and Zambézia Livelihoods .....</b>	<b>125</b>
4.1 Debating ‘Development’ in Colonial Mozambique.....	130
4.2 The Colonial Legacy.....	136
4.3 Contemporary Livelihood Diversity in Mutange and Mugaveia.....	143
4.4 Approaches to Rural Development and Poverty in ZADP .....	154
4.5 Conclusion .....	159
<b>Chapter 5 . Ascribing ‘Community’.....</b>	<b>161</b>
5.1 Unpicking Abstractions: Referents of ‘Community’ in ZADP .....	162
5.2 Seeking ‘Community’ in Mutange and Mugaveia.....	168
<i>Defining Place</i> .....	169
<i>Cohesion or Division?</i> .....	171

	<i>Destruction or Reconfiguration?</i> .....	178
5.3	Unpicking Implications: Homogeneity and Exclusion .....	183
5.4	Sustainability and Participation .....	190
5.5	Conclusion .....	194
<b>Chapter 6 . Pursuing Ownership, Pursuing Dependence.....</b>		<b>196</b>
6.1	Community-Owned Development .....	198
6.2	Understanding World Vision .....	200
6.3	Becoming a Client.....	204
	<i>Frelimo Cooptation</i> .....	205
	<i>Pursuing Dependence</i> .....	207
6.4	Exchange and Reciprocation.....	210
	<i>Rejecting Exchange, Rejecting a Relationship</i> .....	212
	<i>Contesting Patronage; Unseating Voluntarism</i> .....	214
6.5	Debating Interpretations.....	217
6.6	Conclusion .....	219
<b>Chapter 7 . Trust and Envy.....</b>		<b>224</b>
7.1	Introduction.....	227
7.2	Hidden Arts .....	228
7.3	Envy .....	232
	<i>Distribution</i> .....	233
	<i>Consumption and Sharing: Goods and Knowledge</i> .....	236
7.4	Trusting ZADP.....	238
7.5	Manipulating Accusations .....	242
7.6	Conclusion .....	246
<b>Chapter 8 . Muddled Fashions: Anti-Politics and Aid Effectiveness .....</b>		<b>248</b>
8.1	Anti-Politics, Politics and the State .....	248
	<i>State Effects</i> .....	249
	<i>Neutrality and Party Politics</i> .....	252
	<i>Contestation</i> .....	256
8.2	Development Effectiveness .....	258
8.3	Conclusion .....	262
<b>Appendix A: Terms of Reference .....</b>		<b>265</b>
<b>Appendix B: Interview Details.....</b>		<b>269</b>
<b>Glossary.....</b>		<b>276</b>
<b>Acronyms .....</b>		<b>278</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>		<b>280</b>

## Figures

Figure 1.1 Map of Mozambique .....	10
Figure 1.2 Map of Zambézia showing where ZADP operated .....	16
Figure 1.3 Original budgets for project components .....	28
Figure 1.4 The Zambézia Agricultural Development Project.....	30
Figure 1.5 The ZADP Agriculture Team, December 2001.....	31
Figure 1.6 Bridge in Mucunha localidade, before rehabilitation by ZADP.....	34
Figure 1.7 Mucunha bridge after rehabilitation .....	34
Figure 1.8 Zambézia Province, showing transport routes.....	36
Figure 1.9 Tea estates in Gurué.....	38
Figure 1.10 Map of Namacurra District and northern parts of Nicoadala District .....	42
Figure 1.11 Map of Gurué District.....	43
Figure 1.12 Scattered houses in Mugaveia .....	45
Figure 1.13 Houses and fields near our house in Mugaveia .....	45
Figure 1.14 Kitchen hut belonging to Tio Daniel's family .....	46
Figure 1.15 Kitchen hut, with Lita's house in the background.....	46
Figure 1.16 Steeply sloping field planted with cassava .....	47
Figure 1.17 Group from Mugaveia .....	47
Figure 1.18 Fields in Mutange .....	48
Figure 1.19 Meeting in Mutange.....	48
Figure 1.20 Group of women in Mutange.....	49
Figure 1.21 Group in Naminane, Mutange .....	49
Figure 1.22 World Vision budget by donor, Financial Year 2001.....	52
Figure 1.23 Rita and I with the two Mugaveia leaders who accompanied us.....	56
Figure 1.24 Arcanjo cycling in Mutange .....	57
Figure 1.25 Daniel Namuteca and his granddaughter.....	58
Figure 1.26 Social life in Quelimane .....	59
Figure 2.1 World Vision organisational structure.....	73
Figure 2.2 Relationships between DFID Advisers in ZADP (pre-June 2001).....	74
Figure 4.1 Workers on tea plantations in the 1920s.....	137
Figure 4.2 Workers on tea plantations at the time of ZADP.....	137
Figure 4.3 Sisal plantation at Naciaia .....	139
Figure 4.4 Destroyed cashew factory in Namacurra.....	142
Figure 5.1 Participatory Impact Assessment, 2001.....	165
Figure 6.1 Formal opening ceremony of bridge built by ZADP in Muximua, Gurué ..	203
Figure 7.1 Rats in project-supplied traps .....	225
Figure 7.2 Trapped rats being measured .....	225
Figure 7.3 Eating roasted rat .....	226

## Tables

Table 1.1 ZADP Goal and Purpose.....	13
Table 1.2 Activities carried out by the agricultural component.....	32
Table 4.1 Comparative statistics on ODA levels .....	126
Table 5.1. 1999 Legislative and presidential election results .....	173
Table 5.2. Participants in ZADP agriculture component activities.....	186

### **Additional Note for the PDF Version**

I hope that you enjoy reading this thesis. I would very much welcome any comments and/or corrections, which I could then incorporate into further work.

Comments can be sent to me at [rachelwrantham@hotmail.com](mailto:rachelwrantham@hotmail.com) or at :

Rachel Wrangham  
c/o The Manor  
Church End  
Barley  
Royston  
Herts SG8 8JW  
England

## **Acknowledgements**

The fieldwork on which this thesis was based was undertaken while I was a DFID Associate Professional Officer, seconded to World Vision in Mozambique. I gratefully acknowledge the financial and logistical support of both DFID and World Vision in researching and writing this thesis.

I have accumulated huge debts over the course of writing this thesis and working in Zambézia. I would most like to thank Arcanjo de Jesus and the late Rita Madeira, my research assistants. I am grateful to them for friendship, support, and help which often went far beyond the call of duty. I wish that Rita, who died on 7<sup>th</sup> April 2003, were here to see the product of her work.

I thank all my colleagues in ZADP, who bore endlessly with my questions and ideas. I am particularly grateful to Tim Russell, who first welcomed me to the project, and who not only permitted me to carry out this research, but encouraged me in it. I also thank Roberto Cassiano, Julia Compton, António Gaspár, Filipa Gouveia, Sally Henderson, Barbara Johnson, Karen Johnson, Gervásia Lopes, Fernando Pequenino, Remígio Possa, Chris Steel and António Tcheco for particularly stimulating conversations on many occasions during my fieldwork. Daniel and Maria Botomane housed and cared for us in Mugaveia, and were the source of endless information, stories and amusement. Maria Lázaro helped with all kinds of logistics, and Inácia made me a comfortable base in Quelimane to come back to.

In Britain perhaps my greatest debt is to Tamsin Tweddell and Justin Saunders who have housed me, fed me, comforted me and put up with all the gripes and grumbles that accompany thesis-writing. The encouragement and comments of the writing-up seminar group in the Anthropology Department provided me with stimulation, focus and the belief that it might be possible to complete the thesis. I thank the swimmers at the Kenwood Ladies Bathing Pond for a sense of perspective. Invaluable support during writing up came from Nicola Frost, Michele Gaudrault and Tara Surry. Piers and my parents know the extent of my debts to them.

### **Notes on the Text**

I refer to the Zambézia Agricultural Development Project, Phase II as ZADP, or simply as ‘the project’. Any references to the Zambézia Agricultural Development Project, Phase I are glossed as such.

Translations from Echuabo and Elomwé were made by my research assistants, Arcanjo de Jesus and Rita Madeira. The translations from Portuguese, whether from interviews or documents, are my own.

The value of the Mozambican metical (MT) fluctuated considerably during my research, but a reasonable rate of conversion is MT 24,000 to US\$ 1.

Pseudonyms are used.

I took any unattributed photographs.

## Chapter 1. Framing the Thesis

### 1.1 Introduction

I made my last visit to Zambézia in May 2003. I went as a consultant, as part of the Final Review of the Zambézia Agricultural Development Project, Phase II (henceforth ZADP).<sup>1</sup> I was already well acquainted with the project and province; only my role was unfamiliar. Our little team of three – all white-skinned, all English-speaking – met on the tarmac at the airport in Quelimane, the provincial capital (see Figure 1.2).<sup>2</sup> A tiny plane had been chartered to fly us up to Gurué, so the usual six hour drive into the tea-growing highlands was compressed into a convenient and comfortable forty minutes. We were all excited at the prospect of a flight in a plane into which we barely fitted.

We took off over the rice *machambas* (fields) and followed the line of road and railway out of town. The single road leaving Quelimane runs straight as a ruler for miles, banked up high above the plains, kinking only occasionally to avoid or to cross a river. A jumbled patchwork of unevenly shaped *machambas*, all at slightly different stages of harvest, lay below us, until the *regadio* (irrigation scheme) at Mucelo came in sight. Suddenly straight-edged fields were sharply delineated, with irrigation channels running exactly parallel to the road. The *regadio* was utterly distinct from surrounding *machambas*, instantly recognisable from the air. I strained my eyes to see if I could identify the remains of a similar scheme that I knew had once existed in Mutange, one of my two field sites, but there was nothing to be seen.

Away from the coconut groves of the coast, houses clustered on slightly higher ground, sheltered by mango and cashew trees and surrounded by acres of lower-lying rice paddy in the endless swamps. From this height, we could still pick out individual trees, the brightly coloured clothes of women working in the fields, the occasional corrugated roof brilliant in the sun. We curved northwards, away from the road, and higher. Less detail was visible as we climbed, and we could see that great swathes of

---

<sup>1</sup> I refer to ZADP (Phase II) as ‘ZADP’ throughout the thesis.

<sup>2</sup> Although consultants and reviewers of ZADP were generally white, and frequently British, more than ninety percent of ZADP staff were Mozambican. The small numbers of expatriate staff are highlighted in Figure 1.4. I discuss the question of staff backgrounds in more detail on page 69).

Figure 1.1 Map of Mozambique



the more arid inland land lay uncultivated. As we passed over Mocuba, where the Lugela and Licungo Rivers meet, we could just glimpse the wrecks of two bridges still partially straddling the stream. Neither had been destroyed by the war of the 1980s, during which many other Zambézian bridges were blown up, but by more recent flooding. Small boats plied back and forth beside their broken arches. The cement town (as the centre was known) looked much as it must have done when the Portuguese left, although the bamboo stalls and shacks that made up the market had entirely filled in some of the roads, subverting the neat grid system.

As we neared Gurué the landscape changed once more, and I started to search for landmarks that would show me where Mugaveia, my second field site, lay. But Mugaveia had no visually striking features – nobody had tried out major new development schemes there, there were no colonial mission churches, and thus little to distinguish it from surrounding areas. During my fieldwork I had found Mugaveia's particular characteristics slower to reveal themselves, connected as they were to political and social divisions, and to the split between the governing Frelimo party and the opposition Renamo.

When we reached Gurué, we came down slowly, circling the town to give warning of our landing. On the airstrip – a long ribbon of grass with a thin path running down it – two men were standing with their bicycles, watching us. They must move, they must know that we'll crash into them if they stay there, I thought. But there they remained, apparently unaware of the speed or size of the plane, until just a few metres from the ground the pilot aborted the landing, and made a further circle round the town. By the time we returned, the men were gone.

Flying over the towns, villages, roads that I knew so well at ground level was yet another displacing experience for me to add to a long list of disconcerting shifts I had experienced during my fieldwork. Neatly dressed in clean pressed clothes, I was about to step down from the aeroplane in Gurué as unruffled as when I had set out from Quelimane – fresh and ready to start work, not travel-stained, aching, and covered in a thin red dust from six hours on the road. From the air I could see so well and so differently the contrasts and compromises with which I had lived during my fieldwork – the new schemes, like the smart tarmac road and the Mucelo *regadio* which FAO was now rehabilitating; the remnants of earlier good ideas now gone to seed, like the

invisible Mutange scheme, the broken bridges, and the roads of the neatly planned town now covered in buildings.

I found it strangely moving to be back in Zambézia again, in what felt like such different circumstances. On this occasion (May 2003), I was in the province for less than two weeks, collating the ‘lessons learned’ from ZADP for the donor, DFID (Department for International Development, UK).<sup>3</sup> Like the little aircraft, we were to skim over the surface, discerning bigger patterns, undistracted by detail. In my fieldwork, which took place over a period of more than two years, it had been the detail that fascinated me, the intricate and place-specific complexities of the *particular* project, in a *particular* time and space. Flying over Zambézia in air-conditioned comfort, I found it suddenly easy to ignore the specificities of life in the province, to forget about the political differences that shaped relationships, to brush aside the history of colonialism, conflict, and ‘failed’ development schemes.

Indeed, back on the ground again, it was almost possible to forget that ZADP had ever existed. The project, which had started in 1998, was by May 2003 in its final month. Implemented by World Vision, a transnational NGO (non-governmental organisation) and funded by DFID, its aim had been to improve rural incomes and food security in three districts of Zambézia Province, Central Mozambique through a combination of agricultural research and extension, micro-credit and work on land tenure security (see Table 1.1).<sup>4</sup> But already by May 2003, just five months after the contracts of the *técnicos* (extension workers) had been terminated, there was little evidence left in the intervention areas we visited of what had once been a ‘flagship’ DFID project, visited and approved of by Clare Short, then Secretary of State for International Development. Local project facilitators told us that they were mocked by their neighbours – ‘your patron has left you now’. Goats supplied to rotating credit schemes were the only easily visible evidence of project investment. Even here, facilitators and beneficiaries were concerned about how long the schemes would continue to function, and about the survival of the animals themselves in the absence of veterinary care.

---

<sup>3</sup> See Whiteside (2003) for full details.

<sup>4</sup> For reasons explained in more detail on page 29, this thesis focuses on the agricultural component.

**Table 1.1 ZADP Goal and Purpose**

<b>Goal:</b>	<b>Performance Indicators</b>															
To increase household food security for the poorest groups in Zambezia.	Poorest 25% obtain food for an extra 3 months of the year from their production and from regular income generating activities by Project Year (PY) 4.  50% of the households in the poorest 25% of the population own luxury items which they considered were unobtainable before the start of the project.															
<b>Purpose:</b>																
To increase farm production and income sources for the rural poor in three ZADP target Districts.	<p>Production of three indicator staple crops over baseline figures increased by:</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Crop</th> <th>Poorest 25%</th> <th>Remaining 75%</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Rice</td> <td>15%</td> <td>50%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cassava</td> <td>10%</td> <td>25%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Maize</td> <td>10%</td> <td>40%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cowpea</td> <td>10%</td> <td>60%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>By end of project:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Range of income generating activities increased by 50% by PY 4.</li> <li>• Target communities marketing twice as much by PY 4 compared with a baseline measure.</li> <li>• Admissions of malnourished under 5 year old children from ZADP target area to Namacurra and Nicoadala clinics declines by 50% by PY 4.</li> </ul>	Crop	Poorest 25%	Remaining 75%	Rice	15%	50%	Cassava	10%	25%	Maize	10%	40%	Cowpea	10%	60%
Crop	Poorest 25%	Remaining 75%														
Rice	15%	50%														
Cassava	10%	25%														
Maize	10%	40%														
Cowpea	10%	60%														

Source: ZADP Logical Framework (DFID 1998b)

Some villagers still had new varieties of rice, cassava and sweet potato introduced by ZADP, though others had lost them in floods or droughts. A small number could recall planting technologies that they had learned and adopted from *técnicos*, though even more could recall the technologies they had rejected. Bridges were universally praised in the small number of places where they had been built, but everywhere there were cries for further investment. Overall, we found little evidence of the £3.75 million that had been ploughed into the agricultural component of the project over the preceding five years.

My two colleagues, both older and more experienced than me, were profoundly perplexed by the project, and I was repeatedly called on to explain ‘why’ something had happened, and how ZADP had developed into its final form. After all, I knew the project well. I had visited it first as part of an annual DFID review in May 2000, then from November 2000 to June 2002 had been attached to it full time, under DFID’s APOS (Associate Professional Officer) scheme to do my PhD research,<sup>5</sup> and had visited

<sup>5</sup> Under this scheme, now sadly defunct, I was provided with funding for a year’s preparatory study in Britain, then a year’s work experience-cum-research on a DFID-funded project overseas, and then a final year’s funding on my return.

again in November-December 2002. The confusion and surprise of my two colleagues reminded me of my own bemusement at the outset of my involvement with ZADP, a project which seems to have puzzled and frustrated many who encountered it.

The findings of the Final Review did not come as a surprise to the people most intimately involved in the project. It had been evident from as early as 1999 that the agricultural component was seriously under-achieving, both in terms of original expectations and money spent (DFID 1999a, 1999b). Nor were the lessons and recommendations that we made a shock:

- Take practical steps to keep administration and logistics simple
- Be realistic about the difficulty of the task and the skills available
- Be cautious about mixed objectives – such as having a rapid and large-scale impact on poverty and developing sustainable capacity
- Allow sufficient time before scaling up
- Be careful when making assumptions about ‘community’ or ‘poverty’
- Address market failure first where and when there is potential, and allow time to overcome teething problems
- Check that there is enough to offer on the ‘extension menu’ before developing an agricultural extension system
- Ground-breaking developments at provincial level also need national level support
- Twice yearly donor reviews, with large teams of DFID Advisers, most with limited experience of rural Mozambique, can be counterproductive.

(Whiteside, Wrangham, and Gudz 2003: 5-7)

These were practical issues which had been raised time and again by DFID Advisers, the 2001 Mid-Term Review team, and many of the other consultants employed to advise the project. Broadly speaking, analysis focused on poor design and poor management.

As the thesis shows, design and management did undoubtedly both contribute to project problems. ZADP was designed and monitored by individuals who did not know Zambézia well, and who were responding to policy initiatives coming from London and Washington. The design was internally contradictory, and assumptions were ill thought-through. Though many problems could perhaps have been ‘managed out’, a combination of particular personnel, unclear ownership structures, lack of confidence in change-making, and an unwillingness to make tough decisions militated against this. But is this kind of analysis, focused entirely at the technical level, sufficient? I argue that it is not, and that it is necessary to look deeper, both at the assumptions and

exclusions which defined the optic of the project and shaped project practice, and at the relationships within which the project was itself negotiated and developed. Although there were numerous practical problems with ZADP, which militated against its 'success', I argue that a close analysis of this particular 'site' allows us to identify a number of different 'narratives' or 'concepts' of development. At no stage was the existence of these different concepts acknowledged. Thus, to develop Long's (1992) battlefield analogy, neither the terms of battle, nor the nature of the different armies or alliances, was ever made clear. Instead, we can see fundamental clashes between different ways of seeing the world. These clashes did not necessarily cause the project's 'failure' (management issues were more immediate here), but they underlay many of the arguments about what the project should have done and how it should have acted.

Through a carefully grounded ethnography of aid of the type advocated by Crewe and Harrison (1998), I investigate how individuals, institutions and organisations with a wide range of agendas, ideas, interests and strategies negotiated over meaning and practice within the context of ZADP. Although personality and agency were frequently attributed to 'ZADP', 'DFID', and 'World Vision', I emphasise the fact that it is individuals and not organisations that have agency, although attention should always be paid to attribution practices. I look therefore at struggles over material resources and ideologies, and at how actors had the ability to resist each other in a myriad ways, while remaining caught within power and political structures that none controlled. Moving on from a literature that elaborates the differences between 'project' and 'beneficiary' priorities and perceptions,<sup>6</sup> I look at the ways in which difference and similarity were asserted and manipulated. I argue that despite attempts to make it into a managed and manageable intervention, ZADP can usefully be seen as a site of constant and continuous conflict relating to a range of discourses, articulated in changing historical, social and institutional contexts.


The thesis is written from a perspective that draws on the substantial 'anthropology of development' and 'development anthropology' literature, which I discuss in Sections 1.2 and 2.1. A study of a specific intervention, and not a 'village study', it looks first at the organisations involved in planning and implementing ZADP,

---

<sup>6</sup> A considerable literature gives evidence of a mismatch between beneficiaries' and planners' perceptions. See for example Chambers (1972, 1983, 1986, 1993, 1995, 1996), Crehan (1988), Dey (1982), Lentz (1988), Mosse (1994, 1995), Olivier de Sardan (1988), Richards (1991), and Tierney (1997).

and at how they conceptualised *Zambézia*. Attention to detail and historical context permits a nuanced understanding of the practices and strategies of actors involved in ZADP. Focusing on history, and on its (mis)understanding by development personnel, allows for a deeper appreciation of the ways in which different people responded to the ZADP intervention. This is considered in the second half of the thesis, where I look at how the project worked ‘on the ground’, and how it was understood by a range of local participants and observers.

**Figure 1.2 Map of *Zambézia* showing where ZADP operated**



Source: ZADP Files

## 1.2 Debating ‘Development’

‘Development’ is a slippery term. Accepted definitions vary widely, and the term remains highly contested and ambiguous. Carrying strongly subjective and judgemental overtones, ‘development’ and its derivatives have been used to refer to planned social change, to economic growth, to the outcome of social and economic change, to the intervention by one group in another’s affairs with the intention of bringing positive change, and most recently, to a discourse of domination of the ‘Third World’ by the ‘First World’ (Cowen and Shenton 1996, Lewis forthcoming-a). Some of the debates about whether ‘development’ is inevitable or avoidable, value-laden or amoral, relate to this definitional confusion.

Here I am concerned less with the specifics of definition, and more with the ways in which definitions were used: I take the question of how, why and when ideas were shared as a subject for investigation. In particular I do not assume that the organisations with which I deal can be analysed as simple (individual) agents. In this way I attempt to go beyond Ferguson (1990). His influential study looked at the ways in which a specific kind of knowledge about Lesotho was produced, and what its effects were. He showed how a supposedly technical project actually extended bureaucratic state power, through a process he described as depoliticisation. However his arguments were weakened by the fact that he did not attempt to portray the diversity of personalities and ideas within the World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency, nor did he unpick the processes by which the documents he analysed were created. Although he stated his intention to look both at the practice of ‘development’ and its effects, it was on the latter that his book focused. In this thesis I look inside the ‘black box’, at how outcomes were negotiated and produced.

Instead of emphasising the hegemonic power of development discourse (e.g. Escobar 1995, Sachs 1992), I follow Long and his Manchester School forebears in looking at how decisions and room for manoeuvre were negotiated between developer and beneficiary.<sup>7</sup> My reading of Long puts an examination of the agency of individuals

---

<sup>7</sup> The work of certain Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and Manchester School writers such as Gluckman (1958), Mitchell (1956), Colson (1964, 1971) and Long (1968) was intimately concerned with processes of social and economic change that would now be called ‘development’. This literature was critically examined by Ferguson (1999). See also Arce (2001: 106-7) and Werbner (1984).

– both ‘beneficiaries’ (often called ‘local people’), and development workers – alongside a consideration of the structural constraints on their actions. By agency I mean the ‘knowledgeability, capability and social embeddedness associated with doing (and reflecting) that impact upon or shape one’s own and others’ actions and interpretations’ (Long 2001: 240).<sup>8</sup>

Though their capacity for action may be limited, local actors retain some freedom of manoeuvre. This is frequently conceptualised as ‘resistance’, which can be made manifest in a variety of different ways.<sup>9</sup> Resistance is diverse and context-specific: it refers to a whole range of practices from withdrawal, covert opposition, and symbolic challenges, to outright rebellion. As Hilhorst put it, ‘local actors are not merely overcome by development: they interpret, bend and negotiate it through their agency’ (2001: 402).

However it is important not to romanticise the opportunities for alternatives, nor to be naïve in the celebration of diversity. ‘Development’ is inherently power-laden, and control of definitions and resources lies more in the hands of the powerful than the marginalised. One must pay close attention to social positioning, and to the power structures which open and shut off options. In this I draw on Feierman’s study of ‘peasant intellectuals’ in Tanzania (1990), and look at the social positioning of actors. Feierman argued that ‘discourse does not float independently above the play of social forces, nor is it a mere instrument of social forces’ (1990:4) but that it is necessary to be aware of the social positioning of those who hold particular ideas:

‘Not all regularised improvisations are created equal; not all have an equal weight in shaping the language that will be in general use in the future. To explain the direction of change it is necessary to introduce power into the equation and explore the relationship between the characteristic of domination by ruling groups and the evolution of discourse’ (4).

A focus on the social positioning of individuals anchors my work in the Zambézian context.

I pay close attention to labelling practices: not only which labels are used, but who controls them. As Shore and Wright have written, ‘A key concern is “who has the

---

<sup>8</sup> Agency is discussed further in section 2.1.

<sup>9</sup> A number of excellent studies of peasant resistance were carried out in Zambézia (e.g. Isaacman 1976, 1996, Vail and White 1983). See also Ranger (1977), Taussig (1980), Comaroff (1985), Scott (1985, 1990), Ong (1987), Comaroff and Comaroff (1991), van Walraven and Abbink (2003) and Allina-Pisano (2003).

power to define”: dominant discourses work by setting up the terms of reference and by disallowing and marginalizing alternatives’ (1997: 18). Following Scott (1990, 1985), the “transcripts” of the weak may be hidden, but that does not mean they do not exist. Extending the argument, even when one discourse appears to be dominant, there are always parallel, residual or emerging alternatives: ‘transcripts’ which are *not* completely hidden, but which may be disallowed or marginalised. The relationship between such dominant and counter-discourses is dynamic, and meaning is constantly subject to renegotiation (Hilhorst 2001: 402). Vocabularies acquire new meanings through their use in different contexts, through ‘the intricate interplay and joint appropriation and transformation of different bodies of knowledge’ (Arce and Long 2000b: 24).

To demonstrate how I look at the ways in which ideas are shared and negotiated, and to introduce a second body of literature that underpins the thesis, I now briefly discuss the ways in which concepts of ‘development’ were contested. With Harrison (1995a), whose similarly multi-sited work on an aquaculture project took her from rural Zambia to the FAO offices in Rome, I argue that simple ‘them’ and ‘us’ dichotomies ‘may oversimplify how some “local” people include themselves in particular forms of language and action’ (134). Ideas about what ‘development’ was and should be were not neatly split between ‘developers’ and ‘beneficiaries’. ‘Knowledges’ do not form discrete bounded systems; rather all kinds of knowledge – ‘Western knowledge’ included – are fragmented and contested (e.g. Nygren 1999, cf. Hobart 1993) The people I worked with in ZADP belonged to linked and overlapping worlds: ‘contradictory discourses overlapped and discrepant meanings criss-crossed, [and] all knowledges were made up of diverse elements and combined within a world of multiple actors’ (Nygren 1999: 277). It follows that it is unwise to make strict typological distinctions between different groups, or to assume, for example, that ‘the poor’ will always have different perceptions from ‘the well-off’.<sup>10</sup>

For development (*desenvolvimento*) to exist, informants in Mutange and Mugaveia generally considered that three main things were necessary: outside help, material goods, and peace, which I now discuss in turn. While many *técnicos* informally agreed with much of this analysis, it did not fit well with an official

---

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, the influential *Voices of the Poor* consultation carried out for the World Development Report 2000/2001 (Narayan and Petesch 2002, Narayan et al. 2000a, Narayan et al. 2000b).

emphasis on replacing the provision of concrete goods with a move towards ‘community participation’ and the facilitation of developmental processes.

First, development was linked to help from outsiders. *Desenvolvimento* was said to require the aid of outsiders, whether concession holders,<sup>11</sup> government officials, or project workers. A Frelimo leader in Mutange said, of potential investor in the area:

‘We can’t resolve our poverty on our own. Maybe with those who have a little, if they can help us ... That’s how we think. We are too poor. It is only this way that we will also see development further ahead (*vimos também o desenvolvimento para afrente*).’

Some informants identified these connections with outsiders as themselves constituting development, and on several occasions I was told that ‘it shows that we have development that I can be sitting here like this, talking to a white woman’. I discuss the strategic nature of this acclamation and projection of dependence in Chapter 6.

Certain people contested the suggestion that ‘community participation’ (see page 33), a cornerstone of the ZADP approach, might form part of ‘development’. A Frelimo leader from Namuinho, who had received project goats and had participated in various seed multiplication and research activities, said that he himself could see no ‘development’ from project activities. For him construction was fundamental to ‘development’, and he argued that the project should follow the example of the colonial Portuguese in prioritising it. In particular he emphasised that ‘development’ would never come about if people went on ‘helping’ to build things:

‘Helping like this is what doesn’t develop the country (*ajudar é isso que não desenvolve o país*). This is helping without getting anything. I can’t help all day without being paid. It’s hard – I don’t buy anything, I haven’t farmed. At least if I pick up my hoe then there’s some return. But helping? It’s this kind of help that has made us fall down, to this day.’

He considered that ‘help’ was meant to come from outside, rather than from amongst themselves. Thus, although ‘community participation’ was very important for project designers and staff, it did not fit with villagers’ ideas: that development was what ‘outsiders’ should do for them. This issue is further discussed in Chapter 5.

I return to the question of strategic claims of dependence – and the stress on interpersonal relationships as a key aspect of the development process – at several points in

---

<sup>11</sup> Concessionaires held tracts of land granted to them by the government, for commercial exploitation. Land was also granted on concession in colonial times.

the thesis. I argue that it can be usefully analysed through the lens of patron-client relationships. Although there is a substantial anthropological literature on the subject, it is now somewhat antiquated (e.g. Foster 1963, Boissevain 1966, Wolf 1966, Scott 1972, Waterbury 1977, Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980, 1984, Goodell 1985). Clientelism as an explanatory paradigm fell out of favour after the rise of Marxist analysis of rural societies, which emphasised the exploitative nature of relations previously analysed as patronage. However I suggest that this approach can be extremely helpful in analysing relationships between different actors involved in ZADP. Arguing that two organisations stood in relation to each other as patron and client, as I do in Chapter 2, or that the relationship between ZADP and its ‘beneficiaries’ can likewise be seen as a patronage relationship (Chapter 6) does not fall foul of class analysis, nor does it fly in the face of ‘discourse’ theory. Rather, it highlights the power-laden and strategic nature of the interface.

The literature generally suggests that patronage plays a mediating role in hierarchical societies, as a response to hostility and inequality. For Boissevain patronage is ‘the complex of relations between those who use their influence, social position or some other attribute to assist and protect others, and those whom they so help and protect’ (1966: 18). Both clients and patrons are said to benefit from the system. However, if the system is thought of as triadic and not dyadic (Foster 1963), that is to say that the patron is mediating for the client in a system such as bureaucratic hierarchy, the question of the degree to which the patron is working for himself and not only his client must be considered (Stein 1984: 31). It may be that the patron needs the client just as much as the client needs the patron. I consider this question both in the context of ZADP-beneficiary and ZADP-DFID relations

The second feature of ‘development’ was often, though not always, connected to these strategic claims of dependence. It was widely believed that for an area or an individual to be *desenvolvido* they needed to have *things*. A ‘developed’ person was one with plenty of solid, durable goods. An elderly man who had recently moved to Mutange described the area as ‘developed’, because a number of black people had tin roofs on their houses. For him this indicated development: ‘It is necessary to be rich to be developed, but if you are rich and you do not display your wealth – you do not have a lot of food, you do not have a tin-roofed house – then you are not developed.’ He

emphasised the importance of material goods, specifically food and housing, in indicating the development of both individuals and areas.

The connection between *desenvolvimento* and machinery (agricultural machinery, vehicles, processing equipment) was made especially strongly in Mutange, in particular by those who had been involved with the agricultural cooperative of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Frelimo *chefe de zona* of Namuinho said ‘Real development needs machines – I just can’t do enough by hand.’ Without machinery, and without the infrastructure to which they had been accustomed, many in Mutange felt themselves limited. Another Frelimo leader, who ran a small carpentry business in addition to his *machambas* (fields) said:

‘We lack many things. To buy clothes you have to go on foot to Namacurra, or Nicoadala. No shop. We have no machines to plough with. You have to cultivate by hand, and don’t produce enough. But with a tractor you can cultivate up to two hectares or more. And what we produce we have to take a long way on our heads.’

Those who had known the cooperative themselves tended to place the most emphasis on the need for machinery and equipment. Although there had been serious problems with the cooperative (see page 123 for more details), it was seen by many as marking the most ‘developed’ moment in Mutange’s history.

The connection between *desenvolvimento*, employment and transport was made equally strongly in Mutange and Mugaveia. A group of Renamo leaders from Mutange told me that ‘for us, *desenvolvimento* is having a factory, with people working, the railway working and people able to take their produce to Quelimane’. ‘There’s no way that we can develop here’ said a man in Mutange. ‘Everything is impeded because we don’t have a road. No transport comes here.’ The Renamo leaders agreed: ‘Development here is a bit delayed because of the road and the bridges, because even if a person wants to develop, how can he, without a bridge?’ Likewise in Mugaveia the lack of a solid bridge was referred to again and again as the prime obstacle to development, with the absence of a mill, shop and hospital in second place.

The connection between material goods and ‘development’ was also made by many ZADP *técnicos*, though in a slightly different manner. For the *técnicos*, *desenvolvimento* was an unsettlingly abstract concept, and direct questions about its meaning tended to elicit confused responses. *Técnicos* preferred to describe activities, or ideal outcomes, or to tell me what *desenvolvimento* was not, rather than what it was.

The most popular definition was a comparative one, with *desenvolvimento* contrasted to *emergência*, the emergency. In this context *emergência* was used to refer not so much to a period, as to a way of working that was characteristic of the war and immediate post-war years, when hand-outs and donations were provided to displaced people and returning refugees.<sup>12</sup> *Técnicos* contrasted this way of working with the methods of *desenvolvimento* now preferred, which to them implied a credit or commercial relationship, in which inputs were loaned or sold (usually at subsidised prices). For them, therefore, *desenvolvimento* referred not only to the possession of material goods, but also to a particular means of acquiring them.

Finally, it was widely agreed that social cooperation and peace were necessary preconditions to development. ‘For there to be development, people have to help each other’ and, ‘If there’s no union at home, development is difficult’ were two things I heard in Mutange. Witchcraft was seen as the enemy of development; white people’s wealth was in part attributed to their ability to accumulate without sparking envy and therefore witchcraft.<sup>13</sup> War was also antithetical to development, and many believed that rural districts had been ‘more developed’ (*mais desenvolvidos*) before the war. Although ZADP staff tended to focus on a rather higher level – the need for national stability – a concern with peace was one they shared.

This discussion has briefly demonstrated some of the ways in which ideas were shared and debated between different groups of actors involved in ZADP. Less powerful ‘beneficiaries’ were able, at times, to force changes in ZADP practices; although ‘development’ takes place within a context of extremely uneven power relations, local actors still retain significant levels of power in their relationship with ‘developers’. ‘Development’ is not simply the exercise of irresistible power, but rather ‘a complex process involving the working and reworking of knowledge in a changing and contested environment’ (Phillips and Edwards 2000: 49). Foucault was at pains to argue that all power is by its nature opposed and opposable, and that it consists of actions upon the actions of others, a definition that presupposes rather than annuls the capacity of those others as agents (Gordon 1991).

---

<sup>12</sup> I discuss another referent of *emergência* on page 90.

<sup>13</sup> I discuss this further in Chapter 7.

In this thesis, adopting and critiquing Long's practice-based actor-oriented and 'interface' approaches allows me to focus on the complexities of the ways in which discourses were negotiated and renegotiated, and on the messy world of conflicting perspectives and heated exchanges.<sup>14</sup> Long's approach is characterised by an interest in discontinuity and ambiguity, and in the 'battlefields of knowledge' he discerned between local actors and 'developers' (Long and Long 1992). At the 'interfaces', points of intersection between different fields of social organisation, discrepancies and discontinuities of power, knowledge, interest and value are revealed. As Long emphasised, 'development' is part of a continuous flow in social life and relations between actors, and cannot be separated from that flow (Long 2002). Interventions do not have the clean beginnings and ends that formal documents might suggest; they are understood in an already-existing context, and their effects continue past formal end-dates. Interface analysis looks at how interactions between interveners and intervened shape outcomes, and at how, over time, 'the interface itself becomes an organised entity of interlocking relationships and intentionalities' (2002: 7).

As I show in Chapter 2, I move beyond the accounts of Ferguson (1990), Escobar (1995) and some contributors to Crush (1995b), who, by concentrating on the outcomes of 'development' at times seem to imply that it is all-powerful, top-down and singular. Looking at process and negotiation keeps questions of power and agency in view; I concur with Gardner and Lewis that 'while it [development] may function hegemonically, it is also created and recreated by multiple agents, who often have very different understandings of their work' (1997: 134).

An interesting and unusual feature of this 'different understanding' in Zambézia was the political interpretation given to development organisations and 'development' itself. As I discuss in more detail later (page 173), a positive attitude towards 'development' was an important part of the self-definition of certain adherents of Frelimo, the ex-communist ruling party continuously in power since Independence, in particular of those who tended to be at the forefront of ZADP activities. Such people saw 'development' as somehow associated with themselves alone, and felt that their own openness to 'development' stood in stark contrast to what they saw as the closed minds of Renamo members. Renamo, now the opposition party, but once a guerrilla

---

<sup>14</sup> Long's 'interface' approach builds on the work of Rhodes Livingstone Institute and Manchester School anthropologists in its conscious focus on actual practice (Arce 2001).

movement supported in turn by Rhodesia and South Africa, was seen by Frelimo-supporting villagers to be backward-looking and primitive. Renamo adherents, accepting parts of this definition, rejected much 'development' as being too closely associated with their rivals, even when administered by self-consciously 'neutral' NGOs like World Vision.<sup>15</sup>

'Development' thus proved to be important in the self-definition of some Zambéziian beneficiaries, in a manner mirroring Pigg's findings from Nepal. She showed how a once-external concept was locally appropriated and came to form part of the way in which people constructed their identity, independent of any individual 'development project' or Western intervention (1992). The politicisation of development, in which Frelimo adherents were 'development-identified', while Renamo supporters were 'development-denied', is a theme to which I repeatedly return; it is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

Drawing on the insight that 'the meaning development holds for people is specific to the historical context in which they experience it', and that 'innovations in development activities are received in a context already formed by previous activities' (Pigg 1993: 49-52), this thesis repeatedly seeks to contextualise and historicise. Engaged as I was with ZADP over three tumultuous years,<sup>16</sup> any analysis that sought to present itself as timeless would be entirely exposed to the familiar criticisms made of the 'ethnographic present' (Fabian 1983, Hobart 1997). This thesis attempts to trace contingent and changing relationships between individuals and organisations which themselves are in a state of constant flux. In order to embed an understanding of what development 'meant' to those involved with – or who had made the choice not to be involved with – ZADP, my work also attempts to understand the ways in which people made livelihood choices, and what factors gave some a broader range of choices than others.

---

<sup>15</sup> Observation would suggest that few Renamo supporters were involved in the more time-consuming or marginally economically beneficial ZADP activities, such as seed credit or demonstrations. However, a much greater number did accept rat-traps and livestock. It could thus be suggested that the economic benefits of involvement in ZADP activities were of interest to Renamo adherents.

<sup>16</sup> In the period 2000-2003 Zambézia suffered devastating floods. World Vision decentralised its offices to the provinces. ZADP changed managers and finally employed a rural sociologist. DFID (Central Africa) decentralised power to a new office in Maputo (DFID Mozambique), almost completely changed the advisory team, and subsequently took two years to write a new 'Country Plan'. Corporately, DFID refined and redefined its mission and ways of working, in the context of a rapidly changing global development agenda.

### 1.3 The Setting

This research was carried out within a context framed by the organisations with which I worked, by geography, and by ‘development’ itself. There were no neat boundaries to my ethnography of aid, as there were important connections and linkages that stretched far beyond the locales of intervention into many institutions and countries. Even within the province of Zambézia, ‘development’ was a multi-sited activity, engaging a web of people spread over a large geographical area. During the course of my fieldwork I moved to and fro between different spheres, with a range of roles. Attending an expatriate birthday party (Figure 1.26) or having lunch with a group of expatriates in the Quelimane pizzeria was as much part of my research as sitting under a mango tree talking to someone from Mutange whose cassava *machamba* (field) was being destroyed by a goat provided by ZADP. That said, my fieldwork was largely concentrated in three places: Quelimane, Mutange and Mugaveia (see Figure 1.2, Figure 1.10, Figure 1.11).

Quelimane, the provincial capital, was the site of the main ZADP office. Mutange was a small *localidade*<sup>17</sup> in Namacurra District, in Lower Zambézia. Mugaveia, in Gurué District in Upper Zambézia was about 350 km north of Quelimane (normally six hours’ drive). Mutange and Mugaveia were just two of the nineteen *localidades* in which ZADP operated, which were spread across Namacurra, Nicoadala and Gurué Districts (see Figure 1.2). While Namacurra and Nicoadala Districts were relatively similar in terms of ecology, climate, cropping patterns and language, Gurué District was substantially different. The decision to work in the two different regions was made by the Project Manager at the outset of my research, as he wished me to draw comparisons between the project intervention areas: it was expected that my work would help ZADP understand the impact of project activities on those living within the project area, in particular the rural poor, and provide recommendations on how future activities could be modified to enhance project impact.<sup>18</sup> The *localidade* of Mutange was chosen because it was the only Namacurra *localidade* easily accessible at the time when I started work (during the 2001 Zambézia floods). Mugaveia was chosen because it was

---

<sup>17</sup> Zambézia province is divided into districts (*distritos*), each sub-divided into administrative posts (*postos administrativos*), made up of a number of localities (*localidades*). Each *localidade* comprised several cells (*células*).

<sup>18</sup> See Appendix A for my terms of reference.

seen as ‘representative’ of villages in Gurué District: neither mountain nor lowland plain; not too densely populated, but still sizeable.<sup>19</sup>

ZADP, in its different guises, was the central location of my work, but I also looked at the broader movements, discourses and narratives that affected and shaped it. My choice of what Gatter termed ‘the crucial middle ground’ (1990: 12) where development projects are put into action was pragmatic. It reflected the fact that I was working within ZADP, and represented my attempt to put the situation to good use. The project itself formed an ideal location for the study of a variety of what Long (1989b) has called ‘development interfaces’, and relationships across such interfaces. ZADP formed what could be thought of as a supra-national space, intertwining with local and global fields in complex ways. Those who acted within this space belonged at the same time to other fields, which did not necessarily overlap. These actors included the DFID Advisers who designed and monitored the project; World Vision staff in Britain and Mozambique; ZADP staff both Mozambican and expatriate; national government staff; numerous consultants; and the men and women living within the project area. ZADP was perceived and understood differently by the various categories of actors. Not only did actors occupy different institutional spaces, they also occupied and moved between different geographical spaces. Studying such spaces calls for multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995). Here I describe each of the frames for ZADP in turn: the project itself, the geographical location, and the organisational context.


---

<sup>19</sup> I worked in all parts of Mutange, a small *localidade*, though I concentrated most on the hamlet of Namuinho. In Mugaveia, I worked only in the northern part of the *localidade*, in the *células* of Intuba and Nicoria, and occasionally in Inlixé and Inhapé. When I refer to ‘Mugaveia’, I am thus referring only to the portion of the *localidade* in which we worked.

## The Zambézia Agricultural Development Project

ZADP was a large and complex project. It was implemented by World Vision-Mozambique, funded by DFID, and had a budget of £7.8 million (see Figure 1.3) spread over four years, later extended to five. It grew out of an earlier project (ZADP Phase I), which had provided tools, seeds and other agricultural inputs to farmers in the wake of the conflict. ZADP (I) had aimed to revive agriculture in the province by spreading new and old crop varieties through a research and extension programme (ODA and World Vision 1994). ZADP inherited staff and structure from this earlier project, but was itself much more elaborate. It had more than double the budget, and components dealing with land tenure and micro-credit were added to the agriculture work. The stated purpose of ZADP was to: ‘increase farm production and income sources for the rural poor in selected *localidades* in Gurué, Nicoadala and Namacurra districts’ (DFID 1998b:1). They were to ‘diversify smallholder food and income sources’, ‘develop community-based organisations’, ‘assist communities...to assert their legal rights over land’, and to ‘assist *communities* to move away from subsistence agriculture, and diversify their income sources by initiating savings and credit’ (DFID 1998b:1).

**Figure 1.3 Original budgets for project components**



Source: Derived from Project Memorandum (DFID 1998b, Annex 5)


Within ZADP, the agricultural component was dominant. As Figure 1.3 shows, it was by far the most expensive, and its greater budget was reflected in a larger number of staff (see Figure 1.4). The fact that the Project Manager was an agronomist and the Deputy Project Manager doubled up as the agriculture component manager also contributed to its supremacy. Although in theory the project was an integrated one, in fact the three components were run separately. They were physically separated, based in buildings spread across Quelimane city. They were also each very different in nature. It was considered essential for the success of the micro-credit component that it should maintain an identity clearly distinct from World Vision, as World Vision was believed to be associated with hand-outs (see Chapter 6 for further discussion). The land tenure component was involved in institution-building between an NGO (ORAM)<sup>20</sup> and a government department. By contrast, the agriculture component was focused on research and service delivery.

As also shown by Figure 1.4, my own 'location' as a Social Development APO within the project was as a member of the agriculture component. For this reason, and because neither the land tenure nor micro-credit components maintained on-going village-level programmes, I focused almost exclusively on the activities of the agriculture component. It should therefore be borne in mind throughout the thesis that my comments on ZADP pertain to the agriculture component, unless otherwise indicated.

---

<sup>20</sup> ORAM, the Rural Association for Mutual Help, was one of Mozambique's largest national NGOs, with a wide profile of activities. In addition to working on land issues, it was involved in emergency responses to the 2001 Zambézia floods, and provided on-going support to the Association of Mutange Villagers.

**Figure 1.4 The Zambézia Agricultural Development Project**



**Figure 1.5 The ZADP Agriculture Team, December 2001**



Source: John Steel

The agricultural component was equivalent in scale to a substantial project in itself. Two extension supervisors managed a network of *técnicos* based in nineteen *localidades* spread across the three districts of Namacurra, Nioadala and Gurué (see Figure 1.2). An agricultural research team, working closely with the field *técnicos* and supervisors, undertook both on-farm and on-station research, most notably into cassava disease. A livestock manager was appointed shortly before I arrived to manage a small team of livestock *técnicos* in coordination with the extension supervisors and field *técnicos*. The ‘social component’, of which I formed a part, was also nominally included within the agricultural component, and we shared office space with agriculture colleagues.<sup>21</sup> Despite being the most junior members of staff, the *técnicos* were the lynchpin of all the extremely varied project activities in the *localidades* (see Table 1.2). Normally one *técnico* lived in each project *localidade*, where they worked in a

---

<sup>21</sup> I do not discuss the social component in any detail, as it was only established in its final form towards the end of my fieldwork.

maximum of six *células*. Most of the *técnicos* were younger men, but the *técnico* for Mutange was a woman, Jacinta Lopes. Most were *técnicos médios* (middle-level technicians), meaning they had completed agricultural training equivalent to twelfth grade schooling. All were employed by ZADP, which meant that they had no job security after the project ended.

**Table 1.2 Activities carried out by the agricultural component**

Livestock	Goat and duck restocking Chicken vaccination Training of para-vets
Agricultural extension	Resident <i>técnicos</i> Farmer Field Schools Community Extension Workers Radio soap opera
Research	Farmer Research Groups On-farm research On-station research Collaboration with national research institutes International research with Natural Resources Institute
Associational development	Establishment of farmer associations Community Development Committees Partnership with CLUSA
Post-harvest	Improved granaries Biological and chemical pest control methods Rat-trapping Crop processing technologies Storage technologies
Plant provision and multiplication	Individual and group seed multiplication Introduction of new seed and plant varieties Tree seedling multiplication and distribution to individuals and groups Seed sale Seed credit
Tools	Ergonomics and improved tools Tool sale
Roads and Bridges	Spot improvements on feeder roads and stream crossings Bridge construction
Partnerships	Traders Agricultural marketing companies Input suppliers Honey company

As Table 1.2 shows, the agriculture component carried out a huge range of activities, some sequentially, some simultaneously. *Técnicos* and Community Extension Workers (generally known as facilitators) worked together on many different schemes. For example, Farmer Field Schools (in which groups of farmers worked with a *técnico* to investigate solutions to agricultural problems identified by themselves) were abandoned after one season, before my fieldwork. The radio soap opera, which

was intended to take extension messages to a far broader audience, only started in 2001 (and was hugely popular). Seed provision underwent similar changes. At first seed was supplied in small quantities on credit, and repaid to a village-level 'seed bank'; however repayment rates were low, and storage problems meant that by the following season there was little to lend. Attempts to encourage commercial seed sale proved unsuccessful, as sales volumes were so low, and by the time I was involved in the project, seed of certain varieties was being sold by *técnicos*. At the same time small amounts of improved planting material (in particular brown-streak resistant cassava and yellow-fleshed sweet potato) continued to be provided for free (see Chapter 6). Each year there was a programme of on-farm demonstrations (sowing rice in lines, bunding, fertiliser use, plant spacing, plant intercropping, new varieties and new crops such as paprika). Other demonstrations included the use of eucalyptus leaves and ash for seed storage, and the use of aluminium cones to protect granaries against rats. Many of these demonstrations were of questionable value, as pointed out by a consultant involved in an early DFID review (DFID 1999a). Some were extremely popular – as discussed in Chapter 7 there was considerable jealousy of those who had been given rat traps, as part of a research project – while others went unadopted, as they required unacceptably high levels of either financial or labour investment.

It was intended that most agricultural activities should involve 'community participation', so the Farmer Research Groups were meant to investigate problems prioritised by farmers, and bridge construction was meant to be done using materials provided by 'the community' (in order to increase the chances of 'sustainability'). However as I discuss later, beneficiaries did not generally wish to work together, and disputed any attempt to get them to contribute to project activities; this meant, for example, that those who worked on bridge repair (Figure 1.6 and Figure 1.7) were paid for their labour.

**Figure 1.6 Bridge in Mucunha localidade, before rehabilitation by ZADP**



**Figure 1.7 Mucunha bridge after rehabilitation**



Mucunha *localidade* is high in the mountains of Gurué District. Prior to bridge rehabilitation by ZADP, vehicles had to stop more than 7 km from the centre of the *localidade*. Source: John Steel.

## Zambézia

Zambézia province was the setting for the project and source of its name.<sup>22</sup> It was the location of most of my fieldwork. In this section I introduce both the province and my two field sites. In 'Power of Development' (1995b), Crush and his contributors make the point that brief 'cameo' descriptions of places are constitutive, and lead to the identification of particular 'problems' and 'solutions' (see Mitchell 1995 for an analysis of the practical effects of description in Egypt). Mindful of this, the account I give here of Zambézia is a personal one, focused around the places where I worked. I give only the briefest of historical and political sketches; much more detail on these questions is woven into the argument of later chapters.

The available literature on Zambézia is patchy. The turbulent history of the region has attracted a number of eminent historians and political economists, among them Newitt, Isaacman, Vail, White and Ishemo.<sup>23</sup> Much of their work has used a combination of archival and oral sources, and as such has involved periods of fieldwork. However, with the exception of accounts written by colonial administrators like de Almeida (1948) or Lacerda (1929, 1934, 1939, 1944), there are few formal ethnographies. More recently Catholic missionaries have produced small monographs (e.g. Brentari n.d., Ciscato n.d.), and there are a growing number of academic theses dealing with the province (Pequenino 1995, Serra 1995, Bowen 2000b, Marzetti 2001).

---

<sup>22</sup> The boundaries of 'Zambézia' have not been historically constant. The present-day province of Zambézia is not co-extensive with the 'Zambesia' of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. 'Zambesia' used to refer to both sides of the Zambezi river valley, extending as far inland as present-day Zambia. Several histories of 'Zambézia' (e.g. Isaacman 1972a, 1976, Newitt 1973b, 1973a, Vail and White 1977) deal almost exclusively with the Zambezi valley, and not with the parts of Zambézia in which I worked.

<sup>23</sup> I discuss this literature in Chapter 3.



significant mineral deposits, both in the form of coastal heavy sands, and mines producing semi-precious stones. Nearly twenty percent of Mozambique's population live in Zambézia, in an area roughly half the size of Great Britain.<sup>24</sup> Population density, though high for the country as a whole, is low, at 27.5 inhabitants per square kilometre (1997 census figures).

Although rich in resources, Zambézia is a poor province. There are many reasons for this. An important one is the war, which from about 1978 to 1992 devastated large parts of the country. Initially there were two explanatory frameworks for the war. It was either blamed on Frelimo's revolutionary socialist agenda (Hoile 1994), or viewed as a war of external destabilisation, an attempt first by Rhodesia then South Africa to undermine a frontline state (e.g. Fauvet 1984, Morgan 1990). As I discuss later (Chapter 3), scholars have now attempted to combine the best of both perspectives. In Zambézia the war caused enormous damage to infrastructure, and destroyed the province's entire processing capacity for sugar and cashew.<sup>25</sup> In 1989 a journalist wrote

'Once the source of over 50 per cent of Mozambique's hard currency exports and bountiful crops of sugar, tea, copra, and coconuts, the province is now a major drain on the national economy. One-third of its 3 million people have lost their homes or livelihood to the war and now depend on international aid to survive.' (Maier 1989: 14).

Contemporary observers of the war in Zambézia (e.g. Finnegan 1992, Nordstrom 1997) focused almost exclusively on the brutality of attacks on people and property, and the results of such destruction remained eminently visible during my fieldwork. Mills lay in ruins, factories stripped and idle. Rural shops were virtually non-existent, and farmers continued to have grave difficulties selling their surpluses. However copra concessions (in the south) and tea plantations (in the highlands) were gradually being re-established, and were slowly employing more labour.

---

<sup>24</sup> The area of the province is 105,008 km<sup>2</sup> (República de Moçambique 2001: 1). The 1997 census showed Zambézia to have a population of 2,891,809, out of a national population of 15,278,334.

<sup>25</sup> Although official accounts attributed this to Renamo (e.g. Hall and Young 1997: 159), informants in Zambézia blamed government troops. In a similar manner, traders to whom Wilson spoke in 1991 said that much of their property was actually damaged by their own employees and dependents under the cover of Renamo destruction (Wilson 1991c: 16).

**Figure 1.9 Tea estates in Gurué**



The mountains of the Gurué highlands, with tea estates on the lower slopes, and the roof of a tea factory in the foreground. Many estates became overgrown during the war years, and were gradually returning to productivity over the course of my fieldwork (Barbara Johnson)

Zambézia's recovery from wartime destruction has been slowed by a lack of investment. It would appear that opposition-supporting provinces, like Zambézia, have received relatively low proportions of state investment (see statistics in the UNDP National Human Development Reports (2000: Table 16, 2002: Table 23)).<sup>26</sup> These statistics seem to show that Zambézia and Nampula, populous provinces with substantial numbers of Renamo voters, received by far the least state investment in 1998 and 1999. Although these figures should be treated with great caution, as much government expenditure occurs off-budget, they would appear to give some support to beliefs widely held in Zambézia: that the Frelimo government intentionally starves the province of resources. Many in Zambézia felt that the Renamo-supporting provinces in the centre and north of the country received less than those to the south. This was thought both to stem from, and to exacerbate the north-south divide.

---

<sup>26</sup> In both the 1994 and 1999 multi-party elections, Zambézians voted overwhelmingly for Renamo, the opposition party. In 1999 Renamo received 59 percent of the vote in the legislative elections, and Dhlakama, party leader, won 70 percent in the presidential ballot (for a more detailed breakdown of voting patterns in Zambézia see Table 5.1, page 90).

ODA (Official Development Assistance) levels by province were also highly variable. Although members of the donor and development community alleged that the provinces with the most attractive beaches tended to get the highest levels of investment, statistics from the 2000 and 2001 Mozambique Human Development Reports do not bear this out (UNDP 2000, Table 15, UNDP 2002, Table 22). Once again, great caution is needed in interpreting these statistics, as donors are often slow to report their spending.

A lack of investment in regional transport, which is agonisingly slow and expensive, has further slowed economic recovery. Figure 1.8 shows the limited extent of the road network in the province. During my fieldwork travel remained difficult because many roads had not been rehabilitated nor bridges fully rebuilt. The lack of a bridge over the Zambezi at Caia made long-distance road haulage expensive and slow, and poor quality roads in Nampula province inhibited the easy carriage of goods southwards from the port of Nacala.

Zambézia's development indicators remain extremely poor. The 2002 National Human Development Report reported that Zambézia had the lowest Human Development Index (HDI) in the country (UNDP 2002: Tables 9-10).<sup>27</sup> The 1997 census gave life expectancy at birth as just 37 years in Zambézia, compared with 58.3 years in Maputo city. The same census put the mortality rate during the first 5 years of life at 306.2 per thousand, and the rural illiteracy rate at 74.6 percent.

As I have already noted, and as Figure 1.2 shows, ZADP did not operate in all parts of Zambézia province. Rather, its intervention area was fragmented and spread across the province. My own work took place only in the regions where ZADP operated, and was divided between three key sites. My main 'home', with cats, books, electricity and telephone was in Quelimane City, the provincial capital near the coast. This was where World Vision's provincial headquarters were located, and was the base from which ZADP operated. Most of the project's senior staff lived in Quelimane and

---

<sup>27</sup> The figures in the 2001 National Human Development Report sparked heated debate when they were first published. They showed rapid and increasing differentiation between southern Mozambique and the rest of the country, with Zambézia's HDI rising from 0.176 in 1996 to 0.182 in 1999, falling to 0.168 in 2000. This fall can largely be attributed to the erosion in real GDP per capita, from US\$ 103 in 1996, to just US\$ 78 in 2000.

made short trips to ‘the field’ (*o campo*).<sup>28</sup> Quelimane is a sizeable city with a population of over half a million. There was a substantial ‘development’ presence in the city at the time of my fieldwork. Danida, Finnida, and the EU all had personnel seconded to government departments. ActionAid, Landmine Survivors Network, Save the Children (UK), and Heifer Project International also maintained provincial offices, as well as a number of Mozambican NGOs. World Vision was by far the largest NGO operating in the province; in January 2003 (after over half of ZADP’s staff of more than a hundred had finished their contracts) there were still roughly five hundred employees (of a national total of about 980) on the provincial payroll.

In addition to my home in Quelimane I maintained bases in the two *localidades* in which I did the bulk of my research, one in Lower Zambézia (Mutange, see Figure 1.10), the other in Upper Zambézia (Mugaveia, see Figure 1.11). The two *localidades* differed in many important respects, but also shared certain characteristics. Both were some distance from a trunk road. Mutange was reached along a relatively well-maintained dirt road, with bridges and aqueducts built by ZADP in 1999, and lay about thirteen kilometres from the main N1 national north-south route. The *célula* of Intuba in Mugaveia, which was where we worked and lived, lay some seventeen kilometres from the secondary road connecting Gurué City and Nauela (Alto Molocué). An ill-maintained track led to the *célula* crossing a rickety and dangerous bridge over which few traders and health workers were willing to risk taking their vehicles.<sup>29</sup>

The similarities between the two *localidades* ended here. Linguistically, culturally, ecologically and historically they were distinct. Mutange, for example, was a small *localidade*, with a population of just 4261; Mugaveia was a great deal larger, with a population of 9718 (1997 census figures). Yet Mutange was much better known within the province, as the site of a famous *aldeia comunal* (communal village) and agricultural cooperative that operated in the early days of Independence (see page 114 for more details). Former members of the agricultural cooperative established the Association of Mutange Villagers after the end of the war, which received substantial financial and material help both from ORAM and the DDADR (District Directorate of Agriculture and Rural Development) during the course of my fieldwork.

---

<sup>28</sup> The Farming Systems Specialist and one Extension Supervisor lived in Gurué City. The other Extension Supervisor maintained a base in Namacurra town, but spent much of his time in Quelimane.

<sup>29</sup> It was replaced by ZADP after the end of my fieldwork. Before the war, an alternative road to Nauela ran through Intuba, but the destruction of bridges had made it impassable.

Geography and cropping patterns were distinct. Mutange, lying in a swampy area, was much more food-insecure. It was liable to flooding, and substantially dependent on cassava and rice. Cashew had been an important cash crop in the past, but many trees were diseased, and yields were low. Both cropping patterns and geography were far more diverse in highland Mugaveia, where river valleys were used for dry rice, early crops of maize, beans and vegetables, and the main food crop was maize. Beans, particularly the green bean (*phaseolus vulgaris*), were an important cash crop in Mugaveia, and owning land appropriate for this crop was a key determinant of wealth.

Linguistically and culturally the two *localidades* fell on opposite sides of the ‘dividing line’ between what is widely described as the ‘patrilineal’ south and ‘matrilineal’ north of the country. However the divide is far from clear, and Zambézia province is internally divided between more patrilineal (and virilocal) areas (like Mutange), and more matrilineal (and uxori-local) areas (like Mugaveia).<sup>30</sup> In Mutange the most commonly used language was Echuabo, and 30.6 percent of Zambézians spoke Echuabo as their mother tongue (1997 census figures). In Mugaveia people generally used Elomwé, the mother tongue of 41.8 percent of Zambézia’s population (1997 census figures). The north of the province, of which Mugaveia forms part, is populated by the group often referred to as the ‘Makua-Lomwé’. This is less a fixed ethnic identity than a convenient agglomerative term for more than six million people spread through the northern and north-central provinces, who speak similar languages. A number of studies of these groups have been done in Nampula Province, most importantly by Geffray (1985a, 1985b, 2000) and Medeiros (1985, 1995). Within Gurué District people identify themselves as Lomwé, or Elomwé speakers. This subgroup, also known as Anguru, Nguru, or Alomwe, has received relatively little attention from scholars.<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> I return to the subject of kinship and inheritance in more detail on page 90. See also Dias (1965).

<sup>31</sup> Most studies of this group are from Malawi. Work from the colonial period (e.g. Hetherwick 1931, Colson and Gluckman 1951, Tew 1950) was largely concerned with social structures, traditions, and the meaning of the name ‘Anguru’. Later studies looked more at migration (e.g. White 1987, Boeder 1984), again within the Malawian context. It has been suggested that the terms Anguru and Lomwé have derogatory connotations associated with snake-eating, menial labour and savagery (Chirwa 1994: 527, Alpers 1974: 44).





However for the purposes of this thesis the key location of difference lay in their recent divergent historical experiences, as they related to relationships with outsiders, the state, investors and ‘development’. I mentioned earlier that in the late 1970s-early 1980s Mutange was the site of a regionally famous agricultural cooperative and communal village, which had brought substantial investment. After the war ended, UNICEF worked in Mutange, building the main EP 1 (lower primary) school, rehabilitating the health post and carrying out agricultural extension. After UNICEF withdrew, ZADP invested relatively heavily in Mutange, with a research sub-station and a small nursery in addition to the project’s usual activities. ZADP also paid for the rehabilitation of the access road, and for improvements to the main well. Perhaps even more important, the land tenure component, along with ORAM (a national NGO concerned with land rights, see footnote 20) and SPGC (Provincial Cadastral Service) was very active in the *localidade* in 1999-2000, and the ‘community’ was issued with a certificate for its land in 2000. In addition, another World Vision programme implemented with the District Directorate of Health undertook vaccination campaigns in the *localidade*. In Mutange, a pattern of intervention by relatively benign outsiders was well established by the time ZADP started to operate, and many of its first activities followed on easily from these interventions.<sup>32</sup>

In Mugaveia, by contrast, such a pattern had not been established prior to the arrival of ZADP, the first NGO-funded project to operate in the *localidade*.<sup>33</sup> As later chapters describe, staff faced great suspicion in the early years, suspicion that had only partly diminished by the time of my own research. It was not easy for me to negotiate permission to start work in Mugaveia. Eventually it was agreed that we would be accompanied by village leaders, as otherwise people would be too frightened of an unaccompanied, unintroduced white woman wandering around alone (see page 62 for more details). Even this did not prevent rumours about child-stealing and murder arising, rumours which I discuss in Chapter 7.

---

<sup>32</sup> See page 90 ff. for accounts of less benign outsiders from the colonial period.

<sup>33</sup> A primary school had been constructed by INDER, the government-run Institute of Rural Development, in the late 1990s.

**Figure 1.12 Scattered houses in Mugaveia**



**Figure 1.13 Houses and fields near our house in Mugaveia**



**Figure 1.14 Kitchen hut belonging to Tio Daniel's family**



**Figure 1.15 Kitchen hut, with Lita's house in the background**



Both pictures show the same kitchen hut. The top picture was taken in the wet season, and when the maize and sorghum were high. The lower picture was taken in the dry season

**Figure 1.16 Steeply sloping field planted with cassava**



Steeply sloping field planted with cassava, typical of Mugaveia. Banana trees are visible in the background.

**Figure 1.17 Group from Mugaveia**



Maize is growing in the background, with sweet potato on canteiros in the foreground

**Figure 1.18 Fields in Mutange**



Cassava plants growing on ridges (canteiros), with coconut and cashew trees in the distance

**Figure 1.19 Meeting in Mutange**



Meeting in Mutange, at which we presented a brief report of our findings. The (Frelimo) District Director of Agriculture is on the extreme left, followed by the (Frelimo) *localidade* President, and Jacinta, the ZADP *técnico*. Our house is just visible in the top right hand corner

**Figure 1.20 Group of women in Mutange**



**Figure 1.21 Group in Naminane, Mutange**



Jacinta, the *técnico*, is at the centre. Houses in Mutange were usually mud and pole constructions, thatched with grass, and surrounded by a wide area of clean-swept sandy earth. Mango and coconut trees are visible (Barbara Johnson)

## **Institutional Context**

The third locus within which my fieldwork took place was an institutional setting broader than that of ZADP. As implementing and funding agencies respectively, World Vision and DFID had considerable influence on the shape of the project, and I introduce the two organisations here (I return to them in Chapter 2). I also explain my own relationship with both in more detail.

World Vision is a Christian relief and development organisation. It was founded in 1950 by an American serviceman in response to the plight of war orphans in Korea. His words ‘Let my heart be broken by the things that break the heart of God’ formed for many years the ideological core of the organisation (Whaites 1999: 411). Relying mostly on private donors who ‘sponsor’ a child, the organisation now works in around a hundred countries worldwide. Child sponsorship money is used to fund Area Development Programmes (ADPs), twelve- to fifteen-year programmes which work for ‘holistic and transformational development’ in limited geographical areas, generally building infrastructure, paying the school fees of sponsored children, and supporting income-generating activities. World Vision is a controversial NGO, and one which few who work in development are able to approach without prejudice. Reactions to it are strongly polarised, and this basic fact needs to be borne in mind throughout the thesis.

Although World Vision was originally a highly centralised organisation, from the 1970s it began to decentralise, a partnership structure was formed, and significant ideological changes followed.<sup>34</sup> Whilst retaining a strong Christian ethos, the partnership moved away from a narrow evangelical position towards a more radical and ecumenical attitude (Whaites 1999: 414-7). A flexible partnership allowed for considerable diversity; however all offices continued to sign up to the agreed ‘core values’:

‘We are Christian  
We are committed to the poor  
We value people  
We are stewards  
We are partners  
We are responsive’

---

<sup>34</sup> In 1996 Smillie judged World Vision to have devolved more than most other ‘transnational aid agencies’, reducing its headquarters staff from almost 500 in 1989 to less than 150 in 1994 (1996: 103). The Board, with significant power, is made up of representatives from World Vision operations worldwide.

and a joint partnership mission statement:

‘World Vision is an international partnership of Christians whose mission is to follow our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ in working with the poor and oppressed to promote human transformation, seek justice and bear witness to the good news of the Kingdom of God.’<sup>35</sup>

Although all offices agree to these central statements, I found that in practice there were significant differences in terms of ethos and focus on Christian witness, even within the single Mozambique office. Projects had different policies on Christian teaching, depending on their funding source.<sup>36</sup> As the Country Director explained:

‘In the UK, Australia, Germany, for example there are a large number of donors who aren’t Christians *per se*, so we do have to be sensitive to that even in the ADPs. Whereas in the USA and Canada the reverse is true, if we don’t do Christian activities they’re very upset and they’ll withdraw their support!’

Still greater divergence from World Vision’s central Christian ethic could be seen in donor-funded projects, such as ZADP, where the use of funds for proselytising purposes was strictly forbidden. Some senior ZADP staff, appointed on contract, did not fully sympathise with World Vision’s Christian perspective, to the extent that the Mozambique Country Director said, somewhat despairingly, that she had heard that certain ZADP staff referred to themselves as ‘the non-Christian arm of World Vision-Mozambique’.

A wide internal diversity of policies on Christian activities was just one of the atypical features of the World Vision-Mozambique office. Set up in 1984 during the war, it had always been funded almost exclusively by institutional donors. Child sponsorship was initially illegal in Mozambique, and so World Vision was unable to rely on its usual sources of funding, or to work in its usual ways. Instead of undertaking its familiar small-scale Area Development Programmes (ADPs), it became involved in huge emergency interventions in Tete, Manica, Sofala, Nampula and Zambézia provinces. From 1992-1996 the organisation spent more than US\$ 150 million on refugee resettlement programmes (World Vision Mozambique 1996), and was involved in the repatriation of two million refugees. From 1996 the programme reduced in size,


---

<sup>35</sup> [www.wvi.org](http://www.wvi.org) (accessed January 2003).

<sup>36</sup> The World Vision-US webpage ([www.worldvision.org](http://www.worldvision.org)) includes a long section on how sponsored children learn about Jesus and a motivational section entitled ‘Changing Lives through Faith, Hope and Love’. By contrast, little emphasis has been given to Christianity by World Vision-UK. This is in large part due to an undertaking given when the office opened in 1979 not to fundraise in churches for fifteen years, which gave the organisation a largely secular support base (Whaites 1999: 416).

and with the relaxation of restrictions on child sponsorship, ADPs started in several provinces. However institutional donors continued to provide an uncharacteristically large proportion of World Vision-Mozambique’s budget (see Figure 1.22). This meant that the ADPs, World Vision’s usual way of working, made up just a small proportion of projects, with the remainder responding to donor priorities. At the time of my fieldwork there seemed little prospect of moving away from what was for World Vision a highly uncharacteristic dependence on institutional (rather than private) donors.

**Figure 1.22 World Vision budget by donor, Financial Year 2001**



Source: Mimeo of PowerPoint presentation, World Vision-Mozambique

World Vision-Mozambique has proved an especially controversial country office. This was partly due to Hanlon’s polemic book *‘Mozambique – Who Calls the Shots?’* (1991), a vituperative critique of NGO activity in the country, which accused NGOs of undermining the government by setting up parallel systems (I discuss his argument in more detail in Chapter 2). It was also due to the size and visibility of the organisation. The name *Visão Mundial* (World Vision) was recognised wherever I went in Mozambique, and it was an organisation on which most had an opinion. Though the scale of its programmes had gradually been reduced, it remained Mozambique’s largest NGO, and was still perceived as being extraordinarily rich. Typical comments from staff of donors or other NGOs were ‘Every other vehicle in Zambézia belongs to World Vision’, or ‘World Vision has more resources than the provincial government in

Zambézia'. It was popularly seen as dominated by expatriates, despite a long-standing record of promoting and training national staff (Wilson 1991a: 8, Cosgrave et al. 2001: 103). It was also believed to be strongly – even virulently – Christian, and one Mozambican scientist I spoke to had refused a contract with the organisation because of the intrusion into her personal beliefs she felt at interview.

While the institutional persona of World Vision seen by outsiders was monolithic, traditional, foreign-dominated and Protestant, this does not describe the 'World Vision' I came to know. I found an organisation that was far more fragmented, far more uncertain than the one described by Hanlon, or the one whose wealth and cars were ridiculed in bars and cafés. The World Vision I knew was characterised more by poor internal communication than by a strong common vision, Christian or otherwise. Divisions and differences between projects were seen as more significant than anything that was shared.

Indeed, as a member of ZADP I actually had very little to do with 'World Vision' – that is, if I leave aside my regular tussles with the Accounts Department, the circuitous processes of Human Resources, and the endless problems in getting vehicles into the workshop and then extricating them from it. My lack of connection with a larger 'World Vision' was partly because I, like several other senior staff members and the entire complement of *técnicos*, only occasionally attended twice-weekly *devoções* (devotions), at which staff announcements were made. I am not myself a committed Christian, and so avoided both prayer meetings and bible study groups. The fragmentation of the organisation into projects funded by different donors, with strikingly different policies, also contributed to the sense that 'World Vision' did not really exist as an organisation. And, from the vantage point of ZADP, these two factors were then amplified by a sense of 'not really belonging to World Vision' which I discuss in Chapter 2. As I will explain, ZADP's relative independence from World Vision was encouraged by all involved. The donor, DFID, wished to distance itself both from World Vision's Christian ethic, and its history of service delivery. World Vision struggled to find a way of finding a home for ZADP in a structure within which it did not fit. ZADP management chose to define ZADP as 'different' from other World Vision projects. The fragmented reality thus differed significantly from a popular perception of a singular institutional persona.

The second institution with substantial control over ZADP was ODA/DFID. The Overseas Development Administration (ODA) funded activities in Zambézia through NGOs from the late 1980s. From about 1995 calls came for the greater integration of NGO and government programmes and policies (BDDCA 1995: 7), echoing Hanlon's concerns about parallel systems. By 1998 DFID documents spoke of 'the need for partnership between the Government of Mozambique and NGOs in delivery of support services and the desirability of inclusion of NGO activities within the investment envelope' (DFID 1998b: 6). The changes in policy which accompanied and followed the metamorphosis of ODA into DFID are described in Chapter 2. Here I will only point out that new policies did not immediately usher in new staffing structures. Until 2001 ZADP continued to be overseen from the Harare regional base, even though a 'Rural Livelihoods Field Manager' had worked in Maputo from 1999.

My personal connection to DFID remained important, although it was dormant for much of my fieldwork. The fact that DFID rather than World Vision/ZADP was my employer gave me an essential freedom of manoeuvre. It also gave me a privileged level of access to DFID commentary on ZADP, Zambézia and Mozambique, not available to other ZADP and World Vision staff. After the DFID office was decentralised to Maputo in mid-2001, I used to visit the office whenever I was in Maputo, and was in reasonably close touch with the Social Development Adviser (my DFID line manager). I attended several workshops and planning meetings in Maputo, occasions which I found increasingly frustrating as I came to know Zambézia better. As the only fieldworker, the only British employee based outside Maputo, and by far the most junior British member of the office, my observations and experience proved peripheral. I did not manage to find an effective voice within the office as a whole, despite interesting conversations with individuals. This was partly because of the ideological struggles going on within the office during my time in Mozambique, described in Chapter 2, and partly because the nature of my work, with its emphasis on detail and difference, did not meld well with DFID's generalising approaches. Thus within neither World Vision nor DFID did I have a voice, although both organisations

shaped my research and both received my periodic reports.<sup>37</sup>

I have here looked in some detail at the three defining locations of my fieldwork: the project itself; the province; and the institutions involved. My fieldwork was displaced, in that it was more defined by a nexus than by a geographical location. It took place at all levels of the project, from rural villages, through project meetings and offices, to the Maputo offices of DFID and World Vision. I had good access to DFID files, meetings and personnel, while my day-to-day location within the project meant that I developed close personal and working relationships with ZADP colleagues. I was 'in' each organisation, but not 'of' it.

#### **1.4 Methods: Ethnography of a Development Encounter**

In the descriptions of ZADP, World Vision and DFID in section 1.2, I started to sketch some of the important methodological issues for my research, focussing on the nature of my engagement with ZADP. As I described, my attachment to ZADP was arranged by DFID, and DFID was my employer.

In Mutange and Mugaveia, my two village locations, my fieldwork was carried out with the help of research assistants. ZADP employed two assistants for me, who I interviewed and chose in January 2001. Both were around my age, had ninth grade schooling, and had been out of formal education for many years. Arcanjo de Jesus is an ebullient person, the leader of a theatre group for the deaf. Although his theatre group had done contract work for development projects, he had not himself previously worked for one. Born in Nicoadala, he is an Echuabo speaker, and worked with me in Mutange. Rita Paula Madeira, who worked with me in Mugaveia, had worked for World Vision on a USAID-funded agriculture project, as a marketing extension worker. She came from Ilé District, and spoke Elomwé. After a long period of illness, Rita died of tuberculosis in April 2003.

In Mutange and Mugaveia we mostly worked through relatively formal interviews. These were arranged in advance, and were carried out in Echuabo or Elomwé, unless the informant was very fluent in Portuguese.

---

<sup>37</sup> I produced brief quarterly progress reports, which were incorporated into ZADP Quarterly Reports. My final report (Wrangham 2002), which should have given a detailed account of my findings, was far sketchier than intended, as it had to be completely rewritten after the laptop on which it was saved was stolen. As a member of the final evaluation team (referred to at the beginning of the chapter), I had a further chance to air my opinions.

**Figure 1.23 Rita and I with the two Mugaveia leaders who accompanied us**



I made the decision that I would not learn either of the vernacular languages very early on in my fieldwork, as I had learnt Portuguese from scratch in the summer of 2000,<sup>38</sup> and considered that attempting to learn three languages was unrealistic. Over the course of the year I acquired extremely basic skills in both Echuabo and Elomwé, but was always primarily reliant on either Rita or Arcanjo. Most interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed into Portuguese. We also carried out a livelihoods survey, described in more detail below.

Our pattern of work varied according to the season. I divided my time about equally between work in the *localidades* and work in ZADP offices (see Appendix B: Interview Details). In my case study villages I lived with a research assistant and interacted on a daily basis with the project *técnicos*, village leaders, my neighbours and informants. Most days would be spent on a combination of interviews and more informal conversations; I also attended extension meetings organised by *técnicos*, or the village executive council (*conselho executivo*).

---

<sup>38</sup> I had six weeks of one-to-one tuition, which meant that my Portuguese was fluent, though by no means perfect, when I first arrived.

**Figure 1.24 Arcanjo cycling in Mutange**



Cycling was much the easiest way of moving around Mutange, although deep sand and single log bridges got the better of me several times. In Mugaveia we cycled much less, as we didn't have bicycles for the two men who worked with us, and many hills were far too steep for cycling.

In Mutange I lived with Arcanjo, my Echuabo-speaking research assistant, in the very centre of the *localidade*, in a house originally built for the UNICEF *técnico*. It was at the end of the road, between the market and the main primary school. As the *localidade* was small it was possible to bicycle all around it, and we got to know the narrow winding paths crossing the swamps and weaving between fields and cashew groves well. We were also soon known to most *localidade* residents, as all the main paths and roads led straight past our house. This greatly eased our work.

**Figure 1.25 Daniel Namuteca and his granddaughter**



In Mugaveia we followed a different pattern. My Elomwé-speaking research assistant Rita was frequently ill, which meant that planned work was often disrupted or interrupted. In Mugaveia we lived not in a house of our own, but with the family of Daniel Namuteca, an ex-shop keeper. He had an impressive house on the road between Nicoria and Intuba. Tio Daniel (Uncle Daniel), as we called him, had worked in a local Portuguese-owned shop prior to Independence. When the owner of the shop left in 1975 he divided the remaining goods between the senior employees, and only Tio Daniel managed to keep control of his stock and capital. He bought a vehicle, and gradually accumulated enough to build a substantial house and shop of his own. A solid construction, it survived the war, and although the shop no longer operated (owing to Tio Daniel's failing sight) it was there that we lived.

**Figure 1.26 Social life in Quelimane**



My research encompassed social occasions in Quelimane, as well as village-based fieldwork.

The second half of my work was carried out amongst the ‘developers’. When I was not in the villages I worked in the project offices, and attended project meetings and evaluations. I occasionally went to DFID meetings and workshops away from Zambézia, on subjects like performance assessment, poverty evaluation, and social development in Africa. I felt out of place more often than not. My position was permanently liminal. I was never a *técnico*, a full member of project staff, a World Vision or a DFID employee. I had a level of privileged access to all these different networks, but I belonged to none.

With my ZADP colleagues I relied mostly on participant observation, a method that was more useful to me here than it was in the villages, as I had a real participant role. I attended project meetings as an engaged staff member, helped to run workshops, wrote reports and talked to colleagues about the way things were working out. Frequently participation triumphed over observation: notes from some later meetings are less than complete, as it is very difficult to be fully engaged in debates as well as recording them faithfully. Within ZADP, unlike World Vision or DFID (page 54), I did find myself a voice, and my opinions were listened to. As will become clear, this was

because I was working on subjects that were important to staff, but which had not been formally recognised before I joined the project. I carried out formal tape-recorded interviews with colleagues only at the very end of my research, and on my return visit in December 2002. Most of the time I just listened to what people said and noted it down in my diary or jottings on meetings. Long conversations with colleagues on the bumpy drives to and from Gurué proved useful: over five or six hours you have plenty of time to discuss things from many different angles. There were a couple of people, who tended to be the more reflective, on whose opinions I rely a good deal. As well as Agostinho and Jacinta, who were the *técnicos* in Mugaveia and Mutange, I quote Rodrigues on several occasions. He was a livestock *técnico* in Gurué, and a man who was very interested in discussing new ideas and reflecting on the nature of social life. We used to talk for hours, sitting in the Gurué guesthouse. Estevão, who worked in Vehiua (Gurué district), is also cited several times, for the same reason.

In neither project nor village setting was I able to avoid attributions of position and status. In Mutange and Mugaveia I was known as a member of World Vision staff; as I discuss in Chapter 6, no distinction was made between World Vision and ZADP. The *técnicos* generally saw me as a member of ZADP senior staff. Although I had no implementation responsibilities in the project I nevertheless helped to organise various short training sessions for them, and my ‘status’ was clearly that of senior staff member, with the accompanying regalia of car, house, driver, assistants. Amongst the other senior staff I was something of an anomaly, reporting to no one, and with only my own independent work to manage.

My plural status, although marginalizing me in one sense, provided me with a unique opportunity to work as a participant-observer in a number of different realms. My own position, perceptions, status (real or attributed) are at the forefront of my analysis (cf. Tsing 1993), as I concur with Phillips that ‘the “facts” about the project are not “out there” waiting to be discovered, but are constituted through a series of specific encounters’ (2000: 58). Chapter 7 deals with an incident that focused on me, and on attributions of responsibility and power over which I had no conscious control.

As would be expected in a politically divided post-conflict context, my village-level fieldwork was not entirely straightforward. However the difficulties I experienced were not, as I had originally anticipated, due to my known connection with World

Vision. Before starting fieldwork I had been concerned that my relationship with an organisation known as a distributor of resources might fundamentally alter the ways in which people interacted with me. Although I was indeed associated with World Vision, I soon realised that, even had I studiously avoided any such identification, I would still have retained a strong attributed status, informed by previous encounters with ‘people like me’. In Mutange and Mugaveia that classification was so wide-ranging and indiscriminating, in temporal and social terms, that it included Portuguese (male) colonial government officials or overseers, socialist era *cooperantes*, Frelimo party members, state officials and development workers. Given the history of the area, which I discuss in Chapter 3, I suggest that my connection with World Vision and ZADP was thus not as important as might have been expected. In any case, as time went by my association with ZADP became less important. People found other ways of identifying me. My behaviour was sufficiently different from that of other senior project staff, whose visits to the field were of short duration and who almost never stayed overnight, for distinctions to be easily made.

This is not to suggest that my association with ZADP had no influence on those to whom I talked. Some informants took the opportunity of a conversation with me to put forward their own priorities, contesting ZADP allocation of resources. Others were fearful of contact, either because they were concerned about jeopardising their relationship with the project or because of the potential risks of contact with outsiders (I discuss this further in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6). My experience here paralleled that of Marzetti in her survey work in Morrumbala district in 1997:

“Those who had been refugees in Malawi or *deslocados* (internally war-displaced people) exaggerated the numbers of family members and lent children to each other in case any benefits were to be given out on a per-person basis following the system of aid agencies. Those who had been fugitives or lived with Renamo did the opposite. They gave very small numbers in each family or false names as they thought that they were likely to get taxed or forced to work. “*I only declared part of my family on that first visit, so if you returned in the night to collect those people at least some of us would remain here to be seeds for the future*” (Marzetti 2001: 53-4, emphasis in original).

For Marzetti the crucial distinction related to wartime experience: ex-refugees saw the encounter as potentially lucrative, ex-fugitives saw it as potentially dangerous. In my own work, which took place four to five years later, and in a different part of the province, I did not find wartime experience so significant. Rather, as I discuss in Chapter 6, party political allegiance was more important. The people who entered into a

relationship with ZADP tended to be Frelimo supporters, while those who did not trust it were more often associated with Renamo.

I thus had to be constantly aware that I was being used strategically by informants to further their own ends, which were often obscure to me. As Phillips and Edwards put it, ‘people enter the arena and utilise the encounter for their own purposes’ (2000: 59). This was something that I was not alone in noting; the President of Mutange told me that any ‘outsiders’, Mozambican or foreign, were understood with reference to past experiences:

‘He told me that my presence in front of the population always made people think of the wartime *cooperantes*, who would come and bring stuff. He gave various examples of this, and the ways in which the local population attempt to take advantage of outsiders. He said that whenever a *brigada* (work team) comes to visit the villagers complain about lack of seeds and things. But that nobody had complained to him locally about it, and that to his amazement it is still possible to buy rice in tins in the market – this after a harvest that was reputed to be disastrous.’  
(Entry in my fieldwork diary from January 2002)

The President’s comments were particularly apt, not only because he pointed out that villagers attempted to make the best of all encounters with all outsiders, but because he also highlighted the success of their endeavours. In this case the complaints about lack of food and lack of seed were so taken to heart that one visiting team refused to accept a meal from those they perceived – incorrectly, but in accordance with the image projected – as hungry.

These were not my only problems in my fieldwork. In Mugaveia a seemingly endless series of meetings with different leaders had to be gone through, followed by plenary meetings in the two *células* in which we wished to work, and then yet further negotiations with leaders. Eventually it was agreed that we would have to work accompanied by well-known leaders, as otherwise people would be too scared to talk to us. A Renamo *mambo* and a Frelimo *secretário* (medium-level leaders) were therefore assigned to work with us. At first I hoped that this would be a temporary arrangement, but in the end one or other of them accompanied us on most days.<sup>39</sup> Though far from ideal, it proved practical. However it did not prevent us from sometimes finding house after house empty, after having made careful appointments.

---

<sup>39</sup> After a few months we agreed to pay a small salary to these two men: MT 10,000 for each day they worked with us. The payment was equivalent to a day’s wage for a *ganho-ganho* (casual) farm labourer, and was intended to compensate for time lost.

The tactic of working with known leaders (who would usually wander off during our conversations, which they found repetitive), did not entirely quell people's fears. On one occasion we had been having a particularly interesting conversation about history and change to a very talkative and enthusiastic man from Mugaveia. Feeling, after an hour or so, that we shouldn't outstay our welcome, I suggested that we should continue the conversation another time. He refused outright. I was surprised, and asked why. It's the same with friends, he said: if you have a conversation with somebody, and then later they want to go back and talk about the same things again, you wonder what they're up to. Other concerns included a suspicion that time was being wasted unprofitably, while some feared that they or their families might later be arrested or forced into work (see Chapter 3). A few were afraid of more sinister things, as Gray found in much earlier research:

'Local people reacted with extreme wariness to the arrival of a group of students with notebooks and pencils. Later they explained that in colonial times such a visit from outsiders meant that the next day someone would be arrested. Strangers would come and make conversation about the harvest and cash crop prices. Then the talk would turn to gossip about the local *régulo*<sup>40</sup> and the administrator. Afterwards, the newcomers disappeared behind a tree and wrote it all down. They were from the PIDE'<sup>41</sup> (Gray 1981: 13).

Informants often asked what would come of the answers they had given, saying 'we are always being registered, but nothing ever comes of it (*estamos sempre inscritos, mas depois nada acontece*)'. Such sentiments were repeatedly expressed during the survey we carried out in Mutange in August 2001, and in Mugaveia in August-November 2001.<sup>42</sup> While in the hamlet of Namuinho (Mutange) all 147 households were surveyed, a substantial number of people in Intuba (Mugaveia) refused to participate in the survey, either choosing to be out at prearranged times, or disappearing into the fields when the interviewers approached.<sup>43</sup> I have mentioned some of the concerns people had about censuses and surveys above; in Mugaveia the survey was described to me as a *recenseamento*, a census, even though we had taken pains to

---

<sup>40</sup> Colonial leader, now used to refer to a 'traditional' Renamo-supporting leader.

<sup>41</sup> Colonial-era secret police.

<sup>42</sup> There were more than twice as many houses in Intuba (Mugaveia) as in Namuinho (Mutange), and I employed a temporary research assistant to help with data collection there. However Rita's illness meant it was impossible to complete the survey in August. Data collection continued until November, as the survey proved a good way of identifying informants.

<sup>43</sup> We surveyed 252 households in Intuba, Mugaveia. The leaders that we worked with reckoned that we had visited all households in 'Intuba', of which about twenty-five percent refused to be surveyed. This estimate does not match the 1997 survey figures, which show that there were 676 households in 'Intuba'. The difference is probably due to different identification of boundaries (see section 5.2).

explain that that was not what it was.<sup>44</sup> Censuses have historically been contested in Zambézia. In 1878 there was a widespread uprising (known as the Makuta Revolt) over government plans to take a census in preparation for levying *mussoco*, a poll tax. The Massingiri Rising of 1883 may also have been sparked by rumours of an impending census (Newitt 1973b: 282, Vail and White 1977: 12-17).

## 1.5 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis begins with an analysis of the complex and disputed relationships between DFID, World Vision and ZADP. I discuss the theoretical problems associated with attempting to differentiate between structural and individual explanations, and suggest that it can be helpful to analyse relationships between donors and recipients as patron-client relations. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are historical, and explicitly contrast the ZADP view of the past with accounts both from Zambézians and secondary historical literature. In Chapter 3 I focus on how organisations and individuals external to the area, but with some kind of connection to the state, have operated in rural Zambézia, and consider how these past experiences affected potential beneficiaries' opinions of ZADP. Chapter 4 looks more generally at the ways in which 'development' has been denied and debated over the last hundred years, and argues that the denial of history, though far from unique to ZADP, had important consequences.

Chapters 5 to 7 deal in detail with material from my two field sites, Mutange and Mugaveia. In Chapter 5 I look at the implications of imputing 'community' in rural Zambézia. I consider what 'community' was believed, by donor and ZADP staff, to mean. I then show that assumptions about unity and cohesion resulted in the exclusion of many potential beneficiaries, and undermined the possibility for 'community participation'. Chapter 6 then considers how ZADP was understood in my field sites, and argues that it, like DFID in Chapter 2, was perceived as a patron. This was not an interpretation understood or liked by ZADP staff, but it provided the basis for the exchange relationship which beneficiaries developed with the project. Chapter 7 then looks at what happened when things went wrong and the project was accused of occult practices. These accusations related to the perceived morality and immorality of accumulation and unequal distribution, and provided a way for beneficiaries, both actual and potential, to assert some control over the project. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis.

---

<sup>44</sup> Unofficial censuses are illegal in Mozambique; only surveys are permitted.

## Chapter 2. World Vision, ZADP and DFID: Negotiating Relationships

I came to work for ZADP by a roundabout route. DFID had first assigned me to work on a planned project in Zambia: a huge NGO-implemented livelihoods project, which was to last eight years and cost £30 million. At the very last minute, senior DFID staff in London pulled the plug on the project, and I was left without a place to go. ZADP was the suggested alternative. Although I knew little about the project, next to nothing about the country, and not much about World Vision, I jumped at the opportunity. It was by this point the April of my first PhD year, and I needed something fixed.

The first book I read on Mozambique was Joseph Hanlon's *Who Calls the Shots?* (1991). It seemed a good choice, as it dealt directly with the role of NGOs in Mozambique, and World Vision was mentioned several times in the index. I was shocked by what I read. Hanlon's book was a polemic against the excessive influence of foreign organisations on domestic Mozambican affairs, and he singled out World Vision and Care for particular criticism. Although Care came in for the most sustained and blistering critique, World Vision was described as a right-wing anti-communist Christian organisation, controversial during the 1980s for linking aid to evangelism, and for connections to repressive South American regimes (51). Hanlon observed that World Vision was one of the very first foreign NGOs permitted to operate in Mozambique, and alleged that in ordinary circumstances World Vision would have been refused permission to operate.<sup>45</sup> However large parts of the country were in the grip of famine, and the government had little choice in the matter: rejecting World Vision would have meant losing desperately needed food aid. It would also have offended USAID and US Congress, and would have played into the hands of those alleging the Marxist suppression of religion (51).<sup>46</sup>

Hanlon's argument was that the presence of NGOs in Mozambique was profoundly pernicious. His book was filled with examples of them 'doing their own

---

<sup>45</sup> This was because of its anti-communist stance (unnamed staff were said to have suggested that Renamo might be a better government for Mozambique than Frelimo), and because the government did not approve of food distribution by foreign church-related organisations.

<sup>46</sup> At the time Renamo enjoyed some support amongst a certain group of US politicians, who saw its guerrilla forces as 'freedom fighters' against a communist state.

thing’, without government coordination, often because of a misguided desire to ‘get things done’, and without consideration of the longer-term consequences of their actions. He believed that even progressive NGOs undermined the Mozambican government, by attracting funding away from it. In the case of organisations like World Vision and Care, Hanlon was far from convinced that the effects of their actions were unwitting. He observed that such NGOs displaced the state from its usual functions. By setting up parallel systems they were acting in a neo-imperialist fashion and undermining national sovereignty.

Yet it was clear that, much though Hanlon disliked NGOs, the real target of his criticism was ‘key donors’ whose ‘number one goal ... is to use aid to break, weaken, or bypass the state’ (1991: 249). For him NGOs were just pawns in a much larger political battle:

‘Donor governments with clear political goals have played on [the] mix of arrogance and humanitarianism that characterises so many aid workers. Such donor agencies have encouraged aid workers to reject the Mozambican line, to construct parallel structures, and to help individuals at whatever cost to the Mozambican system as a whole. In practice, then, well-meaning aid workers have often become pawns in a much more complex battle for political and financial control, and in attempts to weaken the Mozambican government’ (Hanlon 1991: 81).

Reading this before I had even visited Mozambique, I found my mind filling with questions. Even leaving aside questions about the ‘correct’ role of the state, or the details of state substitution,<sup>47</sup> were things really so simple? Was it appropriate to characterise the relationship between NGO and donor as one of simple domination? What about the internal diversity and questioning that I knew inevitably existed within any organisation? Ten years after Hanlon, what differences might I find, ideally placed as I would be, between donor and NGO?

This chapter attempts to answer these questions, taking as its central focus the one-week workshop which concluded the Mid-Term Review of early 2001. Starting just a few weeks after I had arrived in Zambézia, the Review had three parts. First, a Participatory Impact Assessment (PIA) was carried out by a team of consultants and project staff (Cavane et al. 2001). Then an independent review team, chosen and contracted by the ZADP Project Manager, reviewed all project activities in detail (Bias et al. 2001). Finally, in March 2001 a substantial team of DFID Advisers came and

---

<sup>47</sup> These questions are progressively dealt with from Chapter 3 onwards.

spent a week considering the findings (DFID 2001).<sup>48</sup> At the end of the week a plenary meeting was held, from which I quote at length. Mason, the DFID team leader, presented DFID's findings and 'recommendations', which were then discussed.<sup>49</sup> Between forty and fifty people attended, including all senior ZADP staff, the independent review team, the lead PIA consultant, members of the district and provincial departments of agriculture, and staff from other 'partner' NGOs and organisations. The Mid-Term Review was the only occasion during the life of ZADP when so many people were brought together in this way.

The Review was not positive. Mason noted that:

'ZADP has not been a spectacular success to date... The project has gone through and repeated some of the mistakes that others have already encountered... These mistakes have been repeated both in strategy and management, so both are at fault'.

The words he used to describe ZADP were 'top-down, handout, prescriptive and effectively a patronage system in the way that it operates'. Individuals in both ZADP and World Vision-Mozambique were severely criticised for poor management and strategy.

In this chapter my focus is not on the largely negative findings of the Review. Instead I concentrate on the relationships between DFID, World Vision, and ZADP in an attempt to break down some of Hanlon's generalisations and to investigate his claims that donors used NGOs for their own political purposes. Far from characterising NGOs and donors as powerful and purposive institutions, I focus on fragmentation and conflict. I show that not only did the approaches of the different organisations shift significantly during the life of the project, but there was also a striking plurality of approaches *within* each organisation. Although commonalities of interest have been assumed, both within organisations and between donors and implementing NGOs, I follow Elwert and Bierschenk in arguing that 'the history and result of a project can be best understood through detailed analysis of the (hidden) struggles between the different interest groups involved' (1988: 102). It is not possible to identify singular or stable organisational

---

<sup>48</sup> The DFID team (an Economic Adviser, Rural Livelihoods Field Manager (later Adviser), Social Development Adviser, Senior Rural Livelihoods Adviser, Senior Enterprise Development Adviser and Chief Rural Livelihoods Adviser) was entirely British, with only one Portuguese speaker. They were accompanied by a Mozambican member of the Mozambique EU Delegation.

<sup>49</sup> All unreferenced quotations in this chapter come from the bilingual meeting that concluded the weeklong workshop. Speakers made their primary statement in the language they considered appropriate to the discussion.

'points of view', even though the actors involved frequently assumed and asserted just such stability and singularity.<sup>50</sup>

The manipulation of concepts by actors involved in ZADP was not static. As Gardner observed in her discussion of the 'Plantation Rehabilitation Project', long-term projects often out-last their founding concepts, and risk being labelled 'out-of-date' or 'old-fashioned' as a result (Gardner 1997: 138). This certainly happened with ZADP, despite valiant attempts to change with the times. ZADP adopted new concepts, analytical tools and priorities as and when its donor wanted, and in response to perceived trends in international development thinking.

At the same time all actors, both organisational and individual, found themselves 'room for manoeuvre so that they might pursue their own "projects"' (Long 1992: 36), at least for as long as ZADP lasted. As Long wrote, 'all actors (agents) exercise some kind of "power", even those in highly subordinated positions' (1989a: 223).<sup>51</sup> However actors do not adopt new concepts at the same rate, or with equal levels of enthusiasm; Gardner's (1997) account is a revealing analysis of how novel policies and practices threatened and privileged different actors in a particular project situation. Whilst the chapter supports many of Gardner's observations, the ZADP context was substantially different to the Plantation Rehabilitation Project: the chapter shows how individuals were able to negotiate their way around changing fashions, minimising constraints on their activities.

These policy changes were, crucially, negotiated by individuals, and running through the chapter is a discussion of the relative importance of individual agency and structural constraints. I acknowledge the agency of project staff in managing relationships, but also seek to identify the limits to this agency. Shifting DFID policies led to the re-interpretation of many aspects of the project, including the nature of the appropriate relationship between northern NGO and northern donor. These changes had significant implications for project implementation.

---

<sup>50</sup> Both World Vision and DFID employees made general statements about each others' employers – 'DFID thinks...' or 'World Vision policy is...'. Such comments were not made of the individual's own employer, because of a greater awareness of competing currents and 'counter-tendencies'.

<sup>51</sup> Long follows Giddens (1984: 16) who argues that 'all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors', but points out that the dependent rarely choose the situations they encounter.

## 2.1 Structure and Agency

In considering the changing nature of the relationships between World Vision, DFID and ZADP, this chapter is concerned with the balance between ‘structural’ explanations, and explanations which rely more on individual agency. Such a distinction is, of course, primarily of analytical use; my informants did not make such distinctions. ZADP was designed, implemented and monitored by individuals, each with his/her own point of view, and to some extent outcomes depended on personalities and individual abilities. At the same time individuals were constrained by the changing policies of their employing organisations and the ‘development’ agenda; they thus operated within a structural framework as well.

Personalities were of considerable importance in the negotiation of relationships between individual World Vision, ZADP and DFID employees. In ZADP, the two Project Managers, Barnes and Cope, were both British and somewhat older than other employees. Both had ties to DFID before joining World Vision. Barnes had known Mason, the Harare-based DFID Natural Resources Adviser, in Nepal, where he had worked soon after leaving university. The personal relationship between Barnes and Mason was important in the early years of the project, when it helped to allay DFID suspicions of World Vision.<sup>52</sup> Barnes’ career had involved unusually long postings (five to seven years) in countries he grew to know well. He was most interested in the details of the agricultural work, but by the time I knew him his days were occupied by administration. Cope, the second Project Manager, had previously worked as an ODA Technical Cooperation Officer, and was the ZADP Farming Systems Specialist prior to becoming Project Manager. Taking over from Barnes in October 2001, six months after the Mid-Term Review and when the project was in its final stages, he took an administrative and managerial approach, leaving the detail of components to their managers. All other ZADP agriculture staff were Mozambican. Six of the eight senior staff were from Southern Mozambique,<sup>53</sup> whilst the entire complement of *técnicos* were from either Zambézia or Nampula provinces (see page 243 for further discussion).

---

<sup>52</sup> Prior to the approval of ZADP, DFID accused World Vision of ‘institutional apartheid’ because of poor communications between ZADP (I) and a USAID-funded agriculture programme. The fact that Mason had previously known Barnes helped heal this rift; as Barnes put it, ‘I knew Keith Mason from Nepal, I worked with him there. They knew me. They were less suspicious of me than anyone else.’

<sup>53</sup> Some of this number worked for ZADP for only part of my fieldwork. The ‘social component’, of which I was informally a part, was staffed by two Zambézians and two expatriates.

The two key DFID Advisers were strikingly different characters, with strikingly different experience. Mason, who had been in charge of project design, was already past retirement age when I knew him. He had many years' experience working as an agronomist all over the world, although he did not speak Portuguese. On his visits to Quelimane he always used to try and visit the local market, keen to take back local produce (ideally prawns) to his family in Harare. Jackson, who took over as lead Adviser in 2001, was at first Mason's subordinate, and a 'Field Manager' rather than an Adviser. Her appointment in Mozambique was her first job with DFID. She had been a *cooperante*<sup>54</sup> (foreign worker for a Mozambican ministry) in the 1980s, and had a strong personal commitment to Mozambique. Her experience was not very highly valued by her DFID colleagues, and she and another *ex-cooperante* often found themselves isolated within the organisation.

The significance of personal attributes and personal connections such as these is one of the concerns of Long and his Wageningen collaborators. Building on the work of earlier Manchester School and Rhodes-Livingstone Institute writers, they have taken individual actors as their central focus. The actor-oriented perspective 'entails recognising the "multiple realities" and diverse social practices of various actors' (Long 1992:5). Actors are viewed as agents, all capable of exerting some kind of power, even when in subordinate positions (Long 1989b: 223), and many of the writings of the Wageningen School attest to the ability of actors to manipulate and at times subvert the intentions of 'developers'. This is an approach which puts the strategies adopted by individuals and groups at the very centre of the analysis. It views intervention as 'a socially constructed and negotiated process, not simply the execution of an already specified plan of action with expected outcomes ... not simply a top-down process' (Long 1989b: 241). Strategic groups and hidden struggles are thus at the centre of analysis. Critical commentators have however pointed out that while details may be debated, the constraining field for manoeuvre is still determined beyond the sphere of influence of local actors. New policy agendas and new funding streams define the spaces where contestation can occur. Only certain 'needs' can be comprehended, even by 'participatory' projects (Mosse 2001: 29). Looking solely at the strategies of individuals thus risks not taking account of key structural considerations.

---

<sup>54</sup> *Cooperantes* were often seen by more recently arrived development workers as old-style socialists, nostalgic for the country's communist period.

The influence of personalities and individual agency must therefore not be overstated. Whilst changing personnel did affect ZADP, so did new organisational priorities, the economic situation, and the international development agenda. Changes in DFID policy were particularly influential in shaping the implementation climate for ZADP. Thus discussions of the evolving relationship between DFID, World Vision and ZADP need to take account of both structural and action-based explanations; as Booth noted, ‘there are limits to the productive pursuit of either on its own’ (1994: 27).

Although much of what happened within ZADP initially seems well-explained by a consideration of individual decisions, personalities and relationships, an analysis that looks solely at the individual risks dismissing the wider historical and social forms of rationality which inform actors’ deeds. Ferguson (1990) is a key exponent of an approach that focuses on these social and historical forms of rationality in explaining development outcomes. He argues that ‘development’ has structural properties, and that as a result, individuals may find themselves unintentionally serving the interests of a development ‘machine’:

‘The thoughts and actions of “development” bureaucrats are powerfully shaped by the world of acceptable statements and utterances within which they live; and what they do and do not do is a product not only of the interests of various nations, classes, or international agencies, but also, and at the same time, of a working out of this complex structure of knowledge... Seeing a “development” project as the simple projection of the “interest” of a subject (the World Bank, Canada, Capital, Imperialism) ignores the non- and counter-intentionality of structural production... One must entertain the possibility that the “development” apparatus in Lesotho may do what it does, not at the bidding of some knowing and powerful subject who is making it all happen, but behind the backs or against the wills of even the most powerful actors’ (18).

In a Foucauldian argument, Ferguson sees actors as embedded in particular forms of power/knowledge. Given that the ‘real’ intention of development is very different from the felt intentions of individuals, it is not surprising that time and again development projects ‘fail’. Nor should it then be unexpected to find that a large proportion of projects are designed as ‘solutions’ to earlier development ‘failures’ (Crush 1995a).

Ferguson’s structural arguments, though persuasive, have significant weaknesses. Most notably, the agency of individuals is substantially denied. By writing of ‘anonymous constellations of control’, and ‘authorless “strategies”’ (1990: 20), he neither gives a sufficient account of the ability of individuals to carry out their own strategies and projects within or through a ‘Project’ (cf. Long 1989b, Arce, Villarreal, and de Vries 1994, Grillo and Stirrat 1997, Arce and Long 2000a), nor of the


responsibility of development bureaucrats for development ‘failures’ (cf. Grindle and Thomas 1991, Haas 1992). He therefore omits to note the potential ability of less powerful actors to manipulate interventions for their own ends, whilst also absolving those who might have been in a position to bring about a different outcome (de Vries 1992). His arguments also run the risk of being development-centric, attributing excessive power to the development project. Not enough is made of the fact that projects are always locally embedded, and understood within a local context (see Chapter 4).

In this chapter I attempt a combination of the stronger features of both Long and Ferguson’s approaches, arguing that the ‘discourse of development’, the changing policy constraints of DFID and the international development community provided the constraining over-arching structure within which individuals involved with ZADP were then able to make choices.

## **2.2 Relationships in the Mid-Term Review: Ownership, Advice and Control**

An approach to ZADP that attempts to combine both structural and actor-centred forms of explanation must identify the different actors, both individual and institutional, that were involved in the project. It is far from simple to characterise either ‘World Vision’ or ‘DFID’. Both are international organisations with many thousands of staff spread across the globe. Although diverse and ever-changing, making the imputation of a singular personality inaccurate, I am at times forced to refer to them as singular entities. Yet I emphasise again that both organisations were in a constant state of flux, reacting to both internal and external pressures, and dependent on particular individual post-holders. I discuss internal contestation and change in section 2.3.

**Figure 2.1 World Vision organisational structure**




‘World Vision’ refers to World Vision-Mozambique, which had its central office in Maputo.<sup>55</sup> At the time of my fieldwork key individuals for ZADP were Hobson, the Country Director, and Lloyd, the Deputy Director of Agriculture. Neither was involved with ZADP at outset, but from late 1999 Lloyd allocated about one day a week to project matters. In 2000-2002 World Vision-Mozambique was largely funded by USAID (Figure 1.22), and the Maputo office (Figure 2.1) was structured to serve USAID projects. ZADP did not fit in easily, and there were a series of budgetary disputes between World Vision and DFID over what should and should not be paid for. DFID did not understand that the administration fee of fourteen percent that World Vision-Mozambique usually took from projects covered only the most basic

<sup>55</sup> Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 adopt a different usage, explained later.

administrative functions: human resources and accounting. All other services (e.g. office space, computer network access, travel planning, policy advice) were paid for directly by projects. ZADP contributed to only some of these services. From World Vision's point of view, ZADP was thus a free rider, while DFID felt that ZADP was not being given appropriate support. In addition to these organisational misunderstandings, several key staff were not in full agreement with the Christian values that form the core of World Vision's institutional identity and global mission (see above, page 50), and problems arose when World Vision-UK tried to recruit committed Christians for international positions.<sup>56</sup>

**Figure 2.2 Relationships between DFID Advisers in ZADP (pre-June 2001)**



Key:

→ Line Management Relationship

SCS Senior Civil Service

A1, A2 Seniority Ranking

Although in charge of organising reviews, Mason did not manage any of his advisory colleagues other than Jackson, and he could not insist on a unified line.

<sup>56</sup> DFID Advisers were keen that ZADP should be run by professionals, and that selection for posts should solely on the basis of merit, not faith. They took particular exception to advertisements requiring applicants for the post of Rural Sociologist to be in sympathy with World Vision's core values and Christian principles when the criteria seemed to be causing recruitment delays.

‘DFID’ refers to the Advisers within DFID who designed and monitored ZADP – a small number of people within a large and diverse organisation. Until mid-2001 the senior Advisers responsible for ZADP were based in Harare. Their profile was international rather than local: with the exception of the more junior Maputo-based Field Manager they did not speak Portuguese, and were also responsible for projects and programmes in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. DFID was at that time divided into different departments, each staffed by Advisers. Natural Resources, Social Development and Economic Advisers all contributed to project design, and as I discuss below (page 87), their analyses were by no means always the same.

During the Mid-Term Review, DFID Advisers spoke and wrote as if ZADP was jointly ‘owned’ by itself and World Vision, and as if the relationship between the two organisations was a ‘partnership’:

‘There are clear tensions between DFID, Mozambique and World Vision which appear to reflect a lack of a shared understanding of what the project hopes to achieve, with particular reference to sustainability. This tension arises notwithstanding the shared ownership of the logframe during appraisal and design’ (DFID 2001).

‘The Project Memorandum ... is joint owned by DFID and World Vision. Those two organisations are co-owners. But although there’s co-ownership, I don’t think there’s a shared vision... and where there is no shared vision trust becomes much reduced’ (Smith – Chief Rural Livelihoods Adviser).

‘You helped design this framework, you knew what we were looking for, you accepted the management role’ (Mason).

‘If we put terms of reference together [for a new credit consultancy] we are going to have to jointly agree those at some stage – this is a partnership project’ (Jones – Enterprise Development Adviser).

Although concepts of ‘ownership’ and (less) ‘partnership’ had been mobilised before, they had previously been used in a different way. Earlier discussions of ‘ownership’ had focused on relationships between the project and district government or ‘local people’ (discussed further in section 5.4), or on ‘ownership’ of activities by implementing staff. Reports are vague about whose ‘ownership’ was meant to be encouraged, with ‘ownership’ itself apparently viewed as a normatively ‘good thing’:

‘DFID is understandably concerned to ensure the quality and quantity of project outputs. The review team felt that this can best be done through improving the *sense of ownership* of the project team, of MAP<sup>57</sup> and of World Vision. It is especially important to improve the *sense of ownership* of ideas among the local staff who form the front line of contact with farmers and who may take the ideas forward into

---

<sup>57</sup> *Ministério de Agricultura e Pescas*, later transformed into MADER, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

other Mozambican institutions after the project has finished.’ (DFID 1999b: 19, my italics)

These are confused aims. If World Vision, the Ministry of Agriculture, the project team, and the *técnicos* all ‘owned’ the project, then who should be accountable to whom (c.f. Stirrat and Henkel 1997: 75-6)? Definitions of ‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’ were never established in ZADP, although this should not be surprising since ‘these are by and large political, not analytical, concepts. They are normative statements signalling certain qualities in relations between organisations involved in aid and in the processes of decision-making about foreign aid’ (Jerve 2002: 390). In ZADP the deployment of these concepts had certain clear advantages. ‘Partnership’ emphasised commonality and equality, and highlighted the fact that each institution brought with it different and valuable skills and resources. By talking of ‘partnership’, the legitimacy of both organisations was boosted: DFID gained credibility from an on-the-ground project, while World Vision gained prestige from its connection with a reputable donor. It was also expected that improving a ‘sense of ownership’ of all ‘partners’ would lead to a better project. However, as the remainder of the chapter demonstrates, it is difficult to find examples of World Vision, ZADP or DFID staff behaving in a way that would have allowed ‘joint ownership’ to become a reality. I first discuss the very few occasions on which DFID Advisers confined themselves to giving ‘advice’ alone, before looking at more controlling patterns of behaviour.

### **Advice**

On several occasions during the Review, Advisers pointed out that their role was indeed to ‘advise’, and that their recommendations did not have the binding power of instructions. Mason said:

‘I think the ZADP team here must take their own view of the recommendations of the independent review team...not all of which we ... agree with. But we do not intend on this occasion to interfere with the detailed programmes, because we believe it is within the ability of the ZADP team to make their own correct strategic decisions.’

[To the land component] ‘A few suggestions; these are not recommendations, neither are they instructions... We have decided that for some time now the land component has really been setting its own pace and going at its own speed... I would say, set the targets that you’re happy with.’

At first it would appear that Mason was expressing the DFID team’s confidence in the ability of ZADP staff to make their own ‘correct’ decisions. (What was considered

‘correct’ was of course determined by the contemporary DFID policy environment.) However what was actually happening was rather more complex and contradictory.

In the example given above, the land tenure component was explicitly granted freedom to make its own choices (‘set the targets that you’re happy with’). This was possible because the component was believed to be tightly managed, and more significantly, because of the perceived congruence between DFID’s evolving policy aims and those of the component itself. As I discuss below (page 88 ff.), over the two years prior to the Mid-Term Review DFID had started to move away from the model of service delivery to poor people through INGOs, of which ZADP was a clear example. Instead it prioritised support to the Mozambican state, first through SWAs (Sector-wide Approaches), and later through Direct Budget Support. ZADP thus came under increasing pressure to increase its collaboration with provincial and district departments, and to think about wider policy issues. As a policy-oriented component, dedicated to small-scale institutional change within the Provincial Cadastral Service (SPGC), and explicitly forging links between ORAM (a Mozambican NGO) and SPGC, the land tenure component fitted neatly into the ‘new’ DFID policy environment. This congruence meant that the component could be given leeway to do as it wanted, as it was already doing the right thing. The component was praised for ‘looking outside the rigidity of the logframe’ (Mason) and exploring new and innovative activities.

The agriculture component did not match evolving DFID policy in the same way. While the land component fitted ever more closely into the ‘new DFID’, the agricultural component appeared increasingly outdated. When ZADP was first designed, debates centred around the most appropriate way to deliver services (participatory, empowering, bottom-up, process not blueprint, local not expert knowledge), but over the life of the project the entire nature of the debate altered. INGOs such as World Vision should, it was argued, be confining themselves to development education, emergency work, and capacity building for southern NGOs, while service delivery – no matter how well run, no matter the number of people reached – was *passé*. The agriculture component, though set up for service-delivery, was now expected to be ‘linking with governments

and elsewhere' to find 'long-term institutional owners' for activities, in the words of Smith, the London-based Chief Rural Livelihoods Adviser.<sup>58</sup>

The agricultural component thus came under pressure to strengthen its interactions with MADER (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development) at all levels, in the interest of sustainability. ZADP management maintained that they collaborated in every way possible with District-level government agriculture staff, who were welcomed at ZADP training sessions and meetings, and provided with offices, office supplies and transport. They felt that they did all that could be expected in coordinating with a poorly-resourced and poorly-trained government in their day-to-day work. DFID Advisers disagreed. Although recognising ZADP efforts to improve coordination (DFID 1999a, DFID 2000d), they repeatedly raised the question of 'better coordination with government', and in particular, of 'feeding into national policy initiatives'. They attempted, both by negotiation and instruction, to persuade members of the agriculture component to 'forge links with Proagri' (Smith).<sup>59</sup> In response, ZADP staff made considerable efforts to work even more closely with government systems. In 2000, project activities were, with considerable difficulty, entered on the 'Provincial Budget and Activity Plan' of the Provincial Department of Agriculture. The project also put together a bid for first the Namacurra and then the Nicoadala Agricultural Extension Outsourcing contracts. This took time and brought few rewards.<sup>60</sup>

By the time of the Review, DFID Advisers viewed the agricultural component as problematic. Independent from government from the outset and focused on service delivery, it was criticised not praised for experimentation:

'[The agricultural] component has a history of exploring numerous approaches. Just to verify this I would like to give you a quote from the review in 1999: "Evidence is emerging that this component is beginning to dissipate its energies on an increasing number of interesting but resource-demanding activities, without a clear understanding of their potential impact or the strategy."' (Mason)

---

<sup>58</sup> Ironically, the first draft design of ZADP, written by World Vision employees and rejected by DFID, had included a specific output which required linking with government. 'A flexible management structure developed which responds to community needs and seeks to transfer responsibility for project activities to participating communities and the [Ministry of Agriculture] by the end of the project' (World Vision International - Mozambique 1997). This did not feature in the final Project Memorandum.

<sup>59</sup> Proagri was a sector-wide financing mechanism (a SWAp), not a policy initiative. The meaning of 'forging links' in this context was unclear.

<sup>60</sup> The Provincial Directorate of Agriculture and Rural Development was unwilling to enter ZADP activities into the PAAO for budgetary reasons, and the experiment was not repeated. The outsourcing contract was repeatedly delayed, and eventually awarded – to a consultancy company – in 2003.

By this point, some of the Advisers who knew ZADP best had already given up hope of being able to change the project's direction. For them, the component no longer fitted into DFID's strategic plan in Mozambique, and therefore reducing the amount of advisory time committed to it was a priority. They were willing to let the project determine its own direction for the 18-24 months that remained.

In the context of ZADP, DFID Advisers can be said to have restricted their role to an advisory one in only two situations: when the outcome of an intervention was of less importance than the minimisation of their workload; and when they could be confident that their aims were congruent with those of the recipients of advice. In other instances, as I now go on to show, they adopted a more controlling attitude.

## **Control**

A second deep-rooted strand of language and behaviour ran through the Mid-Term Review. Advisers frequently spoke as if DFID had the control, power, and right to determine the direction of ZADP. This form of address predominated in earlier DFID review reports (DFID 1999a, 1999b, 2000c, 2000b), which tended to be filled with detailed – though at times contradictory – instructions to ZADP staff. The reasons for this pattern of behaviour, which ran directly against the 'ownership' and 'partnership' rhetoric I emphasised earlier (page 75), can be sought in the design of the project, and in patterns of behaviour that developed in the project's early years. The design process, which was strongly led by DFID, meant that World Vision was distanced from ZADP from an early stage. A stronger relationship than would otherwise be expected therefore developed between senior ZADP staff and Advisers, with World Vision left out of the loop. While this had some advantages (both for ZADP and DFID), it eventually led to great dissatisfaction on the part of all parties, and to allegations of project 'failure'.

Evidence of controlling behaviour was visible at many stages of the Mid-Term Review. DFID Advisers appeared to have a shaky grasp of the difference between recommendations and orders. For example, a report detailing plans for the Mid-Term Review, noted that DFID would 'discuss the findings of the Independent Review and determine the course of the project beyond that date' (DFID 1999a). 'Recommendations' made orally during the Review meeting were listed as 'action

points' in the report (DFID 2001), and action on them was indeed expected. Even in the final oral presentation it was hard to detect a negotiating tone. This was especially noteworthy in Mason's comments on the (failing) micro-credit component:

'They will attempt to recover the bad loans and maintain the successful banks and attempt to move them forward... DFID will commission an independent consultant to design a new component... We would expect a newly designed credit component to go out to competitive tender...'

Mason's lack of qualms in giving extremely strong 'advice' was evident again later in the morning. A question had been put by Valoi, Deputy Project Manager, about the project's target groups. He asked whether diversification away from the 'poorest of the poor' was permissible.<sup>61</sup> Mason responded:

'DFID's mandate is to eliminate poverty. We have out there in Zambézia some of the poorest rural people in the world. I don't really think that you can start saying "look this is very difficult, we'd like to work in the richer communities." I can't remember what the proportions are within your three wealth ranking groups, but your success will be measured in how successfully you affect the lives of the people in the two lowest groups. Nobody said it was going to be an easy task. But you helped design this framework, you knew what we were looking for, you accepted the management role, so I wish you luck.'

Mason argued that as co-owners and co-designers of the project, ZADP staff knew from the outset what kinds of outcomes DFID was looking for, and that it was therefore impossible to contemplate any changes to what had been originally agreed. A rustle of concern from his colleagues indicated that they did not entirely agree with his response, and the Social Development Adviser stood up to speak to the assembled group: 'I just wanted to add something to what [my colleague] has said.' To which Mason responded:

'Don't soften... don't sugar-coat the pill!'

That Mason should have said this, perfectly audibly, in front of the assembled company of project, World Vision and government staff is quite remarkable. It was clearly an off-the-cuff remark, and must have been made with no consideration of listeners.<sup>62</sup> The implication of Mason's comment was that his previous response had potentially binding power, and he did not wish the 'pill' of his tough advice to be 'sweetened' by a more

---

<sup>61</sup> This question had been comprehensively discussed in reviews in 1999 and it had been agreed that the project should revise its target group to the 'economically active poor'.

<sup>62</sup> Mason did not speak Portuguese; the comment was made in English, and was not translated. This meant that only about a third of the audience would have understood it.

soft-hearted colleague. His ‘advice’ had the tone of instructions of an employer to an employee, of client to contractor.<sup>63</sup>

When questioned about a way of behaving which was seriously at odds with their ‘ownership’ rhetoric, DFID Advisers had a simple explanation of what was going on. Serious management failings in ZADP were not being dealt with by World Vision, and they were therefore forced to step in to fill the holes caused by institutional and managerial weaknesses. This explanation was given by Jackson, who became involved with the project less than a year after it started. She noted pathologies in the relationship as soon as she arrived:

‘My impression was that the relationship wasn’t a very healthy one. I think it had to do with the individuals involved. DFID appeared in my view at the time to be micromanaging, looking in great detail at details of the project, which I didn’t think was appropriate. But it’s not that those individuals micromanage every project everywhere. It was something to do with the way in which the project was set up and managed that made people step in to fill a perceived gap in management. So in a sense they were responding to a lack of management and direction, rather than trying to change the direction.’

Faced with the fact that one of their biggest projects<sup>64</sup> was apparently in difficulties, DFID Advisers became involved in operational decision-making that should have been the preserve of project staff and World Vision management.

But the situation was more complex. It is not sufficient to say merely that World Vision ‘failed’ to manage the project effectively; it is necessary to consider why they managed it in the way they did. To do this requires an understanding of the project’s early years, and of the relationships that were built up and broken down between DFID and World Vision, World Vision and ZADP, and ZADP and DFID.

The original proposal for ZADP, a project to follow on from the ODA-funded ZADP (I), was drafted by Jane Green and Steve Barnes (ZADP (I) Project Manager and Project Manager to be), and presented to ODA Advisers in March 1997 (World Vision International - Mozambique 1997). It was summarily rejected. A new proposal, far more elaborate than the first, was then put together by ODA/DFID Advisers, in Barnes’ phrase ‘cherry-picking from the original proposal’, with additional inputs from

---

<sup>63</sup> By demanding a continued focus on the poorest, he was also holding ZADP staff to priorities that were no longer fully current in DFID thinking, and it was this concentration on the poorest, rather than the newer focus on poverty in general, that provoked concern amongst his colleagues (see section 2.3).

<sup>64</sup> The grant to World Vision for ZADP was the biggest one DFID made that year (George Foulkes, cited in Tancock 1999: 31).

contracted consultants. This rejection and redesign meant that right from the outset ZADP was seen as ‘DFID’s project’ by many World Vision staff, as reflected in a 2002 conversation with Hobson (Country Director, and not herself involved in the design):

‘ZADP, to my knowledge, was very much designed by DFID consultants who advised World Vision on what the project should be. This has had a negative impact over the lifetime of the project as World Vision has very much seen it as a DFID project. It was set up almost as if we were just a contractor of DFID. The overall strategic structure of World Vision, a 90 country partnership, didn’t integrate well with ZADP, because it was designed by DFID.’

Within World Vision, ZADP remained strongly identified with DFID.

From the start, World Vision-Mozambique found ZADP an anomalous project. For example, it was to collaborate closely with the Mozambican government, even though this was not at the time common practice for World Vision projects. Steve Barnes said:

‘DFID pushed ZADP into working very closely with government, something that NGOs in general aren’t comfortable with. And USAID policy at that time was not to work with government.<sup>65</sup> So this caused some internal friction within World Vision... We were singing different tunes, depending on what each donor wanted. I happened to agree with DFID in all those things, I wanted to work that way; so it wasn’t a problem for me.’

Although Barnes approved of the policy, the distinctive way of working served to isolate ZADP, an isolation confirmed by the decision of the then World Vision Country Director to allow ZADP to be managed and run fairly independently.<sup>66</sup> The decision to devolve an unusual amount of responsibility to the Project Manager, coupled with the Project Manager’s own fierce desire to maintain project independence, then meant that ZADP remained outside World Vision’s formal structures, and World Vision played a minor part in determining its direction and activities. This suited Barnes, the first Project Manager, a contract rather than a career employee of World Vision, who was believed by some World Vision staff to feel a greater allegiance to DFID than to his own employers (see above, page 69). As the final project review commented:

---

<sup>65</sup> This is an extremely strong statement, which needs to be interpreted within the context of donor-funded projects in World Vision. Within the organisation the two large agriculture projects, one funded by USAID, the other by DFID, were regularly caricatured. One feature of the caricature was that the DFID-funded project worked with government, and hence with difficult characters such as Albano (page 84), while the USAID project worked independently from government at a district and *localidade* level.

<sup>66</sup> As a legacy of an earlier staffing structure, the ZADP Project Manager reported directly to the World Vision Country Director, rather than to the Agricultural Director. Initially ZADP made no financial contributions to the World Vision Agricultural policy team, which as a result allocated no time to the project (see footnote 77 for further details). This increased ZADP’s isolation still further.

‘During the first three years, World Vision International’s ‘ownership’ of ZADP ... was weak and corporate management provided little strategic leadership to the project. The Project Manager chose to keep a distance between ZADP and the rest of WVI, tending to report direct to DFID, and as a result was left relatively isolated when things became difficult’ (Whiteside, Wrangham, and Gudz 2003).

Operational independence, originally granted on a pragmatic basis to make project implementation more straightforward, reinforced a sense of isolation that had emerged during design, and ZADP became progressively distanced from World Vision-Mozambique.

At the same time, DFID Advisers became involved in making detailed comments on operational matters. They were asked to approve the selection of the expatriate component managers. The first annual DFID review included a comprehensive analysis of project operations, undertaken by a team of Advisers supported by consultants (DFID 1999a). Even at this very early stage the agriculture component came in for severe censure. The review team argued agricultural activities were ‘unlikely to meet targets in any significant way’ (DFID 1999a: 7), and made extremely detailed criticisms of the practice and justification of the Farmer Field Schools (at that time the main extension method).<sup>67</sup> Concrete suggestions about ways in which these problems could be overcome were put forward: there should be closer coordination between research and extension; a Rural Sociologist should be recruited forthwith; and a broader range of extension methods should be used.

The involvement of DFID Advisers in detailed decision-making strengthened the feeling amongst both project staff and other World Vision employees that ZADP was ‘DFID’s project’. Advisers were both well aware of this and concerned by it (DFID 1999b: 19), but initially made no significant modifications to their interactions with ZADP. Neither the number of reviews, nor their scale, nor their level of detail was reduced, even though it was noted that ‘donor micromanagement can risk undermining [any] sense of ownership, giving the team the sensation that they are working for the donor rather than developing their ‘own’ project’ (First Draft of DFID 1999b).

The reasons for an absence of behavioural change by Advisers may have been connected to a belief that the problem was one of interpretation, and did not stem from

---

<sup>67</sup> The report questioned the advisability of the improvement package presented, the usefulness of the ‘School’ as an extension technique, the likely overall benefits in terms of number of farmers involved and area improved, the incremental value derived from adoption, and the extent to which technologies promoted were answering constraints faced by poor farmers (particularly labour).

their own actions. The same DFID report observed that what were intended as ‘recommendations’ were sometimes ‘interpreted as orders, instead of points for debate and agreement’ (DFID 1999b: 19). Advisers located the problem with the person doing the interpreting (ZADP staff), not the person issuing the ‘recommendation’ (themselves). This absolved them from amending or correcting their approach. They adduced other evidence in support of their argument, pointing to project management’s habit of referring large numbers of minor but uncomfortable decisions to DFID.<sup>68</sup> For Jackson it was just an easy way out of difficult situations: ‘I can understand why individuals take that position, it’s easier. And DFID can handle that, being the big villain.’

The interpretation made by many World Vision and ZADP staff was quite different. Within World Vision, DFID was seen as a difficult and demanding donor, endlessly reviewing and revising, never satisfied. According to Barnes, the pattern of interaction was set not only by the design process, but also by a serious and early recruitment disagreement. World Vision had found a candidate they considered ideal to manage the project in Gurué, whom Barnes introduced to a visiting DFID team in April 1998 (just before ZADP was finally approved). To his amazement, members of the team were apoplectic:

‘They went berserk, saying this hasn’t been agreed etc. etc. I was flabbergasted, I hadn’t realised it was a sensitive issue. They said that they wouldn’t fund the project unless the District-level operations were run by the Mozambican District Director of Agriculture, and they therefore wanted Albano [the Director] to manage Gurué. They said that if we didn’t do this, then funding might go to Action Aid. It wasn’t very nice. By this time I had heard that Albano had a drink problem and put that to them. They said that you have made him an alcoholic, you pushed him into it. That’s what [an Adviser] told me.’<sup>69</sup>

As a result of this experience the ZADP Project Manager began referring decisions to DFID because of the potentially disastrous consequences of not doing so; the distinction between orders and advice was further blurred.

This is not to suggest that DFID Advisers did not, on occasion, make serious attempts to improve World Vision ‘ownership’ of the project. In 1999, a review headed by Jackson (Mason’s subordinate, who did not at the time have the same personal

---

<sup>68</sup> In 2001, the Project Manager sought DFID guidance on the disposal of assets, specifically whether they could be sold to staff. Jackson noted that World Vision already had a policy on the matter, and questioned why such operational details should be referred to the donor.

<sup>69</sup> The case of Albano was peculiar, because he was not himself pushing for control of the project. In fact, what he wanted from DFID was funding for further study, which was not forthcoming. A most unwilling and difficult collaborator for ZADP, he remained as Gurué District Director of Agriculture until 2000, when he finally obtained a scholarship from another source.

relationship with Barnes as Mason had), agreed that Lloyd, Deputy Director of Agriculture, should allocate fifteen to twenty percent of her time to the project. This was to 'make sure lessons learned by ZADP are shared with other World Vision projects in Mozambique, and vice versa' (DFID 1999b: 23).<sup>70</sup> In the same review it was also suggested that the ZADP team should revise the project logframe to something more in line with their perceptions of the project's actual objectives. However in the meeting held the following February to follow up on these recommendations (DFID 2000b), not only was Mason absent, but Barnes too was on sick leave in Britain. The absence of these key individuals meant that suggested changes were never fully implemented. Mason continued to insist on measuring ZADP progress against the original logframe, while Lloyd's allocated time was substantially devoted to management.

This suggests that, whilst ZADP management had a tendency to do as they were told, the word of more senior Advisers tended to be given more weight. Yet DFID instructions were not always obeyed. On some occasions when DFID advice was unwelcome, ZADP management tended to offer no active opposition, but instead quietly ignored it. This can be seen as covert resistance within what I will go on to argue was a patron-client relationship. For example, a DFID review report advised that a plan to train para-vets should not be carried out until the sustainability of the service they provided could be assured. ZADP went ahead with the training nonetheless. Likewise, in the final Mid-Term Review meeting DFID 'recommended' that Promiza, the failing micro-credit institution, should be closed down. Taking advantage of a two month delay in the production of DFID's formal report, Promiza staff lobbied fiercely for World Vision funding for a new pilot product, and Karela (a new microfinance institution to replace Promiza) was born. In neither case was ZADP's decision without problems: as I noted at the very start of the thesis (page 12), the absence of veterinary care was already causing difficulties just five months after the project ended its field activities. The point is not that the decisions taken were wise; it is that they were taken covertly, and as such, attest to the fact that ZADP managers felt that they were going against instructions, not advice.

---

<sup>70</sup> This was later revised to 'sorting out policy issues and lobbying national institutions (especially MADER) where necessary in order to ensure institutional sustainability of ZADP interventions' (DFID 2000c: 14).

In this section I have looked at the ways in which ZADP, World Vision and DFID staff related to each other, and at how the relationships were described by different actors at different times. While policy shifts did lead to significant changes in relationships, I have also shown that the structural relationship between actors, built up through a pattern of historical interactions, was important. In the next section I look in more detail at these policy changes, and show that their contested nature always left spaces for dissenting voices and counter-hegemonic practices.

### **2.3 Change and Contestation**

The last section sketched in outline some of the changes in the international development agenda that impinged on ZADP. Here I discuss these changes in more detail. I look at the ways in which new policies were challenged and disputed, and also at the way in which their ultimate result was the sidelining of ZADP by DFID. ZADP was already marginal to World Vision, and so the result was that the project was left with no institutional champion.

ZADP was designed at a historically specific moment, by individuals engaged in understanding, shaping and contesting DFID policy. It was designed in the immediate aftermath of the transformation of ODA into DFID, and was approved shortly after the first White Paper was issued in November 1997 (DFID 1997). Advisers were at the time still in the process of interpreting and understanding what was perceived as a new and very different departmental agenda. In the Project Memorandum (DFID 1998b) they were careful to tie the new project closely to the priorities they believed the White Paper and the new DFID to have:

‘The project fits well with the White Paper’s poverty elimination aim through assisting poor people to establish sustainable livelihoods. The project specifically targets the poorest 25% of the population, many of whom are widows. Poor and vulnerable groups will benefit from better access to credit, surplus crops for sale, diversified income and food sources, and greater security of tenure’ (5).

‘DFID policy is to help the “poorest of the poor”.’ (Annex 2: 9)

Yet despite these clear statements, the focus on the ‘poorest of the poor’ was not universally supported, and there was no clear agreement on the best way of bringing about ‘poverty elimination’ in rural Zambézia. There were significant divisions between the different Advisory streams and an evaluation of ODA programmes in

Mozambique at the time mentioned ‘unresolved tension’ between Economic and Social Development Advisers (Shepherd 1999 (2003): 21). This tension was not confined to Mozambique, and was due to a changing balance of power between different sectoral groups (cf. Gardner 1997: 145). Starting as a marginal group with a tiny handful of staff, the Social Development Department became much more powerful in the late 1990s. ZADP was designed and approved when the influence of the Social Development Advisers within DFID was arguably at its zenith,<sup>71</sup> and their analysis had started to challenge, though not displace, that of the Economic Advisers (see Gardner and Lewis (2000) for a discussion of changes in DFID at the time).

In the Zambézi context, disagreement centred on the nature of economic growth and how best to foster it. Social Development Advisers wished to concentrate support on poorer and female-headed households, and so initiated a shift away from interventions centred on Contact Farmers (‘advanced peasants’) towards groups for food production. By contrast, Economic Advisers noted the relative strength of the private commercial sector compared to smallholders, and believed that the key to economic development lay in out-grower schemes and cash cropping (Duffield 1998, Shepherd 1999 (2003)). In ZADP the result was a design that embodied these ‘unresolved tensions’, proposing the support both of cash cropping and female-headed households, and failing to deal with the implicit contradictions between the two aims. Although I do not deal with the implications of these inconsistencies here, I return to the subject in Chapter 4, where I show that they were not resolved during implementation, and led to a confused approach both to targeting, and to poverty alleviation more generally (see page 156).

Although the focus on the ‘poorest of the poor’ was perceived by (some of) the authors of the Project Memorandum to be at the centre of DFID policy, it did not remain high on the agenda for long. Almost as soon as the ink was dry the policy environment shifted, and it continued to change at speed. Vereker, ex-Permanent Secretary, characterised the transformation as ‘A to D’: Aid to Development, Agency to Department, Administration to Delivery (2002). From 1997, DFID began to define a new role for itself.

---

<sup>71</sup> See work by Rosalind Eyben (2000, 2003a), first Chief Social Development Adviser, for an insider’s view of the changes.

From late 2000 to June 2001, as part of DFID's global expansion and institutional restructuring, the Mozambique programme was 'decentralised', and a new Maputo office with delegated financial responsibility was established. Few of the new Advisers based in Maputo had any knowledge of ZADP, which was described to me by one of them as a 'traditional' project, of the kind 'we don't now do', doing 'dodgy capacity building in government'. Although ZADP staff did not realise it at the time, the Mid-Term Review (March 2001) marked DFID's disengagement from ZADP. Disengagement was by no means total, as later tense negotiations over the micro-credit component showed, but the project was no longer a DFID priority. New Advisers had neither personal nor career ties to the project or its staff. The Head of Office told me:

'I don't think that ZADP has fallen off my agenda, I don't think it was ever on my agenda, certainly not on my work plan... To be blunt I decided I had enough to do with taking the programme forward without getting involved with projects that were going to die anyway. So I think I made a fairly conscious decision not to get involved.'

DFID's agenda in Mozambique changed in three important ways. First, owing to what Patrick Anderson, the DFID Head of Office, described as 'disappointment, which had been emerging since the early to mid-90s with the whole project model', DFID was forced to reconsider its role in development. Anderson believed that disappointment with the fact that projects were not delivering hoped-for changes led DFID to question where it should be 'adding value':

'The fundamental question was, are we just a big NGO? Is it our job to change people's lives directly, which is what leads to programmes like ZADP? Or is it our job to try change the systems that leave people poor, both at the international and the national level?'

For him, the answer was clear: DFID should work at the policy level, and should move away from service delivery and direct poverty reduction:

'I think there's been a recognition, which I strongly share, that it's not DFID's role to deliver development. It's DFID's role to help deliver the conditions within which development can happen, but it's not our role, in my view, to create outcomes ourselves... That's been a fundamental move in DFID's thinking: that we're not responsible for poverty reduction. Mozambique has got to be responsible for its poverty reduction.<sup>72</sup> We're here to help, but our job is to try and work ourselves out of a job.'

As a result of this change, DFID began to focus on what was called 'up-stream' work.

---

<sup>72</sup> This was echoed by Shepherd (1999 (2003): 4), who wrote 'In this context DFID believes that there is no need to ensure that DFID's support directly benefits poor people, and that this could never be accurately measured anyway'.

This involved an increased emphasis on the role of the state and the need for policy reform. According to Jackson (Rural Livelihoods Adviser), ZADP had been designed at a time when it was still considered justifiable for an NGO to be providing services, but that did not last:

‘ZADP was caught at a changing period when the role of the state was becoming stronger. ZADP (I) was set up at time when donors had little confidence in the state, so it was acceptable for an NGO to fund extension or research, the impact in the field would justify it. By the time of ZADP [II], they were struggling with the fact that we had a much stronger state, that Proagri was coming along, that DFID was much more statist and was pushing World Vision/ZADP to work in a way they weren’t particularly comfortable with, with, through and inside state structures.’

By contrast, what Jackson termed the ‘new model of how change operates’, involved ‘a combination of working at top levels on policy dialogue, backed up with budget support, and supporting advocacy of civil society to work with the state.’ As she pointed out, the role of INGOs in the ‘new model’ was not clear.

A move away from support to INGOs was the second major change in DFID practice in Mozambique. INGOs were already unpopular in DFID; Clare Short attacked them as ‘unelected and economically illiterate whingers’ (The Economist 2002: 39). She questioned their legitimacy, asking whether it was right that unaccountable special-interest groups should wield so much power or control such enormous budgets. She was by no means the first to raise these concerns; enthusiasm for NGOs has always been matched by criticism and concern. To some extent this stems from generalisation: the very category ‘NGO’ includes an enormous variety of different associations, ranging from relief agencies and public service contractors to grassroots development organisations and advocacy groups. Clark (1995: 593) emphasised the lack of uniformity amongst NGOs:

‘NGOs may keep their distance from the state and run their projects parallel to those of the state; in some countries NGOs effectively play an oppositional role; while elsewhere NGOs seek to represent the voice of the weak and help them organize in their communities to achieve a more powerful voice in the making of decisions and the allocating of resources’.

Within this diversity of functions and practices, NGOs may occupy multiple positions, for example both challenging government and providing services with and through it.

This diversity should be recalled when attempting to understand both how working through NGOs came to be advocated by ideologically disparate groups, as happened in the 1980s, and how they subsequently came to be disparaged by an equally

diverse group of observers. Support for NGOs in development came from radical campaigners, bilateral donors and multilateral organisations; as Farrington and Bebbington put it, 'Many roads lead to NGOs' (1993: 1). Much interest was generated by disappointment with the past performance of the state, and both those proposing popular participation and empowerment, and those in favour of the privatisation of development, thought NGOs offered a possible way past that disappointment.

By the time of my fieldwork in 2000-2002, the 'NGO decade' of the 1980s and early 1990s (Bratton 1989: 569) seemed well and truly past. As Fisher predicted, 'NGOs, now so widely praised, can anticipate becoming victims of the current unrealistic expectations and being abandoned as rapidly and as widely as they have been embraced' (1997: 443, see also Hellinger 1987). Criticisms of NGOs focused on their less-than-claimed efficiency and effectiveness, on the unintended consequences of their actions, and the changes brought by their popularity with donors. DFID proved to be a particularly swift deserter of once-popular INGOs, and the growing coldness towards them and the insistence that they work in 'new ways' had serious effects on relationships and activities in ZADP.

The third significant change related both to the move away from INGOs, and to DFID's increased focus on policy-level work. The emphasis on government strengthening meant, in the words of the same adviser, that DFID would 'no longer have a focus on concrete outputs. Our entire focus is now on changing processes, not on outputs, which are down the line. It's no longer possible to justify a programme on the basis of the number of people it helps directly.' This meant that 'the poorest of the poor', although so clearly defined as the primary target in significant parts of the Project Memorandum, were no longer at the top of DFID's agenda. Holmes (DFID Economic Adviser) was able to say in 2002,

'I don't know if I know what the focus on the poorest of the poor was before. Were we really seriously ... [trying to focus on them]? Sometimes things get sold on labels and justifications that may sound attractive and catch the mood of the moment...'

Four years on, in a changed policy environment – in which the Economic Advisers had recovered some of their lost influence – Holmes could deny a previously important imperative. The focus on the 'poorest of the poor' had been replaced by a more general – and abstract – concern with 'poverty'. Yet these institutional, organisational and

policy changes did not go uncontested. DFID was at no time a singular and unified organisation, with Advisers all in agreement. Differences between the advisory streams remained of considerable importance, and even everyday decisions were internally disputed.<sup>73</sup>

A clear example of this came in discussions about Direct Budget Support. Although the DFID-Mozambique office at the end of 2002 was officially strongly in favour of it, an anonymous Adviser was quoted in *The Economist* as saying that it involved ‘putting your money into a very leaky bucket’(2002: 39). Another Adviser, also cautious about the policy, pointed out that even this analysis was naïve, as it did not take account of where the ‘leak’ was going: ‘They seem not to understand that the “leak” is going exactly into the pockets of people who are building up an ever-stronger power base’.<sup>74</sup>

ZADP staff were also damning about DFID’s focus on purely national-level institutions and policies. The new Advisory team based in Maputo were, with few exceptions, considered to be completely out of touch with the realities of non-Maputo Mozambique. A member of ZADP staff said of a DFID Adviser that ‘the feeling was that [X] was not on the planet of Zambézia’. Mozambican staff members found it difficult to believe that DFID was really planning to withdraw most of its support from projects like ZADP, in favour of interventions like Proagri and Direct Budget Support. Most were sure that little would reach the areas where they had been working, and that the change was effectively the withdrawal of resources.

ZADP was thus a project located in a ‘space’ between two organisations for which it was not a high priority. It could perhaps have been protected by the contractual relationship between them; instead, arguments over the contract itself neatly illustrate how supposedly formal structures were in fact negotiated, manipulated and reshaped by individuals. ZADP was officially funded under a contractual relationship between World Vision-UK and DFID-UK.<sup>75</sup> However in practice important relationships and

---

<sup>73</sup> This was shown by the incident discussed on page 80. When Mason answered a question about targeting policy in a manner that allowed no room for manoeuvre and was strongly directive, two other advisers stood up in quick succession to give entirely different responses.

<sup>74</sup> Hanlon (2002a) went further to argue that donors were directly supporting the ‘predatory elite’.

<sup>75</sup> ‘Notes of Agreement’ were exchanged after the project was approved by the London-based Projects Evaluation Committee. World Vision-UK was contracted by DFID-UK to implement ZADP, with the

lines of responsibility were neither defined by nor limited to the contractual relationship. I had considerable difficulty finding the formal ‘Notes of Agreement’: neither World Vision-UK nor World Vision-Mozambique were able to find their copies. That did not prevent people from both DFID and World Vision referring to contracts that they had neither written nor read. Advisers suggested that World Vision might have ‘broken its contract’ first when a new Project Manager was (internally) appointed without reference to DFID, and again when it was said that Lloyd had provided less support than had been contracted for (see page 85). However the Letter of Agreement between DFID and World Vision (17 April 1998) actually left the relationship extremely vague. World Vision was to account properly for its grant, allow DFID to monitor the project, not change the project purpose without permission, and write appropriate reports. No mention was made of any DFID right to comment on the selection of staff. Thus, although the relationship was described as contractual, in which each side supposedly had formal rights and responsibilities, in fact it was much more fluid and negotiable; the remaining sections of this chapter discuss the nature of that negotiability.

## **2.4 Defining Relationships**

Relationships between DFID, World Vision and ZADP were under constant renegotiation over the course of the project’s life, shaped by historical patterns of behaviour, and institutional and individual responses to such behaviour. As I have already indicated, the relationship between World Vision and DFID was frail from the start: early decisions about design and structure meant that ZADP was always peripheral to World Vision-Mozambique.<sup>76</sup> It was this relationship that DFID Advisers attempted to describe as a ‘partnership’ at the time of the Mid-Term review. Yet there was little incentive for World Vision-Mozambique to put money and time into trying to attract more DFID funding by playing DFID’s game and acting as DFID’s ‘partner’. It was clear to me from my first visit in 2000 that there would not be a ‘ZADP III’, and World Vision had effective ways of positioning itself to receive ongoing and substantial support for its other projects from different donors. The relationship between DFID and ZADP was thus of much greater importance. I now discuss how this relationship might

---

understanding that they would subcontract this responsibility to World Vision-Mozambique (an ‘independent’ country office, though fully dependent on donor and support office funding).

<sup>76</sup> The microfinance component became an exception as a result of sustained lobbying following the Mid-Term Review. When funding for ZADP ran out in 2003, World Vision found additional finance.

be characterised in a way that recognises its changing character, and acknowledges the hierarchical relation between DFID and ZADP

It is evident from the previous sections that ZADP was never a ‘partner’ for DFID. Structurally it is difficult to see how, as a time-limited project supported by a sole funder, it could ever have been. It is also clear that the relationship was constantly contested and negotiated, with individuals and groups manoeuvring at times for control, at times to avoid responsibility. I have shown that the design process militated against both ‘partnership’ and joint ‘ownership’, and that relationships became more rather than less hierarchical during project implementation. Actions and rhetoric remained contradictory. So what is a more appropriate model for understanding the relationship between project and donor? I now suggest that some of the complexity and contradictory behaviour can be satisfactorily accounted for by seeing the link between ZADP and DFID (*not* World Vision and DFID) as a patron-client relationship.

### **Patron-Client Relationships**

In some respects it can be argued that the two organisations stood in relation to each other as patron to client, in the classic anthropological formulation. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, there was a period when rural relationships were widely analysed in terms of patron-client relations (see page 21). Eisenstadt and Roniger list the most important analytical characteristics of a patron-client relationship (1980: 49-50). They tend to involve the simultaneous exchange of different kinds of resources. From the patron these may be instrumental, economic or political – funds, in the case of DFID. From the client they involve promises of solidarity or loyalty: ZADP’s compliance with DFID norms and changing DFID policies. The exchange is usually a ‘package deal’, in which different kinds of resources are exchanged, and involves long-term obligations. Relations are informal, not fully legal or contractual, but tightly binding nonetheless. This was certainly the case here, where the relationship went far beyond the contractual (see page 92). Patron-client relationships are usually entered into voluntarily, and can be abandoned. They tend to be vertical and may indeed undermine horizontal organisation and solidarity. The relationship between ZADP and DFID was certainly vertical, and the close relationship with DFID did make relations between ZADP and other World Vision agriculture projects somewhat difficult.

Crucially, patron-client relationships are also based on strong elements of inequality and differences in power, self-evidently the case here.

There were many occasions on which ZADP staff behaved as if they were DFID clients. They were deeply conscious of their dependence on the whim of a single much more powerful institution,<sup>77</sup> and attempts were constantly made to placate the potentially restless donor. DFID ‘recommendations’ were frequently taken to be commands. As discussed from page 79, DFID recommendations often resembled orders, but even on occasions when the wording was less strong, ZADP staff did not feel able to oppose DFID advice. Recognising this as a problem, the UK-based World Vision project officer urged the project to ‘have a position, otherwise we get taken down a route by the donor... Don’t let DFID’s view enter a vacuum’. Yet staff found it hard to break patterns of behaviour established during the design process and as a result of early conflicts (see page 84). In 2001 Cope (Second Project Manager) acknowledged that the project had not been sufficiently clear in its dealings with DFID:

‘I think management should have said look, these are new terms. If we’re rewriting the thing, let’s rewrite it now. But some people don’t like that kind of confrontation, though I think it was needed. Otherwise you’ll be walked upon, you’ll be blowing in the wind like a rag doll, and I feel that to some extent this is how the project has gone.’

Although ZADP staff did at times offer some covert resistance to DFID demands, for example by quietly ignoring them (page 85), in general they made great efforts to adapt the project to DFID’s changing policy frameworks, spending substantial amounts of time on activities which had not originally been planned (see page 78). In this way it can be argued that ZADP acted as DFID’s client, providing praise, acclaim and even outputs far in excess of what was contractually required.

If it is accepted that ZADP often took on the role of client, did DFID espouse the role of patron? How might that be reconciled with the rhetoric of ‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’ adopted during the Mid-Term Review? The evidence here is more mixed. DFID Advisers habitually required ZADP staff to do things that were not contractually specified. New activities were required, while some of those planned were cancelled. ZADP found itself responsible for two kinds of outcomes, both ‘hard’ service provision

---

<sup>77</sup> World Vision-UK provided two percent of the project budget, but this was for World Vision-Mozambique’s internal administration. DFID refused to agree that World Vision should take an administrative fee of fourteen percent of the project budget, and it was agreed that DFID should pay twelve percent and World Vision-UK would make up the difference.

(numbers of goats provided, tonnes of seed sold), and ‘soft’ processes (increasing the degree of local/government ‘ownership’, sustainability, participation). Many different agendas were sequentially foisted upon ZADP – working with the poorest of the poor, working to mitigate the effects of HIV/AIDS, working with the government to strengthen policy. Although not all of these agendas were pursued with vigour, ZADP management did not actively oppose them. The demands were not stable, but shifted with DFID policy. By making these demands, DFID behaved like a capricious patron. ZADP appeared to be saddled with a debt that could never be paid. The ‘currency’ of the debt was never established, and as a result it could never be worked off.

The argument that DFID acted as patron to a client-like ZADP can thus account for a number of otherwise inconsistent patterns. But it might be faulted on two counts. First, the explanation would be unacceptable to many of those involved, who would certainly deny the identification of themselves as either patrons or clients. Second, the implication that organisations (rather than individuals) are capable of patron-like and client-like behaviour verges on implying that organisations have personality and agency (c.f. Douglas 1986). This is not something I wish to suggest. DFID and ZADP were composed of individuals who used their agency to act within the context of the structure provided by the organisations of which they were part. Although there were undoubtedly hierarchical personal relationships between the various people concerned, I am not suggesting that any DFID Adviser acted as patron to any ZADP staff member. Rather, the structural manner in which the two organisations related had features strongly reminiscent of the patron-client relationships which have been more usually described between individuals.

In Chapter 6 I look at another relationship with similarities to this: that between ZADP staff and project beneficiaries. There too I argue that the relationship can be well described as one between patron and client, but in that case the relationship was reaffirmed and reinvented through gift exchange. The gift is relevant here as well, although the relationship was too tightly regulated for gift exchange to be a fully appropriate analogy. The fact that the relationship between DFID and ZADP was based on gift-giving (funding), with no formally accepted means of reciprocation, accentuated rather than weakened differences. As Stirrat and Henkel put it, ‘Gifts, like charity, do

not lead easily to identification, but, rather, to a reaffirmation of difference' (Stirrat and Henkel 1997: 80).

## 2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Hanlon's suggestion that NGOs simply operate as the 'pawns' of donors (1991: 81) was, at the time of my fieldwork in 2000-2002, simplistic. Instead relationships were constantly renegotiated by individuals over the course of the project's life, within the bounds of changing structural constraints. Actors operated within the bounds of what I have characterised as a patron-client relationship, itself under negotiation.

Although I have argued that it is helpful to see the overall relationship between DFID and ZADP as a patron-client relationship, as this highlights structuring power inequalities, many interactions took place on a different basis. DFID Advisers by no means always agreed with each other. ZADP staff did not always follow Advisers' instructions. This provides an interesting contrast to Gardner's work on the 'Plantation Rehabilitation Project', in which she described organisational and personnel-related changes as following on from ideological shifts (1997). Although shifts in DFID policy and the international development agenda were important for ZADP, such changes took effect within the context of ongoing relationships.

The analogy of a patron-client relationship has proved most useful in attempting to characterise the bond between donor and NGO. The relationship was more than a purely contractual one, for its scope was undefined, and there were no sanctions for misbehaviour. ZADP staff did not always comply with the instructions of DFID Advisers (page 85), and Advisers did not flinch from redefining the scope of ZADP activities. Yet nor was it a 'partnership'. The power relations between the two organisations, which stemmed from the subordinate and financially dependent position of ZADP, meant that they could not stand as equals, although the inequality was never such as to entirely limit ZADP freedom of action.

*'No matter the degree to which a common identity is asserted, there is still an asymmetry between givers and receivers, and he who pays the piper not only calls the tune but attempts to make sure it is performed. Old identities re-emerge; older lines of differentiation reassert themselves' (Stirrat and Henkel 1997: 75-76).*

The fact that DFID paid ZADP served to reinforce and perpetuate difference:

To an extent this conclusion backs up Ferguson's argument, referred to earlier, that what goes on in development projects like ZADP may involve a 'non- and counter-intentionality', and that much of what happens goes on 'behind the backs or against the wills of even the most powerful actors' (Ferguson 1990: 18). That is a reasonable description of some of what went on under ZADP. Individual actors negotiated relationships with each other on the basis of imperfect knowledge, and in response to imperatives that were often obscure to those with whom they were interacting. Thus, for example, although commentary and criticism about the project tended to be focused on (not) achieving planned outcomes, or (not) responding to the needs of the target population, in fact actors' objectives were more closely connected to DFID priorities (either as employer or patron) than to the needs of the target population (c.f. Clay and Schaffer 1984: 10-12). The complexity of managing multiple imperatives over time thus led to the appearance of 'development' 'acting behind backs', even though the 'anonymous constellations of control' (Ferguson 1990: 20) were the product of the decisions of many individual actors. Returning to Long, although the eventual outcome of multiple contestations may appear to be authorless, an intervention is nevertheless 'an ongoing transformational process in which different actor interests and struggles are located' (1992: 9). In the next chapter I therefore start to look at the specific context of ZADP, to embed it historically and politically, and to understand how other groups of more 'local' actors negotiated their relationships with the project.

### **Chapter 3. Change and Continuity: Patterns of External Intervention in Rural Zambézia**

Development projects are frequently designed with little consideration for their historical or political context (Ferguson 1990, Mitchell 1991); ZADP was no exception. This chapter first shows that the planners of ZADP took little account of what had gone before when they designed the project, and considers the implications of a selective approach to history. It then demonstrates that, for my informants, the past experience ignored by ZADP designers was of key importance in shaping their understandings of the project. Using a range of secondary sources and interview material, I examine how individuals and organisations defined as external to ‘local’ processes acted and were understood in Zambézia over the last century, focusing on the historical resonances of external involvement in agriculture. This involves considering the degree of resemblance my informants identified between colonial-era forced cultivation of rice and cotton, socialist agricultural cooperatives, and post-war ‘development’ interventions.

The historiography of Zambézia is unusual, as historians of the region have, since the late 1970s, made innovative use of a mixture of archival sources and oral testimony.<sup>78</sup> Although I did not myself undertake archival research, due to lack of time in Maputo, I followed their lead by adopting a combination of my own: bringing together their secondary material (partly based on oral testimony) with information from interviews I conducted myself. Doing this, I found to my surprise that my informants gave very different accounts of the past to those recounted to an earlier generation of historians. I came to realise that this was principally due to the changed context in which I was carrying out my research.

This is not the place for a lengthy rehearsal of the strengths and weaknesses of oral testimony as history;<sup>79</sup> however as Jessica Schafer observed in her study of ex-Renamo militants in Manica Province (2001), an uncritical use of such testimony can result in underestimating the significance of the context in which information is collected. How things are remembered and retold depends crucially on the context of

---

<sup>78</sup> See for example, Isaacman (1969, 1972a, 1976, 1996), Newitt (1969, 1973b), Vail and White (1980), and CEA (1981a, 1981b).

<sup>79</sup> See Thompson (1978), Miller (1980), Vansina (1985), Tonkin (1992), Slim (1993), White et. al. (2002).

the retelling. In the Mozambique of my 2001-2002 fieldwork, certain characteristics of the past seemed more or less interesting to people, and as a result the emphasis given to violence, wealth, employment and suffering differed from that in earlier accounts. Much of the oral material collected in the late 1970s, which highlighted colonial oppression and suffering, was taken at face value, and not subjected to the cautious critique that should be expected of historians.<sup>80</sup> More recent work suggests that such caution would have been well-advised. José Negrão recounted a fieldwork visit to an informant who had already been interviewed by two famous historians, and whose account of the 1950s had been quoted and requoted. Asking again about the same period, Negrão was astonished to hear a diametrically opposed version of events. He asked the man why he had altered his account so dramatically from the one given in the late 1970s, and was told ‘that was the time of Frelimo, and now is the time of Renamo’ (1995: 39). The implication was that different stories were appropriate to different times. Nostalgia also has a part to play here, and it is not uncommon for populations released from periods of authoritarian rule (post-Soviet, post-apartheid) to feel, ironically, some nostalgia for old certainties (Verdery 1996, James forthcoming).

Of course, my own data is no ‘cleaner’ than that of previous generations. The accounts I heard of the past were equally partial, fragmentary, and particular, filtered through my ears and often those of Rita and Arcanjo. As is always the case, what I was told reflected what informants wanted me to hear, and what they felt it was safe for me to know. This no more undermines the data presented here than it undermines all oral historical endeavour; however it is important to keep in mind the context of my research, both temporally, and as part of a ‘development’ project.

I begin by outlining how Zambézian history was written about – or not written about – in the Project Memorandum, followed by a brief chronological outline of the main events in Zambézian history from the early nineteenth century onwards. Thereafter the chapter proceeds thematically, as I examine the main concepts informants used when talking about powerful organisations and individuals with connections to the colonial or independent state in the past: exploitation, violence, patronage, and help. In the final section I look at the different labels applied to ZADP, focussing mostly on the

---

<sup>80</sup> Most historians who worked on Mozambique in the late 1970s and early 1980s are now seen to have taken insufficient account of the context of their work. See for example work from the *Centro de Estudos Africanos* (CEA) (1981c, 1981b, 1982), First (1983), Head (1980), Isaacman (1977b, 1980, 1982, 1985), Manghezi (1981) and Vail and White (1978a, 1980, 1983).

project as exploiter, and consider the impact of past experiences on potential participants' understandings of ZADP.

### 3.1 Ignoring History: Analysing the Project Memorandum

History was entirely absent from the ZADP Project Memorandum. There was neither any serious contextualisation of the planned project, nor any attempt at historical analysis. In a document of 132 pages, there were just seventeen references to a non-project-related past (quotations from DFID 1998b). Twelve mentioned the war,<sup>81</sup> concentrating on the tremendous destruction it wrought:

'The 16 years of civil war effectively destroyed most of the previous community structures through out-migration to avoid the conflict and removal of traditional social hierarchies and relationships. Following the Peace Accord in 1992 many people returned to their home areas to find almost complete destruction of housing, physical infrastructure and services' (Annex 1:1).

Only twice was even passing mention made of Independence or the colonial period:

'Little investment in education by the Portuguese administration followed by 16 years of civil war has resulted in a poorly educated rural population with little ability to further its development. The dislocation of families during the civil war has resulted in communities that lack cohesion and, to some extent, trust' (11).

'The rural economy of Zambezia Province is still recovering from the devastating civil war that ended in 1992. This effectively destroyed much of the market infrastructure. A large proportion of the rural population was displaced. The network of rural stores (*cantinas*) was largely destroyed. Before independence these had formed the hub of the rural economy, selling inputs, providing credit and buying and storing produce' (Annex 6: 2).

Even in these two cases the problems described – lack of education and infrastructure – were related to the war. Other comparisons were made between what was implied to have been a static pre-war past, and a post-war present:

'The customary [land tenure] systems of the various matrilineal and patrilineal ethnic groups in Zambezia vary and have anyway changed as a result of the enormous destabilisation and movements caused by the war' (Annex 1: 3).

'Before the war there existed a network of shops in the villages at which farmers could exchange produce for household goods and farm equipment and inputs. These were all destroyed leaving the community without outlets for their products or places to buy household goods' (Annex 2: 10).

'...the informal credit systems that used to exist outside the family and immediate neighbourhood broke down as a result of the mass displacement of people during the civil war' (Annex 6: 4).

---

<sup>81</sup> The other five dealt with the Land Tenure component. Three were brief references to the 1979 Land Law. Another noted that land tenure regimes were widely variable according to factors 'including population density, kinship organization, inheritance patterns (matrilineal or patrilineal), land quality, markets, and historical experience' (Annex 3: 2). The final reference merely noted that many land applications followed the peace agreement of 1992 and the elections of 1994 (Annex 8:1).

This shallow historical awareness had three main implications for the design of ZADP. First, the significance of the Renamo-Frelimo war was misunderstood. Writers of the Project Memorandum saw the war as the source and location of economic and social change. The ‘disruption’ caused by fifteen years of conflict and displacement was believed to be the main ‘problem’ for smallholder farmers, the primary cause of rural poverty, and the cause of ‘community destruction’. They ignored the disruptive effect of plantation-style colonial forced labour. By blaming problems on ‘the war’, they were also able to package and distance conflict, in particular political conflict. Second, the designers of ZADP did not consider how potential beneficiaries might perceive external organisations or individuals. Nor did they take account of the resonances outside interference in family agriculture might be expected to have in an area where agricultural produce had been ruthlessly expropriated for decades. Third, the long-standing diversity of rural livelihoods was not appreciated. The complex relationships of economic interdependence between rural and urban areas which stretched back several generations and structured the ways in which people understood their lives and history were ignored. I now look briefly at each of these points in turn.

The implications of describing the war as if it were a discrete and singular event, uniquely destructive, but from which Mozambique was in successful convalescence, were profound. The quotations above show that the war was held solely responsible for the destruction of infrastructure, in particular the transport system and the rural marketing network, and for the disruption of ‘subsistence’ agriculture.<sup>82</sup> It was blamed for the destruction of ‘most of the previous community structures’, communities which lacked cohesion ‘and to some extent trust’, and for changes in ‘customary systems’. In support of this argument, later sections of the chapter do indeed provide ample evidence of the destructiveness of the Renamo-Frelimo war and the wholesale migration of the rural population that it caused. However, change was not initiated by the war; nor was it the single instance of violence in recent Zambézi history. Rather, agricultural practices, land ownership and livelihoods had been adapting in response to changing circumstances for many generations. For example, Independence brought fundamental alterations in people’s lives – the end of regular employment for many, the closing of almost all rural shops, and the establishment of communal villages and agricultural cooperatives in some areas. The entire twentieth century was a time of turmoil, as

---

<sup>82</sup> I discuss what was meant by ‘subsistence’ agriculture in Chapter 4.

variable labour and tax demands led to new patterns of livelihoods. The nineteenth century was likewise a period of intense dislocation, characterised by sixty years of slaving, famine, migration, and a changing political landscape. The suggestion in the Project Memorandum that ‘the war’ was somehow responsible for all Zambézia’s problems not only failed to do justice to the depth, profundity and long-standing nature of livelihood flexibility in Zambézia, it also implied that there was a recent stable situation to ‘go back to’, and that what had been ‘destroyed’ could be ‘mended’.

Furthermore, and at a rather different level, a focus on a ‘war’ which had ‘ended’ allowed ongoing conflicts to be discounted. By confining conflict, division and destruction to the war, designers absolved themselves from the responsibility of analysing ongoing divisions and contestations, and instead emphasised post-war gains and achievements.<sup>83</sup> Such divisions as existed were labelled ‘political’, and were considered to lie outside the remit of a development project. However, as I will show, it is simplistic to see the war as either a starting or ending point. The ethnic, regional, social and economic divisions that fed the war have not ended, but instead now find their reflection in the two political parties, Renamo and Frelimo. Thus, although the power of the war to explain changes in livelihoods, agricultural practices and community structures was greatly exaggerated, ironically its influence on the creation of a bipolar party division in contemporary rural Zambézian life went unacknowledged.

Following Englund (2002: 13-14), a useful parallel can be drawn with the war of liberation in Zimbabwe. Early studies had suggested that there was a close correspondence between the goals of the rural population and the guerrillas fighting for Independence. Lan (1985) noted a cosmological unity of purpose, with guerrillas enlisting the help of spirit mediums in their attempts to reclaim land, while Ranger (1985) emphasised the importance of class struggle. But following Kriger’s influential book (1992) it was realised that there was wide variation in terms of aspirations, and that the war had at times been used to settle old, local, scores, which had little to do with overall national objectives. Later work has paid much greater attention to local variation (Bhebe and Ranger 1995, Moore 1995).

---

<sup>83</sup> I take up the question of representations of Mozambique in Chapter 4, where I contrast the ‘positive’ view of a country that has successfully left behind war, and has moved towards growth and democracy with the help of international donors, with the simultaneous assertion of Mozambique’s desperate poverty and need for continuing support.

Second, despite strong evidence that it was an issue, the designers of ZADP did not attempt to analyse how ZADP, as a project involving individuals and resources from outside the region, might be (mis)understood.<sup>84</sup> I look at the different ways in which successive generations of Portuguese *prazo*-holders, concessionaires and administrators expropriated both produce and labour from rural Zambézia, and at how these patterns continued after Independence. In an argument taken up later in the thesis, I suggest that ZADP was seen not as a new sort of organisation, but as one intimately connected to ‘the state’, and for many indistinguishable from it. Although I would not wish to imply that ZADP was doomed to ‘failure’ as a result of the actions of its predecessors, the fact that they were not taken into account during the design process meant that it was much more likely that project staff would not develop a sophisticated analysis of who would be willing and able to participate in activities, and why.

Finally, by ignoring the tumultuous history of war, famine, slavery and forced labour in Zambézia, project designers repeated the errors of many analysts before them. They were far from alone in their inability to recognise the intimate historical links between rural and urban areas, between household agriculture and wage labour: the identical mistake had been made by Frelimo in its early years. As O’Laughlin pointed out, the ‘agrarian question’ in Mozambique has long been seen in a misleadingly dualistic light, owing to a misunderstanding of the nature of rural livelihoods and of the historical processes that formed them (O’Laughlin 1996). This misperception led designers of ZADP to write: ‘Communities need help in moving away from subsistence agriculture’ (DFID 1998b: 1); and ‘the majority of farmers, who are currently dependent on subsistence agriculture, [will be enabled] to move into the wider economy by improving household food security, increasing incomes and helping households accumulate assets which can be sold during lean times’ (DFID 1998b: 5). The questions this raises are taken up in Chapter 4, where I show that rural Zambézians have been involved in selling their crops and buying consumer goods and inputs for many decades, and that at least since the early twentieth century they have therefore been part of a ‘wider economy’.

---

<sup>84</sup> One of the PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) exercises undertaken in Mugaveia as part of project planning had to be abandoned, as villagers’ suspicions were raised by the drawing of a village map. They accused the team of planning to steal and occupy their land (ZADP 1997). Earlier still, an internal ODA strategy review of 1995 had raised concerns that ‘given the history of forced labour and coercion in Zambézia, donors and NGOs need to adopt a cautious approach to the promotion of community groups’ (BDDCA 1995: 7).

### 3.2 Historical Outline

The Portuguese arrived near the mouth of the Zambezi River in the sixteenth century, and from the mid-seventeenth century the crown granted *prazos* (crown estates) to Portuguese settlers along rivers and trade routes.<sup>85</sup> In return for an annual sum the leaseholder had the right to exploit the *prazo*, and collect taxes from the local population. The intention was to encourage the development of a large and loyal settler community. To begin with, the *prazo*-holders did live within a social milieu that remained outside African society, and maintained a strong commitment to King and nation (Isaacman and Isaacman 1975: 8). But, as time went on, local alliances became more important than a relationship with Lisbon, and during the eighteenth century the *prazos* became a part of an African political landscape, their success contingent on accommodation with surrounding African chiefs and polities. *Prazo*-holders, increasingly of mixed race, relied on personal relationships with indigenous leaders for their legitimacy. Portuguese influence on the Zambezi delta area during this period was thus very limited: their rule had little impact on either social institutions or modes of production, and both highlands (including Gurué) and hinterland (including Namacurra) remained beyond their control.

From the eighteenth century the *prazo*-holders, now increasingly Afro-Portuguese, and with substantial slave armies (*achikunda*), began to penetrate further into the interior, in search of gold and ivory. There were as yet no fundamental changes in the traditional economy – plantation labour was not imposed, no crops that could be grown for export had been found, *prazo*-holders remained dependent on tribute in kind, and the free Africans (*colonos*) remained able to evade even this tax by migrating (Newitt 1969: 76). The *prazo*-holder's power depended mainly on his slave retinue, slaves at the time being best described as clients who chose to attach themselves to a protector, who would offer them the opportunity to enrich themselves. This form of voluntary enslavement pre-dated the *prazos*; during crises it had long been common for a man to choose to enslave himself and his family to a member of the royal family or a wealthy commoner, and this practice was transferred to the *prazo*-holders (Isaacman 1972b: 450).

---

<sup>85</sup> This section is based on Newitt (1995), Isaacman (1969, 1972a, 1975, 1983), Ishemo (1995), Hedges (1999), and Serra (2000).

After a century of relative political stability, the early nineteenth century saw the fragmentation of the area to the north of the Zambezi into ‘secondary states’ which later became the focus of indigenous opposition to Portuguese rule. Newitt (1988) argued that this fragmentation was due to the devastating drought and famine of the 1820s and 1830s, which in turn fed the fast-expanding international slave trade.<sup>86</sup> As social dislocation and turmoil spread through the region, many of the smaller *prazos* declined and power became concentrated into the hands of the already powerful, either Afro-Portuguese, Nguni, or Swahili warlords. Thousands of *achikunda* ex-slaves were left unattached. Some joined predatory bands, or the retinues of the leaders of the secondary states. Many others were captured and sold by these same leaders. Newitt noted that ‘the slave trade introduced violence on an unprecedented scale into the Zambezi world, violence within the Portuguese community itself, and increasing violence between the Portuguese and neighbouring tribes’ (Newitt 1969: 78-9). Drought, followed by the growth of slave trading, also meant that centuries-old trade routes were disrupted, and led to a fundamental realignment of the economy (Newitt 2002).

The international trade in slaves remained an important part of the Zambézian economy through the nineteenth century, despite an official ban from 1836. It began to decline somewhat from the 1880s,<sup>87</sup> and a profitable trade in locally grown oilseeds started to develop in the region (Negrão 1995: 44). This marked the beginning of what was to become a significant trade in agricultural commodities. International companies opened offices in Quelimane, and the production of sesame, peanut and copra increased rapidly, with rural families reacting swiftly – and apparently without coercion – to demand. The trade was highly flexible, with shops often based in former *aringas* (military posts in the *prazos*), which were at strategic and accessible points. Itinerant merchants travelled to producers, and as a result the oilseed boom proved a major impetus in extending the European presence into the interior. In the words of Vail and

---

<sup>86</sup> At the high end of estimates Isaacman and Isaacman calculated that during the nineteenth century over a million people were exported from Zambézia, Sofala and Nampula (1983), and James Stewart (quoted in Vail and White 1977: 5) estimated that half the population of Lower Zambézia had been exported to Brazil by 1860. At the lower end, Vail and White suggested that by 1846 at least 300,000 slaves, mostly men and boys, had been taken from the Zambezi *prazos* and surrounding areas (1980: 22), while Newitt (1988: 15) quoted Gerhard Liesegang’s calculation that 102,900 slaves were taken from Quelimane between 1800 and 1829. Many more died before reaching the coast: Livingstone wrote that for each slave who reached the trading ports a further four died (quoted in Vail and White 1980: 30).

<sup>87</sup> However in inland areas, away from water transport, older patterns of ivory and slave commerce continued throughout the nineteenth century (White 1987).

White, 'the long-suppressed potential of African agriculture had been released' (Vail and White 1980: 42).

This period also saw the beginnings of plantation agriculture in the region, and sisal, sugar and copra plantations were established.<sup>88</sup> Companies such as the Boror Company were attracted by easy access to land and favourable ecological conditions. In addition, at the end of the 1890s three measures changed the shape of the Zambézian economy and gave the new companies exceptional privileges, most notably in the control of labour. First, administrative structures were reformed. In most regions the *prazos* were reorganised and redefined as concessions, with the aim of creating modernising agents and encouraging investment.<sup>89</sup> As with the original *prazos*, the government hoped that awarding concessions to responsible individuals or chartered companies would encourage Europeans to settle in the interior and develop the agricultural sector. The companies were given tax-raising powers and the duty to develop their areas. Second, a new Labour Code was introduced in 1899. All men aged between fourteen and sixty were legally obliged to work, while significant tax demands meant that men started to spend a considerable period of each year labouring on the newly established plantations (Vail and White 1980: 131-137). Third, progressive restrictions were imposed on itinerant trading, suppressing the newly-established free trade in oil seeds and sacrificing the interests of family agriculture to those of the new plantation companies.

The result of these developments was that over a short period labour demands increased dramatically. At the end of the nineteenth century eight days of waged labour sufficed to pay the annual hut tax; by 1919 that had increased to 180 days (Negrão 1995: 56). At the same time the terms of trade for smallholder family production worsened sharply, as concession holders were able to deny access to free traders, and force farmers to sell at low prices. The development goals of the Portuguese government were not achieved: 'what emerged was a speculative, exploitative and generally inefficient tribute system, rather than a modern agricultural sector which could serve as a catalyst for change' (Isaacman 1972a: 163). The former *prazos*, now concessions, effectively became private labour pools from which the companies, by direct force or indirect manipulation of the economy, could compel the labour they required.

---

<sup>88</sup> Highland tea plantations were established from the 1930s.

<sup>89</sup> They were not renamed, and although differently defined, were still called *prazos* until the 1930s.

Responses to the new demands, and to the new relationship between company and resident population, varied across the province. In the long-occupied delta regions south and west of Quelimane, the companies were seen as heirs to the relationship between *prazo*-holder and African cultivator, patron and client, first established in the late seventeenth century (Vail and White 1983: 891). There was thus a measure of legitimacy in their increasing demands, and in some cases the companies were seen as protectors from a new enemy: the state (Vail and White 1980: 175, 365). However in the newly 'pacified' areas to the north and east, the companies were seen as an invading army, and met first by armed resistance and later, flight. This was the case in much of what later became Namacurra and Gurué Districts. That said, although flight, or the possibility of flight, to some extent limited the demands which the companies could make (Vail and White 1980: 166-7), as the century went on men found themselves required to work more and more days, and found employment less and less easy to avoid as increasing numbers of plantations and companies required workers. Workers were required not only on the relatively long-established sugar, coconut and sisal plantations of Lower Zambézia, but also on the tea estates that began to be established in highland Gurué in the 1930s. Anyone who did not work satisfactorily or attempted to avoid work was beaten, and could be made to do unpaid labour on roads or bridges (known as *trabalhar muacuante* or *chibalo*). Some were even deported.<sup>90</sup>

From the 1930s pressures became even more intense in some regions, as women's labour began to be expropriated too. Although exempt from the compulsory employment that took men away from the villages for six months of each year, in many areas women were required to grow a stipulated acreage of food or cash crops (rice, cotton, cassava), to be sold at a fixed price to a Portuguese concessionaire. The highly exploitative nature of compulsory cotton cultivation, the purpose of which was to provide sufficient cotton for Portuguese manufacturers in the metropole, has been the subject of detailed historical enquiry.<sup>91</sup> These forced cropping schemes, along with forced labour on the plantations, were abolished in 1961, following investigation by the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

---

<sup>90</sup> Export slavery continued into the twentieth century under the title of contract labour to São Tomé (Vail and White 1980: 166).

<sup>91</sup> See for example Isaacman (1992, 1995, 1996) and Pitcher (1993, 1995). Vail (1978b) wrote about the rice and cassava schemes.

However, even as early as the 1950s, people across Zambézia had come to depend on regular wages, not only to pay their taxes and buy the clothes they were required to wear, but also to buy part of their food. Consequently many adult men continued to work six-month contracts after compulsion was abolished in 1961. The desire for consumer goods (sewing machines, cloth, bicycles, radios, manufactured tools) was by that time strongly established, making a cash income necessary. Livelihoods were highly diversified, with most families farming small plots of land, selling excess food crops and cash crops, and drawing a cash income from employment. A further incentive to stay in work was that after 1961 remuneration improved, as recruiters were obliged to compete for labour. They also began to distribute articles such as blankets, trousers, shirts, mugs, cutlery, cigarettes or fish to their employees (Cross 1992/4: 152).

The years leading up to Independence were good ones in the province. The war between nationalist Frelimo and the Portuguese was not fought in Zambézia, and the years from 1960 to 1975 were prosperous ones for the region. Wages were higher than ever before and there was a world boom in commodity prices (Marzetti 2001: 48). It was Independence that brought sharp and unwelcome changes. The precipitous flight of most Portuguese settlers led to the collapse of both the plantation companies and the rural marketing network. Frelimo, from 1977 a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party at the head of a one-party state, embarked on a development strategy which did little for most rural Zambézians. It proved extremely difficult to establish the agricultural cooperatives that Frelimo hoped would revolutionise family production, and the formation of the communal villages (*aldeias comunais*) was even more problematic.<sup>92</sup>

Crucially for the later history of the province, Frelimo found it difficult to establish a strong presence in Zambézia after 1975. This was in part a legacy of the war for Independence, which had leapfrogged over the province leaving it largely untouched. It was also due to the fact that Frelimo's policies were antithetical to the interests of most rural Zambézians. Frelimo's development strategy took no account of the intimate links between rural and urban areas, or between wage labour and family farming, and as a result policies were promulgated which acted against the interests of many of those who lived in rural areas, but whose lives had been bound up with the wider economy for

---

<sup>92</sup> On Frelimo's rural development policies see amongst others, Bowen (2000a), Roesch (1988), Mosca (1999: 116-40) and Munslow (1980, 1984). On agricultural cooperatives, see Harris (1980) and Guilherme Pereira (1980). On communal villages see Araújo (1988), Borges Coelho (1993) and Casal (1996).

many decades.<sup>93</sup> Frelimo's concentrated focus on the state and cooperative sector led to the family sector being ignored: 'the peasantry was largely left to fend for itself in an ever-growing parallel economy' (Wuyts 1996: 728). From 1977-83 about ninety percent of total agricultural investment went to state farms, two percent to cooperatives, and virtually nothing was invested in household production (Mackintosh and Wuyts 1988: 145). As Vail and White perceptively pointed out in the last chapter of their book, completed in 1978, there was at that time 'a real danger that Frelimo officials, that new class of bureaucrats, [might] become the latest heirs of the *senhores*', a group that had been criticised as early as 1806, as people 'who prevented all development by their inability to do the job themselves and their refusal to permit others to get anything done' (1980: 403).

Opposition to Frelimo arose early in Zambézia, with two groups, Africa Livre and Wotcha Weka, active in different localised parts of the province from the late 1970s (Bowen 2000b: 77). Renamo, initially an unnamed guerrilla group funded by the Rhodesian secret service, built on this early opposition when it started to operate in Zambézia in the early 1980s. Unlike in other provinces, it had considerable military success. At different times Renamo controlled half the District capitals, and in 1987 eighty percent of the province was beyond government control (Legrand 1993: 98). Although significant numbers lived in Renamo 'tax areas' (to use Gersony's (1988) classification), much of the countryside was abandoned for many years, and people fled across the border, to towns, to camps for the dislocated, or to the mountains.<sup>94</sup> Almost 1.4 million Zambézians, half the provincial population, were displaced at some point during the war, either within the country or to Malawi (Bowen 2000b: 13). For many the war years were ones of constant flight.

Peace was restored in Zambézia after the signing of the Peace Accords between Renamo and Frelimo in 1992. By this point Frelimo had abandoned Marxism-Leninism and the one-party state, and with the 1994 elections the country became a multi-party democracy. People started to return to their villages and re-establish more settled lives. Much of the province's infrastructure had been damaged: roads and bridges were in

---

<sup>93</sup> See Bowen (2000a) for an account of the impact of these policies in southern Mozambique.

<sup>94</sup> Gersony distinguished between tax, control and destruction areas (Gersony 1988: 10-20); residents of 'tax areas' were treated most leniently.

ruins, many factories had been destroyed, and the plantations were overgrown and untended.

Despite some investment, employment opportunities remained very limited in the decade following the war. This meant that the particular pattern of diversified livelihoods to which people had been accustomed prior to Independence proved impossible to re-establish. Politically, the situation remained tense. Renamo won an overwhelming majority in Zambézia both in 1994 and 1999, but the centralised system of majoritarian government meant that Frelimo appointed the provincial governor. It can therefore be said that for many in the *localidades* where ZADP worked, the transition to multi-party rule meant little, as Frelimo's hold on power continued (a point considered in detail in Chapter 5). This then was the context in which ZADP started to operate.

### **3.3 Understanding 'Outsiders'**

I now look at how the involvement and interference of organisations and individuals external to Zambézia shaped contemporary rural Zambézian society. I describe the various different organisations and schemes which operated in the *localidades* of Mutange and Mugaveia over the course of the twentieth century, and consider how they were perceived. I argue that people's experiences with these organisations and individuals, generally operating either within or hand-in-hand with the state, affected their understandings of ZADP.

NGOs like World Vision have a very short history in Mozambique (see Chapter 2). Prior to their arrival, in the mid-1980s, associational life was tightly controlled, first by the colonial and then the post-colonial state. The Portuguese followed corporatist principles, controlling the forms of representation permitted to business, labour, farm and other interest groups (Sogge 1997: 42). These bodies were used to publicise and promote state policies, and were in turn rewarded for their loyalty by state protection and patronage. Frelimo adopted this pattern, though with a different ideology, creating singular associations (for example of women (OMM) and youth (OJM)), subject to state control. Dynamising Groups, although ostensibly a forum for popular participation, were also intended to promote state policies (Kanji, Braga, and Mitullah 2002: 5). The state has therefore long been closely linked to associational life.

Many informants characterised intervention by external organisations or individuals as exploitative and violent. Forced labour on plantations succeeded a period of slave trading, and a range of socialist schemes of ‘improvement’ were followed by war. Yet at the same time the *patrões* (patrons) of the colonial period were recalled with great nostalgia, and prosperity and resources were seen as deriving from connections with external institutions. ZADP, with its fleets of white land rovers, its close collaboration with District and Provincial Departments of Agriculture and Rural Development, its credit schemes, its group activities and its ‘white’ personnel, was seen by many as the heir to colonial and post-colonial schemes, with all their advantages and disadvantages.

The ‘outsiders’ to whom I have referred were thus a particular group, comprising powerful individuals and organisations generally associated with the state. Many of them were referred to in villages as *azungu* (Elomwé, sing. *muzungu*), *brancos*, or white people. It should be noted that the skin colour of individuals designated *brancos* or *azungu* was by no means always pink; the term also had economic and class connotations.<sup>95</sup> This perceived connection between these outsiders and the state was of key importance, because, as I show in Chapter 6, ZADP was widely mis-recognised, and believed to be part of the state, and hence Frelimo. This mis-recognition had crucial consequences in shaping the ways in which potential participants in project activities conceptualised their actual or potential relationship with ZADP.

### **Exploitation, Violence and Flight**

The themes of violence, exploitation and flight recur time and again in accounts of the last century of Zambézian history, in discussions of slavery, forced labour, forced cropping, early socialism and war. Although some useful analytical distinctions can be drawn between the three themes, they were intimately connected.

Memories of labour on the plantations (and railways, factories, mines and roads) were often characterised by exploitation and violence, as has been thoroughly

---

<sup>95</sup> The *branco* label was applied not only to the colonial Portuguese, and to development and government workers of all skin colours. I also heard it applied to wealthier traders, and to others who had done well for themselves. The eldest son of Tio Daniel, our host in Mugaveia, was said to have been killed by a cousin who was jealous of him, realising that ‘he would have become ‘white’ (*havia-de ser branco*)’. See Bowen (2000b) for a discussion of further referents of the term.

documented in research conducted in the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>96</sup> Many interviews I conducted myself also attested to the hardships of plantation labour and compulsory recruitment. Men recalled being ‘captured’ to go and work, even when they were still very young. Many remembered colonial officials coming to schools to see if any of the boys had hairs in their armpits. If they had, then they were taken away to start work. If someone was caught evading work, not only would they be beaten, they might be taken to do the hardest work of all (*trabalhar muacuante*, page 107), for no pay. Occasionally women were made to do this work as well, and were not even allowed to care for their children. As an elderly informant from Mugaveia recalled being told:

‘When the road was built between Gurué and Nauela I was a tiny child. My parents were both taken to work on the road, and as I was a baby I was taken too. Rather than letting the mother carry the baby, the *cipaios*<sup>97</sup> ordered a hole to be dug and the child left in it while the mother worked.’

Yet although many informants recalled plantation labour as sporadically violent and generally exploitative, the sense of intense misery so vividly conveyed by earlier research was absent. The bitterest memories of suffering I heard dealt with forced rice cropping by women in Mutange. From 1941 women there were required to cultivate a specified acreage of rice, and sell their crop at a fixed low price to Sr. Cardoso, a Portuguese concessionaire memorable for his cruelty. This period was remembered as one of great suffering:

‘Working on the rice *machambas* wasn’t good work, but as it was obligatory people accepted it. The white only paid fifty Escudos for a sack of rice. This work was very coercive (*forçado*), because the portions of land were large. If a person didn’t finish they were beaten until they had finished the *machamba*. If you produced fifteen sacks of rice from this rice *machamba*, then five sacks were for you, and ten for Cardoso. We had to use the money they received to pay taxes, and buy our clothes.’

This was deeply exploitative, as the prices offered to African farmers were substantially below those paid to white producers, and those who did not work well enough were punished. One woman recalled that each person had to produce six sacks of rice from a single oil-tin of seed. Another remembered that people had their hands beaten with the *palmitoria* (a wooden paddle with holes in it) if they didn’t work. Harvest was tightly

---

<sup>96</sup> Notable examples include the work of teams from the Centro de Estudos Africanos (CEA 1981a, CEA 1981c, CEA 1981b), Isaacman (1980), Vail and White (1980), Manghezi (1981) and First (1983). Sensitivity is needed in the interpretation of this research (see page 90).

<sup>97</sup> Colonial police.

controlled, and at this the hungriest time of year, they were forbidden from harvesting their crops without permission: 'People were starving at that time, when the rice was already ready in the fields. If you were going to steal it, you had to go right into the middle to eat it. And if you were caught with rice in your mortar, you were in trouble.'

Personal abuses, particularly against women, were remembered in both *localidades*. Informants said that when Cardoso came to visit he had to be provided with a chicken, spirits, and a woman for sex – and if the woman refused, then all members of the household would be beaten. Sexual violence against women was also recalled in Mugaveia. One elderly widow I knew there was picked out, when young, to be 'married' to a white man in Gurué city. At that time she was 'fat', wore beads on her arms and legs, and was seen as very attractive. She was taken away against her will, despite already being married herself, and it was only because her nephew worked within the city administration that she was released. Isaacman suggests that such tales of atrocities committed by administrators and overseers took on a life of their own, creating a sense of terror 'which became deeply ingrained in the collective consciousness of the peasants and which helped to create the feelings of despair and powerlessness among at least a portion of the rural population' (Isaacman 1992: 502).

The only alternative to the exploitation and violence of forced labour and forced cropping was flight. An early wave of migration to Nyasaland from the highland regions around Gurué was sparked by a combination of famine, the pressures of 'pacification' and demands for porters during the First World War (Vail and White 1980: 171, 219, Cann 2001: 139-40).<sup>98</sup> Some settled permanently, while other young men went seasonally as 'hoeing boys' on the lowest wages, doing the rough work taken by no one else (Palmer 1986: 111). Although Vail characterised Nyasaland at this time as 'an island of atrocious working conditions and wretched wages in a region characterised by poor working conditions and low pay' (1983: 50), conditions were often still better than those on the Portuguese plantations. I knew several men in Mugaveia who had either migrated to Nyasaland themselves, or remembered their fathers going to work on the Tcholo tea plantations of Mulanje. At that time those who went to Nyasaland were either those who had not paid their taxes, and thus had to flee, or those who had finished a contract at home and did not want to be forced into work

---

<sup>98</sup> An estimated 100,000 Lomwé had entered Nyasaland by 1920, and by 1945 the Lomwé population was said to number 380,000 (Palmer 1986: 106, Chirwa 1994: 528).

again soon. One elderly man remembered that people used to go to buy clothes in Nyasaland, before they were widely available in Portuguese East Africa.

From Mutange cross-border migration was much less common, owing to distance. However when the Boror Company was first established, its impositions – coming on top of drought – were so great as to lead some to flee to Nyasaland in search of refuge (Vail and White 1980: 118-120). From the lands of the Boror Company, people could more easily move to government-controlled lands where exploitation was less. But in all cases migration was a process, not an event, and in 1912-13 there was a counter-migration back into the Boror Company *prazos* as government labour demands for road-building and construction of the Quelimane to Mocuba railway grew. There was also a very small amount of labour migration to the South African mines. Though considered particularly tough work, and hard to get (it involved a lot of travel), the salary was higher, and the job offered the chance to bring goods back.

In 1961 both forced cropping and compulsory labour were abolished, and in Mutange the ‘time of Cardoso’ came to an end. The land Cardoso had used passed first into the hands of the general population. Soon after Independence it was taken over by a socialist agricultural cooperative that quickly became famous within Zambézia. It is perhaps ironic that the two large-scale agricultural enterprises Mutange has seen should have used the same land. Ironic, because one of the ways in which the socialist cooperative – intended to put the means of production into the hands of the producers – was in fact remembered, was for its similarity with Sr. Cardoso’s work, not its difference. Although the resources that were channelled to Mutange through the cooperative were much appreciated, for many people both it and the *aldeia comunal* (communal village, founded at the same time) were a ‘trick’, and they felt themselves to have been cheated and exploited once again. As Marshall and Roesch put it, based on work with a ‘Green Zones’ (peri-urban) cooperative in Nampula, membership of the cooperative came to seem ‘an onerous and not altogether sensible political obligation towards the state’ (1993: 249).

The recollections of one of the younger Frelimo leaders in Mutange were typical. He had been a cooperative member himself when young, and remembered the time when so much grew on the cooperative fields that people came from as far away as Quelimane to help with the harvest. But he also remembered the problems:

‘People felt that they worked in vain at the *aldeia*.<sup>99</sup> There was a lot of production at that time, but the people who harvested weren’t given it. There was a warehouse, then it was collected by car, and then the money was put in the bank. It was looked after by the cooperative, and it was that money that was used to buy the stuff that was sold in the shop. But people didn’t receive much money. The *aldeia* wasn’t a good way to work (*não era boa forma*), and people don’t want to work in that way any more. They want to work for themselves, and then sell what they have for their salt or clothes or children’s education.’

These sentiments were repeated time and again, by supporters of both Renamo and Frelimo. Two elderly women even told me that things were better at the time of Cardoso, than at the time of the *aldeia*. Aida Ismael said:

‘We worked without knowing the objective of the work, and we worked like prisoners. I entered the cooperative with the expectation of getting something that would benefit me. In fact I just worked for three years, and then the war began. I learned nothing in the cooperative, people just sold the produce and took the money.’<sup>100</sup>

Exploitation was remembered as just as much a feature of the cooperative as the plantations and forced cropping, although the violence which had characterised the colonial period was absent.

It should be noted that Mutange was most unusual in Zambézia in having been the site of so developed a cooperative and *aldeia*. Although both also existed in Mugaveia they were on a far smaller scale, and the *aldeia comunal* was only formed later, in response to Renamo attacks.<sup>101</sup> Later chapters show that Mutange’s history was significant in shaping expectations of ZADP (see page 207 for further discussion of this point).

The war between Frelimo and Renamo, which we have seen described in the Project Memorandum as a singular, catastrophically violent and disruptive break, can thus be seen to have followed what was in fact only a very brief period when violence and migration were not part of everyday life. The calm and settled nature of the immediate post-Independence period and the period since 1994 is indeed more noteworthy. In Zambézia the absence of violence, exploitation and mass migration is more surprising than their presence. Although the destruction and disturbance of the war should not be understated, its visceral reminders in the form of stripped factories,

---

<sup>99</sup> *Aldeia* and cooperative were formally separate, and belonging to one did not imply membership of the other. However, as in this case, many informants referred to them interchangeably.

<sup>100</sup> Although these accounts had a wide currency, former leaders explained that the only people who were not paid were those who did not work the required number of days. One man said: ‘The cooperative was like work; if you come today and not tomorrow, will your boss pay you?’

<sup>101</sup> I knew just one person who had joined the rudimentary agricultural cooperative, which was situated on the far side of the *localidade*.

shot-out shops, and collapsed bridges must not be allowed to trick us into granting it a special explanatory status. It should instead be set into a much longer context of violence and flight (see Newitt's comment on the impact of the slave trade, quoted on page 105).

In both Mutange and Mugaveia a specific moment was identified as the 'start' of the war. The war reached (*atingiu*) Mutange on 23rd October 1984, when the grain store of the agricultural cooperative was burnt to the ground. Soon afterwards the *aldeia comunal* was razed. In Mugaveia the 'bandits' made several raids before the village was completely abandoned, returning each time to carry off more goods, and to kill targeted individuals (see footnote 121). From both *localidades* most people were able to flee. From Mutange, many went first to the swamps, and then later to a number of different camps and settlements. Some were abducted by Renamo guerrillas, and those who survived spent several years working as slaves for their captors. A former Renamo soldier recalled that these people wore clothes of tree bark and did not even have salt. From Mugaveia most fled first to the mountains, where they lived in constant terror of being found by soldiers from either side. Later they dispersed widely, with some moving to government-controlled Gurué, or the camp of Invacula; many others remained in the mountains, and some chose to settle in Renamo-controlled areas around Nauela.

Accounts of the war in Mozambique had prepared me to hear graphic tales of trauma and suffering (see, amongst others, Gersony 1988, Magaia 1989, Minter 1989a, Finnegan 1992, Nordstrom 1997). However this was not my experience. With Bowen (2000b: 99), I found there was a strong emphasis on forgetting and leaving the past behind one. The war was recalled as a time of economic suffering, characterised by 'the violence of loss and destitution (2000b: 20). A family I knew in Mugaveia described spending the war years near Milevane (Nauela): for five years they could do nothing – they produced just a little, to eat; they found mushrooms, and used *saljema*<sup>102</sup> instead of salt. The materiality of suffering was frequently recalled.

Constant movement, fear and flight were other characteristics of the war years. A neighbour from Mugaveia described how the war pursued him:

---

<sup>102</sup> A salt substitute, the ash from maize husks.

‘I was still at work in the tea estates when the war began. My employers gave me holiday, so I came back home. But it seemed like I had brought the war back with me on my back, and when it became more intense we fled to the bush. First we only went as far as the *machamba*, because there was food there. But then the war came up to my house – they burnt their way all the way from the Church of Christ to my house. Then my neighbour was captured, and so we fled further. Then food ran short. In the end we went to Invacula, where we stayed until the end of the war.’

There were no safe places to which to flee. From the point at which the war was deemed to have ‘arrived’, Mutange and Mugaveia were emptied of their population. For most people flight and movement, fear and deprivation became a permanent condition throughout the war.

Violence, exploitation and flight thus characterised the experiences of many in twentieth-century Zambézia, and, as Sogge showed more generally for Mozambique, were particularly connected with obligatory forms of joint activity such as compulsory labour, agricultural cooperatives, life in the *aldeias comunais* (Sogge 1997: 46). I now turn to the implications of these experiences for projects working in rural areas, and to some of the links my informants made between their previous interactions with outsiders and the activities of ZADP.

The connection made between ZADP activities and previous experiences frequently centred on exploitation. Many villagers were concerned about becoming involved with an outside organisation that claimed to be there to ‘help’ (*ajudar*), when previous experiences with what looked like similar schemes had been so bad. When ZADP *técnicos* tried to introduce seed credit in Mutange, many thought back to their experiences with Cardoso. One couple told me that they had initially been concerned that the ‘credit’ was like that provided by Sr. Cardoso, but with time had realised that it was different: ‘World Vision does not take rice away, they give it to the producers, and if the person wants to eat it then they can. At first people refused the rice, thinking of the time of Cardoso, but in the end they liked it.’

The parallel between seed credit and Cardoso’s activities was widely drawn, although some emphasised a continuing similarity. For example, ‘Cardoso would bring seed in a kerosene tin, and after the harvest he would take away the same amount of rice that he had left. He did what World Vision now does.’ Parallels were also drawn between work on the Farmer Field Schools (page 32), and compulsory rice-cropping. A group from another Namacurra *localidade* once told me that the Farmer Field Schools run by ZADP *técnicos* were actually worse than the colonial schemes: ‘In colonial times

the people would just come and measure the land, then give them the seeds, and then collect the harvest. As it is now, if people work on the Farmer Field School they don't have time to work on their own fields.'

Similar concerns can be discerned in interpretations of the goat restocking programme. Goat restocking involved providing a small number of goats on credit; the offspring were then to be passed on to a secondary group within the village, and the intention was that, in time, all should have access to livestock. When the programme started, many were greatly suspicious. In Chapter 7 I discuss the widespread fear that children would be demanded as a delayed payment for the goats, a fear that was strong enough to dissuade many from accepting them in the early years. Even those who did accept them were concerned about the potential for exploitation, and thought that the animals might at some time be taken from them. As one of the livestock *técnicos* said:

'People misunderstood the goat programme. They thought that the project would be exploitation (*pensaram que fosse uma exploração*) and that they would have to look after the animals which would later be taken away. This meant that people didn't think too about the future, and were not so careful with the animals.'<sup>103</sup>

Project activities were also affected by a much broader concern, which derived from experiences in the socialist cooperatives. Even in places like Mugaveia, where there was never a very active cooperative, people had heard so much about their evils that they were determined never to join one. It was widely recognised by NGO staff in Zambézia that it was disastrous ever to mention the word 'cooperative' in the villages, because potential participants instantly lost interest.<sup>104</sup> In Mutange, where many had had first hand experience both of working together in the cooperative, and living together in the *aldeia*, the lesson that communal working led to disaster had been firmly learnt. In an attempt to side-step the issue, NGOs tended to talk about 'groups' and 'associations'. Even so, some informants still thought that the activities they did with ZADP staff were very similar to the work that Frelimo made people do when they first took power. One man in Mutange said

---

<sup>103</sup> Concerns about who the animals actually belonged to meant that recipients tended to be afraid of reporting sale or slaughter. The same *técnico* said that this was because they thought that either World Vision or the government might do something to them, if they admitted to having eaten, sold or killed their goats, and so preferred to blame the animal's disappearance on illness.

<sup>104</sup> CLUSA, the Cooperative League of the USA, was known only by its acronym as a result.

‘They [Frelimo cooperative leaders] made people work using the same methods that the project uses now. And when the project comes along with the same methods people say no: to do this again would be trickery.’

I was told that not only did the effort put into building the *aldeia* and cooperative come to nothing, it also meant that Mutange became a visible and vulnerable target when the war began: ‘the war came to Mutange before even Namacurra town’.<sup>105</sup> The implications of this were explained by the village President:

‘When the war started, they attacked us first. As we were all living close together and working together (*eramos associados*) it was easy. Afterwards people began to see: this was the way we made a mistake. Other people managed to flee, while we didn’t. Now a villager will think a thousand times before joining a group (*agora o camponês vai pensar 1000 vezes antes de associar*).’

Concerns about working together constantly affected the choices people made about becoming involved in group-based agricultural work organised by ZADP *técnicos*, and limited the ‘community-building’ work that ZADP was able to do (see Chapter 5).

The fear of exploitation made villagers extra-suspicious of any alterations to ZADP activities. Seed policy was one example. For a number of years *técnicos* provided villagers with seed on credit. As credit was often not repaid, and there was also a desire to stimulate a market in seed, it was then decided that seed should be sold at a subsidised price. This raised storms of complaint, with many villagers thinking that the change was a ploy on the part of the individual *técnico* to take their money. There were accusations of cheating and deception, of disappointed expectations and false promises, drawing on people’s bitterness about many years of exploitation. Leaders in both *localidades* had long litanies of complaints about recent deceptions practised upon them by different organisations. A group of Mugaveia village leaders described what had happened to them:

‘They say that you can’t deceive a leper by giving him shoes, and perhaps that’s what happened here. A contractor came and asked the community to open a whole new road, and said that he would pay. People worked a lot, beyond the bridge – but to this day he has never paid anyone anything. Then we were cheated again, we were told to make fired bricks for the hospital and that then they would bring zinc sheeting for the roof. Neither sheeting nor money have they brought. They deceived us. With the school we did the same thing – we fired the bricks and they haven’t paid us though they had promised to. We used the bricks we had made for the hospital, so as not to lose them. Here we are always being misled – perhaps we have bad luck.’

---

<sup>105</sup> Renamo tended to target infrastructure, particularly infrastructure put in by, or associated with, the independent Frelimo government (See Finnegan 1989 for an account of ‘meticulous psychotic destruction’ in Morrumbala).

Villagers had had these experiences with a range of different agencies, all of which were locally identified with 'government'. It meant that most were unwilling to do any preparatory work before they were completely certain that promised inputs would be delivered. This led to problems for the ZADP goat restocking programme, as project rules said that nobody might receive a goat who had not constructed a corral. But many were highly reluctant to invest in a corral for goats which might never turn up. They expected the 'government' to deceive them, and every time it happened, it strengthened a view that this was indeed what government did (cf. Arce and Long 1992).

### **Prosperity, *Patrões* and Presents**

The last section looked in some detail at the problems associated with the activities of traders, plantation owners, officials and NGO workers in Zambézia. I showed how exploitation, violence, and flight, though by no means exclusively associated with strangers, were often connected to relationships with external organisations and individuals. I now consider the ways in which these organisations and individuals were at times also connected with positive changes and were linked with prosperous times. Once again I consider the implications of this linkage for ZADP.

Many of my informants recalled the colonial period with nostalgia, not with the fear and bitterness reported by earlier historians (see page 99). In a context of present-day hardship and lack of access to cash, informants often recollected (or recalled hearing) that, although plantation work had been hard, it had given access to things like bicycles and radios, which at the time had been cheap. Many older people in Mutange said that life in the past had been easy, when compared with the difficulties they now faced. The equipment and food given to employees, particularly after 1961 (see page 108), were recalled with great nostalgia. Ex-plantation workers remembered that the dried fish they were given to eat was sufficient to share with many family members, and that each new contract brought a new supply of basic goods. Even those who gave accounts of sometimes violent 'capture' for work nevertheless recollected that as a result of the work they were forced to do they had cash, and thus access to consumer goods.

I had expected that Frelimo supporters would be least likely to recall the colonial period in this manner, as they tended to be critical of the colonial regime. But in fact

many of them remembered the advantages of having regular employment, something not widely available since Independence. The Frelimo-supporting Mutange President spoke for many other party officials when he labelled the Boror Company as occasionally racist, but the provider of many services that had since become unavailable. It was common to hear people of all political persuasions talking about the better discipline and better social control of the pre-Independence period,<sup>106</sup> as well as endlessly recalling the fixed prices at which produce was sold, and for which goods could be bought.

Informants related individuals' prosperity in the colonial period not merely to the era, but also to the relationships which people (mainly men) were able to develop with particular outsiders and organisations. I frequently heard older men talking nostalgically about their former patron (*patrão*, pl. *patrões*). In both Mutange and Mugaveia *patrões* always came from outside the *localidade*, and were spoken of in connection with help and prosperity. According to men who by their own reckoning had done well in colonial times, the key thing was to have a white *patrão*. Sometimes *patrões* took their employees to work far away. Lucas, a middle-aged man from Mutange, got a job as a domestic servant for a white man, who then took him to Beira, which was where he was living at Independence. Jordão Estevão's stepfather was taken by his white employer to Beira and then Maputo, from whence he was able to move on to lucrative jobs in South Africa. For people from Mutange, plantation employers were not identified as *patrões*, probably because the village tended to furnish casual and not permanent labourers to the plantations. This interpretation is born out by evidence from the President of Mutange, born at Naciaia,<sup>107</sup> who described a very different relationship between the Boror Company and Naciaia residents. Men from Naciaia tended to have permanent work at the sisal factory or plantation: 'all those whose fathers worked at Naciaia had the right to be educated at a Boror school. That time was better – we didn't have many problems. Boror brought everything – anything that a worker wanted Boror would make available, and would later discount from your salary'. As only a very few men from Mutange had permanent jobs, Boror was not seen as a *patrão*. However José

---

<sup>106</sup> Individuals from both political parties, in both Mutange and Mugaveia, particularly bewailed the banning of poison ordeals as a way of dealing with witchcraft.

<sup>107</sup> Naciaia was the location of the large sisal plantations which employed many men from Mutange on six month contracts; see Figure 4.3.

Ferreira, a Portuguese cattle rancher who had occupied a substantial parcel of land in Mutange, was identified as a *patrão*, particularly by those he had employed.

In Mugaveia men who had had permanent jobs on the tea plantations talked about how their *patrão*, a white company employee or owner, had identified and singled them out, and then given them increasingly responsible and better-paid jobs. Some worked as factory guards or *capitões* (managers of work teams), others as carpenters or blacksmiths. All of these were year-round jobs, and the individuals who held them accumulated money, skills and tools, which later enabled some of them to set up on their own. A small number of men were thus able to start their own little businesses back in Mugaveia, particularly working as blacksmith, carpenters, or tailors. Another group became *agricultores*, larger-scale farmers with employees, a classification that gave exemption from compulsory labour; they sold their produce direct to the tea companies.

In this way some individual Portuguese from the colonial period were remembered with nostalgia, as benevolent providers of employment and generous givers of help. It was said that shop-keepers would often give a little paper screw of sugar to a customer as a present, and that lifts in vehicles were easily obtained. The shop-keepers based in Mugaveia (there were three small shops or *cantinas* in the *localidade*) were recalled by all informants in a positive fashion. They were not involved in forced recruitment, but employed quite a number of local men in their shops, in a workshop, and on a small out-grower tea estate in Nicoria. They helped build bridges, providing a tractor and eucalyptus trunks, and maintained them. This suggests that the patron-client relationship which Vail and White suggested had long been established between *prazo*-holder and local population in the long-settled delta and riverine regions (see page 107) had, over the course of the twentieth century, become extended to the relationship between individual white employer and employee.

When people talked to me about the ‘good *patrões*’ of the past they often followed up their recollections with a lament about contemporary difficulties. After telling me how the shopkeepers had built and repaired the Mugaveia bridges, informants would bemoan the contemporary lack of a stable bridge. When people from Mutange told me about their problems with a contemporary concessionaire, Gil Fonseca, they were quick to emphasise that they had no objection to the occupation and utilisation of

what had been José Ferreira's cattle-ranching land (page 121). Indeed, it was considered justifiable and welcome that Fonseca should do so. Their concern was that he should confine himself to his own land, and fulfil his expected obligation to employ them.<sup>108</sup> I saw this focus on the virtues and responsibility of these earlier *patrões* as a way of constructing and presenting a view of the 'ideal *patrão*' for me – and by extension World Vision – to follow.

The third way in which outsiders were recalled was as direct providers of resources. I do not discuss this in detail here, as it is the central concern of Chapter 6. It dated from the provision of inputs to the socialist cooperatives, and food aid to displaced people during the war years. The emphasis on resources can be seen in the account of the Mutange agricultural cooperative, given to me by a group of members of the *Associação dos Camponeses de Mutange* (Association of Mutange Villagers<sup>109</sup>):

'In 1977 the Law of *Aldeias* said that *aldeias* must be formed so we created one in Mutange. A tractor from Mekanagro<sup>110</sup> tilled 75 hectares, for which we paid 30 Esc/hectare. We also received seed. The 1978-79 rice harvest was huge. People came from Quelimane and other places to help with it. Half of the rice went to members, and we also sold 85 sacks and used the money to buy merchandise for the shop and to start a carpentry. We received two sewing machines...

In 1980-81 we received a motor pump from the government, and were told to reduce the area we sowed to 50 hectares, because otherwise we always needed help with the harvest... We had a motor pump and tractor, and there was a car that belonged to the *aldeia*...

There were plans. The plan of the Italians was to open 500 hectares of rice and to send five tractors and three motor pumps. They were going to put in a railway line to Mutange, and the late Henriques [Cooperative President] was to go to Italy, but this was not possible due to the war.'

Both cooperative and the *aldeia* were strongly associated with the provision of material goods. The cooperative was associated in people's minds with physical inputs: a tractor, seed, the irrigation system. The same was true of World Vision, which was known to many during the war years as the provider of seeds, tools, and hospital treatment; the implications of these memories are discussed in Chapter 6.

---

<sup>108</sup> Gil Fonseca attempted to lay claim a far broader area, comprising the entire *localidade* of Mutange. His claims were considered illegitimate, and with the help of ORAM and the ZADP Land Tenure component, were successfully repelled. See de Wit (2002: 14-20) and Norfolk and Soberano (2000: 41).

<sup>109</sup> The *Associação* was supported by ORAM, and in 2001 it received a heavily subsidised tractor on 'credit'. Few repayments were made during my fieldwork, although the tractor did continue to work. An ORAM official I spoke to in December 2002 said that despite huge arrears ORAM had no plans to repossess the tractor.

<sup>110</sup> Scheme for the loan of agricultural machinery.

### 3.4 Conclusion

This chapter started by demonstrating that an understanding of the history of rural Zambézia was absent from ZADP design, and argued that as a result, both too much and too little explanatory power was granted to the war. Blaming the war years for all livelihood ‘disruption’ was, as I have shown, unjustifiable. However a closer concentration on the complexities of past and present conflict would have shown that the war solidified previously latent political and economic conflicts, which are now primarily expressed through membership of the two political parties.

The designers of ZADP demonstrated little awareness of the resonances that the involvement of a project with clear similarities to earlier interventions would have for residents of the target area. However memories of these interventions strongly affected the ways in which potential beneficiaries conceptualised and interacted with ZADP. Whether ZADP was linked in people’s minds to the state, to Frelimo, to colonial plantations or forced cropping, the connection was to powerful and unpredictable forces, over which they had little control. As Pijnenburg put it, ‘decades of (often brutal) colonial rule, top-down socialist policies, civil war, and now political strife do affect trust and confidence within communities and between them and external agencies’ (2002: 199). The relationship between potential and actual participants and ZADP is discussed in detail in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.

The next chapter shows that ignoring history led to the agricultural component of ZADP being designed with inappropriate aims and objectives, and with an apolitical grasp of the reasons for rural poverty. Assumptions about the nature of the ‘peasantry’<sup>111</sup> were then coupled with a lack of knowledge about rural society and the history of the region, with the result that, as Isaacman put it, development practitioners and researchers have focused ‘on the future – or rather a set of imagined futures in which the relevance of the past is often understated or ignored’ (Isaacman 1997: 758). I now look at how livelihoods, poverty and ‘rural development’ were constructed in ZADP, and how this compared with the complex ways in which people made their living.

---

<sup>111</sup> I use the contested term ‘peasant’ throughout the thesis. As the next chapter shows, the term had wide currency during the period of Mozambican socialism. My use of the term does not imply a lack of rural differentiation, or that country folk relied completely on agriculture. See Leeds (1977), Shahin (1982) and Hill (1986: 8-15) for further discussion of definitional issues.

## Chapter 4. Rural ‘Development’ and Zambézia Livelihoods

A1. Mozambique remains **one of the world’s poorest countries**. Over 90% of Mozambicans (14m) live on less than \$1 per day, the World Bank’s measure of absolute poverty. **Mozambique’s 10 year civil war, which ended in 1992, left much of the country’s social and economic infrastructure destroyed.**

A2. **But good progress is being made. Macroeconomic management is sound and the economy is growing at about 8%.** The Government of Mozambique is committed to reducing poverty. It is allocating extra resources to health and education, and progress is being made, from a low base, towards the International Development Targets. **Democracy is functioning, though fragile**, but there are large areas of the country where Government cannot provide services. The police and judicial systems need strengthening. The Government promotes a constructive and open relationship with the donors.

(DFID 1998a)

i. Mozambique is **one of the poorest countries in the world**. Achieving and sustaining a real reduction in absolute poverty will not be easy: **the legacy of colonialism and war is one of low skills, weak institutions and poor coverage of essential basic services.** External aid, which funds half of government expenditure, will continue to be needed over the medium to long term. HIV/AIDS and growing crime and corruption compound the development challenge.

ii. **Yet there are many reasons to be optimistic about Mozambique’s future.** That it has just celebrated eleven years of peace after **a bitter civil war which killed over 100,000 people, dislocated some five million, and left most of the country’s infrastructure in ruins**, is a remarkable achievement, and one of which Mozambicans are justly proud. **Despite some setbacks, the democratic system continues to develop**, and preparations are underway for the country’s third multi-party general elections in 2004. Striking also has been **Mozambique’s success in maintaining macroeconomic stability, and in attracting new foreign investment, which has resulted in high growth** in recent years.

(DFID 2003)

The paragraphs quoted above<sup>112</sup> open the Executive Summaries of the 1998 DFID Country Strategy Paper, and the 2003 draft of the replacement Country Assistance Plan. Although separated by five years, two Secretaries of State,<sup>113</sup> and several self-proclaimed ‘new approaches’ (Chapter 2), the similarity of the cameo descriptions of Mozambique is remarkable. Stylised and stereotyping, they can be seen as ‘development texts’ of the kind analysed by Crush and his contributors (Crush 1995b). As such, one of their functions is the construction of a particular kind of field for

---

<sup>112</sup> Colours in the quoted text mark similar sections.

<sup>113</sup> Clare Short was Secretary of State for International Development from May 1997 until May 2003, for the entire effective life of ZADP. She was replaced by Baroness Amos, who was in turn replaced by Hilary Benn in October 2003.

‘development’.<sup>114</sup> Like the ZADP Project Memorandum, they place a heavy explicatory burden on the war, and on the changes it caused.

Although details and emphasis differ, the first paragraph of both documents is devoted to establishing Mozambique’s extreme poverty. ‘One of the poorest countries in the world’, it is identified as a nation with a ruined infrastructure, weak institutions, and poor services, damaged by war and wracked by continuing destabilisation in the form of crime, HIV/AIDS and corruption.<sup>115</sup> Much as in the ZADP Project Memorandum (Chapter 3), the role of the war in creating and sustaining poverty is emphasised. These and other reports observe that the country is near the bottom of the UNDP Human Development Index, is one of the most highly indebted countries (Hanlon 2000: 890), and also one of the most aid-dependent (Plank 1993, van Diesen 1999); see Table 4.1.

**Table 4.1 Comparative statistics on ODA levels**

HDI Rank		Total ODA (net disbursements) \$US 2002	ODA per capita, (net disbursements) \$US 2002	(ODA) received (net disbursements) (as % of GDP)	
				1990	2002
111	Indonesia	1,308.10	6	1.5	0.8
112	Viet Nam	1,276.80	15.9	2.9	3.6
146	Uganda	637.9	25.5	15.5	11
170	Ethiopia	1,306.70	18.9	11.8	21.6
171	Mozambique	2,057.60	111	40.7	57.2

Source: Compiled from [www.undp.org](http://www.undp.org)

In an almost ‘Looking Glass’ fashion, the second paragraph then turns this picture of woe and suffering on its head. Mozambique is not only immiserated, poor and vulnerable: it is simultaneously successful. There are ‘many reasons to be optimistic’. There is ‘good progress’, sound macro-economic management, a ‘constructive and open relationship with the donors’. Again, this analysis is not confined to these reports: donors frequently identify the country as an international ‘success story’ (see for example Stern 2002, IRIN 2002, cf. Lundin 2000). Mozambique has been held up to

<sup>114</sup> Although I focus on just these two texts, they are far from atypical, and similar analysis can be found at the outset of reports from organisations as diverse as Skillshare and SIDA.

<sup>115</sup> Crime, HIV/AIDS and corruption might be seen as serious problems, but this representation downgrades them to background risks. In the case of corruption, Hanlon argues that donors see the country as one where corruption is ‘not institutionalised’, rather than as the criminal state he perceives (2002a: 2).

the world as a ‘successful reformer’: not only have two general elections been held peacefully, but the economy has grown substantially and normality has returned to people’s lives. A World Bank report on development effectiveness approvingly noted the reforms implemented (financial liberalisation, exchange rate reform, trade liberalisation, privatisation), and detailed the growth that was believed to have derived from the changes:

‘After growing just 0.1 percent on average over the previous decade, GDP grew at an average of 8.4 percent annually from 1993 through 2001.

Inflation, which had averaged 53.3 percent annually between 1993 and 1996, fell to an average of 3.3 percent in 1997-99.

Social indicators also improved in this better environment: the gross primary admission rate rose from 57 percent in 1995 to over 100 percent in 2000, while the repetition rate fell somewhat from 26 percent in 1995 to 23 percent in 2000.

Private investment, crowded in by the better policies, helped to spur this growth. For example direct foreign investment grew some 500 percent between 1992 and 2001.

Export growth improved dramatically, from -6.8 percent (1980-90) to 15.1 percent (1990-00).

Agricultural growth was revitalized, accelerating from 1.3 percent annually (1985-92) to 9.8 percent annually (1993-01).’

(Stern 2002: 39)

Why has this peculiar representation of Mozambique, simultaneously negative (extraordinarily poor), and positive (equally extraordinary levels of growth) had such lasting currency? The question parallels that asked by Ferguson (1990) of the World Bank’s approach to Lesotho. Although I earlier criticised Ferguson’s failure to look at the processes by which the ‘anti-politics machine’ actually works (Chapter 2), his analysis of ways of writing is nonetheless instructive. He found that World Bank descriptions of Lesotho bore little resemblance to either the academic literature or his own observations. But as he remarked:

‘One would be mistaken, however, to suppose that the paragraph cited...is simply an error, the sign of gross ignorance or incompetent scholarship... It must be recognised that what is being done here is not some sort of staggeringly bad scholarship, but something else entirely... What is needed is not so much a correction or setting straight of the discourse of the “development” industry... as a way of accounting for it, and of showing what it does’ (Ferguson 1990: 28).

Ferguson showed how, when deprived of its history, geography and politics, Lesotho was constituted as a 'less developed country', an appropriate target for technical development interventions. In a similar manner, Mitchell demonstrated how descriptions of Egypt as a narrow valley, surrounded by desert, and crowded with rapidly multiplying inhabitants indicated not only the problem but also the solution (1995). Since the problem was defined in terms of nature and human reproduction, solutions were in the realm of improved resource management and technology. This kind of analysis also allowed the role of the development organisation to be ignored, and 'development discourse' constituted as an objective intelligence. Both these examples support Wood's contention: 'If a peasant has a problem behaving like the label, then he has a problem of access to the treatment – but the treatment itself has been authoritatively established with the help of the label' (Wood 1985b: 23). Following Ferguson, my task here is similarly to explain what descriptions – here of Mozambique in general, but later in the chapter of specific features of Zambézia – 'do'. How do they function? And what is it that makes them so robust?

First, poverty has taken on a special status within the international discourse of development (Rahnema 1992). In Mozambique, as in other countries, poverty and poverty reduction have become central donor concerns. As McGregor rather disconcertingly phrased it, 'poverty is the life-blood of the development industry' (McGregor 2000: 2). Internationally donors have moved to commit themselves to eliminating poverty, rather than fostering growth.<sup>116</sup> The intense focus on 'poverty' has had particular effects in Mozambique, where it is a relatively new phenomenon. The poverty of Mozambique preoccupied neither the Portuguese colonial government nor Frelimo socialists. The Portuguese considered the 'province' backward, and in need of investment; the socialists considered it to have been systematically under-developed, in the interest of the metropole. For neither was 'poverty' the central issue. It was only in the late 1980s, with the growing involvement of the IFIs (International Financial Institutions) and NGOs, that 'poverty' began to be seen as the key problem. Mozambique became defined as the world's poorest nation, and therefore in urgent need of donors' aid.

---

<sup>116</sup> Donors such as DFID have explicitly committed themselves to the Millennium Development Goals, and thus aim to reduce 'poverty' by fifty percent by 2015. DFID is also bound by a parliamentary act which restricts the use of aid to poverty reduction.

Second, Mozambique's high growth rates – from a desperately low base – have been cited as evidence that donor interventions and new donor-advised policies have worked. 'Success' legitimises intervention. During the 1990s Mozambique was defined as a Good Performer, a Satisfactory Reformer, and lauded as such.<sup>117</sup> As a BBC journalist, quoted in Christie and Hanlon (2001: 83) put it,

'Mozambique is the darling of the international aid community. There is incredible sympathy for a country that has done everything right. Mozambique had become a beacon of hope in Africa.'

Donors need such 'beacons of hope' to justify their activities back home, and, as I argue later, the need to maintain optimism can lead to uncomfortable realities being ignored. Needing positive examples, donors have fixed on Mozambique (like Uganda) as a favourite example of 'where aid works'. Establishing the desperate poverty of Mozambique thus establishes the right for donors to be involved in the country, while describing it as a 'success story' validates aid itself.

Third, defining the periods of war and colonialism as 'pre-development' means that they do not have to be taken into account. Change is asserted at the expense of continuity, and no attempt at historical analysis is made. Instead particular 'break points' are identified: Independence, and the end of the war. An 'ideology of the blank page' allows interveners to ignore the complexities and specificities of local circumstances, and impose externally-designed and externally-mandated interventions, from state farms to 'community development' initiatives (cf. Crewe and Harrison 1998). It also raises the question of what 'counts' as 'development', and underlines the ways in which, as definitions have changed, so the existence of earlier attempts at 'development' has been denied.

These three factors help to explain why seemingly contradictory descriptions of Mozambique remain powerful: intervention is validated, its scope is defined, and a justification for disregarding history is provided. This underlines Ferguson's point that there are reasons for what might otherwise appear to be 'staggeringly bad scholarship'. It is also useful, in the context of ZADP, to consider what the *implications* and *consequences* of not thinking straight were. ZADP staff, after all, were in the end

---

<sup>117</sup> In a recent speech at the London School of Economics ('The development challenge in crisis states', 4 March 2004), Hilary Benn referred twice to Mozambique. He first described it as a country that had in just five years reduced poverty from 70 percent to 55 percent and doubled the number of children in school, and later as an example of 'how countries can move out of crisis to provide basic security and begin to raise the living standards of the poorest people'.

saddled with a project which was riddled with design and conceptual contradictions (Chapter 2), but they were nonetheless faced with the necessity of doing something.

I therefore look now at how a lack of historical awareness shaped the ZADP analysis of livelihoods and poverty, and consider how it affected decisions about appropriate activities. First I consider twentieth century debates about ‘development’ in Mozambique. Although definitions of ‘development’ have been sequentially rejected, I demonstrate that economic change brought substantial alterations to Zambézian livelihoods over the century. I then look briefly at different patterns of livelihoods in Mutange and Mugaveia, before discussing the ZADP approach to livelihoods and poverty. The chapter shows that failing to take previous ‘development’ policies seriously led ZADP to adopt confused and inappropriate approaches towards rural development.

#### **4.1 Debating ‘Development’ in Colonial Mozambique**

Debates about ‘development’ are not new in Mozambique. Interventions in rural Zambézia have been made in the name of ‘development’ for at least a century. However, as Chapter 3 demonstrated, private sector, government, and NGO actors have often emphasised the novelty of their actions while failing to investigate how they connected with earlier initiatives. From the beginning of the twentieth century, certain aspects of Portuguese colonial policy were, for a range of internationally-influenced reasons, couched in terms of ‘development’. Although under Salazar’s *Estado Novo* (New State, 1928-62) Mozambique’s economy was run for the benefit of the metropole rather than the colony, investment in the country was nonetheless considerable, and at Independence, Mozambique was one of the most industrialised countries in Africa (Englund 2002: 5, Hanlon 1984: 100). Following Clarence-Smith (1985a), it is thus incorrect to suggest that when the Portuguese left ‘the new government was faced with what approached a development Year Zero’ (Tancock 1999: 7). By looking at how ideas about ‘development’ influenced colonial and post-colonial policy, I now show that far from being novel, ‘development’ was already a well-worn concept when ZADP was defined as an innovative first-generation post-war ‘development project’. Deep disagreements characterised debates over the nature, ‘meaning’ and objectives of development, and how it might best be brought about. Although dominant approaches can be discerned, contestations and counter-currents should not be ignored. As Chapter

2 demonstrated for DFID policy, 'hegemony is never finished, never complete; there is always an ongoing process of contestation and negotiation' (Ferguson 1994: 135).

*Desenvolvimento*, 'development', has a long but largely unacknowledged history in Mozambique. Occupied by one of the weakest colonising powers, from the late-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century Mozambique operated as a migrant labour reserve from which surrounding countries drew. As this section elaborates, the Mozambican economy depended on 'primitive' labour exports (mostly from Southern Mozambique, to the South African mines) for many years after surrounding countries had moved beyond this to develop industries of their own. International migrant labour remained a key revenue source for the Portuguese right up until Independence, while compulsory labour, which kept wages artificially low, provided the basis for the plantation economy of central Mozambique described in the last chapter. A key focus of debate has since been over whether or not the economic activity generated by these policies constituted real 'development'.

Debates about 'development' first assumed importance in the late nineteenth century. Portugal was at that time coming under significant international pressure both to demonstrate her occupation of her colonies, and to prove that she had abolished slavery. The 'Scramble for Africa' meant that the Portuguese needed to exploit labour in order to protect their claim to the country, yet at the same time needed to prove – in order to calm humanitarian anti-slavery critics – that they were not exploitative. There were heated arguments about what constituted slavery, whether Portugal could be trusted to run her African colonies, and how abusive her 'native policy' really was (Allina 1997: 12-16). Both at this time and when the Portuguese were again on the defensive in the 1920s the circle was to some extent squared by a rhetoric of *desenvolvimento*. It was claimed that they 'sought to attract the indigenous people and transform them into a useful element of civilization' (Cayolla (1926: 24), quoted in Allina (1997: 16)), and did indeed invest in railways, plantations, and productive indigenous agriculture (de Vasconcelos (1926: 3-5), quoted in Allina (1997: 16)).

Though Portuguese policies from the 1890s to 1930s were – partly for the reasons given above – often phrased in terms of 'development', the aims and targets of such 'development' were contested. From the 1890s until Salazar's accession, disagreement about whose interests should predominate characterised debate about economic and

social change in the country. It was by no means clear to policy-makers of the time that the interests of rural Mozambicans should be put first. 'Development' of the metropole, and of the interests of private companies themselves, were usually prioritised in the context of a virtually bankrupt colonial state. A key nexus of debate concerned the appropriate balance between a short-term need for income (most easily generated by the sale of labour domestically and internationally), and the longer-term development of industries and enterprises within the colony itself. Interest groups including British chartered companies, the mine-owners of the Transvaal, northern plantation-owners, and Portuguese manufacturers favoured the former priority. They were keen to secure access to continued and substantial supplies of cheap labour. The system whereby the mining companies recruited labour south of the Save River, with deferred salaries paid by the colonial government, was one that was extremely lucrative both for the Portuguese and the gold mining companies. In the central and northern areas the chartered companies and plantation owners, usually backed by British capital, relied for their profits on a steady flow of cheap labour. Both groups therefore opposed the establishment of Mozambican industries which would have competed with them for the workforce.

Yet to suggest that the Portuguese state had no sense of responsibility for the well-being of the 'natives' would be wrong. A group known as the 'Generation of '95', Portuguese soldiers and administrators so called because of their participation in the important military campaigns of 1894-95 in southern Mozambique, was particularly influential. Members of this group agreed that a spirit of realism was necessary in Portugal's relations with its colony. They argued that agricultural development should provide the basis of Mozambique's economic growth, rather than the constant and draining export of labour (Smith 1991: 499-500). They also believed that the 'subject peoples' of Mozambique should be provided with improved social services. As da Costa (a member of the group) wrote, 'the domination of a superior race over savage countries is only legitimate when it is accompanied by real benefits' (*Estudo sobre a Administração Civil das Nossas Possessões Africanas*, Lisbon, 1903, p187-91, quoted in Smith 1991: 501).

The 'Generation of '95' initially had little success in gaining political support for their ideas, and it was not until the 1920s that it was finally agreed that a measure of

administrative decentralisation should be granted to Mozambique. The first head of the decentralised government, Brito Camacho, had ideas about development in line with those of the 'Generation of '95' (Smith 1991: 513). He called for the full participation of Africans in the evolution of the colony, and wished to establish three or four large agricultural and industrial establishments in the south of the country, to reduce migration to the South African mines. However his radical plans aroused the staunch opposition of the interest groups already mentioned. They proved more powerful than he, and he was soon recalled. João Belo, who became colonial minister after 1926, was the last of this generation of reformers. While acknowledging the importance of the colony's relations with South Africa, he nevertheless believed that Portugal had a duty to 'improve the material, moral and social conditions of the local population' (Belo 1927: 274, my translation). To this end, he authorised money for development projects in southern Mozambique: factories for sugar production and distillation; a scheme to attract Portuguese immigrants; and credit for those wishing to initiate agricultural projects in the south (Smith 1991: 520).

This group of reformers, although wishing to foster economic development in the country, and keen to improve services, were not liberal, and were still willing to defend the practice of forced labour. The difficulties of making 'lazy, indolent, inactive Africans' work hard enough to develop the colonies preoccupied Freire de Andrade (then General Director of the Colonies), writing in 1914 (Freire de Andrade (1914: 3), quoted in Allina (1997: 15)). As well as forcing the 'natives' to work harder, a number of technical projects were proposed. Some operated in Zambézia, with the intention of bringing new science to the 'natives'.<sup>118</sup> Grilo, a state-appointed agronomist, wrote that 'the black does not know how to farm' and that 'the native does not possess agricultural knowledge to allow him to work better. To prepare him for a less imperfect way of using the soil he will only be able to acquire it through the systematic repetition of cultural or technological techniques under the guidance of trained personnel' (1929: 83, 88). Grilo argued strongly for rational planning, and investment in native agriculture.

I would thus argue, with Smith, that prior to Salazar's accession some Portuguese official thinking envisaged the development and growth of colonies such as

---

<sup>118</sup> The desire to apply science to the solution of rural problems continued through the socialist period. A technocratic approach to issues of broader socio-economic significance is still current (see Ferguson 1990 for a comparative example). ZADP can to some extent be seen as heir to these earlier projects.

Mozambique (1974: 653). Debates about what '*desenvolvimento*' meant were ongoing, and as a result some reports, including one dealing with the reform of the *prazo* system, were couched in terms of the *desenvolvimento* of both native and European agriculture (Alvares 1916). However this thinking did not go unopposed, and the power of groups including the British chartered companies, South African mine-owners, northern plantation-owners, and Portuguese manufacturers, led to the 'corruption, mismanagement and manipulation of the colonies to the advantage of disparate interest groups' (Smith 1974: 653) well into the 1920s.

This brief emphasis on domestic 'development' did not long survive Salazar's accession. Under his rule it was taken as given that the colonies were there for the benefit of the metropole. The rigorous economic logic that had balanced the domestic books was applied to the colonies: extreme austerity on all forms of spending, and rigorous central control. The *prazos* of Zambézia were taken under state control, the charter of the Niassa Company was ended, and it was made clear that the charter of the Mozambique Company would not be renewed. Strict limits were put on investment by foreigners. A new labour code was promulgated, and with the 1930 Colonial Act, which remained official dogma for almost 30 years, Salazar 'regularized and rationalised the exploitation of the colonies for the benefit of the mother country... The restrictions placed on growth ensured that they would remain underdeveloped...[which] meant that the Portuguese colonies would continue to depend on a primitive exploitation of African labour long after more sophisticated forms had been developed elsewhere' (Smith 1974: 667).

Under Salazar's *Estado Novo* immigration from Portugal was encouraged.<sup>119</sup> The Portuguese government supported European settler farms and foreign-owned plantations with subsidies and an ensured labour supply, promoting them to the detriment of African agriculture. Poor peasants were prevented from making an independent living from agriculture by being forced to undertake migratory labour or grow compulsory crops, and the capital accumulation of the better-off was tightly controlled (Bowen 2000a: 1-4). As described in Chapter 3, the central region became a plantation economy worked by migrant labour producing copra, sisal, cotton, tea and sugar for export, subsidised by forced labour. From the point of view of the metropole,

---

<sup>119</sup> From 1930 to 1960, the white population of Mozambique rose from 18,000 to 85,000 (Minter 1994: 14).

Salazar's policies were successful: by the 1940s the colonies supplied all of Portugal's cotton needs, and four-fifths of this came from central and northern Mozambique (Clarence-Smith 1985b: 150).

In the 1950s and 1960s there was some reconsideration of agrarian policies, and development planning was introduced (Galli 1987: 35). Although expansionary economic and trade policies were primarily intended to stimulate Portuguese immigration, specialised African commodity producers were actively supported in a few areas, including upper Zambézia. Some richer individuals in Alto Molocué district (see Figure 1.2, page 16) managed to become *agricultores*, a status which exempted them from compulsory work (see Mackintosh and Dolny (1982), Mackintosh (1983-85, 1987); also page 122) and allowed them to employ labour. But only from the 1970s was significant investment made in indigenous agriculture. This was partly an attempt to 'buy' the loyalty of those who were starting to support the independence movement, as well as the result of the late colonial policy of economic development.<sup>120</sup>

I have shown here that a commitment to economic 'development', sometimes for the sole benefit of the metropole, sometimes more broadly defined, was behind much colonial policy. Yet in the years since Independence, this colonial 'development' – which profoundly affected the lives of rural Zambézians – has not been recognised or labelled as such. Instead it was defined as surplus extraction, under-development, or exploitation. It is not only present-day 'developers' who have apparently discounted this earlier history of economic growth and development. Frelimo socialists did the same thing, for rather different reasons. As the rest of the chapter makes clear, the people at whom 'poverty-alleviating development' is now being targeted are precisely those who were in the past drawn into the nexus of the capitalist economy through their involvement in waged labour. When this earlier 'development' collapsed, and the sectors in which they had once been employed ceased to function, many returned to small-scale farming and petty employment, and as such became the target for a new wave of rural 'development' interventions.

---

<sup>120</sup> The most significant legacy of this policy is the vast Cahora Bassa dam (Isaacman 2002, Isaacman and Sneddon 2000).

## 4.2 The Colonial Legacy


During the colonial era forms of economic change were initiated that transformed Zambézian lives and livelihoods. In exploring these changes further, I show that dualistic approaches, which unduly emphasise the distinctness of the rural from the urban, have long characterised analyses of rural livelihoods in Mozambique. Such approaches, repeated by groups and organisations as dissimilar as socialist Frelimo planners and reformers from the World Bank, derive from a weak grasp of historical context, and fail to engage with patterns of livelihoods created by a hundred years of exploitation, economic change, violence and ‘development’. In the case of ZADP, the result was that a project was designed with the intention of fostering a process that was already decades old, amongst people whose ways of life had already been radically altered by the colonial plantation economy, socialist planning, and war (c.f. Ferguson 1990).

As described in Chapter 3, Zambézian livelihoods were greatly altered by the development of the plantation economy from the late nineteenth century, and by Salazar’s attempts to make the colony pay its own way. From the 1930s, men from both Mutange and Mugaveia went to work on plantations for six months of each year. From Mugaveia men worked on the tea estates. Many, particularly before 1961, were ‘captured’ and forced to work, mostly at low-skilled pruning and weeding work. Others took the initiative themselves; these voluntary workers were considered more stable, and were often chosen for jobs in the tea factories (Cross 1992/4: 139). Men moved between compulsory and volunteer contracts. Thus some informants from Mugaveia spoke of working in the tea estates in terms of progression: starting off with pruning and picking work, then progressing to work as guards, supervisors (*capitões*), or inside the factories. Quite a few became carpenters or blacksmiths – these were year-round jobs – and accumulated money, skills and tools that later allowed them to set up on their own. To work for himself, a man needed to have a registered occupation. This could be as an *agricultor* (larger-scale farmer) like Nikomo Mwala or Jolio Campa in Mugaveia.<sup>121</sup> As an *agricultor* Nikomo was exempt from compulsory labour, had his own employees, and sold his produce to a tea company. Tio Daniel and Jolio Campa managed to get traders’ licences, and would cycle to Niassa province and bring back dried fish to sell.

---


<sup>121</sup> Before the war, Tio Daniel (our host) and Jolio Campa were the two ‘big men’ of Intuba. Sr. Jolio was an *agricultor*, with a hillside of pineapple plants. When the Renamo ‘bandits’ came during the war, they sought for both men. They found and killed Jolio; Daniel escaped as he was in Quelimane.

**Figure 4.1 Workers on tea plantations in the 1920s**



From Rufino (1929)

**Figure 4.2 Workers on tea plantations at the time of ZADP**



From project files

Men from Mutange were likewise made to work on plantations. Most of the older men I knew from Mutange had worked on the Naciaia sisal plantations, run by the Boror Company. One of the least popular crops, sisal grew in hot, shadeless plains, and was painful to handle. Vail and White found that work was considered so hard that labourers were only recruited with the intervention of administration police (1983: 895). While work on the Naciaia sisal plantations was most common, some men worked in factories, on the railways or the roads. Unlike in Mugaveia, where a considerable number of men had permanent work rather than just the compulsory six-month contracts, in Mutange this was unusual. Elda Essalamo's father worked on the railway line in Nicoadala District and he had a permanent job, which was considered advantageous at the time. The permanent jobs tended to be skilled, for example blacksmithing or machine operator work. One man had worked as a stonemason, and his salary was six times that of a field worker at Naciaia. There was also a very small amount of labour migration to South Africa. Mine work was remembered as being especially tough. Men would travel south in secret, either via Inhambane Province, or Malawi. They would receive a higher salary than was available locally, giving the possibility of bringing back prized goods, often sewing machines.

From the 1940s, women from Mutange were required to grow rice for a Portuguese concessionaire, and to sell a high proportion of their crop at a fixed low price (see page 112). Female informants told me that they were left with no time to grow rice for themselves. This led to modifications in farming patterns. More labour-intensive crops like sorghum and millet became less widely grown, while maize and cassava ('the lazy man's food' (von Oppen 1991)), though significantly less nutritious, became more widespread. Families had to buy maize flour or (their own) rice at prices that were often several times greater than they themselves had received (cf. Negrão 1995: 86, on Chinde District). Options were less constrained in Mugaveia. Women devoted themselves largely to family farming, and many sold small surpluses, generally of maize. Men's incomes could thus be devoted to consumer goods or productive purchases (tools, inputs etc.), unlike in Mutange where a substantial proportion of income was spent on food.

**Figure 4.3 Sisal plantation at Naciaia**



The Boror Company sisal plantations at Naciaia (from Rufino 1929)

Across the province a combination of forced labour, taxation and forced cultivation drew producers inexorably into the cash economy. Even in areas where there was no forced cultivation, demand still grew for the cash to buy expensive but labour-saving goods, such as manufactured tools, metal cooking pans and cloth. However the high price of these items required greater participation in the cash economy. Agriculture became increasingly wage-dependent (cf. van den Berg 1987 for Southern Mozambique). As a result, even after 1961, when employment was no longer compulsory, many still presented themselves for work voluntarily. This was particularly common in upper Zambézia, as working conditions on the tea estates were less onerous than those in the sisal plantations and factories, which started to mechanise at this time.

It was all but impossible to escape these changes. Even those who attempted to avoid the demands of the Portuguese state found themselves drawn into the nexus of labour markets and the cash economy, as the very terms of their resistance (mainly involving seeking work elsewhere) were defined by options determined by the colonial regime (O'Laughlin 2002: 16). Gestures of resistance often bound people even more tightly into capitalist relations of production. Working conditions might have been slightly less harsh on the Tcholo tea plantations of Mulanje in Nyasaland (see page 113), but at root a man was fleeing from one form of exploitative labour to another. When people sabotaged production (for example by boiling cotton seed so that it would not germinate (Isaacman 1996)), all they could hope was that their land would be reclassified for another form of exploitation.

These multiple pressures shaped rural livelihoods in a way seldom recognised by later planners and commentators. Central planners of the socialist era did not take account of the extent to which rural dwellers had become engaged with the market during colonial times. At Independence, Frelimo defined its agrarian policy in terms of 'development', drawing the distinction from the colonial period I noted in section 4.2, and defining its post-colonial project as novel. It was stated that 'building the foundations of Socialism demands radical transformation in the social relations in our country and the development of our economy' (Frelimo, Central Committee Report, Third Congress of Frelimo, 1977, p 35 quoted in Pitcher 1998: 124). For rural areas 'radical transformation' was to involve the eventual elimination of the peasantry, who would henceforth work either on state farms or cooperatives. It would be funded by rapid industrialisation and the development of a modern sector. In the short term, planners prioritised modernisation and industrialisation. They saw rural areas as populated by a homogeneous peasantry, outside and independent from a modernising state sector (O'Laughlin 1996, O'Laughlin 2000). Believing that the peasantry survived in a world somehow unconnected to the market, they therefore concentrated their efforts and resources primarily on urban areas. In the mistaken belief that peasants did not participate in the money economy, Frelimo planners thought that they would be able to survive without cash, while investment was channelled towards priority sectors (Hermele 1988). There was little recognition that the peasantry might suffer if goods became unavailable in local markets as a result of economic policy failures (Wuyts 2001: 5).

What investment in agriculture there was, was concentrated on state farms and the cooperative sector. The *aldeias comunais* (communal villages) into which the rural population was encouraged to move were intended to allow the better delivery of essential services, such as clean water, health and education. Seasonal migrant labour was considered pernicious; instead the nationalised plantations and settler farms were converted into state farms, which it was envisaged would be mechanised, and which would employ a smaller number of full-time workers. Other peasants were intended to work on producer cooperatives where productivity would be increased by mechanisation.

Later writers, including those whose political sympathies lay with the Frelimo socialists, have condemned these policies (e.g. Munslow 1984, O'Laughlin 1996, Wuyts 2001). Bowen's critique of Frelimo's early policies, which draws on ethnographic work carried out over more than ten years, is stark:

'It ... sanctioned policies that were antithetical to peasant farming. By concentrating investment in public-sector enterprises that aimed for an extremely high growth rate, Frelimo's socialist development strategy of rapid accumulation resulted in a shortage of goods in the countryside and unfavourable terms of trade for the peasantry. According to Frelimo, poor peasants were to be wage workers on poorly run state farms or join underfinanced cooperatives. Middle peasants were to renounce their own status by handing over their cattle, ploughs, tractors, and other resources to cooperatives. *In essence, Frelimo's agricultural strategy completely negated what independence meant to the peasantry*' (Bowen 2000a: 2, my emphasis).

Far from providing peasants, whether well-off or poor, with new and better options, Frelimo's policies left peasants in an even worse position. Wuyts (2001: 4) suggests that Frelimo mistakenly saw the Mozambican peasantry as 'uncaptured', to use Hyden's terminology (1980). Seeing accumulation by Portuguese settlers as having relied on the exploitation of the peasantry, Frelimo sought to break such links. But in fact 'unifying capitalist class relations cut across divisions between town and country, between peasant and workers, between settlers and Mozambican farmers' (O'Laughlin 1996: 3). The policies of concentrating investment on state farms, focusing first on the cities and restricting private markets all had the effect of reinforcing regional divides, creating hinterlands that were impoverished and open to Renamo assault (1996: 31).

**Figure 4.4 Destroyed cashew factory in Namacurra**



The destruction of the cashew factory in Namacurra was absolute, and cashew liberalisation policies imposed by the World Bank make it extremely unlikely that it will be rehabilitated. The factory continued to work under Frelimo, and the walls were still covered in exhortatory murals in 2001. On the far right, still clearly visible, Xiconhoca (see Harrison 1999: 540), the ‘enemy of the people’ can be seen corrupting youth, while in the middle another figure holds a plaque with daily production targets.

A dualistic understanding of livelihoods was by no means confined to socialist planners. Indeed Wuyts (2001: 1) has argued that there are important underlying similarities between the ways in which the peasantry was perceived during the period of central planning and that of liberal reforms. From both viewpoints the peasantry appeared more or less homogeneous. Both took an ahistorical perspective, sharing ‘a view that the character of the peasantry could be captured in a simple image – a model view – without much need for understanding the historical process and the path dependency of outcomes’ (1). Both thus shared a ‘blank slate’ approach. However Wuyts also argued that there was one crucial difference between the two approaches. Under central planning the peasantry were seen as *subsistence* producers, a perspective that did not recognise the fact that peasants depended on the market for both food and inputs. During the period of economic reforms they have been labelled as *smallholder* producers, a view that ignores long-standing links between household agriculture and

off-farm employment. But during both periods most rural dwellers in Central Mozambique derived their livelihoods from at least two sources. They have been substantial agricultural producers, producing both for their own consumption and for the market, while at the same time engaging in a variety of off-farm income-generating activities.

Over the course of the twentieth century intimate links were built up between rural and urban areas, and between household agriculture and wage labour. As O’Laughlin pointed out, the ‘agrarian question’ in Mozambique has long been seen in a misleadingly dualistic light, owing to a misunderstanding of the nature of rural livelihoods and of the historical processes that formed them (O’Laughlin 1996). In section 4.4 I will show how ZADP also fell into the trap of viewing Zambézian livelihoods in a dualistic manner, but I first look briefly at patterns of livelihoods that existed in Mutange and Mugaveia at the time of my fieldwork.

### **4.3 Contemporary Livelihood Diversity in Mutange and Mugaveia**

A discussion of rural livelihoods in Mutange and Mugaveia must start by emphasising the contemporary lack of material goods held by families and individuals. The possessions that families and individuals owned, or aspired to own, were doors, chairs, stools, knives, basic agricultural tools, pots and pans, radios, bicycles and metal roof sheeting. Not a single resident of either *localidade* had a vehicle, cattle, or powered agricultural machinery of any type.<sup>122</sup> When I first visited Mutange on a damp day in May 2000, this material poverty was borne in on me with particular clarity. I was accompanying a DFID review team on a rural visit; the rain was coming down in steady sheets and the Landrover growled steadily forward on the soggy dirt road. It was lunchtime, and we ate our sandwiches as we jolted along. When my colleagues threw their empty soft drink cans out of the window I was hard pressed to conceal my disapproval. I did not realise that these cans were prized, and that they would be picked up by the first passer-by. I had no idea just how few material possessions people living

---

<sup>122</sup> The head teacher at Nicoria school (Mugaveia) had an old and unreliable motorcycle, but he was not local. Tio Daniel had owned a vehicle before the war, which he had bought from a fleeing settler, but had no way of replacing it after it was burnt. Cattle had always been the property of settler farmers or plantation companies, not smallholders. Similarly, agricultural machinery had always been owned by individuals external to Mutange or Mugaveia.

in Mutange had, and therefore had not imagined how the uses to which a hard-to-come-by empty can might be put.<sup>123</sup>

Mutange was the less food-secure of the two *localidades*. 2000-2001 had been a dry year, and rice production had been lower than normal. 2001-2002, the agricultural year of my fieldwork, saw dangerous flooding in many parts of lower Zambézia. Although Mutange was far less seriously affected than other regions, the rice crop was again much reduced, and a substantial proportion of cassava rotted in the ground. The second season crops of beans (mostly cowpea and pigeon pea, *vigna unguiculata* and *cajanus cajan*) and sweet potato were successful, and the hungry season of December 2001 to March 2002 was no more severe than usual (see the comments made by the village President, page 62).

Although agriculture was an important activity for all households in Mutange (including the *técnico*, the health worker and teachers), almost nobody relied on it alone. Of 147 survey respondents in Namuinho, only three women claimed no non-agricultural activities. Castinha Nemes and Elda José were extremely elderly neighbours, dependent even for much of their food on Castinha's successful adult sons. Odete Lemeia was a very newly divorced young woman, who was living with two tiny children in a house belonging to her uncle. Six months later, when I went back to talk to her again, I found that she had moved, marrying a man with a small trading business. A complete lack of non-agricultural activities was thus either temporary, or related to extreme old age and infirmity.

Although there was a reasonable range of off-farm activities in Mutange, many were still related to agriculture. The most common was the distillation of *catxaço* (107 households), using sugar cane grown by the family. 76 households acquired money from *ganho-ganho* (casual labour) on other people's *machambas*, while 33 earned money from carpentry or sawing planks. A number of men migrated temporarily to urban areas in search of work, often seeking construction jobs in Quelimane. Petty trade was carried out by some. This might just involve the sale of single cigarettes from the house, but a few men owned small stalls in the market-place beside our house, selling a much wider range of goods bought from Quelimane or Nicoadala. Petty trade,

---

<sup>123</sup> The main use of empty cans was as measures: small quantities of grain and beans were universally sold by volume (*uma lata de leite*, a condensed milk tin, *uma fanta*, a soft drinks can, *uma castel*, a beer can). They were also used to make lamps, and, more occasionally, drinking vessels.

*catxaço* distillation and carpentry were male activities, while *ganho-ganho*, which might be paid in produce, goods or money, was usually carried out by women. No one in Mutange depended on any kind of regular remittances from family members working away from home.<sup>124</sup>

To give a more vivid picture of the ways in which people made their living I now provide brief sketches of the lives of four informants from Mutange. Henriques Francisco became a friend in the early days of fieldwork. In his forties, he was a minor Frelimo official (*chefe da zona*). He was amongst the best-educated men in the village, with fourth grade schooling (the highest grade available locally when he was a child). He came from a family of carpenters. His father had worked six-month contracts on the sisal plantations of Naciaia, but between contracts divided his time between farming and sawing planks, which he would sell locally. His older brother also became a carpenter at a young age, while he (as the only other son) was given an education. He left school when he was about twelve, just after Independence, and began to work in his older brother's carpentry workshop. When the *aldeia* and agricultural cooperative were set up, he joined neither, though he did work in the *aldeia*-owned carpentry. When the war came, he fled, like almost everyone else. At one point his wife was captured by Renamo, along with his mother, sister and baby son. He never expected to see them again, but they turned up, a year and a half later, at the refugee camp. He was unable to continue his carpentry work as a refugee because there was no wood. Nor did he have land. 'Whoever had money did business', he said, but for himself he relied on government-supplied food, and on casual work on other people's fields.

When we knew him, Henriques had two wives, Julia and Helena, each of whom had a house in Namuinho. His main home was with his first wife, Julia, to whom he had been married for many years. They had four children. Henriques' carpentry workshop and his pigs were at their shared homestead, though Henriques determined how any money earned from either was used. The land for both homestead and *machambas* came from his family, as was customary, and was rich in valuable tree crops (mangoes, oranges, tangerines and cashew), as inherited land often was. Helena also had four children, but two were from a previous relationship. The *machambas* she farmed came from neither her family nor his, but were ones she and Henriques had

---

<sup>124</sup> The exceptions to this were two women whose husbands who had left Mutange in search of work and married again. These men generally brought gifts and money when they visited their first wives.

cleared and occupied. Similarly, the land where the house stood had been purchased (by Henriques), and was not family land. She had few trees, and the bananas and papaya she grew were sufficient only for family consumption. Although Henriques had experimented with ZADP activities, joining the Farmer Field School in 1999, he soon dropped out, deciding that the benefits were not worth the time taken. Considered one of the richest people in Mutange, with six pigs, he nevertheless did not have a bicycle; nor did he regularly eat either fish or meat. He did own a radio, kept at Julia's house. At the end of one conversation he asked us about what he should do with his money, because he had been saving, and now had close to MT 1,000,000 (about US\$ 50) – 'so much money that it makes me tremble', he said. He was concerned not to parade his wealth (hence his relatively restricted diet), so as not to attract the scrutiny of the envious, who might suspect him of using *droga* (sorcery) to get rich, or might ensorcell him themselves (see Chapter 7 for further discussion).

The life of Arminda Sambique was very different from that of Henriques. An elderly woman, once widowed and once divorced, she lived alone in a tiny house in Mapiazua, which her son had helped to build. He lived nearby, and her grandchildren were in and out all the time. As with Castinha Nemes and Elda José (page 144), maintaining good relations with this son was important; widows without adult sons were in a very vulnerable position, and were frequently forced to return to their natal families (see footnote 151, page 180 for more details). Although Arminda was old, she still had her own *machamba*, where she grew rice and cassava, and a second season crop of cowpea and sweet potato. She had no livestock and considered herself too old to care for anything other than chickens, of which at the time we interviewed her she had none. All had recently died, in one of the periodic epidemics that destroyed flocks. She earned a little cash each year by selling early rice – collecting a small amount prior to the main harvest, winnowing it, and selling it in the market by the tin. Otherwise she was dependent on her children.

Ricardo Bove, a young married man, was at home with his family when we went to see him. It was most unusual to find both husband and wife at home on a working day, but he explained that it was because one of his children was ill. Ricardo had a troubled family history. His father had died when he was very small (he worked at the Quelimane port, and died because of envy: 'people considered him rich'). During the

war Ricardo had lived with an uncle, because his mother had been captured by Renamo, with whom she spent many years. After she was freed, she married again, and when she moved to Mutange with her new husband, he moved with them. However he did not get on at all well with his step-father, and for that reason he married when he was still young, and left home. This did not solve his family problems, and about three years before we spoke to him he had been forced to leave his good land (on which we met him) and move away. Thinking that the problems were over, he later returned, but they had recurred. Shortly before we met him his mother had accused him of being a murderer who wished to kill his own sister. He thought this was because he had started to do well: he bought an oil drum (used for distilling *catxaço*), which cost him MT 150,000, and a bicycle. He had earned the money by sawing logs in the bush near Nicoadala, and bringing them back to Mutange for sale to carpenters. His wife had *machambas*, but he said that the sale of planks and *catxaço* was much more profitable. However as he sat cuddling his child he wondered about what was happening to his family, and whether the child's illness was connected to family envy: 'We don't know how to explain the disease. And our income has gone down – we are frightened of progressing now'.

Nunes Alberto, unmarried at 19, did not yet have his own household. Although he lived in his own house, he still ate with his mother and younger brothers. He left school after fifth grade, and started to work on his own. Although he had his own *machambas* of rice and cassava, he earned most of his money from making *catxaço*. To do this he chopped sugar cane finely, and left it in a big drum. After three or four days he would distil it, and take it to Nicoadala on the bicycle he shared with his brother. Nunes would take two jerry-cans (plastic flagons originally used for cooking oil), which he would hope to sell for MT 60-75,000, in measures (tins, again) costing MT 2,500. Although the price for which *catxaço* was sold in Nicoadala was the same as in Mutange, the advantage of going to Nicoadala was speed of sale (he could sell out in an hour, meaning he could go and return within a day, without needing to eat), and ease of buying goods. He used the money he earned to buy food and clothes, and things to sell in Mutange: cigarettes, salt, fuel. His *machamba* provided most of his food, but he also bought cassava and maize flour during the hungry season.

The cases of these four informants illustrate some of the ways in which people in Mutange made a living, and some of the factors promoting economic differentiation. None of the four had a regular salary or formal employment, but depended on a reasonably diverse range of income sources, many of which were linked to the wider economy. While in the past all men had been forced to work for plantations or other large companies, during my fieldwork men found it extremely difficult to get paid work of any sort. Instead they tended to spend a substantial proportion of their time on non-farm activities, such as brewing, petty trade, or carpentry. Brewing and petty trade required no particular manual skills, but carpentry did, and as the case of Henriques Francisco demonstrated, such skills were often passed on preferentially to family members. The capital for brewing and petty trade was often derived from the sale of rice, but despite this, manual arable agriculture was not seen as a viable way of accumulating wealth (see the comments made by a Frelimo leader on page 22). By contrast, agriculture was women's main activity, and they did most of the work on family *machambas*.<sup>125</sup> Men would participate in land clearance, and would help with activities such as sowing and weeding, but the main responsibility lay with women. Much of what was produced was for family consumption, but practically everyone sold a little of what they grew, either polished and in small quantities, like Arminda, or unpolished by the sack. Options for single women were far more constrained than those for single men.

In Mugaveia the situation was somewhat different, although livelihoods had undergone much the same process of change as in Mutange, and reliance on agriculture as a central income source had steadily increased since Independence. Agriculture in Mugaveia was more varied than in Mutange. In the rainy season virtually every household would plant maize and sorghum (*sorghum bicolor*). Those with suitable land would plant beans (mostly green beans (*phaseolus vulgaris*) and highland rice. They would also have a cassava *machamba*, generally intercropped with cowpea. Many grew peanuts and squash. Second season crops included more beans (including bambarra nuts and pigeon pea), and sweet potato. This range of crops meant that in most years Mugaveia was much more food secure than Mutange, and when I started my fieldwork I was repeatedly assured by informants that 'nobody from Mugaveia ever goes hungry'.

---

<sup>125</sup> Mechanised agriculture (for example the ploughing done by the tractor provided by ORAM to the Association of Mutange Villagers) was the sole preserve of men.

In fact, 2001-2002 was a disastrous agricultural year, with maize production at a small fraction of its usual level. Cassava production, the usual mainstay, was hit too, and at the start of 2002 there was an unprecedented exodus to Nampula province, where men and women did *ganho-ganho* (casual labour) in return for sacks of dried cassava which they brought back to sustain their families.

Informants said that agricultural production in Mugaveia was reasonable, and for those with the fertile land appropriate for growing green beans, it could be very lucrative. One variety of green beans, that had been introduced to the area by ZADP (known as *maixa*, speckled), sold for over MT 4,000/kilo at the start of the 2001 buying season, four times the price of maize. Most of those who had bicycles and radios had bought them with the proceeds of their bean *machambas*. Access to good land for beans was critical to success. Not only was such land limited, it was also at a considerable distance; at the busiest times of the year, many would choose to sleep up at their *machamba*, rather than walk many kilometres each day. Those with the best land had inherited it from family members who had claimed it in the past, which meant that those with an *agricultor* (see page 122) amongst their forebears were advantaged.

Non-agricultural activities were less prevalent in Mugaveia than Mutange, despite experience gained working for the tea companies. A lack of wood seriously limited options for men with carpentry skills, while the prevalence of cheap second-hand clothes meant that there was no market for hand-made clothes. There was relatively little petty trade: although many young men sold salt and cigarettes from their homes, there was no daily market. *Catxaço* distillation was not prevalent (sugar cane was less widely grown), and alcohol was produced solely for a local market. However quite a number of men undertook small-scale trading of eggs and chickens to Gurué; an egg purchased for MT 500 in Mugaveia would sell for MT 1,500 in Gurué. Likewise longer-term and longer-distance *ganho-ganho* migration was fairly commonplace amongst younger men.

Agricultural work was divided more equally between men and women in Mugaveia than in Mutange. Most men would spend a substantial portion of each day working on their *machambas* alongside their wives. However they and not their wives would be responsible for selling the produce, and they tended to take responsibility for more valuable crops like beans and peanuts. Produce was usually sold in Mugaveia,

either to visiting traders (of whom there were several in 2001, competing for the scarce harvest), or to young men from the area who had acquired enough capital to trade.

The trading undertaken by members of our host family in Mugaveia was on a larger scale, and did not take place within Mugaveia. Tio Daniel, former shopkeeper and car owner, had in the past bought produce at his shop, and sold it in Gurué or Nauela. However by the time I knew him he had given up: in 1999 a local bridge had collapsed, and several tonnes of maize he had bought had subsequently spoiled owing to damp. In 2000, a trader had used his shop as a buying post, but had failed to return to collect the maize he purchased, which remained stored in the old shop.<sup>126</sup> However his youngest daughter's husband continued to make his living from trade. Lita Namuteca lived in a small house about twenty yards from the old shop where we stayed. Her husband, a trader from Nauela, where Lita had been at school, visited between his trading trips, which would take him as far as Xai-Xai, in Gaza Province, Southern Mozambique. On one trip in March 2001, he bought 1000 kg of green beans from Carmona, a large Sunday market near Nauela at MT 5,000 /kg. He then paid MT 1.5 million for transport to Nampula, where he sold the beans on for MT 8,000 /kg.<sup>127</sup>

Trade on this scale and to this distance was extremely unusual in Mugaveia. It was significant that Lita's husband was from Nauela, an important regional trading centre, and had been trading since childhood. Much more common was the attempt by Beto, another son-in-law, to make money on a smaller scale, by selling mats. In April 2001, using money from the wages we paid him for cooking for us, Beto bought seventeen mats in Mugaveia at MT 10,000 each, which he intended to sell in his natal town of Molumbo (Milange District) for MT 25,000 apiece. Out of a gross profit of MT 255,000 he needed to pay for transport, and to find a way of getting the mats from his house to the main road. It appeared that he had counted on his connection with us to transport the mats to Gurué town, but owing to some probably mistaken moral qualms, I ruled this out. Unwilling to eat into his potential profit, Beto waited until he was able to get a lift for his mats as far as Gurué, with the trader who returned to collect the maize.

---

<sup>126</sup> Maize prices in 2000 were extremely low, and it was apparently not worth the trader's while to return. However in August 2001, long after Tio Daniel had stopped expecting him to return, but after steep shortage-induced price rises, he did come to collect his maize.

<sup>127</sup> In April 2002, this man suffered a catastrophic loss when his brother stole his entire working capital, and fled with it to Maputo. To make matters worse, Tio Daniel had also invested in the business. Such losses are fairly common, according to Bowen (2000b).

Beto himself followed in October. Assuming his other transport calculations were correct, and that he sold the mats at the price he hoped, he made around MT 165,000 over four months.

Raúl Muanavola was a little older than Beto, and was one of the better-off men in Mugaveia. Born in Intuba in 1963, he studied up to fourth grade, living with his brother who worked on one of the tea estates. When the time came for him to start work, he apprenticed himself to a tailor working for Tio Daniel, as he thought that the work on the tea estates was hard. He later became one of Tio Daniel's five employees. During the war years he moved to Gurué town, where he was able to set up a small business, using money accumulated from tailoring. He lived there, selling second-hand clothes and *capulanas* (sarongs) in the general market, until 2000, when he returned to Mugaveia at the urgent request of friends, who wished him to work in the area: 'we need people like you to help develop the area'. In Mugaveia he continued with his second-hand clothes business, but also set up a carpentry and started to farm. His carpentry workshop was larger than most, but was plagued by the same problem: a lack of wood. It had to be carried from Vehuia (a neighbouring *localidade*), which was costly. He sold the furniture he made in Gurué and Nauela. His farming was successful, and in 2001-2002 he had sizeable *machambas* of rice, beans, pineapple, maize and cassava, worked not only by him and his wife, but also by several *ganho-ganho* labourers (paid from profits from clothes and carpentry). Raúl also kept goats, which he had bought from someone who had received them from ZADP. Like most of the better-off, he was not involved in ZADP activities – 'I have my own projects', he said.

Julião Mauinto and Maria Naquele were a married couple; Julião, at 45, was old enough to have worked on the tea plantations before Independence, first as a domestic servant and then, after Independence, on the plantations. At that time Maria stayed in Intuba and worked on her *machambas* – smaller *machambas* than today, because her husband was not there to help. Julião worked on the tea plantations until the war started, and they fled. They spent the war years in the bush with Renamo. After their return to Mugaveia, they both devoted themselves to farming: 'nowadays the *machamba* is big, and we sell crops to buy clothes'. In addition Julião mended shoes. This was profitable, but was seasonal, because people did not get their shoes mended when they are short of money.

Timitório Sérgio was one of the young men who had tried leaving the *localidade* in search of work. In 2001 he walked to Malema (in Nampula province) and then caught the train to Cuamba (Niassa). He went with a group of friends, because his family was very short of material goods at home. They went from house to house looking for work. It was not difficult to find piece-work on maize or cotton *machambas*, or building ridges in *machambas*. At the end of six months he was able to buy a bicycle. All the time he was away he could send nothing to his family, because there was no one he could trust to take it. When he eventually returned to Mugaveia he brought plates and clothes, as well as the bicycle. But when the time came to go back, he chose not to go. He said that the family had suffered a lot as a result of him not working on the family *machamba*, and so intended to finish preparing the *machambas* and would then consider what to do next. That year they were planting particularly large *machambas*, having chosen to kill a pig, which they then shared with those who worked with them.<sup>128</sup>

Amélia Nalalaca was an elderly woman living alone, on the hillside below our house. Her first husband had died, and she had married again, becoming the second wife of a man who worked as a cashier for one of the tea companies. They separated in 2000, at her instigation: her church said that polygamy was wrong, and she wanted to be sound (*sã*) when she died. She never had children, and so lived alone. Her house was built when she was still married, using money her husband sent. Though it was still fairly solid, she was concerned about how she would maintain it, as she had no one to turn to: ‘When a woman gets old, they are said to be a witch (*feiticeira*), and nobody will come or let their child come near me, they think I will eat them.’ In the past she had ‘borrowed’ children to help her, but that was no longer possible.

These examples show that people in Mugaveia were managing to ‘get by’ through a variety of activities and strategies. Yet I still heard constant complaints about how difficult life was, and how much men wanted full-time work. A very small number had managed to obtain such work, often through family connections. Timitório Sérgio commented wryly that ‘if you don’t have a chicken to take to work, you’ll lose your job’, a point of view shared by many. Yet in a good agricultural year, people in Mugaveia were able to produce an abundance of crops, with substantial surpluses for

---

<sup>128</sup> The pig had come from his wife’s aunt; they borrowed two animals, and when they reproduced were allowed to keep some of the offspring.

sale. For the men who used energies once devoted to plantation labour to grow valuable food crops (mostly beans and peanuts), a high priority was the reestablishment of a reliable marketing network, which would prevent them starting the new agricultural year with produce lying unsold and uneaten in their granaries.<sup>129</sup> In the absence of formal employment, they at least wanted to be able to market their crops.

As this section has shown, in both *localidades* economic shifts connected with Independence and the war had led to substantial changes in livelihood patterns as formal work became hard to find. Whilst those who would once have had formal employment on the plantations were increasingly seeking work in the informal sector, families continued to maintain diversified strategies. All but the most elderly sold a portion of their crop, even if that meant they later had to buy food. Connections between rural and urban areas, although different from colonial days, were still very evident. There was also significant stratification, with some families managing to accumulate even in the difficult 2001-2002 agricultural year. Differentiation between households existed, although it was often carefully concealed for fear of destructive envy, as explained by Ricardo Bove and Henriques Francisco, and explored further in Chapter 7.

Connections and access proved to be important drivers of differentiation. This meant that some people were able to get lifts in government or project vehicles, were able to get their fields ploughed by the ORAM tractor (in Mutange), or had family connections that would allow them to travel cheaply. Ability to access resources was not necessarily connected to wealth; Castinha Nemes and Elda José (mentioned on page 144) had very few possessions and little strength to work, but were able to draw on Castinha's son's support. In Mutange, access to inherited land provided some households with valuable tree crops, whilst in Mugaveia access to fertile land appropriate for growing beans was important. Connections also affected people's ability to manage misfortune, as in the case of Odete Lemeia, who, as I discussed on page 144, married again very shortly after her divorce. As the daughter of a middle-ranking Frelimo leader, she was able to marry again quickly. Likewise, although Newcastle disease would strike chicken flocks at random, some were quickly able to start rebuilding their flocks with the help of friends and relatives (generally through

---

<sup>129</sup> During the year of my fieldwork, the agricultural year 2000-2001, there was such scarcity that there were unprecedented levels of theft from granaries.

loans, as in the case of Timitório Sérgio), whilst for others recovery was a much more lengthy process.

#### **4.4 Approaches to Rural Development and Poverty in ZADP**

In the last two sections I looked in some detail at changing patterns of rural livelihoods in Zambézia from the colonial period to the present day, emphasising their continuing and ever-changing diversity. As I argued at the start of Chapter 3, the designers of ZADP took little notice of this diversity, largely ignoring historical patterns of rural Zambézian livelihoods. They demonstrated little awareness of the long-standing factors affecting Zambézian livelihoods. The enormous upheavals of war, famine, slavery and forced labour that coloured nineteenth and twentieth century Zambézian history and created the diverse livelihoods characteristic of the province were not mentioned, whilst the impact of the war of the 1980s was exaggerated. I now build on my discussion of changing livelihoods to look at some of the problems with the ways in which Zambézia was imagined by the designers of ZADP. In particular I focus on the question of what rural poverty was, and how different commentators thought it might be combated.

First, it was assumed that ‘subsistence agriculture’ was the natural and historic pattern for the province. ‘Subsistence agriculture’ has two distinct meanings: production for own consumption, and making a bare living (Barker 1989: 61). The Project Memorandum did not specify which definition it intended. Although self-sufficiency agriculture was indeed common amongst the rural population at the time of project design, it was a ‘recent and unstable phenomenon’ (Marzetti 2001: 20). Project designers, apparently unaware of this instability, ignored the complex historical patterns of interaction and intermingling of family production and wage labour, of production for consumption and production for the market, and stated that ZADP should facilitate and promote an allegedly novel process of diversifying incomes away from ‘subsistence’ agriculture:

‘The Project will diversify small-holder food and income sources’ (DFID 1998b:1).

‘Phase II will build on these successes [of ZADP (I)] enabling the majority of farmers, who are currently dependent on subsistence agriculture, to move into the wider economy by improving household food security, increasing incomes and helping households accumulate assets which can be sold during lean times’ (5:1, 5).

The design of ZADP implied that such diversification was unprecedented. But as I have shown, income diversification had deep roots in Zambézia, where for many years most families had depended on a combination of family farming and wage labour. During the 1940s and 1950s, over 85 percent of available Zambézian men worked on the plantations (Hanlon 1984: 19). A minimum of six months of annual waged employment was compulsory for all non-Portuguese and non-*assimilados*<sup>130</sup>, and taxes had also to be paid. Not paying attention to historical patterns of livelihoods meant that ZADP was designed with the intention of fostering a process that was already decades old, amongst people whose way of life had already been transformed by the colonial plantation economy, a brief period of socialist planning, and war. As Sogge put it, (1997: 46) “‘Tradition’ is a highly relative matter where social upheaval and attempts at social engineering have been the order of the day for decades’.

Second, although some inequalities were recognised, project designers assumed that Zambézian rural society was largely undifferentiated. As a result, they connected poverty solely to household lifecycles. Although it was observed that ‘the family or small-holder sector is not homogeneous but diverse’ (DFID 1998b, Annex 1: 2), the only differences identified related to gender and wealth. Other factors, such as education, background or family, were not considered. Households were classified into more or less poor, and male- and female-headed. An apolitical analysis of poverty was developed through Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) work, which fed into project design (ZADP 1997). It focused on wealth and activities, and not the relationships that allowed for the production and reproduction of wealth. According to this analysis, widows and female-headed households were the poorest of the poor (defined as the bottom 25 per cent); they were labour-poor, and therefore cultivated small plots of less fertile land. They were able to do fewer off-farm activities, as they lacked both labour and cash. They therefore suffered a long hungry season, owing to low production, and were forced to sell their labour in order to feed themselves. This in turn reduced the labour left for agriculture, trapping them in a cycle of low production (DFID 1998b, Annex 2: 9). This representation of poverty assumed a relatively undifferentiated society and that being ‘poor’ was connected to life-cycle events. As poverty and vulnerability were associated with the ability to mobilise labour and cultivate land, the age and gender of the household head were of central importance. It was implied that,

---

<sup>130</sup> *Assimilados*, the assimilated, were considered ‘civilised’ and granted different legal status.

although richer and poorer people might exist side by side in rural society, no intrinsic relations of power or exploitation connected them (Duffield 1998). Even gender – though visible – was detached from its social and political context.<sup>131</sup>

ZADP interventions were designed to take account of this imagined context, where ‘subsistence’ agriculture was the norm, and society undifferentiated. They also reflected the sectoral divisions in DFID discussed in Chapter 2 (page 87). A close reading of the Project Memorandum shows that ZADP had twin aims: to promote simple economic growth, and to alleviate the position of the very poorest (defined by the project). These aims were potentially contradictory, and reflected the context of design. ZADP was the successor to ZADP (I), a rehabilitation project planned and implemented in the middle 1990s, and later criticised for ‘lacking a social dimension’ and failing to counter the propensity of liberal reform to promote economic differentiation (Duffield 1998: 11).<sup>132</sup> ZADP aimed to do more than simply improve livelihoods and increase incomes, because wealth differentials were defined as problematic. Differentiation was not to be encouraged: ‘the project should ensure that all disadvantaged groups benefit and that a widening of social and economic differentiation and increase in food insecurity is avoided’ (DFID 1998b, Annex 1: 2). Concerns about the poorest of the poor and the dangers of differentiation were expressed by then-influential Social Development Advisers. The continued focus on income generation, cash crops and economic diversification was in line with the analysis of the Renewable Natural Resources Department, and the Economics Department. The suggestion that project-led economic or social differentiation was unacceptable led to conceptual and practical troubles for a project designed to support income diversification and income generation.

However, for ZADP to operate, a path had to be negotiated through these implicit contradictions. This was done by adopting a number of – again conflicting – models of poverty reduction. The approach to poverty reduction taken was determined by the analysis of poverty upon which it was premised; as that analysis was somewhat confused, approaches to poverty reduction were likewise compromised. Two different

---

<sup>131</sup> PRA is discussed further in Chapter 5.

<sup>132</sup> Although framed in terms of poverty reduction, ZADP (I) did not initially have the institutional and social dimensions that became dominant in the design of ZADP (Winch, Diogo, and Pijnenburg 1996).

approaches can be discerned both in the Project Memorandum, and in subsequent activities.

First, it was suggested that the 'poorest' should be targeted directly. This was to be done mainly by a focus on women, and by establishing targets for women's participation in activities:

'Restricting credit to small amounts and for short periods will be less attractive to wealthier farmers who want credit to finance longer term projects... As the poorest of the poor as defined by the wealth ranking exercises are women, targeting women is also likely to target the poorest of the poor. Thus the aim of the credit programme is for membership of 70% of village banks to be composed only of women. Similarly half the FRG<sup>133</sup> members must be women. Tree seedlings and cashew nut improvement is likely to be more attractive to female headed households as they are more dependent on these crops for food, firewood and cash than wealthier farmers. Establishing trading and crop processing centres in villages will be of particular value to single women as they will both have a market for the small quantities they produce and be able to save labour by having their crops processed mechanically.' (DFID 1998b: Annex 2).

The argument that targeting women would automatically target the poorest was repeated at regular intervals through the Project Memorandum. 'The project specifically targets the poorest 25% of the population, many of whom are widows' (5); 'To ensure poorer farmers are targeted by the programme, the groups will be divided into subgroups for men and women' (Annex 2); 'The 'repaid' goats will be specifically targeted at widows and poorer families' (Annex 2).

The desire to work directly with the very poorest was put into action in the early years of the project. Goats were provided to widows, elderly women, and other female heads of household. But there were immediate problems. Goats were not easily managed by the labour-poor. They were vulnerable to neglect, and an extremely high death rate among animals provided to widows meant that activities soon had to be rethought. Moreover, providing valuable inputs like goats solely to the poorest groups proved socially divisive. As early as November 1999 a DFID review report remarked that 'it should not be assumed that targeting project outputs (e.g. goats) directly at the poorest is necessarily the best way to reach them' (Draft of DFID 1999b).

This marked a move away from the direct targeting of the 'poorest of the poor', as mentioned in Chapter 2, to a more abstract concern with 'poverty'. The same report remarked that

---

<sup>133</sup> Farmer Research Group.

‘It was generally agreed that there was a mismatch between the project outputs, which mostly relate to improvements in agricultural productivity, and the project target group of the ‘poorest of the poor’. The project team felt that most project outputs by their nature could not be expected to reach the very poorest individuals, who are the elderly and disabled – often barely economically active and depending on social safety nets – and that there is little scope for major changes in the nature of project outputs at this stage’ (DFID 1999b).

The mismatch between the nature of the activities being undertaken and the abilities and capacities of the intended target group was recognised. The activities undertaken were not immediately accessible to the labour-poor. Nor was it easy to square the circle of promoting financial sustainability whilst simultaneously targeting inputs on a group with extremely restricted access to cash:

‘The design of the project makes it difficult to focus on the stated target group; most agricultural interventions are aimed at the majority of poor but economically active peasants rather than the ‘poorest 25%’. There are tensions between objectives of financial sustainability and reaching the poorest (for example, cost-recovery pricing for tree seedlings produced in project nurseries)’ (DFID 1999b).

A serious clash between the overall goal of ZADP, which was ‘to increase household food security for the poorest groups in Zambézia’, and the simultaneous identification of ZADP as an agricultural development project was recognised in a draft report:

‘The successful implementation of most of its component production and marketing activities would be undermined if they were specifically targeted at the vulnerable poorest 25% of the households’ (draft of DFID 1999b).

This fundamental contradiction meant that ‘the log frame provides a major problem in determining an effective project strategy or guide to implementation’(draft of DFID 1999b).

At this stage, the project was informally refocused around the generally poor (the ‘economically active poor’ in project parlance). However the move away from the ‘poorest of the poor’ was never formalised, nor was it completely agreed. Reviews continued to assert that ‘it is important for the project to demonstrate how more disadvantaged groups, such as households headed by women, are able to benefit from project activities and whether the project is narrowing or widening inequalities at community level’ (DFID 2000c); and ‘despite attempts to target the poor they remain under-represented in extension activities and wealthier farmers continue to capture the benefits of group working’ (DFID 2001). The move away from working with the poorest of the poor was to some extent a pragmatic one, and the ideological concern for the poorest remained.

The second approach taken to poverty reduction was trickle-down. It was argued that the poor would work on the land of the better-off, who would require greater supplies of waged labour as they expanded their cropping area and productivity rose due to project interventions (DFID 1998b: 6). The move away from the direct targeting of the poorest towards a focus on the slightly better-off also assumed a trickle-down effect. However this was never directly investigated, despite the concerns of reviewers:

‘the unspoken assumptions of ‘trickle-down’ which underlie many project components also need examining. If the immediate beneficiary of a goat is a wealthy male, how likely is it that the offspring will eventually reach the poor, and through what mechanisms?’ (DFID 1999b)

Running alongside these two parallel approaches was a third assumption. This was that, although the Mozambican state was weak, owing to a lack of resources, it nevertheless ultimately retained responsibility for service delivery in the area of agriculture (DFID 1998b: 10). The exact limits of state responsibility for agricultural service delivery were under negotiation throughout the life of the project, but the basic assumption did not change. Indeed, it was strengthened, as the development of the centrally-designed PARPA (the Mozambique Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan, PRSP), and the move to SWAps and Direct Budget Support by donors demonstrated. The desire to engender government ‘ownership’ of project activities to ensure their ‘sustainability’ is another example of this.

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

I started this chapter with a discussion of the ways in which Mozambique has been simultaneously constructed as a desperately poor country, and a highly promising one, and what the implications of such a construction might be. Building on the insights of the last chapter, I showed that one of the functions of descriptions of the kind quoted at the outset was to dispose of history, rendering irrelevant any earlier periods of economic growth or ‘development’, however defined. I went on to argue that this was deeply unsatisfactory. Not only were there debates about the meaning of ‘development’ from as early as the end of the nineteenth century, but the economic policies followed by the various Portuguese colonial governments also had profound effects on the lives of rural Zambézians.

That Portuguese economic policies had an effect on rural livelihoods is indisputable; but can such policies in any way be described as ‘development’? And what are the connections between this earlier period of capitalist growth, industry and waged employment, and contemporary rural development projects, designed to alleviate poverty? These questions have been much debated. Rapley (1996) has shown, for example, that economic theories on ‘development’ tend to deal with exactly these subjects – capitalist growth, industrialisation, employment – while conversely many ‘rural development projects’ do not address these issues at all. But in Zambézia, as Ferguson also found in Lesotho (1990), the connection between the later rural development projects and earlier Portuguese economic policies is a direct and often personal one: the same group of individuals has been affected by all the different policies and schemes I have described here – the plantation economy, socialist cooperatives, and now projects like ZADP. In addition, both rural livelihoods today and people’s expectations about what livelihoods *should* be, are shaped by previous experience. The lack of acknowledgement of that previous experience, and the failure to set the current situation in a broader contextual understanding of changing patterns of livelihood, are at the root of the weaknesses in the dualistic models described. Yet, although weak, dualistic descriptions have had long currency, and constant repetition adds to their strength.

## **Chapter 5. Ascribing ‘Community’**

Over thirty years ago Hirschman observed that development ‘depend[s] upon a set of more or less naïve, unproven and simplifying assumptions’ (Hirschman (1967) quoted in Watts (2001: 287)). I look here at the implications of one such assumption in the context of ZADP: that ‘communities’ exist and can be worked with. I show that even when their daily experience revealed that there were no simple ‘communities’ Zambézia, ZADP staff continued to deploy the concept. This happened because the rhetoric of ‘community’ was intimately tied up with discourses of ‘participation’ and ‘sustainability’. It was possible because ‘community’ is an imprecise term, and its fuzziness ensured its continued usefulness. I furthermore argue that the definition of ‘community’ espoused by ZADP with the encouragement of its donor was one that delineated and determined the project’s ‘failure’. Given the destruction which designers believed the war had wrought (see page 101), it was their aspiration that ZADP should bring ‘community’ into being again. ZADP later accepted responsibility for its ‘failure’ to do so. Part of the purpose of the chapter is thus to argue that the project set itself an illusory and hence impossible task.

This chapter, in common with the past two, takes the Project Memorandum as its starting point. In Chapter 3 I looked at how a selective understanding of history led to an untenable emphasis on the war as a source of change, and to a weak grasp of the complex ways in which external interveners were perceived. In Chapter 4 I then broadened a discussion of project understandings of livelihoods and poverty to look at how discourses of novelty and innovation again allowed the past to be ignored. Here I move closer to project implementation, to look at how the ideological construct of ‘community’, and other supporting principles, affected the project’s operation. I argue that the particular set of definitions of ‘community’ adopted by ZADP led to two significant implementational outcomes. The first was the unintended and largely unnoticed exclusion of a significant number of potential participants: those who associated themselves with Renamo. The second was that the problems with the ZADP definition of ‘community’ in the end undermined the possibilities for both ‘community participation’ and institutional ‘sustainability’, themselves key project priorities.

I look first at the variety of references ‘community’ had when used by ZADP staff and reviewers. It was used to refer to people residing in a specific place; to cohesive social values, and to new forms of mutual organisation. In each case there were inconsistencies in definition, and the picture was complicated. Although I then turn to look at certain features of social life in Mugaveia and Mutange in some detail, this chapter is less about self-perception of a ‘community’ – ‘communities’ as ‘worlds of meaning in the minds of their members’ (Cohen 1985: 20) – than about the implications of attributing ‘community’ to others. I am writing about ‘community’ as imposed from outside by ZADP. That this should have happened is not unusual; as Nelson points out ‘community is a concept often used by state and other organisations, rather than the people themselves, and it carries connotations of consensus and “needs” determined within parameters set by outsiders’ (1995: 15). Although this outsider-determined aspect is not widely acknowledged, the ascription of community is nevertheless commonplace.

Defined, thus, by outsiders, ‘community’ turned out to be, to use the Comaroffs’ phrasing, ‘...known primarily by its absence, its elusiveness, its incompleteness, from the traces left by struggles conducted in its name. More aspiration than achievement, it retreats before the scrutinizing gaze’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000: 330). In fact the Comaroffs were here writing not about ‘community’, but about ‘civil society’; the point is however equally valid for both concepts. ‘Civil society’ and ‘social capital’ might well have been used in the same way as ‘community’ in ZADP – both were fashionable phrases and concepts in Mozambique during my fieldwork – but the rhetoric of ‘community’ as an even more malleable and polysemic concept was never displaced.

### **5.1 Unpicking Abstractions: Referents of ‘Community’ in ZADP**

‘Community has never been a word of lexical precision’ wrote Cohen (2002: 165), and, as is the case for all similar terms in social science, a simple and satisfactory definition has indeed been impossible to agree. For decades scholars have pointed to the inherent difficulties of definition (Hillery 1955, Stacey 1969: 134, Guijt and Shah 1998b), and for a time futile attempts at such definition consigned the field of community studies to ‘an abyss of theoretical sterility’ (Cohen 1985: 38). The term has been used to refer both to the thick social relations between individuals living in geographical proximity (Amit 2002b:4), as well as to Anderson’s (1983/1991)

‘imagined’ or ‘affective’ relationships, decoupled from geographical location. Many authors have now decided there is little mileage in scholarly definition (see contributions to Amit 2002a), and have turned their attention instead to descriptions of the word’s everyday use (Cohen 2002: 165).

For in popular discourse the term has persisted, a ‘warmly persuasive word’ (Williams 1976: 66), which ‘evokes images of meeting people’s real needs and widespread participation at the grassroots level, thus creating a normative sense of “a good thing”’ (Guijt and Shah 1998b: 7-8). Its resilience to critique should not surprise us: its very ambiguity ensures survival. Terms like ‘community’ ‘persist in usage because they evoke a thick assortment of meanings, presumptions and images... Invocations of community thus pivot on a constant tension between impulses towards or experiences of sociality and platitudes of classificatory fellowship’ (Amit and Rapport 2002: 14).

In the context of ZADP design, ‘communities’ were mentioned in the first three paragraphs of the Project Memorandum, in conjunction with each project component:

1.1 ...The Project will diversify small-holder food and income sources and develop *community* based organisations which will eventually be capable of initiating and managing their own development programmes.

1.2 ...The project will assist *communities* in all three districts to assert their legal rights over land they have traditionally used, now threatened by applications for concessions by large scale interests.

1.3 The project will assist *communities* to move away from subsistence agriculture, and diversify their income sources by initiating savings and credit...

(DFID 1998b: 1, my italics)

The term continued to be liberally and loosely used through DFID review reports, emphasising the continued importance the donor attributed to the term.

‘Community’ was invoked by ZADP staff in a number of different ways. By the time I worked out that the word was most frequently used in an affirmative motherhood-and-apple-pie sense, I found that I too had adopted the sloppy usage and un-thought-through assumptions that went along with it. I heard myself talking about ‘my work with communities’, caught myself failing to ask what people meant when they said that a new activity had been ‘prioritised by the community’. Like my colleagues I found the word to be a useful cover-all, with what I now realise to be

considerable power given by its comfortable ambiguity. In everyday usage it had three main references.

First and most commonly, it referred to a place, either a *localidade* (population 4,000–15,000), a *célula* (population 800–4,000), or some smaller division of a *célula*. ‘*O nosso trabalho com a comunidade*’ meant no more than ‘our work in the village’, and *comunidade* was the usual Portuguese translation of ‘village’.<sup>134</sup> By extension, it also referred to the population of the *célula/localidade*. It was assumed that there was one and only one identifiable ‘community’ in any given location, and that social, administrative and resource boundaries were coterminous (cf. Cleaver 2001: 44). This recalls the error made by Frelimo policy-makers in the 1970s, who assumed that the peasantry was homogenous and independent, when in fact it was characterised by fractures and segmentation (Wuyts (2001); see also page 140).

Second, ‘community’ implied internal cohesiveness, shared interests and homogeneity. Ideas about representation and leadership drew on this assumption of cohesion. Designers of ZADP took for granted that through the mediation of legitimate ‘community leaders’, ‘communities’ would be able to organise themselves, pay for the services of Community Extension Workers (later facilitators, see page 191), and work in groups (DFID 1998b). *Técnicos* would frequently say that a particular person had been ‘chosen by the community’ for a job. The implication was that ‘the community’ was a unified body capable of decision-making, and at times even of thought (Douglas 1986).<sup>135</sup>

The implications of this homogenising vision can be seen most clearly in the PRA activities carried out before ZADP started, briefly described in section 4.4. In 1997, a series of four to five day PRA exercises were carried out in a number of ZADP *localidades* by a mixed team of senior staff, *técnicos*, and government workers. Designed and implemented with a great deal of dedication, the exercises included historical timelines, mapping, Venn diagramming (of significant institutions), household budgeting, seasonal calendars, food calendars, gender division of tasks, daily timetables, pie charts of income sources, prioritisation of ‘general’ problems (transport, hospitals,

---

<sup>134</sup> Village translates as *aldeia*; however in Zambézia this word was only used to refer to *aldeias comunais*, communal villages.

<sup>135</sup> The World Vision country director once described to me a process (not connected with ZADP) that she said ‘makes the community think, and make decisions, and prioritise’. See also page 90.

unemployment etc.), prioritisation of agricultural problems, and the development of possible solutions to agricultural problems. An immense amount of data was collected, although only a small proportion was analysed in the report produced (ZADP 1997).

**Figure 5.1 Participatory Impact Assessment, 2001**



Women 'prioritising needs', many of which ZADP was unable to satisfy.

As many before me have observed, participatory approaches rely on a notion of 'community' (e.g. Crewe and Harrison (1998); Guijt and Shah (1998a), Cooke and Kothari (2001). PRA, used extensively during the ZADP design process, naïvely privileges the collective or 'community' level, allowing insufficient attention to be paid to social differentiation or class, and inappropriately imbuing 'communities' with agency (Francis 2001: 79). 'PRA techniques are biased towards seeing 'communities' as consensual and harmonious' (Mohan 2001: 159). Green goes further, pointing out that 'as collective agency is critical to community development, participatory

interventions are primarily concerned with the construction of the right sort of knowledge as a precondition of its achievement ' (2000: 71).

As I discussed in the last chapter, project designers assumed that Zambézián rural society was economically undifferentiated. Although definitions of wealth groups were elicited in the PRAs, no sustained consideration was given to why certain people were poor and others rich. There was no analysis of who participated in the PRA exercises, and it was supposed that those present spoke for the entire community. It was also assumed that the group present would suggest and prioritise activities that were suitable for the poorest twenty five percent of this otherwise undifferentiated 'community'. (Singular) 'community' maps were produced, and prioritisation of needs and problems was done by gender-divided groups. The assumption of homogeneity made in these PRAs was deeply instilled into project staff. When I asked the Project Anthropologist, himself a Zambézián, to whom he was referring when he wrote about 'community-prioritised bridges', his answer focused on sameness and shared interests:

'It was all the community because our PRAs were developed openly... There were women, men and youth... If I look at tables made during PRAs in 1997 and 1998, there are many needs presented by communities, not by one person in the community, but by the community. I was there and I witnessed it.' (E-mail, 28.11.02)

PRA smoothed over conflicts and political difference. Some social and wealth stratification was acknowledged by ZADP, but an underlying commonality of interest was still assumed (Li 1996), and processes of enrichment and impoverishment were not considered. Although the lived experience of *técnicos* showed them that the relationships between rich and poor were not power-free, and that 'communities' were constituted on the basis of divisions as much if not more than of consensual harmony (Nuijten 1992), this understanding was not reflected in 'participatory' work.

A third way in which 'community' was used was in connection with eroded social norms, and their replacement with 'new' NGO-mediated social forms. Whilst the existence of 'community' was affirmed and indeed taken for granted in the planning and implementation of numerous project activities, project design was nevertheless based on the belief that 'community' had been drastically eroded and weakened during the war years. The Project Memorandum was explicit: the war was blamed for the destruction

of ‘most of the previous community structures’, ‘communities that lack cohesion and, to some extent, trust’, and changes in the ‘customary systems of the various matrilineal and patrilineal groups’ (DFID 1998b, Annex 1:1, 11, 3). The 2001 DFID review report commented that ‘it is perhaps too soon to expect attributable impact given the difficult environment in which the project operates and where community cohesion is still fragile and community awareness weak’ (DFID 2001), and in 2002 the World Vision country director echoed these sentiments:

‘[when the project began] there was no social cohesion... Those people were displaced, many if not all of them. They were either returning from the capital city or from another country, and that had enormous impacts on the social structure, and the lack of trust.’

Following on from this, ‘community’ was used to describe the institutions that the designers of ZADP hoped would fill the void believed to have been created by wartime dislocation. It was intended that the space left by the destruction of ‘community’ would be filled by organisations such as ‘community-run development committees’, which would in an egalitarian manner appropriate increased levels of collective production and testify to growing ‘social cohesion’. This was important; as a reviewer of DFID policy in Mozambique wrote, ‘in relation to the social dimension, a measure of a project’s success is how far it strengthens and contributes to the re-emergence of social cohesion. This is especially the case with regard to new forms of collective organisation and reciprocity’ (Duffield 1998: 28). For a brief period (at the time of the Mid-Term Review described in Chapter 2) this was referred to as ‘building social capital’ (Bias et al. 2001, DFID 2001), but in the context of ZADP the new vocabulary was not adopted.

ZADP staff thus used the term ‘community’ to refer to three distinct things: geographical area; cohesive social relations; and what was perceived as the replacement of ‘traditional’ institutions and ties with new, more meaningful and less hidebound ones. These were of course not interchangeable meanings; rather they delineated the edges of a field labelled ‘community’ by the project, and provided a way of discussing – and sometimes of avoiding discussion of – these themes.

## 5.2 Seeking ‘Community’ in Mutange and Mugaveia

I now consider what the three referents of ‘community’, as used by ZADP staff, meant in my field sites. It will come as no surprise that understandings of place, forms of leadership, sociability and mutual behaviour bore little resemblance to those the last section showed that ZADP designers assumed existed. As Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 have already demonstrated, the history of Zambézia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries involved displacement, violence and labour expropriation. Independence brought positive changes to very few of those who lived in Mutange and Mugaveia, with only a handful of people benefiting from the imposition of *aldeias comunais* and agricultural cooperatives. The fighting between Renamo and Frelimo forces, which led to the abandonment of both *localidades* for many years during the war, fed on ethnic, regional and local discontent. Though the war had been over for a decade by the start of my fieldwork, the sources of conflict had not vanished.

After I had been working in the villages for some time, I came to realise that the word ‘community’, *comunidade*, was seldom used unless I prompted it. The words more commonly used to group people were *povo* (populace) or *população* (population). *Povo* was the term used by the older generation of Frelimo supporters: a word which had strong currency during Frelimo’s socialist period. *População* was a more neutral term used by everyone to refer, in the most general manner, to the people living around and about. *Comunidade* was seldom used, with two exceptions. First, it referred to the congregation of a church, particularly when they got together to do something. The widow living below us in Mugaveia had her roof repaired by ‘*a comunidade da Igreja União Baptista*’ (the Baptist Union congregation), and ‘*a comunidade católica*’ (Catholic congregation) cleared the roads of overgrowth when the padres visited at Easter. Second, the word was used by those most enrolled in the project, in particular facilitators,<sup>136</sup> to refer to the population of the *célula* or *localidade*. For example, if I asked who had chosen someone for a particular position of project responsibility the answer was almost always ‘*a comunidade*’.

---

<sup>136</sup> Facilitators were ZADP’s local collaborators. I describe them in detail on page 90.

## Defining Place

As discussed above, in general ZADP parlance ‘community’ was used loosely to refer to the population of an administratively-defined *célula* or *localidade*. It was assumed that these boundaries were locally recognised and legitimate, and that the people living within a *célula/localidade* identified themselves as belonging to a group. In Intuba (Mugaveia) this was not the case. In my survey just 153 of 252 respondents said that they lived in ‘Intuba’. The others identified themselves as coming from places that neither state nor project recognised – Nicatxaca, Naminhoso, Mucuiipi, Nwola, Mualaworipa, Murapani, Murapa, Erequele. These hamlets were of varying size and status, ranging from a cluster of houses little bigger than a homestead, to a substantial area with its own party leaders and churches. In Mutange the situation was rather different, as ZADP staff mis-recognised what were officially hamlets (Mapiazua, Namuinho A, Namuinho B, locally referred to as *bairros*), and termed them *células*, thus going against governmental classification, but matching locally recognised boundaries.

If we accept the obvious point that administrative classifications are not automatically legitimate, then the question is what these boundaries *did* mean. In both Mutange and Mugaveia the *localidades* were old *regedorias*, territories ascribed to the *régulos* who formed the bottom level of the Portuguese colonial administration, and who controlled the population living within their areas of influence. Frelimo did away with many of the trappings of colonialism at Independence, but administrative boundaries did not change, though the *régulos* lost their position. This meant that while disputes about the exact position of the boundary between *localidades* were common, the existence of the boundary was undisputed, and considered to be ancient.<sup>137</sup>

A sense of place shaped interactions within each *localidade*. Physically the two places were very different. Mutange, a small *localidade* with a more clustered population, had a *centro* (centre) where the market, health post, improved school, and *técnico*’s house were concentrated, and where we lived. Marking the end of the road and at the intersection of many paths, it stood on the site of the former *aldeia comunal*

---

<sup>137</sup> People would frequently refer to ‘the old Portuguese maps’ as if they were a source of legitimate knowledge and power. However as Kloeck-Jenson pointed out, these maps generally dated only from the 1960s, and were produced with the aim of segmenting populations, not carefully marking recognised boundaries (1998: 455).

and cooperative shop. The reputation of the local health worker brought patients from many miles around, and Jacinta's house was often a centre of project-related activity. Half-way through my fieldwork a building for the *localidade* Executive Council was constructed opposite our house, and Frelimo leaders congregated there. There were always plenty of people hanging around at the *centro*, mending bicycles, drinking *catxaço*, conversing or just passing by. On Thursday and Saturday nights a disco operated in one of the larger huts, with music from a stereo system run off a car battery.

Mugaveia had no such centre. The *localidade* was far larger, so large that I never visited great swathes of it (see footnote 19). The population was correspondingly greater and, unlike that of Mutange, thinly spread. Family compounds were separated by hundreds of yards, often perched on the top of ridges, or on the sides of hills. There was no daily market anywhere near where I lived in Mugaveia, there were just two sites where people congregated to sell things after church on Thursdays and Sundays. People lived far more separate lives in Mugaveia than in Mutange, and it was not uncommon for those living in the same *localidade* not to know each other by more than sight or parentage.

*Localidades* were not islands, but were connected to regional, national and global networks. Over the course of the twentieth century people became bound to the global capitalist economy through compulsory labour expropriation and migration (O'Laughlin (2000), see also Chapter 4). In my experience, people in Mutange and Mugaveia had many links with friends, relatives, traders and employers living and working away from the immediate *localidade*. Earning and spending money was something that took people outside the *localidade*. As discussed in section 4.3, a number of young men were involved in petty trading, taking chickens, eggs, *catxaço* and furniture for sale in district capitals, and bringing back cigarettes, salt, soap, and other low-value goods. From Mutange men would travel either to Nicoadala or Namacurra towns (both district capitals), and much more occasionally to Quelimane. These links were strong, and there was a regular traffic of bicycles and pedestrians. From Mugaveia men would visit either Nauela (in Alto Molocué district) or Gurué. It was not unusual for men with bicycles to travel more than 100 km to sell a tin (25 kg) of grain. The *localidade* of Mugaveia was isolated, and many (including most women) had not visited Gurué town for several years. Few were employed on the tea estates at the time of my fieldwork;

their workforces had been in decline since Independence. However if anything this increased the value of hard-won linkages with outsiders, and the importance of patrons external to the *localidade* (I discuss the project as patron in Chapter 6).

Although the ZADP definition of ‘community’ envisaged place as unproblematic, in actual fact boundaries were fluid, negotiated and contested. Although geography and geographical location shaped social interaction, scales were variable, both with networks stretching far beyond the reach of either *localidade*, and interactions at times limited to within much smaller hamlets.

### **Cohesion or Division?**

Both for ZADP staff, and for people from the two *localidades*, place – although differently delineated and imagined – was important in creating a sense of belonging. What though of the internal cohesion and legitimate representation which ‘community’ had implied for the designers and implementers of ZADP? These did not find a simple reflection in Mutange or Mugaveia. As is the case the world over, numerous divisions, differences and subsets could be discerned in both *localidades*. Within each ‘community’, as defined by the project, there were political divisions, social and economic differentiation, religious differences, and power struggles. Having looked briefly at economic differentiation in the last chapter, I now focus on the most notable and fundamental of the divisions: political difference between Renamo and Frelimo.

It should be borne in mind throughout my discussions here that I was far from a neutral figure in the two *localidades*. As a presumed employee of World Vision, travelling in a World Vision vehicle, I was assumed to have close links with the government, state and party. My sympathies were thus perceived to lie with Frelimo. It was not possible for me entirely to dispel these beliefs, which were deep-rooted. However, as recounted on page 62, I made attempts from the very start to consult with leaders from both political parties, and frequently returned to talk to them. In Mugaveia, where we were forced to work with a Frelimo *secretário* and a Renamo *mambo*, I built up good personal relationships with Renamo members and leaders. Nevertheless, I should repeat that the ways people related to me throughout my research were coloured by the assumptions they made about me; never was this more the case than in political discussions.

A brief introduction to the recent national-level history of Frelimo and Renamo has already been given (pages 108 ff.), but some comments on the ways in which both movements/parties have been written about over the last thirty years are appropriate. In power ever since Independence in 1975, Frelimo initially escaped serious criticism, as ideologically committed scholars were wary of disparaging party efforts (see for example Munslow 1983, Wield 1983, Isaacman and Isaacman 1983, Hanlon 1984). As the war worsened through the 1980s, it gradually became clear that what had started out as externally-supported destabilisation had developed many of the characteristics of civil war, and analysts sought explanations for what had gone wrong (Geffray and Pederson 1986, 1991, Clarence-Smith 1989, O'Laughlin 1992). With the 1992 Peace Accords Mozambique's period of single-party socialist rule came to an end, and the international community was intensively involved in the establishment of multi-party democracy. Multi-party rule has so far not loosened Frelimo's grip on power. Until 2003 (i.e. after the end of my fieldwork) Frelimo remained in control of all elected bodies, although some concessions to Renamo have been exacted in the interest of creating and maintaining multi-party democratic rule (Manning 2002).<sup>138</sup> In recent years the increasingly intimate relationship between the Frelimo leadership and international donors has drawn criticism even from former supporters of the party (e.g. Hanlon 2001, 2002a, 2002b), but commentary has remained focused at the level of national politics.

The history of writing on Renamo is very different. At first authors struggled to understand the organisation, programme and operation of the movement,<sup>139</sup> and much emphasis was placed on its brutality and lack of political programme (e.g. Magaia 1989, Derluagian 1989). While scholars of Frelimo were initially most unwilling to criticise the party, scholars of Renamo were even more unwilling to admit any legitimacy to a movement they conceived of as utterly vicious. Yet from 1994 the analytical environment gradually changed. Scholars, journalists and development workers have marvelled at the transformation of Renamo from vicious guerrilla movement to

---

<sup>138</sup> On 19<sup>th</sup> November 2003, Renamo contested the municipal elections and won control of four municipalities. This was the first time in independent Mozambique that any elected body was not controlled by Frelimo. However as this happened after my fieldwork was complete, and Renamo did not win any of the four Zambézia municipalities, further discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis.

<sup>139</sup> The only book-length study of Renamo of which I am aware remains Vines (1991), much revised in 1996. Other significant writers on Renamo include Darch (1989), Tajú (1989), Minter (1989b), Young (1990), Morgan (1990), Roesch (1990); Hall (1990), Nilsson (1993a, 1993b) Cahen (1998) and Manning (2002).

minimally effective political party, capable of competing in national and municipal elections (e.g. Harrison 2000, Schafer 2001, Manning 2002, Carbone 2003).

In rural Zambézia, Renamo dominates elections, and won more than double the Frelimo vote in 1994 and 1999 in both Mutange and Mugaveia (see Table 5.1).

**Table 5.1. 1999 Legislative and presidential election results**

	Legislative Elections (%)		Presidential Elections (%)	
	Frelimo	Renamo	Chissano	Dhlakama
Mugaveia	30	61	29	71
Mutange	24	54	31	69
Zambézia average	26	59	30	70

Compiled from CD-ROM issued by CENE

Yet despite its local popularity, I often heard accusations of backwardness, primitivism, and *obscurantismo* (obscurantism) made against its supporters by village notables, traders, project facilitators and *técnicos*, who tended to vote for Frelimo. As is the case across Mozambique, there was a widespread prejudice against Renamo amongst the better-educated, who saw it as a party with no clear aims and objectives, supported by backward and illiterate rural dwellers. Such people tended to categorise Renamo supporters as ‘very confused’ (*muito confuso*), complicated (*complicado*), closed (*fechado*), and with unclear heads (*com cabeças escuras*). Project problems were often attributed to Renamo people causing trouble, and in Mugaveia they were even blamed for persistent rumours about child-stealing, murder and organ theft (see Chapter 7).

By contrast, Frelimo adherents in the two *localidades* tended to identify themselves with modernity and, crucially, with ‘development’. In this they took on the modernising rhetoric of the party at a national level, which dated from the early days of Independence (for a discussion of this see Hall and Young 1997: 90-4). Members self-consciously contrasted their own ‘open’ (*aberto*) minds with the ‘closed’ minds of Renamo members. The *secretário* of Inlixé (Mugaveia) made the point that he, unlike Renamo people, understood and welcomed ‘development’:

‘He said that he understands our work because he knows what development means. He knows this because there have been many meetings, meetings with government and NGOs and others who talk about development. However those from Renamo have a less clear idea (*concepção reduzida*) because of having spent so long at war. To this day many do not manage to travel far, and understand everything wrong (*percebem tudo mal*) and for this reason they don’t understand what development is.’ (Rita’s field diary, 28.03.01)

It is important to realise that this labelling went beyond the simple caricature of one party by another. For many years Renamo cultivated its links with ‘traditional leaders’ (*régulos, mambos, mwenes*), and in both Mugaveia and Mutange ‘traditional leaders’ supported Renamo.<sup>140</sup> By contrast, Frelimo divested *régulos* of their powers, discouraged religious practice, and outlawed traditional ceremonies such as rain-making. In the area of ‘development’ and modernity, although it was Frelimo that claimed ‘development’ as part of its self-image, Renamo leaders did occasionally dispute the party political identification. In Mutange one Renamo leader specifically said that ‘we are all together for the development of Mozambique, parties have nothing to do with it’. In Mugaveia, whilst Renamo members distanced themselves from accusations of child-stealing, witchcraft, and undermining project activities, they did not identify themselves as pro-development.

On an everyday level, deep political divisions characterised both *localidades*. Each household had a political affiliation, and – as both parties had substantial local representation – a preferred local leader.<sup>141</sup> Although the *localidade* President was ostensibly in charge of all residents, he was not deemed legitimate by Renamo members, who asserted the equal right of the *régulo* to be considered as a neutral leader of all. It was thus impossible to identify any single person who was ever considered to be a leader of the whole ‘community’, and it can therefore be argued that there was no single ‘community leader’.<sup>142</sup> Nor were ‘village committees’ formed at the behest of the government and/or NGOs deemed any more legitimate. The health, education and land committees – which were being set up during my fieldwork but had not started to function – had circumscribed roles and were strongly associated with Frelimo in any

---

<sup>140</sup> For comparative examples from Nampula province (where the same division generally applies) see Geffray (1986), Dinerman (1994, 1998), and Pitcher (1998).

<sup>141</sup> Political leaders were by far the most significant. Church leaders, though respected, had circumscribed authority, usually adjudicating within their congregations on what were known as *assuntos sociais* (‘social subjects’): family problems such as adultery, violence, or illegitimate pregnancy. There were many different religious sects, further fragmenting authority. Perhaps surprisingly, I knew no one who was both a political and a church leader.

<sup>142</sup> ZADP recognised community leaders, but what this implied for a singular ‘community’ was not considered.

case. Legitimacy was furthermore dependent on context. Whilst the knowledge of the Renamo-supporting *régulo* and elders was accepted and valued in the context of a boundary dispute between Mutange and a neighbouring *localidade*, in other circumstances no Frelimo member accepted the authority of a Renamo leader. Nor would a Renamo member necessarily agree to do what a Frelimo official told him.

Party organisation was broadly similar in the two *localidades*. The President was appointed externally, by officials at the level of the Administrative Post or District. Both Presidents were staunch Frelimo supporters, identifying and identified with the party. The Frelimo structure then followed the form of the Dynamising Groups set up in the 1970s, with a hierarchy of *secretário* (secretary), *chefes da zona* (zone chief), and *chefe de dez casas* (head of ten households), all of whom did the bidding of the President. Renamo followed a similar pattern. The *régulo*, also known as *mwene* in Mugaveia, was aided by a group of *mambos*, *chefes de murudha*, and *samassuas*. The Mutange *régulo* was the very man who had been deposed in 1975 (he died at the end of my fieldwork), while the Mugaveia incumbent was the nephew of the late *régulo*.<sup>143</sup> Other Renamo leaders were often family members of colonial leaders.

Although the structure of the two political parties may have been similar in the two *localidades*, their everyday presence and role was not the same. Political divisions were more tangible in Mugaveia than Mutange. In Mugaveia Renamo and Frelimo both held twice-weekly ‘problem-resolving’ sessions, when a number of senior members and leaders would congregate at their respective meeting places and try to resolve issues brought to them. I was never able to attend one of these meetings – they were seen as ‘political’, and thus not appropriate for me to investigate – but I was told that they mostly dealt with ‘social problems’. These were often similar to those taken to church leaders (see footnote 141). Wider problems between neighbours were dealt with here, including land disputes and the like. These meetings were also used to announce marriages: when a couple wished to marry they would go and inform the leaders of the party they adhered to, and the marriage would be considered official.<sup>144</sup> In another example of the parties getting involved in many aspects of people’s lives, one elderly lady told me that she was involved in preparing young girls for their initiation rites, held

---

<sup>143</sup> Inheritance of office in Mugaveia was by mother’s brother’s son, as with land inheritance.

<sup>144</sup> Church weddings were still considered ‘better’, but were often delayed until many years after the couple had started to co-habit.

under the aegis of Renamo. I later found that Frelimo-sponsored initiation rites were held, as well as others organised by churches.

In Mutange the situation was more fluid and less formal. There were no regular ‘problem-resolving’ sessions held by either party, and people did not work through the formal hierarchies when they found themselves in difficulties. Political persuasion, family allegiance, geographical proximity and the reputation of individual leaders affected people’s choice of where to take their problems. Though members of both parties would carefully describe the formal structures to me, and explain how problems should be referred first to the lowest level (the *chefe de murudha* for Renamo or the *chefe de dez casas* for Frelimo), in actual fact complainants tended to ignore structures, taking their problem to the leader they trusted most and who lived nearby. In some cases that would mean crossing *célula* or even *localidade* boundaries.

The significance of the difference between my two sites should not be overstated, as it was largely the result of context-specific factors. Personalities were influential. In Mugaveia, for example, the *régulo* was well-respected and unchallenged.<sup>145</sup> By contrast, in Mutange Renamo was poorly organised and inactive, partly because the old *régulo* (who died towards the end of my fieldwork) was ill and half-paralysed. Tomé Mutange,<sup>146</sup> the younger brother who eventually took his place, had a poor reputation and was frequently drunk. Abílio Catorze, a descendent of a *samassua* (deputy *régulo*), was in many ways the more important Renamo figurehead, coupling inherited legitimacy with energy and talent. However there was considerable rivalry between the Mutange family and Abílio Catorze, and they seldom met. Moreover experiences at the time of the aldeia comunal and the agricultural cooperative had given Mutange residents a firmer understanding of the post-colonial state, and a share of the resources it could command. For that reason Renamo was always significantly less popular in Mutange than in other surrounding Namacurra *localidades*.

In neither *localidade* was a distinction drawn between the ‘state’ and Frelimo. This was a legacy of the one-party state, and persisted a decade after the formal

---

<sup>145</sup> There was a ‘secondary *régulo*’, with a similar status to Abílio Catorze, in a part of Mugaveia in which I did not work.

<sup>146</sup> It was common for the *régulo* and *localidade* to share the same name, but this did not necessarily imply long-standing legitimacy. In Mutange both *localidade* and family had changed names within living memory.

establishment of multi-party democracy. Even at district level, state and party were intimately intertwined, and the linkage was still stronger in the *localidades*. Promotion within the government was said to be dependent on membership of Frelimo. It was certainly the case that government vehicles were used in Frelimo electoral campaigning, and civil servants used their official visits to *localidades* to lobby for the party (see Figure 6.1).<sup>147</sup> A *localidade*-level perception that state and party were identical, was thus strengthened not weakened by experience and observation. As noted, all *localidade* Presidents were Frelimo members. Some, as in Mutange, were salaried, chosen by the District Administration from the cadre of civil servants. In Mugaveia the President had been a loyal Frelimo supporter since 1975 and was promoted from (unpaid) party *secretário* to (unpaid) *localidade* President in 2000, when the previous incumbent abandoned his post.

Likewise all district and provincial structures, including the District Directorates of Agriculture and Rural Development (DDADR), with which ZADP collaborated and to which it provided substantial resources, were linked to Frelimo. ZADP provided the District Directors of Agriculture with vehicles, which were used for project activities, such as carrying staff and goats, and for government agricultural activities, for example transporting the *donativos* distributed after the 2001 floods. They were also used for party work, including electoral campaigning. Although ZADP technical and financial support to the DDADRs was conceived of by designers as politically neutral support to the state, in both Mutange and Mugaveia it was seen as support to Frelimo.

Both *localidades* were thus politically divided. As the election data (Table 5.1) shows, in both – as in Zambézia as a whole – Renamo was a great deal more popular than Frelimo. The strength of political feeling and the identification of state structures with Frelimo led to the almost complete boycott of state and state-identified activities by Renamo leaders and members in Mutange and Mugaveia, a tactic apparently used at all levels of the party. As Manning has written of national politics, ‘Renamo seeks to gain outside the formal system what it cannot win through formal competition, and Frelimo takes refuge in overly legalistic interpretations of the formal rules that maximise its own ability to control procedures’ (2002: 215).

---

<sup>147</sup> See Chapter 6 for a discussion of how this affected ZADP. White land rovers, ZADP’s vehicle of choice, were associated with government, as were the motorbikes ridden by the *técnicos*. Other vehicles rarely visited either village; I can count on one hand the number of times I saw a trader’s truck in either *localidade*.

I found for myself that it was unusual to find any Renamo members at meetings called by the *localidade* President, or held on *localidade* premises (see page 189). Rank-and-file Frelimo members identified the *localidade* premises as ‘theirs’. In Mugaveia the old Frelimo office had collapsed, and the *localidade* offices – supposedly designated for non-partisan activities – were openly used for party events. In Mutange, Frelimo members took for granted that the new Executive Council building would be available for party activities, and were taken aback when the (civil servant) President announced that it would be reserved for state activities. In actual fact Frelimo party meetings were indeed held there, reemphasising the state-party overlap.

Mutange and Mugaveia were thus characterised by political divisions. This did not match the cohesion which ZADP designers had seen as characteristic. I pursue this further later in the chapter, while in Chapter 8 I consider Manning’s (2002) argument that NGOs and donors have had a role in perpetuating the political divisions I have described, both at local and at national level. By providing formal recognition to President, *secretários* and *régulos*, projects like ZADP might be seen to have merely acted pragmatically in recognising divisions not allowed for by a majoritarian system, or to have provided options for negotiation outside formal political institutions, thus running the risk of undermining Mozambique’s fledgling democracy.

### **Destruction or Reconfiguration?**

Turning then to the destruction of ‘community’ as perceived by ZADP designers (page 166), what did the situation look like in Mugaveia and Mutange? First, linkages between families and individuals, though much altered during the war years, were never really ruptured (Bowen 2000b: 109 ff.). Indeed, the war offered opportunities to some people who were able to acquire new skills and profit from uncertainties. Displacement, though in itself an act of violence, did not ‘destroy’ ‘community’; rather the networks of differently-negotiated linkages and alliances were reshaped. With the ending of the war, and the return of many (though not all) to the lands from which they had been displaced, yet another reconfiguration took place, and new patterns of sociability and ways of living together developed.<sup>148</sup>

---

<sup>148</sup> Not everyone ‘returned’ after the war (Bowen 2000b: 109-110), but my fieldwork took place amongst those who had resettled.

Far from there being substantial evidence of ‘destruction’, in both *localidades* family and non-family-based forms of social behaviour, mutuality and commonality were important. In Mutange, Arminda Sambique, a very elderly lady now living alone (page 146), told me that her initiation cohort had been very important to her:

‘I still remember who they were: there were four of them. After the ceremony we were all friends – *samuari*, meaning initiation friends. We insult each other, because we left our bad souls at the same time. We left our bad habits. We are great friends, and whenever one of them sees me she gives me something to eat, and we do not get angry with each other. The insults are teases. You help each other when you are ill, attend each others’ family funerals.’

The same, she said, had been true for men. Initiation rites in Mutange and Mugaveia ceased around Independence both for men and women. It was said that younger men and (to a lesser extent) women would nowadays keep in touch with ex-classmates, but the relationship was not comparable with the bond between members of an initiation cohort. Although female initiation rites had restarted in Mugaveia under the aegis of churches and parties, it was said that they were simplified, and that the bonds between the initiation cohort were less strong.

Family ties were different in the two *localidades*. In Mugaveia residence was uxorilocal,<sup>149</sup> while in Mutange a wife would leave her paternal home on marriage and move to her husband’s land.<sup>150</sup> Two-generation compounds, each containing three or four households in close proximity, and at a considerable distance from other compounds, were the norm in Mugaveia. Everyday help (collecting water, pounding maize) between such households was frequent, but when enmity developed it usually resulted in at least one family having to move away. In Mutange family members did not live in particularly close proximity. It was said that in the past a married son would have lived near his father, but my observations showed that this was now unusual. In Mutange, a woman was vulnerable at divorce or following the death of her husband: she could be sent back to her parents or her brothers with none of the conjugal assets. Such

---

<sup>149</sup> A prospective husband would generally build a home some thirty or forty yards from the house of his wife’s parents. The couple would live there for several years, farming land granted to them by the wife’s parents, before moving away to form a compound of their own.

<sup>150</sup> This description is of ‘ideal types’, and there were many exceptions. In Mutange couples frequently lived at a considerable distance from both families, and in a few cases an ‘outsider’ husband had chosen to move to his wife’s village. Likewise in Mugaveia, some women moved to join their husbands, particularly if the husband was well-off. Thus the wife of Tio Daniel had moved from her natal home in Alto Molocué on marriage, because her husband was well established in Mugaveia. Two of their daughters lived alongside them, but the third had followed her trader husband to Nampula.

women lived in the most makeshift of houses, little more than tents made of woven grass.<sup>151</sup>

There were a number of forms of intra-community help in both *localidades*. Primary responsibility for care for the sick or elderly was considered to rest with family members. In Mugaveia Daniel Namuteca was jointly responsible for the care of his elderly mother. She lived with a daughter, but Daniel contributed money and food, and the two granddaughters helped with pounding her flour and collecting water. In Mutange, Castinha Nemes and Elda José (page 144) lived side by side, both supported by Castinha's successful sons.

It was only when there was no kin to give help that there was any form of broader 'community support'. This came not through the political parties, nor through any traditional structures, but through the church of which the needy person was a member. Such help was sporadic, and hard-won. In Mugaveia one church elder, an aged widow, said that the congregation had helped with her *machamba* the previous year. She had reciprocated by feeding the helpers with *xima* (porridge) and cassava. A leader of the Baptist church in Mutange recounted how members of his church had helped two elderly women to build a house, and had worked the *machambas* of a very ill man (who later died). But not all those who felt they deserved support were given it. One young woman in Mutange, unable to walk because of childhood polio, said bitterly that her church – the Church of the Twelve Apostles – had insisted on payment if they were to help with her *machamba*, and though they were paid (by a suitor) the work was never finished. Another man, a trader who had temporarily fallen on hard times, recounted that when he asked his church for help to bury his child they refused, and as a result he abandoned religion. In neither of these cases were the individuals truly destitute, and they were in fact able to call on kin. It should be observed that in all cases some form of reciprocity was expected and given, either in the form of money or food. Reciprocation might be a mere token, but it was still expected.<sup>152</sup>

---

<sup>151</sup> Treatment of widows was a serious problem throughout Lower Zambézia, in cities as well as rural areas. Jacinta, the Mutange *técnico*, was forced to leave her marital home in Quelimane after the death of her husband, even though she had a child by him. Childless women were in a particularly precarious position, as were those widowed when their children were still young, or who had only daughters. In Mutange widows with fully-grown sons, who were themselves elderly, were fairly well cared for.

<sup>152</sup> This point is taken up in the next chapter: gifts are never free.

These accounts of hard-won aid reflected a general pattern in which people seldom chose to work together and in which mutual help (*ajuda mútua*) was said to be much reduced. Livestock loaning was the only form of mutual help I regularly came across. Timitório Sérgio's experience was typical (page 152). The borrower would take a breeding pair, and after reproduction would return the original pair and keep some or all of the offspring, depending on the agreement made.<sup>153</sup> As would be expected, such loans were never transacted between strangers, but rather between close friends or trusted family members.<sup>154</sup>

Nor did such transactions actually involve co-operative labour. The infrequency with which people worked together was one reason why ZADP staff and designers asserted that communities were 'weakened'. However Cross's study of the Gurué tea plantations (Cross 1992/4) suggested a different reason for the change, unconnected with inter-personal bonds. He argued that during the 1940s and 1950s, when demands for male labour from the plantations were at their height, it was very difficult for women left at home to mobilise sufficient labour to get their crops sown and harvested on time (cf. Moore 1992). Increased labour demands meant that the village social and economic base was transformed. Consequently two forms of mutual help came into regular use: *namuri* (communal help on a field in return for drink and food) and *omore* (working by turn on each other's fields, but with no payment). *Ganho-ganho* (casual labour) also became more common, and better-off labourers would regularly send a portion of their salaries to their wives, to employ *ganho-ganho* labour (Cross 1992/4: 149).<sup>155</sup> If we follow Cross, a reduction in mutual help need not automatically imply a reduction in trust or mutuality between neighbours: it could just be that the economic need for a particular pattern of behaviour has passed, and that relationships have consequently been reconfigured. This is a clear case where the wider processes of labour migration and consequent gender imbalances described in Chapter 3 had an impact at the local level.

That said, informants did talk in terms of a lack of trust when discussing the declining frequency of mutual help. On one occasion we arrived at the house of an old

---

<sup>153</sup> There were many different names for this process; see (Pequenino 2000).

<sup>154</sup> The sense that loans should be transacted between those who knew each other affected the attempts of the agriculture component at credit provision: credit is a social and hierarchical relationship, and as the next chapter discusses in more detail, as such was not entered into lightly.

<sup>155</sup> A slightly different division is made in CEA (1982: 26).

lady in Mugaveia to find that she was out, working on a relative's *machamba*, in return for *oteca*, a beer brewed from sorghum. This corresponds to *namuri* above, but in Mugaveia was called *ntltaro* or *olimiha*, and only happened when sorghum was available.<sup>156</sup> The woman told us that such mutual help now happened only between those who knew each other well, because of the possibilities for witchcraft that inviting strangers onto your *machamba* opened up. She said that it was well known that you could put a lot of effort into your *machamba* in some years for no gain. Beto (the CCM *técnico*) confirmed this, saying that there was a belief that your work could be 'stolen' from you, so that all the effort you put into your own *machamba* was transformed and came out in production on someone else's land.<sup>157</sup>

It was not just ZADP that had a strong discourse about people not wishing to work together: this was also what informants said about themselves. When *técnicos* or consultants asked why group work was so difficult, people would frequently just say that 'we don't like to work together'. I heard several explanations of why this was. Some harked back to their experiences with agricultural cooperatives, where the many had worked for the few. Others agreed with one of the Frelimo leaders in Mutange who argued that they were not resistant to group work *per se*, but that they had to see the benefits of it:

'It's not that we don't want an association ... but to cultivate as an association – if all in the association work manually, nobody benefits at all. This paprika that we grew a little of, if it had just been mine and I'd sold it, then perhaps I'd have got something. But as it was collective, and the *machamba* was small, could there really have been enough for all of us? The reason why it's hard for us to work together is because it's manual work. By hand you'll never get far.'

The implication was that people would only work together for particular ends that they judged to be worthwhile, and where working in a group would bring significant benefits.

This judgement was perhaps borne out by the experiences of other projects in less marginal areas of Zambézia which focused on collective marketing, and where the groups became progressively stronger as the benefits of membership were felt.<sup>158</sup> But to set against this were the comments of Henriques Francisco, another Frelimo leader in

---

<sup>156</sup> Sorghum was not grown in quantity, as it was considered too time-consuming to prepare *xima* from it. A small amount was cultivated for brewing, either for *ntltaro*, or for traditional ceremonies.

<sup>157</sup> I deal with this and related 'zombie' beliefs in Chapter 7.

<sup>158</sup> This also happened to a marketing group in Mugaveia, set up to improve farmers' power to negotiate with traders. This was highly valued, and even in the absence of project workers, group members met regularly. The lack of marketable surpluses in Mutange meant that a similar endeavour there was unsuccessful.

Mutange whose livelihood I discussed on page 145. Again, he did not couch his explanation in terms of ‘community’ strength or weakness, but in terms of the envy that thrives in situations of great poverty:

‘Many people know that for the whites to have a life, it isn’t because of *droga* (sorcery). In their land all are rich. There can be no envy if everyone can eat each day. There is no cause for envy. Our problem is that there is too much poverty here. The white, when it is between whites, when he doesn’t have something asks another. And the person helps him. Here, instead of asking, the person will start to work against the person who has something.’<sup>159</sup>

Henriques perceived working together as modern and desirable, but impossible in contemporary poverty-stricken Mutange. This provides an interesting glimpse of the ways in which ‘poverty’ was locally perceived – as something that was in itself capable of countering the very strategies that ZADP saw as the means of reducing it. For this leader it was poverty itself that meant that the schemes of community cooperation, on which ZADP hung its hopes of long-term sustainable poverty reduction, were impossible, as these were the very conditions in which mistrust and hence witchcraft could thrive.

### 5.3 Unpicking Implications: Homogeneity and Exclusion

The last section looked at how the three ways in which ‘community’ was conceptualised by ZADP were reflected in my field sites. I showed that ‘place’ was far more complicated than had originally been envisaged, and that different locations and linkages were significant in different contexts. By looking at political division, I questioned the notion of cohesion, and by considering how relationships have been reconfigured over time, I demonstrated that a vision of ‘community destruction’ was simplistic. The abstract concept of ‘community’, as expressed in project documents and used by project staff, was strikingly different from the more complex ways in which mutuality, belonging and leadership were negotiated in Mugaveia and Mutange.

However, this does not imply that there was an impermeable barrier between different forms of understanding. The great majority of my colleagues, in particular the *técnicos*, were only too well aware of the ‘real’ situation in the villages, in particular of the existence of deep political divisions, co-existing with numerous small-scale forms of mutual behaviour. They knew that they neither worked with nor heard from everyone, and that the places where they worked were politically divided. An awareness of

---

<sup>159</sup> Chapter 7 looks in detail at the relationship between envy and witchcraft.

division is shown by the fact that staff knew that their activities did not encompass all groups in rural society. The project vet attributed this to poverty:

‘We never hear from the most disgraced (*mais desgraçadas*). They never speak in front of us. They are inhibited. So the ones who are interested in the programme talk the most. And the message that we capture, we say means that “the community wants this”.’

Lloyd, a member of World Vision’s agriculture department, gave a different analysis in a conversation about land registration:

‘Who *IS* the community? That’s my question. Who comes forward is not necessarily the community. The people who come forward in participatory consultations may just be the *régulo* and the *régulo*’s mates... Who comes forward is not necessarily who the community is.’

Likewise Rodrigues, a livestock *técnico*, emphasised the fact that the project tended to attribute the opinions of the most articulate to the entire ‘community’:

‘When we say that someone is ‘chosen by the community’ we mean that they are chosen by people who represent the community, and as it’s not easy to have all the community of a *célula*, we take the opinion of the people who come to the meeting... Normally, we don’t have ... any real idea of what would happen if we really had the whole community there... It’s hard to get the general thought of the *célula* (*o pensamento geral da célula*). That’s one of the reasons why some of our activities haven’t had the response that we wished. We don’t have ideas collected from everyone.’

In each of the three cases given above, staff demonstrated an awareness of different kinds of division and differentiation. However in other situations the same staff would use the term ‘community’ entirely unselfconsciously. For example, Rodrigues told me on other occasions that the project para-vets had been ‘chosen by the community’. While conscious that not everyone was able to participate in ZADP activities, he and others would still informally speak as if it were ‘the community’ (not ‘a community’) that attended meetings, made friends with the *técnicos*, and expressed their opinions. At times this would even be forcefully asserted, particularly if the individual felt him/herself to be criticised. For example the Project Anthropologist, quoted in full on page 166, emphasised that needs presented during PRA meetings really were representative of the needs of the whole community, ‘not ... one person in the community, but ... the community’.

In such situations a notion of a solidaristic, unified ‘community’ would re-emerge, creeping back into discussions about participation, representation, ownership or sustainability. It was as if staff knowledge and understanding of rural society (based on

experience), and their understanding of ‘community’ (based on project literature and theory) were in different mental boxes. The fact that tacit knowledge about rural society could not be squared with the various definitions of ‘community’ that underpinned ZADP activities was not even noticed, and its implications were certainly not considered. The result was that ZADP *técnicos* and other staff, like staff of other projects, worked with a number of contradictory concepts, which had explanatory power in different arenas.

The fact that project staff were able to distinguish between groups who participated more and participated less indicates that they were aware of heterogeneity and differentiation within the rural areas where they worked. Yet all staff would at times insist that the project did indeed work with ‘communities’. This contradictory attitude stemmed from several factors, the most important of which was the sensitive issue of targeting policy. As discussed from page 157, ZADP’s original policy was to target poorer individuals, in particular women and widows, and staff were expected to encourage these groups to participate. However at the same time there were also numerical targets for the project. It was intended that ZADP should work with 130,000 of the 225,000 residents in the intervention area,<sup>160</sup> which as Table 5.2 shows, was far from reality.

---

<sup>160</sup> The Terms of Reference for the Mid-Term Review (Bias et al. 2001: Annex 10) stated that ‘7,027 families are at present directly benefiting from the project by being members of agriculture groups, banks or beneficiaries of chicken vaccination or other programmes. At four people per household, this represents a population of 27,876. This is 12.5 percent of the population in ZADP target *localidades* (224,035 people) and 21.4 percent of the 130,000 people targeted to benefit from ZADP programmes (see project memorandum).’ In fact no population figures are given in the Project Memorandum.

**Table 5.2. Participants in ZADP agriculture component activities**

Activity	No. of Households	Percentage of target population	Source
Growing ZADP crop variety	-	-	No estimate available
Received extension visit in last year	24,000	44	Baseline update
Member of ZADP Group	7,600	14	Baseline update
Member of seed multiplication group	7,000+ 18,000*	13	Oct-Dec 2000 report Baseline update
Chicken Vaccination	4,730 7,000	9 13	Baseline update Project reports
Member of marketing association	840	2	Oct-Dec 2000 Report
Member of goat group	730 + ZADP (I) members 6,140*	1	ZADP reports Baseline update
Member of Farmer Field School	500+ 3,900*	1	Quarterly reports Baseline update
Facilitators trained	220	<1	Verbal report
Honey producer	70	<1	Verbal report

Notes:

Population of ZADP localidades was taken as 225,000 (54,000 households with 4.2 members). It was assumed that only one household member participated in each type of group, although it was recognised that this would slightly overestimate the number of households involved.

Figures marked \*, from the baseline update, were considered far too high. It was suggested that farmers responding to the survey might have been anticipating receiving seeds or goats, rather than reporting receipt.

Source: Adapted from Mid-Term Review Report, Annex Six 'Beneficiary Numbers' (Bias et al. 2001)

Within the context of changing DFID policies (discussed in Chapter 2), which meant that a direct focus on the very poorest was no longer being prioritised, ZADP management needed to negotiate changes that would make activities more 'successful'. Early reviews were intensely critical of high mortality rates for goats given on credit, and low pay-back rates for seeds, and questioned whether the project was going to reach its numerical targets 'in any significant way' (DFID 1999a: 8). In this context, project management was put under considerable pressure to change project practice. As the same report went on to add, 'project management now accepts that substantial changes are required to the generation and dissemination of agricultural improvements if significant progress is to be achieved' (8). Two changes were made to deal with these problems.

The first was a move away from communal and collaborative approaches to ones centred on the individual. The concern to work in a communal fashion stemmed from

the desire to set up institutions that would collectively appropriate the increased production it was hoped the project would bring about, thus mitigating the potentially harmful effects of increased differentiation that were of concern to Social Development Advisers (Chapter 2). In the early years, many activities involved group work. In both Farmer Field Schools and Seed Multiplication Groups (page 32), people at first worked together on the same communal field, while goat restocking involved the provision of five goats to eight people, the animals being kept in a common corral by a collectively employed shepherd. However it was soon realised that these activities were not working. Many of the communally held goats died (from lack of attention, starvation, or strangling), and in other cases group members dropped out, leaving the animals in the possession of a single member (Pequenino 2000).<sup>161</sup> This did not represent value for money for the project. It was also felt that some people were actually put off participating in ZADP activities because of their communal nature; many participants expressed their desire to multiply seeds on their own *machambas*, rather than with their neighbours. By the time I started my fieldwork ZADP had thus largely abandoned collaborative ways of working in favour of activities centred on the individual. Thus three goats were provided to each member of a 'goat group', to care for in their own corral at their homestead. Quantities of seed were lent to individual members of 'seed groups', for sowing on the individual's own fields. And during the construction of bridges and stream crossings in the last year of the project, labourers were paid cash salaries for their work. Notably, although the activities were centred on the individual, the 'group' terminology was not dropped, and livestock 'groups', seed multiplication 'groups' etc. continued to be counted and monitored.

The second solution to low levels of participation specifically focused on the problems with the original target group of 'the poorest 25% of the population' (DFID 1998b: 5). Given the difficulties of working with 'the poorest of the poor', it was agreed in 1999 that the 'economically active poor' should become the main project target (DFID 1999b). In the areas of rural Zambézia where the project worked, where almost everyone identified themselves as 'poor', this essentially meant that all comers would be welcomed. In a situation where many were nervous about involvement with ZADP (a subject discussed further in Chapter 6), and labour-poverty precluded the

---

<sup>161</sup> See Chapter 7 for a discussion of the problems this later caused; five goats were indivisible between eight members, but when the five goats had reproduced and credit been repaid, claims were made and problems arose.

participation of others, this may have been a practical way of working. However it did not deal with the factors which meant that some people excluded themselves from project activities, the most important of which was political affiliation.<sup>162</sup>

These changes meant that from 1999 ZADP staff worked with ‘groups’ made up of almost anyone who was interested.<sup>163</sup> These were groups formed solely for the benefit of ZADP. This recalls Amit’s comment: ‘I suspect that the “cultures” and “communities” we attribute to the people amongst whom we have conducted our research are often less a matter of our own personal convictions than of conceptual convenience’ (Amit and Rapport 2002: 162). ZADP ‘groups’ were just lists of people, who had come together on one day for a specific reason. There were not necessarily any other more significant ties between them. Two review reports commented:

‘What is called a ‘group’ is a grouping of people who receive seed on the same day, and whose names are registered on a list of activities. The same people can also belong to a goat group’ (Waterhouse and Cavane 2001, my translation).

‘At *célula* level there was little sign of groups being in fact considered much more than for administrative purposes, either as “lists” or as the means to access the resources the project is offering. No project groups ever appeared on Venn diagrams, at community, focus group or household level’ (Cavane et al. 2001).

ZADP functioned through these un-group-like groups, which in everyday parlance were then also referred to as ‘the’ (cf. ‘a’) community’. Thus, whilst at one level the utopian insistence on ‘community’ was being replaced by an awareness of the factors militating in favour of individualised enterprise, at another level the insistence on ‘community’ was retained, for reasons of convenience and legitimation. This further masked the political divides that I argue are crucial to an understanding of rural Zambézia. Both *técnicos* and senior staff would, in everyday speech and informal conversation, refer to individual and group-based work as ‘working with the community’; this disguised the need for measures to make activities *more* inclusive, in particular *more* open to those whose allegiances lay with Renamo.

Not concentrating on this important issue meant that opportunities to improve communication with Renamo were sometimes missed. I mentioned above that staff were aware of political differences, and were articulate when talking about divisions

---

<sup>162</sup> The fact that it was political affiliation, and not just generalised suspicion of government distinguishes this case from that reported by Arce and Long (1992) in Mexico, in which the *técnico*, Roberto, had to deal with a generalised suspicion of government.

<sup>163</sup> Teachers, health workers, and those who were only temporarily living in the *localidade* were excluded, although even here there were exceptions.

and differences, about political turmoil and mistrust. *Técnicos* would refer to people ‘belonging to the *régulo*’ (thus Renamo members) or ‘belonging to the *secretários*’ (Frelimo members), and were aware that all political leaders needed to be placated if project activities were to be successful. As a result attempts were made to involve both *régulos* and *secretários* in project meetings. However Renamo leaders would often not attend. Sometimes this was because messages to both the *régulos* and *secretários* were passed via the *localidade* President, who, as I have explained above, was a staunch Frelimo member.<sup>164</sup> One Renamo leader from Mutange told me that he never went along to meetings convoked by Frelimo (including the President), because they didn’t pay him anything, and he didn’t see why he should go wasting his time at their request. At the few meetings he had attended his point of view had not, he felt, been taken seriously.

In Mugaveia it appeared that Renamo leaders were frequently not invited at all, although their subsequent absence from meetings was nevertheless blamed on their *confusão* (confusion, dissent). When Rita and I first visited Mugaveia we felt that it was important to pay personal visits to the most important leaders, before moving to the area and starting our work. We did as colleagues suggested, and went first to the President, the overall leader of the *localidade*. He said that he would take a message to the *régulo*, so that we could come back and meet with everyone the next day. Demurring slightly, we suggested that he might instead take us to the *régulo*’s house, so that we could speak to him directly ourselves. He was not at home, so we left him a written message. Next day the *régulo* was waiting for us at the appointed time, flanked by his subordinates and looking deeply nervous. Much later he told us that it was the first time that the President had called on him in that way, a fact confirmed by our fieldwork. Estevão<sup>165</sup> addressed this directly when I asked why he thought so few Renamo members attended meetings:

‘I don’t think it’s that people from Renamo aren’t interested. It’s probably partly the fault of people from World Vision. People always go to the same person. They go to the President, and he’s the one who explains things. You were different, because you insisted personally and went there yourselves. I think that if you’d just asked the President to invite the *régulo*, I am sure you would never have spoken to him.’

---

<sup>164</sup> Other factors leading to non-participation are discussed in Chapter 6.

<sup>165</sup> Estevão was a ZADP *técnico* who worked in Vehiua, another Gurué *localidade*. He and Agostinho (the Mugaveia *técnico*) had worked together, and when Agostinho became seriously ill towards the end of my fieldwork, Estevão took over in Mugaveia.

The fact that *técnicos*, with the approval of senior staff, generally relied on the President to communicate with members of both parties, implies that, at some level, they accepted what I have shown above (page 176) to have been the fiction of multi-party democracy. The point is a delicate one. It could be argued that *técnicos* who contacted only the *localidade* President were acting in an entirely correct fashion, operating through state structures, and not providing incentives outside formal institutions. At the national level Manning has argued that donors have been too willing to support Renamo in negotiating outside formal structures (Manning 2002), and that for democracy to become ‘embedded’, parties need to accept that they must operate solely through these structures. However in the case of ZADP, *técnicos* did make fairly regular contact with party (as opposed to state) structures, and a failure to contact the *régulo* is better attributed to laziness. Not addressing the non-separation of state and party thus contributed to the exclusion of many Renamo supporters from project activities. Some *técnicos*, like Estevão, were aware of this; however this knowledge did not affect the definition of ‘community’ they worked with. Even though they knew that many were excluded from activities, they would still refer to ‘community’ as if all were involved, and these differences and divisions melted away.

#### **5.4 Sustainability and Participation**

What was it then that the concept of ‘community’ did for the project? Why was it that in the face of considerable evidence that simple ‘communities’ did not exist, the concept was not dropped? I suggest here that ideas about ‘community’ that were known not to be helpful in describing the situation in project *localidades* were nevertheless maintained because they underpinned other fundamental concepts on which the project was based. Two other concepts, crucial to the rationale of ZADP, had been defined in such a way as to rely on a notion of ‘community’.

The first of these was a particular notion of ‘community participation’ as a precondition for local ‘ownership’. Sometimes called *comparticipação*, co-participation, it was different from the PRA ‘participation’ I described above, which involved ‘participation’ in research and prioritisation. However, it was similar in that it also relied on the notion of a ‘community’, and likewise was blind to questions of class, differentiation, or conflict. Co-participation was used to refer to the involvement of ‘local people’ in ZADP activities, and a certain degree of cost-sharing. It was believed

that if a contribution were required, then not only would prioritisation be more careful, but the long-term sustainability of the intervention would be assured.

An example of this co-participation was the bridge building that was carried out in 1999 as a result of ‘community prioritisation’ through PRAs.<sup>166</sup> It was a condition of construction that labour and locally-available materials should be provided for free by ‘communities’, while ZADP paid for iron, cement, tools and transport. However, when work began,

‘the community refused to put sand in the truck and refused to participate in any activity. They said that they would do everything, if the project paid a salary. But ZADP and the community had arrived at the agreement that COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION was necessary’ (Pequenino 2001, original capitals).

In order to get the work done, ZADP was obliged to pay labourers, despite arguing that the benefit from the road accrued to the ‘community’. However as Pequenino’s report observed, ‘They think that the road is ZADP’s (*eles pensam que a estrada é do ZADP*). For this reason ZADP had to pay them. The communities have still not dropped the ideas of the emergency’ (2001, my translation).<sup>167</sup> ‘Emergency’ in this case referred to the expectation that World Vision would always provide hand-outs, a subject I return to in Chapter 6.

The attribution of the road’s ownership to ZADP arose from the clash between designers’ ideas about ownership and representation, and those espoused by many informants. Such a clash was also evident in the case of the ‘Community Extension Workers’ (CEWs, always referred to as ‘facilitators’), with whom it had been intended that the *técnicos* should work. In each project-defined ‘community’ (generally a *célula*, but see page 169) there were two project facilitators. They were said to have been chosen by ‘the community’ to be trained in techniques that they would then pass on to other ‘community members’. Facilitators tended to be younger men, often loosely linked to Frelimo, but without the leadership positions that were monopolised by their elders. In a few cases individuals had volunteered for the job; in others they had been nominated in some kind of a plenary meeting. In ZADP design they had been

---

<sup>166</sup> ‘Community priorities’ developed through PRA work proved hard to satisfy. Many fell outside the scope of an agricultural project (the rehabilitation of schools and hospitals), and others were rejected (e.g. the refinancing of shops). In many areas *técnicos* thus simply began to implement a more general project programme. In the early years this included on-farm research, Farmer Field Schools, and agricultural demonstrations.

<sup>167</sup> I discuss the meanings of ‘emergency’ on page 90.

conceived of as ‘community’ facilitators, responsible to their ‘communities’ and eventually receiving payment from them for their services. The Project Memorandum recounted that at an early training session facilitators defined their role as ‘both disseminators of new technology and facilitators of community initiated development programmes’ (DFID 1998b, Annex 2: 3). This fitted with the founding philosophy of the project, which was that interventions were to be locally owned, locally driven, and locally accountable. However it soon became clear that the facilitators identified far more strongly with the project itself. Thus far from pressing for payment from fellow villagers, their demands were aimed at ZADP. When it did not respond, some took retaliatory action, abandoning their jobs or refusing to pay back their goat credit.

The second and connected notion was sustainability. At the *localidade* level sustainability was believed to require effective ‘community participation’ in the prioritisation and implementation of activities. This would enthuse beneficiaries and reduce the chance of inappropriate externally-imposed activities, thus leading to ‘community ownership’ and therefore to sustainability. Thus ‘activities that will increase the capacity of communities to manage programmes themselves and reduce dependence on outside institutions should be encouraged’ (DFID 2001). It was suggested by several reviewers of ZADP, who were generally western-educated, often white and frequently from the same social group as senior ZADP staff and DFID Advisers (see page 69 for details), that the project should develop stronger ‘community-level institutions’, specifically to ensure greater project efficacy and sustainability.<sup>168</sup> Both the Participatory Impact Assessment and the Mid-Term Review blamed ZADP management and policies for the absence of such institutions, noting the project’s ‘failure’ to:

‘develop a significant amount of new technology that was acceptable to farmers. It was considered that greater participation of farmers in the technology development process and in the management of agricultural programmes would have developed technology more relevant to farmers’ needs and institutions capable of continuing the ZADP programmes after ZADP had finished’ (ZADP 2001).

This also was the view of the final project evaluation, in which I was myself involved:

‘it proved very difficult to develop sustainable systems for disseminating agricultural knowledge, with a failure to develop active and sustainable community level institutions to link with the weak post-project government extension service’ (Whiteside, Wrangham, and Gudz 2003).

---

<sup>168</sup> The object was to instil a sense of obligation and debt to others (to ‘the community’) so that institutions and infrastructure would be maintained (‘be sustainable’) after ZADP funding was withdrawn.

I return to the question of sustainability, and how a project conceptualised as an employer/provider can never be sustainable, in the next chapter.

Remarkably, the suggestion that it was the ‘fault’ of ZADP that ‘community-level institutions’ were not developed and ‘community participation’ was weak, was accepted by project management. But the ‘failure’, as it was seen, was not due to lack of effort. Just as I left the project (in mid 2002) there was a wave of enthusiasm for the creation of ‘goat management committees’, which would be responsible for ensuring the continuity of the goat restocking programme after the project had ended. In the face of a great deal of evidence that almost all groups established by ZADP were groups in name alone, staff still continued to strive towards ‘community ownership’ expressed in the form of ‘community institutions’. They continued to stress the importance of developing ‘community-level structures’ even as they ‘failed’, time and again, to establish them.<sup>169</sup> The analysis implied that the problem and the cure for it were to be found internally, within project management. As Li put it, ‘proponents and critics alike generally interpret ... failures as evidence that more resources and honest effort are needed to overcome the problems of backwardness’ (1999: 303). It can thus be argued that ZADP accepted blame for failing to bring ‘community’ into being. However staff did find something – not the singular ‘community’ imagined in the Project Memorandum, to be sure – but ‘communities of interest’, groups who were interested in involvement.

Given the arguments of Chapter 2 about relationships between ZADP, World Vision and DFID, the suggestion ZADP accepted blame when implementation did not go as hoped might seem surprising. Yet this is not contradictory. The point is that in the last paragraph I have reified ZADP in a way I have been careful to avoid in other parts of the thesis, thus writing that ‘it was the ‘fault’ of ZADP’ that community institutions were not established, and that ‘ZADP accepted blame’ for this. By the time the project came to an end the most senior individuals responsible for the original design and early implementation had moved on, and while those who replaced them did not wish to blame their predecessors, they had few qualms about blaming ‘the project’.

---

<sup>169</sup> After the problems with the CEW concept described above, the project experimented with Community Development Committees (CDCs) to ‘guarantee the sustainability of the project through people’s active participation’ (ZADP 1999a). Less than a year later it was evident that the committees were not functioning and the approach was abandoned. In 2000, a new approach to ‘community planning’ was piloted, and in 2001 a project paper proposed a new process of Community Development Planning (CDP) which would support an ‘Integrated Community Development Programme’. This was never implemented, but instead a process of ‘Participatory Planning with Communities’ (PPC) began in late 2001.

Thus, in the same way that ‘community’ provided a way to gloss the existence of profound political tensions, blaming ‘ZADP’ for failing to find or make ‘community’ also provided a scapegoat – a means to explain development ‘failure’. ‘Community’, in all its different contradictory definitions, and both in its presence and its absence, proved to be a convenient tool. It should again be recognised that what made it powerful was exactly its contestedness, not any overwhelming and irresistible power (c.f. Escobar 1995, Sachs 1992).

## 5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have looked at the multiple ways in which vague and contradictory concepts of ‘community’ were mobilised and operationalised at different times. I asked why, when used so loosely, and to refer to so many different things, was the concept not abandoned? Not only did its very ambiguity give it strength and malleability, it also underlay many of the founding principles of ZADP. A notion of ‘community’ underpinned understandings of sustainability, participation, and ownership. Moreover, the term had a strong legitimating effect. Calling an activity a ‘community activity’ gave it a validity that it might not otherwise have had. An example of this was road repair, described in project documents as ‘community access’:

‘The *communities* in ...[four]... *localidades* of Gurué District have started collecting material using the ZADP tractor to rehabilitate a bridge... There has been a significant increase in participation by the target *communities* resulting in better facilitation of the programme. Construction costs have probably reduced since *communities* have been encouraged to utilise local resources, such as gravel, stones and wood’ (ZADP 2002, my italics).

This activity actually involved about thirty named labourers who received direct payment for their work, but appealing to ‘community’ gave the activity an immediate legitimacy.

In addition to this, I have shown in the chapter that the concept was useful in glossing the existence of difficult-to-comprehend political tensions between Frelimo and Renamo. Although the everyday experience of staff constantly reminded them of the realities of *localidade*-level political division, the rhetoric of ‘community’ meant that these tensions did not have to be dealt with in the course of project activities. Defined eventually as those who chose to turn up to meetings and participate in activities, ‘community’ worked to conceal significant and problematic areas of difference and division.

However it must not be forgotten that others were also engaged in strategic manipulation of ‘community’. Villagers participating in project meetings would wave aside the concerns of some ZADP staff about the representative nature of the points of view expressed, insisting that ‘community’ was indeed represented by those attending. Political divisions were thus strategically downplayed by participants in project meetings, who themselves became involved in the co-constitution of a ‘community’ that matched what project staff were looking for. ‘Who is the community?’ asked the consultant employed to advise ZADP on bridge building. ‘It is us’ (*somos nós*) came the response from the small group of men – from all parts of the *localidade* – gathered in expectation of employment. The importance of relating activities to the notion of ‘community’ was one potential participants grasped and acted upon. The next chapter looks at other ways in which potential beneficiaries attempted to adapt project activities to their own desires.

## Chapter 6. Pursuing Ownership, Pursuing Dependence

I spent a lot of my time in Mozambique in a state of confused culture shock. No doubt this is a usual part of fieldwork; still, I found it disconcerting that my feelings of displacement got stronger rather than weaker as I became more familiar with the different arenas in which I worked. As I explained at the outset of the thesis (page 26), my fieldwork did not occur within any kind of bounded social setting. A DFID employee, placed within an NGO, and also carrying out my own research, I wore many hats and moved with perplexing speed between what felt to me like different 'worlds'. One day I would be sitting on a straw mat in Mutange, talking to someone about how they made their living; the next I might find myself in a smart Maputo hotel with sea view, attending a seminar on aid effectiveness and programme performance management. My diet switched chaotically between cassava leaves and *xima* (maize porridge), and the spiced prawns for which Mozambique is justly famous. I would spend one evening drinking gin and tonic, watching the sun set over the river in the company of a large group of development workers, the next straining my eyes to write my field diary by the light of a kerosene lamp in the midst of a large cloud of mosquitoes.

I got reasonably used to moving around, to the 'jet-lag' I suffered when travelling to my field sites (when bedtime moved from midnight to 6.30 pm or earlier). What I never got used to, what became more and not less of an issue, was the shift of focus. Each time I moved back from the Quelimane round of project meetings, workshops and office life to Mutange or Mugaveia, I became more aware of the mal-comprehension, the not-understanding each group had of the other, and the lack of purchase each group's explanations had on the other's lived reality. My growing sense of culture shock thus derived less from my own inability to comprehend each group's ways of life than from my mounting awareness of their mutual incomprehension of each others'.

In this chapter I will look at two aspects of this not-understanding: how resources channelled through the project were conceptualised; and why they were then appropriated or rejected by different people in Mutange and Mugaveia at different times. I suggest the relationship between ZADP staff and beneficiaries can be viewed as a

patron-client relationship, in which beneficiaries – both individuals and groups – identified the project as patron and constituted themselves as its clients. I then argue that these client/beneficiaries conceived of their relationship with ZADP as one of exchange, and that the ‘gifts’ they received through the project were reciprocated in a variety of ways, within a strongly hierarchical and power-laden setting. I further suggest that the external attribution of ‘gift-ness’ to the exchanges helps to clarify and uncover what were otherwise unarticulated and hidden power relations between recipients and donors, at different levels. This builds on the analysis in Chapter 2, which examined the power-laden relationship between DFID, World Vision and ZADP.<sup>170</sup>

For reasons connected to past experience and political allegiance, some people within Mutange and Mugaveia came to view ZADP as a patron. This conceptualisation ‘anchored’ the project, paving the way both for legitimate exchange and for heated debate when the project was felt not to be fulfilling its patronly duties. Those who did not identify the project in this manner refused to become involved in its activities, even alleging that those who took advantage of apparent project generosity and accepted goats on credit would later find their own children required in exchange. This contrasts starkly with both the perceptions and intentions of ZADP staff. They intended that interventions should move towards ‘sustainability’, and that there should be indications of growing ‘community ownership’ of activities.

The chapter is an analysis of a historically and contextually specific ‘interface’, to use Long’s terminology (1989b). If context is not sufficiently taken into account, then it might appear to be premised on an implicit claim of difference and mutual incomprehension between the world views of villagers and project officials (cf. Hobart 1993). However I do not intend to argue that ‘ways of seeing’ were necessarily mutually exclusive, or based on different philosophical underpinnings. Instead I suggest that the differences I outline here were due to contextual factors, including differing historical understanding, and also incorporated a significant aspect of manipulation. By attempting to draw ZADP staff into exchange relationships, beneficiaries (and in particular facilitators) attempted to force the project to behave in a particular acceptable way. Yet at the same time, a lack of understanding of each other’s

---

<sup>170</sup> Although I carefully distinguished between World Vision and ZADP in Chapter 2, in this chapter I follow local usage so that the distinction is collapsed completely (see section 6.2 for further discussion).

perspectives did also characterise relationships between ‘developers’ and beneficiaries. ZADP designers and implementers did not take earlier historical patterns of interaction with outsiders into account. Nor did villagers understand the degree to which ZADP was working according to terms not of its own staff’s choosing. The result was the mal-comprehension and not-understanding that I now describe.

## **6.1 Community-Owned Development**

ZADP’s role in ‘communities’ was originally envisaged as facilitatory and collaborative. With a design ‘informed by PRA’ the project was to be ‘sufficiently flexible to meet community needs as they are identified’ and to ‘help communities to become self-reliant and strengthen capacity for management of their own development’ (DFID 1998b: 7, 11). The extension service was to be ‘managed through beneficiaries, giving ownership and drawing rights, to provide the basis for a demand driven, responsive service. This approach removes financial pressure from the government to provide such services, increasing chances of sustainability’ (DFID 1998b: 8).

Sustainability was a key aim for the project, and it was believed that it would be promoted by encouraging ‘ownership’ of activities by ‘communities’ (section 5.4). The move in project practice described in section 5.3, towards more individual activities, was intended to make the project more appropriate, and to give participants a greater sense of individual ‘ownership’ over activities. However although these changes undoubtedly meant that the activities concerned worked better (more goats survived, more seed was repaid), they did not necessarily mean that any ‘sense of ownership’ developed.

Consultants and DFID reviewers frequently commented on the lack of local ‘ownership’ of project activities, raising concerns about effectiveness and whether true ‘participation’ was really being encouraged (see, amongst others, DFID 1999b, DFID 2001, Waterhouse and Cavane 2001, Bias et al. 2001). The 2001 Participatory Impact Assessment observed that

‘there is little sign of project participants and local organisations moving towards ownership and management of project activities. Many project interventions and decisions are poorly understood, even by facilitators, and this does not indicate farmer-led research and participatory technology development’ (Cavane et al. 2001).

The explanations given for this by reviewers and consultants were generally technical. It was noted that the project had no professional Social Development Adviser, and was

not linking effectively to existing local-level organisations and groups. Management and training were identified as the problem areas.

ZADP staff themselves tended to look for explanations at another level. They focused mainly on the legacy of the '*emergência*', (emergency), briefly discussed on page 23. '*Emergência*' had two main meanings. First, it referred to the time of the war and the years immediately following it: a temporal definition. Second, it described a way of working distinct from *desenvolvimento*, development. In the regular plenary project meetings, staff repeatedly told villagers present that 'the time of the emergency has past. Now it is the time of development. You should not expect any more donations (*donativos*) or presents (*ofertas*)'. The distinction was repeatedly drawn. For many project staff the key defining feature of '*desenvolvimento*' was that it involved credit rather than hand-outs, even when the credit was not repaid. The dual definition meant that the move from '*emergência*' to '*desenvolvimento*' was neither defined nor circumscribed by the transition from war to peace.

According to many project staff, the legacy of the 'emergency' was that World Vision was widely seen in rural areas as an organisation that handed goods out for free. This, they believed, was the main reason why many project activities proved so difficult, and why many villagers 'failed to cooperate'. As two Mozambican members of staff put it:

'There's the issue of the style in which we entered. People think World Vision just gives. That destroyed a lot of our work, a lot of things. I think it had more influence in the south [e.g. Mutange] than the north [e.g. Mugaveia]. It created parasitism in people. This was a big problem for us in the beginning. It takes a long time to change. People think "Ah well, I'll just eat this, and then either World Vision will come back, or another project, and they'll see that I am poor" ...'

(Deputy Agriculture Manager)

'The worst thing for this project – and not just ZADP – was not managing to differentiate between World Vision during the emergency and World Vision now... This is creating a lot of confusion in the heads of the *camponeses* (villagers). They aren't doing it on purpose, it's just hard to change someone's way of thinking.'

(ZADP Vet)

However this was a very development-centric analysis, focusing just on the recent past, and just on the development world. The rest of the chapter elaborates an alternative explanation of why villagers did not move towards 'ownership' of project activities with the speed and enthusiasm staff would have wished.

## 6.2 Understanding World Vision

In this section I look at the range of associations ‘World Vision’ had in Mutange and Mugaveia. I show that understandings of World Vision were largely coloured by political allegiance, wartime experiences, and to some extent past experiences with outsiders. However considerable confusion was generated by the structure of World Vision itself. In Zambézia, World Vision implemented multiple projects funded by a wide variety of donors. These projects tended to be identified locally simply as ‘World Vision’ (and not as ZADP etc.), but had substantially differing aims, objectives, ways of working, and geographical spread. In Mutange and Mugaveia this meant that people who arrived in a car with a World Vision logo belonging to ZADP might state that ‘World Vision’ could not provide money to improve the health post, as funds were available only for agricultural activities. A week later a team from the USAID-funded health project would visit, travelling in a vehicle with an identical World Vision logo, and carry out child vaccinations and ante-natal care. Both teams were identified and identified themselves as ‘World Vision’; the evident mismatch between words and action led to confusion and mistrust.

The ways in which people related to and understood ZADP in Mutange and Mugaveia were influenced by wartime experiences and their previous knowledge of World Vision. As described in Chapter 3, many people from Mugaveia and Mutange spent several years in the late 1980s and early 1990s living in *campos dos deslocados* run by the Frelimo government and different NGOs. Camp residents received regular supplies of food and other basic goods such as clothes, kitchen utensils and some tools. Depending on who was operating in a particular camp, different organisations were identified as the donors of these goods. In the Nicoadala camp, where many people from Mutange lived at some point during the war, World Vision had a high profile. They ran the hospital, ran supplementary feeding programmes for children, and distributed food and other goods. The organisation continued to provide limited support after the war ended and the camp closed.

Just as project staff thought, World Vision was indeed identified as a provider of ‘hand-outs’ by those who had lived in camps. These people felt that ‘World Vision’ should continue to provide them with free inputs. Tio Daniel, our host in Mugaveia, explained this perspective:

‘At Invacula [displacement camp] people received a lot of stuff for free, and now just expect organisations to bring things for them. If project staff try to sell things they are accused of being thieves, and people say you stole these things, the whites<sup>171</sup> would have given them to us (*Você roubou, aqueles brancos haviam-de dar*).’

Although significant, as I explain later in the chapter, this point of view was far from universal.

Project staff, at the same time as emphasising the importance of the ‘emergency’ legacy, nevertheless believed that the identification of World Vision as a distributor of valuable resources was by this time historic (the temporal definition of ‘*emergência*’, page 199). However such a distinction between a past and present World Vision was not legible for most villagers for two reasons. First, World Vision itself continued with what could be described as ‘emergency’ practices. For example, the ‘Area Development Projects’ funded from Child Sponsorship funds involved hand-outs. In a private conversation a senior World Vision staff member told me, ‘ADPs do work in a very different way, or at least in a very different way to how most of the projects think they work. They *do* just give things’.<sup>172</sup> Second, there were intermittent responses to natural disasters. The floods of 2001 were declared an official ‘*emergência*’ (which meant that there was a local tax amnesty), and during the year I worked in Mutange three different ‘*donativos*’ were received, intended to alleviate the effects of flooding.<sup>173</sup> The rhetoric about moving away from hand-outs was thus directly and regularly contradicted by people’s lived experience.

Whatever the practices of other NGOs, government departments and World Vision projects, ZADP staff held firm to the idea that ‘their’ project did represent a real move away from ‘emergency’ and towards ‘development’. Hand-outs were not part of the ZADP self-image. Nevertheless substantial resources were distributed. Seed was given out on credit, and was not always reclaimed,<sup>174</sup> and was provided for free to Farmer Research Groups, Farmer Field Schools, and to those who had demonstrations

---

<sup>171</sup> ‘White’ in this context did not refer exclusively to the pale-skinned; see page 90.

<sup>172</sup> ADPs worked with individual sponsored children (who received free health care, schooling and school materials, plus private gifts from their sponsor), and at the level of the ‘community’ (building schools, hospitals, wells and bridges, improving roads, and carrying out a range of agricultural activities). Their community facilitators were paid.

<sup>173</sup> CCM and ORAM distributed DEC-funded goods at the time of the floods, and rice seed was provided through the DDADR in September 2001.

<sup>174</sup> Recipients often alleged that they had harvested too little to permit repayment, and this was not always checked. In Mugaveia another NGO provided sunflower seeds on credit after the planting time had passed, and then did not even bother to ask for repayment, assuming that harvest would have been poor.

on their land. Demonstrations of new techniques involved the provision of equipment to facilitators, who were also given things like rucksacks, pens, pencils, raincoats and boots. Towards the end of the project, facilitators were also given bicycles.

A primary identifying feature of World Vision was thus as a distributor of resources. A second was that it was assumed to be closely associated with government, and hence also part of Frelimo. I only twice heard World Vision identified as an *ONG* (NGO) in Mutange and Mugaveia, a label that did not in any case distinguish the project from either state or party, being just a name. Hence a goat recipient in Mugaveia told me that he had repaid the goats he had received to ‘*o estado*’ (the State). On further questioning he said ‘to World Vision’. Various other informants from both Mutange and Mugaveia told me that they thanked the government for sending people ‘like us’ to their *localidade*. The conflation of World Vision with government was nothing special; all NGOs were identified with government. This was partly because NGO staff members often visited *localidades* with civil servants, and partly because civil servants at times claimed (positive) NGO achievements as their own. The manager of another World Vision project described how the governor of Zambézia had come to visit their intervention area.

‘He stood on the podium and said how *they* were giving out goats. There was no mention of [the project] or World Vision. He said, “In this area, we have done...” By ‘we’ I think he probably meant government not Frelimo at that particular time, but government and Frelimo in [the area] were one and the same.’

In this case and the case of ZADP, such claims were not contested, as staff were keen to encourage government ‘ownership’ of their interventions (see Figure 6.1).

This highlights the corollary of the conflation of state/government and World Vision: that World Vision was also conflated with Frelimo. As discussed in Chapter 5 (page 176), although Mozambique was formally a multi-party democracy, in rural Zambézia an equivalence was still made between party and state. When ZADP provided support to what it considered neutral district and provincial structures, in particular the DDADR, this was seen as a political choice, and as support for Frelimo. ZADP’s close association with state structures thus received a particular interpretation in rural Zambézia: that the project was a Frelimo project.

**Figure 6.1 Formal opening ceremony of bridge built by ZADP in Muximua, Gurué**



The formal ceremony to open a bridge constructed by ZADP. The ribbon is being cut by the Gurué District Administrator, and behind him (in a red shirt) stands the Muximua localidade President. In the background stands Agostinho, the Mugaveia técnico, alongside a policeman. All three vehicles belong to World Vision (ZADP), but one has the logo of the DDADR, Gurué, painted on it. Source: John Steel

A third way in which ZADP was understood in the *localidades* was as a project associated with generally ‘white’<sup>175</sup> outsiders. Chapter 3 showed that outsiders were linked with some of the most traumatic moments of Zambézian history. Zambézia was raided heavily for slaves throughout the nineteenth century, and men were exported to São Tomé as late as the 1930s. Outsiders organised the capture and compulsion of men to work on Portuguese-owned plantations, and it was (Mozambican) outsiders who set up what are now perceived to have been the exploitative agricultural cooperatives of the early socialist period. Yet outsiders had also fulfilled the role of patron, and had provided employment in businesses recalled to me with nostalgia. ZADP was thus associated both with violence and exploitation, and at the same time with prosperity, protection, and the chance of self-advancement.

<sup>175</sup> The attributes of ‘whiteness’ are discussed on page 90.

I have here shown that for people from Mugaveia and Mutange World Vision had three identifying features: it was a provider of resources; it was associated with the government and hence with Frelimo; and it was associated with outsiders. Those who had known World Vision or similar organisations during the war saw it as a provider of resources, closely connected to the government and hence to Frelimo. For them the project was easily constituted as a somewhat capricious but at times munificent patron. Historically, relations with white outsiders and with government were relations of subordination, and it was therefore not surprising that villagers entered into a subordinate relationship with ZADP: such a relationship was entirely assumed and taken for granted. Indeed, as I now explore in greater detail, some people actually pursued subordination as a strategy for securing better access to valued resources.

### **6.3 Becoming a Client**

When ZADP first arrived in Mutange and Mugaveia, by no means everyone wished to become involved in its activities. In Mugaveia there was considerable opposition to the project being allowed to operate at all, and many remained suspicious for several years. But in both *localidades* certain people were willing to work with ZADP from the outset. They tended to be Frelimo supporters, and those who had spent time in the government-run *campos dos deslocados* during the war years, groups which often overlapped. I argue that for these people ZADP was constituted as a patron. Constructing it in this manner made it into an understandable entity, with which people could enter into what would otherwise have been potentially risky credit relationships.

Patron-client relations are familiar in Zambézia. Hall and Young referred to Zambézia as ‘deeply socially divided’ (1997: 183), and noted that the *patronato* (patron-client) system had been resilient enough to absorb Frelimo officials. Here I argue that its resilience has been great enough also to absorb new NGO officials, themselves identified as part of the state/party. The word *patrão* was regularly used to refer to white people, employers (actual and potential), important people, and traders (Wilson 1991b). The number of patrons had declined enormously since Independence, and regrets about the lack of a good *patrão* to give one a hand up in life were regularly rehearsed. *Técnicos* were sometimes addressed as ‘*patrão*’, fitting in to what Wilson saw as the long-term relationship between elite and peasantry, ‘the continuation of the long tradition of patronage whereby allegiance, praise and economic dependence was

traded for protection and security in a kind of “moral economy” (Wilson 1991c: 16, see also Scott 1976).

It was the new emphasis on credit, and credit administered directly by project staff, which made the relationship with ZADP different from the earlier relationship with World Vision in the camps. For example, in the Nicoadala camp World Vision ran the hospital and feeding programme, both of which were contained activities in which outside intervention was considered normal. By contrast a credit relationship was felt to be much more socially embedded; as Lewis et. al. have written for Bangladesh, ‘credit is not ... a single-stranded commercial transaction, but is part of an unequal patron-client relationship’ (1993: 189). Furthermore, interventions in agriculture had many resonances with the past (see Chapter 3), most of which were negative. Alongside the frequently-recalled exploitation and compulsory employment, the only positive role outsiders had fulfilled was that of the sporadically generous patron – the employer, the trader who built roads, the shop-keeper who gave little extra gifts of sugar in addition to purchases. Patrons could often be bad, but even the worst ones provided some protection against hardship.

For villagers, there were two possible levels of involvement in ZADP. First were the facilitators, who were the most enrolled in the project. Though the project maintained that they were volunteers, working for their communities with the support of ZADP, their own interpretation of the relationship was as one of employment by a deeply unsatisfactory employer. Second were other participants in project activities, who also saw themselves as clients, although the commitment on both sides of the relationship was less strong.

### **Frelimo Cooptation**

Political allegiance framed participation, and many people interpreted project resources as Frelimo’s patronage goods. Project beneficiaries tended to be those who were on good terms with the Frelimo *secretários*, rather than followers of the Renamo’s *mambos*, *régulos* and *mwenes*. It was generally known, if not exactly accepted, that the most people involved in the project came, as one Mugaveia facilitator put it, ‘from the President’s party’. In both Mutange and Mugaveia the *régulo* and his immediate subordinates (all Renamo supporters) did receive goats, but rank-and-file members were

far less likely to be beneficiaries than equivalent Frelimo supporters. One elderly woman in Mutange explained why she and her family had not received goats:

‘We haven’t received goats because we weren’t included. People don’t think anything of this, because it’s the work of the government (*as pessoas não pensam nada porque é trabalho do governo*)... The problem is that the goats are distributed in a hidden manner; the donors call the *secretários*, and the *secretários* give the names of people who can receive goats – and they give the names of their acquaintances. And we are not friendly with the *secretário*.’

There were a number of reasons why, despite the fact that the project claimed political neutrality and made attempts to work with people from both parties, Frelimo leaders nevertheless managed to capture project goods for their own patronage ends. The first was that there was a widespread prejudice against Renamo supporters. Those with almost any level of education tended to associate themselves with Frelimo, the self-proclaimed ‘modernising’ party (page 173). This group then attributed many of the intractable problems facing the project (in particular witchcraft) to the trouble-making of Renamo adherents. For example, rumours about what would happen to the recipients of project goats were labelled Renamo lies. Likewise, the problems I had in Mugaveia were blamed on Renamo rumour-mongering (see Chapter 7).

This tacit prejudice against Renamo by project *técnicos* and a substantial number of the more influential villagers was then exacerbated by other factors. I discussed above (page 177) the fact that no account was taken of the political interpretation that rural Zambézians made of the project’s funding of government departments. Not only was this funding (incorrectly) seen as neutral by project designers, this analysis did not change during the process of implementation, and the political implications of providing resources to the DDADRs were not acknowledged. The presumed connection with Frelimo was if anything further consolidated by the relationship which *técnicos* then established with the *localidade* President, formally the state representative, but universally identified with Frelimo. He was the project’s most important local collaborator. Invitations to project meetings were often made through him, and he would be requested to invite both Renamo and Frelimo leaders. As our experiences in Mugaveia showed (page 189), these requests were often not fully carried out, but when an uninvited Renamo leader failed to appear, he would still be blamed for *confusão*. ZADP’s unquestioning acceptance of the fiction of multi-party democracy, and the

separation of state and party, thus contributed to the exclusion of many Renamo supporters from project activities. The result was that many Renamo supporters did not want to become involved with ZADP activities, because they did not identify Frelimo as a possible patron. The identification of ZADP with Frelimo was reinforced by the flow of resources to Frelimo-linked institutions, of information through Frelimo-linked leaders, and the involvement of a large number of Frelimo supporters at the level of the *localidade*.

### **Pursuing Dependence**

The individuals most enrolled in ZADP activities were the project facilitators. They had been selected when the project first started work in their *célula*, either by the *técnico* or village leaders, or had nominated themselves. In Mutange, where there had been no competition for the job, they tended to be younger men who would have been children or adolescents in the war years. In Mugaveia they tended to be rather older, and unlike in Mutange, several held local Frelimo party positions. I do not pursue the difference further here, but I believe it to have derived from divergent historical experiences. As explained in Chapter 4, Mutange had been the site of a socialist agricultural cooperative, and the more senior Frelimo leaders devoted their energies more to the Association of Mutange Villagers that had replaced the co-operative, than to ZADP activities. This older group continued to pin their hopes on the rehabilitation of the irrigation scheme, while a younger group, who were excluded from Association leadership, were more closely involved with ZADP. The result was that although facilitators from both *localidades* were voluble in their complaints about lack of salary and recognition, the sense of betrayal was strongest for the older Mugaveia facilitators. They identified World Vision with Frelimo, and so their sense of injustice about non-payment was not confined to non-payment for their work as facilitators. ‘I have worked since 1984 as the head of a Frelimo Dynamising Group’, said one. ‘I thought that as World Vision called me, I would at least receive MT 50,000 to pay my children’s school expenses.’

Facilitators self-consciously emphasised the relationship between themselves and the project, both by stressing the importance of their contribution to World Vision’s work, and their own dependence on it. When, after years of argument, a salary payment

was finally made to them (details on page 215), a facilitator from Mutange commented that:

‘This money is to recognise (*valorizar*) the work of the facilitators. The facilitator is a bridge. He collects data to give the extension worker, to then be given to the directorate. World Vision is now taking into account that they have their youngest children (*últimos filhos*) in the villages.’

Using this idiom of kinship, certain people chose to describe themselves as dependent on World Vision. In a meeting in Vehuia (Gurué district) participants said that:

‘World Vision has provided many things, and without World Vision we feel lost. There is nobody other than World Vision, we have no other support. We have no improved school, no improved health post or infrastructure. We feel forgotten. Sometimes teams (brigades) come, but then they disappear again.’

A Mutange facilitator underlined the dependence of villagers on World Vision: ‘We will be alright so long as the projects of the whites come. We need them to work with us, so that people can get things – bicycles, radios.’

Dependence was underlined in the way facilitators frequently denied understanding the reasons for activities, but pointed out that they still did them out of loyalty. Facilitators highlighted their commitment to World Vision, pointing out that they had worked for many years without salaries for the good of the project. Many talked of their own generosity and goodwill towards the project, and how they were willing to do anything the *técnico* requested of them:

‘We did an experiment, it produced well, and now I am waiting to be told what to do with the seed. I am just looking after it now.’

Strategically denying their own agency, the facilitators emphasised their connection with the project.

Such docile and compliant behaviour was believed to bring further benefits to some individuals. João Mário and Isáquiel Anselmo were the two employees of the project nursery in Mutange, and both attributed their salaried employment to their long and unrewarded participation in a Farmer Field School:

‘World Vision came and needed villagers for a meeting. Villagers went and said that they wanted to form a field school group. We were chosen by Jacinta. I was then chosen to be head of the fruit trees. Later, there was another training of villagers, and we were asked to participate in that training. As I was the head of fruit trees I should be there to hold the pots... At the end I was asked to work on the nursery project... I got this work because I stayed a long time in the school [FFS] without earning anything, and the others desisted. And in this way I was asked to work.’

This kind of example gave hope to other people who continued with what they considered to be profitless activities for the project in the expectation of later rewards. One of the younger facilitators talked about his wife's dissatisfaction with his work:

'My wife laments the [lack of] salary, because of the time I use for these activities. But when I don't go, the *técnico* gets angry. My wife says that I should give up, and I say that we should be patient, because nobody knows when it will rain (*o dia que cai a chuva ninguém sabe*).'

The facilitators were not alone in continuing with project activities in the absence of payment, to cement a relationship which they hoped would later prove valuable. Another facilitator from Mutange explained that although participation in Farmer Field Schools and demonstrations had fallen off, some continued to attend in the hope of future benefits:

'People see that they don't get much from their participation in project activities. Last year there were a hundred of us, but when people saw that the project was not producing an income many ended up abandoning it, and just twenty-five of us were left. These people who left are waiting to see what will come in the future from the project. If they don't get good results, they too will leave.'

Although facilitators called attention to their docility and their willingness to do whatever World Vision wished, they did not necessarily think that they were being asked to do sensible things. Indeed, their willingness to do activities that they saw little point in was, to them, clear evidence of their goodwill and commitment. Facilitators from both Mutange and Mugaveia continued planting seeds in lines for the project, even though they would not do it in their own fields because they felt it took far too much time.

Being a client of the project was expected to bring benefits in relation to one's commitment, with rewards for facilitators being substantially greater than those given to 'ordinary' beneficiaries. Both groups expected that their participation would guarantee them access to resources, in particular goats and seeds, and in general this was indeed the case. Facilitators had privileged access to goats (after a brief focus only on the 'poorest of the poor'); demonstrations of improved granaries or new storage methods provided them with the technologies; and they were always the first recipients of seeds,

seedlings and cuttings, and the first to be chosen for training. They also benefited from a less official flow of favours, in particular in the form of lifts in project vehicles.<sup>176</sup>

Beneficiaries, and in particular facilitators, expected that *técnicos* and/or senior staff would help them out when they were in difficulties, by taking children to hospital or employing family members during hungry periods. This did happen in the context of the personal relationships which the *técnicos* inevitably developed during the course of their work and residence in the villages. However it was a matter of access to individual networks and resources, rather than to the project as a whole, and had to be negotiated and renegotiated with each individual member of project staff.<sup>177</sup>

The fact that project resources went mostly to Frelimo supporters served to strengthen both the sense that the project was a patron, and the identification of the project with Frelimo. It was to be expected that a patron would reward his clients, and thus the provision of resources to Frelimo supporters made sense. The provision of resources in itself also reinforced a sense of difference between project and recipients; as Stirrat and Henkel observed, gifts emphasise rather than disguise difference (1997).

#### **6.4 Exchange and Reciprocation**

I have so far discussed the nature of the relationship between a project constituted as 'patron' by individuals constituting themselves as 'clients', and the one-way flow of resources that this involved. But a closer examination of the relationship shows that resources flowed in the other direction as well, and that there was in fact exchange. Lying alongside the relatively uncontroversial flow of resources from project to beneficiaries was another much more hidden but still important flow of goods and services in the opposite direction. It is because this exchange was unsolicited that I believe it can be compared with gift exchange.

What, then, is gift exchange? A great many people have written about what makes a gift, how gift exchange relationships operate, and what distinguishes gifts from commodities (for example Mauss 1954, Osteen 2002, Godelier 1999, Carrier 1995,

---

<sup>176</sup> World Vision rules stated that only employees could travel in World Vision cars. This was interpreted to include project facilitators, para-vets, local leaders and known participants. Others were fairly rigorously excluded. As both villages were more than 10 km from the nearest public transport, and Mugaveia was 70 km from Gurué, this was a very valuable perk.

<sup>177</sup> The distinction is important because some areas saw significant *técnico* turnover, and relationships had to be renegotiated with each incoming *técnico*. Nor could senior staff be relied on for help.

Gregory 1982, Weiner 1992). Zelizer (1998: 329) makes a useful distinction between a gift (a voluntary bestowal), an entitlement (right to a share) and compensation (direct exchange, generally in the form of a market transaction). Gifts occur within relationships, and both express and create moral and social bonds between giver and receiver. Gregory (1997, 1982) contrasted gifts and commodities, arguing that they create different kinds of debts and therefore different kinds of relationships between transactors. In particular, gifts are always interested, they always come with intentions – the ‘free gift’ is almost never found. Gifts are also rarely unreciprocated, and a web of relations is thus both reflected and developed.

With ZADP there was often material reciprocation for project inputs. Colleagues who worked on livestock (the most popular activity) generally came back from their field visits laden with gifts – cassava, sweet corn, sugar cane, squashes, sometimes even chickens. The rest of us were also given presents, though rather less frequently, and in smaller amounts. Some of the project facilitators regularly gave staff little gifts of produce from their fields, and these individuals were known by name to most project staff. Reciprocation for the project ‘gift’ mirrored the more general exchanges that occurred as part of everyday life. Rita regularly exchanged gifts with our host family. She would bring clothes and little toys for Lita’s new baby (Figure 1.25), and leave laden with maize, eggs, beans. When I gave an informant a Christmas ‘gift’ of money, because his granary had just burnt down, he later insisted that I have a chicken in return. Project gifts were reciprocated in just the same way as other gifts.

It was not only material goods that flowed in both directions within the nexus of project-beneficiary relations. Beneficiaries saw their presence at project meetings and demonstrations as part of an exchange. Attending meetings or weeding demonstration crops was not only a prerequisite for receiving bigger benefits, as the example of João and Isáquiel above showed; it was also something that those who had already received such benefits felt obliged to continue doing.

But if, as I have argued, being a client involved reciprocation for ‘gifts’ and resources received, then why was it that such reciprocation was so small in scale and went so long unrecognised? The answer relates to the mis-recognition of World Vision’s position, that is, the mis-identification of the project with government and hence Frelimo. Since people confused World Vision with the state/Frelimo,

reciprocation to the wrong organisation was equally plausible, so that people could repay World Vision with increased loyalty to Frelimo. The expressions of thanks to government that I have already cited would appear to be evidence for this, as well as substantial attendance at important *localidade* meetings.

### **Rejecting Exchange, Rejecting a Relationship**

I noted above that only certain people were willing to accept ZADP as a patron at the outset of the project. They tended to be Frelimo supporters and people who had lived in the wartime *campos dos deslocados*, who had come into contact with organisations like World Vision before. I argue that those who did not fall into these categories were nervous about the implications of accepting ‘gifts’ from ZADP. Gifts coming from an organisation or individual that was neither known nor understood, were considered to be risky, as the form of pay-back was unclear.

The war-time displacement camps, though heavily populated, by no means housed everyone. A significant number of people from Mugaveia never moved to Invacula, the site of the local camp. Some went to Nauela, where they lived in a Renamo-occupied area, feeding themselves from *machambas* on borrowed land, and moving from place to place. Others were even more peripatetic, fleeing from cave to cave in the mountains, afraid of being captured by either side. These people did not receive food, tools, or health care, and were given no support with resettlement. No NGOs had worked in Mugaveia before World Vision arrived with ZADP, and for people who had not spent time at Invacula, this was their first contact with an NGO.<sup>178</sup>

Consequently, in Mugaveia, and indeed across much of Gurué district, many project interventions were greeted with considerable suspicion. I was told that when a ZADP team first visited Mugaveia in 1997 (to do PRA work), people thought that the white men among the group had come to buy land, and perhaps to take children (see Chapter 7). The organisation was seen as both illegible and potentially malign, and many people wished to wait a while before entering into a close relationship with it. In Mutange, by contrast, World Vision was well-known because of its role in the Nicoadala camps.

---

<sup>178</sup> As noted in Chapter 3, Mugaveia also differed from Mutange in not having experienced large-scale investment in an agricultural cooperative; outside intervention in agriculture was thus even stranger in Mugaveia.

In Mugaveia suspicion was exacerbated by the strong village-level influence of Renamo (see section 5.2). As World Vision was assumed by both Frelimo and Renamo supporters to be intimately connected to the Frelimo government, few Renamo supporters in Mugaveia were keen on what they saw as a close relationship with an organ of the ‘wrong’ party.

The reasons given for refusing to become involved in project activities centred on the potentially dangerous implications of exchange with an illegible organisation. Fears about the implications of accepting unsolicited gifts which could not easily be reciprocated continued for several years in parts of Gurué district, particularly in connection with the goat restocking programme. Informants in Mugaveia almost always related their concerns about receiving goats to fears about exchange: given the high value of the animals it was presumed that large demands would be made in return.<sup>179</sup> Numerous people refused goats, explaining that they were frightened that they might later be required to surrender their children in exchange. This was not a concern about debt, but about exchange; I heard no concerns that children might be taken if a person failed to repay credit. The story was current in all ZADP’s Gurué *localidades*, and was much debated. Facilitators, who like project staff laughed at these fears, said that people were unable to believe that they were getting something for free: ‘People thought like this because it was new – a project had never given a gift of a goat or anything, so people marvelled, and suspected’. These fears were less widespread by the time I started my fieldwork, although one Mugaveia facilitator told me that some people still thought that the project gave things in order to later take children: ‘they don’t think that the project is only there to help them’.

I have here argued that when people felt that the resources being offered by the project were ‘unanchored’ gifts – by which I mean that they came from an illegible institution for incomprehensible reasons – they were refused. Individuals and families came to understand and develop a relationship with the project and its staff at different

---

<sup>179</sup> Concerns about the ‘real’ nature of World Vision’s work were not confined to villagers. Rita was stopped one day in the street in Gurué by a man who worked for the district administration. He cross-questioned her at length, first about the political situation in Mugaveia (of which she denied any knowledge), and then about the *real* reason for World Vision’s projects. He said: ‘It’s not possible to receive all this help just as a donation – what is the real aim of the work?’ When she referred him to her World Vision superiors he said that he knew what they would say, but hoped that ‘people who are inside could perhaps find something out’.

moments. From that point, gifts were no longer unanchored, and thus the particular risks associated with free-floating gifts no longer applied.

### **Contesting Patronage; Unseating Voluntarism**

I considered above the ways in which project beneficiaries, especially facilitators, exaggerated their dependence on the project as part of a strategy to make the most of a subordinate position. In the last section I looked at the reasons why some people did not wish to enter into an exchange relationship with ZADP, and showed that they were connected to historical experience and political affiliation. I now look briefly at what happened when individuals from Mutange or Mugaveia did enter into what they identified as an exchange relationship with the project, but their expectations were disappointed when the project did not behave in the expected patron-like way. These were people who later felt that they had been deceived or lied to by ZADP, and that their participation had not brought them what they had envisaged.

I have already looked at some of the contestations over ZADP not providing sufficient benefits to its 'clients' ('Pursuing Dependence', above). Beneficiaries frequently said that World Vision should pay the people who 'worked for it', because they abandoned their household activities to do project activities without payment. Voluntarism was not recognised as a valid way of working. Writing of the national level, Christie and Hanlon commented that voluntarism 'is seen as a hangover of the socialist era' (2001: 7), while my informants repeatedly contested the validity of 'doing things for free' (see for example comments made by a Frelimo leader from Mutange, page 20). Contestation was particularly acute when beneficiaries compared their situation with that of the *técnicos*. One man from Mutange, who was at the time almost unique in receiving a small salary for his work on the project nursery, nevertheless criticised the differentiation between the treatment given to *técnicos* and to villagers:

'The people who work with us are benefited – they come on motorbikes – and so people wonder whether those in charge are really saying good things? It's better that I sit in my own house, getting on with my own household activities. If the project paid people, it would run well.'

Some speculated that the *técnicos* were profiting at their expense, and as a result stopped participating in project activities. As time went on, fewer people attended project meetings. One *técnico* told me that when people did not receive the magnifying

glasses and hoes they had been promised, they ceased visiting the demonstration fields. Another ex-beneficiary in Mutange said that in the absence of a single hoe, or a single pair of boots to protect his feet from snakes, he had decided to abandon his work with the project.

As part of the contestation, the trustworthiness and truthfulness of the project was questioned. The legitimacy of providing inputs on credit rather than as donations was disputed, and the honesty of the *técnicos* called into question. When project policy changed, so that seeds once provided on credit were sold (at a subsidised price), it was widely suspected that this was actually a corrupt payment being demanded by the individual *técnico*. In a similar fashion it was believed that World Vision as an institution was not straightforwardly honest, due to confusion about the structure of the organisation and its projects (discussed above, page 200).

The most highly contested example of ‘betrayal’ concerned pay for project facilitators. The original intention had been that ZADP should pay facilitators for the first year, and that ‘communities’ should pay for their services thereafter (see Chapter 5). It almost immediately became clear that ‘communities’ would do no such thing, and so the project also held off giving any direct financial incentives, for fear of creating dependence. Instead, they were given various goods to help them with their work: rucksacks, waterproof jackets and trousers, boots, pens, notebooks, and sometimes scales and storage vessels. As described above, they were also the first recipients of any project inputs or training.

Although complaints about the lack of salary were constant, the situation remained fairly stable for several years. Then two things happened. First, in early 2000 World Vision’s Child Sponsorship programme began to operate an Area Development Project (ADP) in Namacurra District, in one of the *localidades* where ZADP had already been operational for over three years. ‘World Vision’ (i.e. the ADP) recruited facilitators and immediately started to pay them an ‘allowance’ (*gratificação*) of MT 200,000 per month (about US\$ 12). This caused instant uproar amongst ‘World Vision’ (ZADP) facilitators who heard that the new collaborators were being paid whilst their own commitment and hard work was ignored. Although the decisions had been taken by independent projects, funded by different donors and with different policies, in Namacurra this behaviour by ‘World Vision’ (singular) was seen as treacherous. Faced

with the prospect of a total strike by facilitators, ZADP management ‘agreed to buy each [facilitator] a bicycle and pay them a small fee for work completed but will not pay them a salary’ (ZADP 2000). In Mutange and Mugaveia this did not entirely resolve the problems. The level of payment was extremely low (US\$ 6<sup>180</sup> per agricultural year, for each seed or goat group formed or assisted). Money and bicycles were not available to all facilitators, and arrived many months late. There was also the added complication of further uproar caused by the rat-trapping component.

I discuss the rat-trapping component in much greater detail in Chapter 7, because the destabilisation it caused revealed tensions and problems that went right to the heart of ZADP. A research project intended to demonstrate that village-scale trapping was effective and viable, it required data to be collected on a daily basis in both Mutange and Mugaveia. This was carried out by rat data collectors, known locally as *facilitadores de ratos*, rat facilitators. They were paid US\$ 1 per day, an extremely high salary in local terms. *Técnicos* were told not to choose project facilitators as rat data collectors, because the extra work might cause them to neglect their ZADP responsibilities. Their exclusion caused outrage. ZADP facilitators were bitter about the fact that the new recruits were being paid in preference to them. ‘World Vision’ was once again felt to have failed the people who had been most loyal to it, and to have privileged those with least commitment. A facilitator in Mutange said that,

‘There is no friendship with the people from the rat project, because we were the first and yet we have no salary, while the rat people were the last and yet they have salaries and their lives are improving. And we don’t know why there is this difference.’

This dispute demonstrates the depth of the difference between what ZADP wished the facilitators to be, and how they imagined themselves. As James found in South Africa, involvement with an NGO was a way of ‘acquiring distance from, rather than being embedded more deeply in, an undifferentiated “community”’ (James 2002: 183).<sup>181</sup> Pigg’s analysis of traditional medical practitioners in Nepal found the same distinction: ‘every time a person with the “local perspective” is enlisted in development

---

<sup>180</sup> I denominate these payments in US\$ following ZADP practice. The project ran dollar budgets, and all Mozambican (as well as expatriate) staff salaries were quoted in dollars in order to inflation-proof them. Although payments to facilitators were quoted in dollars they were paid in (a fluctuating number of) meticals, causing considerable confusion and suspicion that money had been stolen.

<sup>181</sup> This was equally true of *técnicos* and senior Mozambican staff. *Técnicos* were insistent in their demands for car driving lessons and English lessons – neither of which were skills they required in their jobs – that would take them further from fieldwork (cf. Black 1991: 168).

work that person switches sides' (Pigg 1997: 259). But for ZADP facilitators the difference went still deeper, as they did not see themselves merely 'involved' or 'enlisted' in ZADP, but employed by it. In the past, much of the work done for or organised by 'outsiders' was paid at least at a nominal rate (Chapter 3). This payment had made a key contribution to the multiple livelihoods described in Chapter 4, which were ignored by agencies such as ZADP.

In the dispute over the rat component, 'World Vision' was felt to have transgressed, and not to have acted as a 'good' patron. A number of facilitators stopped working, preferring to get on with their own lives rather than waste more time investing in a relationship which was so unproductive. Others continued work until the bicycles they negotiated in 2000 arrived in late 2001; they promptly sold them and left for Maputo in search of jobs. But the great majority continued as before, still hoping that their investment would pay off, and unwilling to take the much greater risk of leaving to look for work elsewhere. These people continued to attend sporadic village meetings, complaining on every possible occasion about lack of recognition and remuneration, and continuing to demand ZADP support for school and hospital buildings.

## 6.5 Debating Interpretations

I have here chosen to look at the relationship between ZADP staff and beneficiaries through a lens that would probably have been surprising to many project staff, had I discussed this interpretation with them. I did not because at the time I was, like them, unable to see it.<sup>182</sup> Patron-ship and client-ship went directly against the founding principles of the project and for this reason the criticism made by Keith Mason, a DFID Adviser, during the Mid-Term Review (see Chapter 2) was devastating:

'It won't be surprising anybody if I use terms that have been thrown out during the last few days, and these words are top-down, handout, prescriptive and effectively a patronage system in the way that it operates.'

As I have shown here, there was indeed a relationship of exchange (of favours and resources) operating between a project constituted as patron, and individuals who constituted themselves as its clients. But although the relationship was one in which project staff – especially *técnicos* – constantly participated, they remained largely

---

<sup>182</sup> Owing to time and language constraints, and to the fact that my ideas developed considerably during writing up, when I had already left Mozambique, I discussed these ideas with only a small number of former colleagues.

unaware of its significance to beneficiaries. They attempted to refute the ‘oppressively mendicant’ attitude they found amongst many beneficiaries, and disputed their identification as the ‘mere conduits for relief items’ they were widely perceived to be (Allen 2000: 165). They therefore identified exchanges and gifts very differently.

First, although it was common knowledge that gifts were given to staff by recipients of project inputs, this was seen as simple courtesy and generosity, not exchange. ‘How can people be so generous when they have so little?’ said one expatriate member of staff. Gifts, always of food, were believed to be given to individuals, rather than to ‘the project’, further obscuring any idea of institutionalised and formal exchange.

Second, as I discussed earlier, ZADP *técnicos* and senior staff associated ‘gifts’ with ‘emergency’ work, from which ZADP was believed to be distinct. ‘The time of *desenvolvimento*’ was said to mean that gifts/hand-outs/donations were all in the past, and that now was the time of co-participation, *comparticipação* (i.e. provision of materials or labour), and credit.

Third, distinctions were drawn between different kinds of goods. The pencils, bicycles and boots given to facilitators were seen as an *estímulo* (stimulus) or *gratificação* (tip), rather than gifts or *donativos*. Goods given to ‘the community’ on credit – even if the credit was never repaid – were believed to be qualitatively different to the *donativo* or *oferta* provided during an ‘emergency’, for which no payment at all was required. The provision of improved forms of seed, or the materials to do agricultural demonstrations was further justified on ‘public good’ grounds. In response to analysis in my own final report to the project (Wrangham 2002), one World Vision staff member gave me a complex analysis of different kinds of goods, based on the work of Carney (1998):

‘Goods are generally thought to have two properties. Non-excludable are those where it is difficult to exclude someone else from consuming the good. Non-subtractable are those where consumption by one individual does not reduce the availability of the good to other individuals. Thus there are four general categories:

- Public goods are non-excludable and non-subtractable.
- Private goods are excludable and subtractable.
- Toll goods (e.g. toll roads) are non-subtractable but are excludable.
- Common pool goods are subtractable but non-excludable.

Sweet potato and cassava<sup>183</sup> are generally considered common pool goods. It is difficult to exclude people from using [them] as they are very easily propagated. Thus the situation is a little more complicated here. The idea would be that the government research and extension would work on providing these to farmers in the future. A private sector firm or locally based person could in the future make some money by selling these in the first couple of years after release but then they would almost be freely available. Bicycles and rat-traps are considered private goods.’ (E-mail, 03.01.03)

Although the complexity of analysis varied, all project staff drew distinctions between the kinds of goods provided that were never mirrored in conversations I had with beneficiaries. *Técnicos* I knew well saw no contradiction between saying that the ‘*emergência*’ was over and the time of ‘*desenvolvimento*’ had come, while continuing to distribute bicycles, pencils, improved cassava and rat-traps.

## 6.6 Conclusion

ZADP’s inability to see itself as villagers, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, saw it – as a patron involved in a web of exchange relations – both resulted from and contributed to its inability to analyse power relations. The blindness of project staff to the realities of exchange and the hierarchical power relations that structured it, was mirrored in the weak analysis of intra-community power relationships described in Chapter 5. ZADP staff were profoundly naïve about power relations between recipients, and how project resources were used to consolidate and structure relationships. As I showed in Chapter 5, it was not that staff were unaware of power relationships and hierarchy, but they were unable to make use of this awareness in their work.

ZADP staff were far from alone in their blindness to power, a blindness that it can be argued extends to ‘development’ itself. When I started to think about this chapter I looked for literature on patron-client relationships and gift exchange in aid, yet I found

---

<sup>183</sup> New improved varieties provided by the project to individuals with no obligation to ‘pass on the gift’.

that almost nothing had been written about either subject.<sup>184</sup> It would seem that this originally perplexing absence is itself associated with power. There has long been an ill-articulated unease amongst development professionals about what is perceived as the demeaning nature of ‘charity’. As a result, flows of money and resources have been gradually relabelled, with ‘aid’ renamed ‘development cooperation’ or ‘development assistance’, and ‘beneficiaries’ or ‘recipients’ called ‘partners’. The change in vocabulary mutes and disguises the relationship, but does not of itself alter its nature (Benthall 2001).

The implications of analysing aid as an exchange are disturbing to development professionals. Considerable work has been done on the extent to which foreign aid has been used to develop and retain control of geopolitical spheres of influence (e.g. Fowler 1998, Lundborg 1998), a clear exchange of loyalty for funds. But a connection between development aid and either foreign policy objectives or trade (tied aid) is now widely seen as unacceptable (although it does of course continue). By implication, other forms of covert exchange are also problematic. In a relationship of ‘development cooperation’ between ‘partners’, even conditionality and the hierarchical relationships it highlights are uncomfortable (cf. Chapter 2). Inequalities of power are distasteful and alarming to many people working in aid, who are all too conscious of the potential for accusations of racism or even (covert) imperialism.

Both ‘gifts’ and ‘patronage’ are thus morally complex. Gifts are worrying because of the implications of partiality, of personal relationships and overtones of outdated ‘emergency’ work. Senior ZADP staff wished to see themselves as impartial professionals, unswayed by personal likes or dislikes, fulfilling their part in an organised and impersonal process of responding to ‘community needs’. ‘Gifts’ and ‘patronage’, with their connotation of exchange, reciprocity, and a web of lasting – albeit unequal – relationships, did not lie well with technical professionalism, with ‘increasing community ownership’ or moves towards ‘sustainability’. This de-politicising and technicalising of what were at root issues connected to politics and power supports Ferguson’s argument that ‘development’ ‘is an “anti-politics machine”, depoliticising everything it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight’ (1990: xv).

---

<sup>184</sup> Exceptions include Eyben (2003b) Stirrat and Henkel (1997) and Werner (2000).

Evaluators of ZADP did indeed focus on ‘technical fixes’ to the problems they identified. For example, concerns were raised in the PIA about the nature of interactions between project staff and ‘community members’:

‘Plans are not developed with local people in a way that they have a clear understanding of them, or use them as a reference point for discussing progress. Research and demonstrations are not carried out with farmers as co-researchers and active managers of experiments. Facilitators are messengers (of technical and managerial matters) rather than facilitators of learning or active experimenters themselves’ (Cavane et al. 2001).

Yet the suggestions made for changes were all managerial or technical, and there was no serious consideration of the reasons for the situation, or the ways relationships were strategically exploited by participants. The conclusion of these consultants, that ‘participation in the PIA demonstrated real interest and capacity to be more active partners...with ZADP’ (Cavane et al. 2001) is itself debatable. The argument I have made here would suggest that building up ‘real’ ownership of project activities was antithetical to what many beneficiaries saw as most valuable about their involvement: that it created a relationship with a powerful, and hopefully protective outside organisation. The intention of participants in the PIA was to strengthen and deepen their relationship with ZADP staff. They therefore made efforts to say what they believed project staff wanted to hear, efforts that were redoubled whenever more important (white-skinned or southern Mozambican) visitors attended project meetings (cf. Jackson 1997: 242).

This is not to say that some managerial and technical changes were not needed, in addition to a broader reconsideration of ZADP’s role. The image of World Vision as resource distributor was after all not confined to villagers, but shared by many staff. Although none of the senior staff (Mozambican or expatriate) had worked for World Vision during the ‘emergency’, many of the *técnicos* had started their careers in the late 1980s, and had been involved in the distribution of ‘AgPaks’ (plastic buckets containing packets of seeds and basic tools). Encouraged by the fact that World Vision was itself a strongly hierarchical organisation, and that ZADP had a hierarchical relation with its donor (see Chapter 2) it was easy for staff to fall back into old patterns of behaviour, providing inputs and imparting knowledge to villagers conceived of as passive recipients. This was cemented by the fact that they were not only meant to establish ‘sustainable community institutions’ (which required new ways of working), but also to

deliver services. 'Ownership' was not encouraged by a controlling attitude on the part of *técnicos*, one of whose main tasks was to monitor and check up on what people were doing with project-provided inputs. When a recipient who had repaid his credit decided to slaughter all his goats to pay hospital costs, *técnicos* were deeply disapproving: 'He should have kept some' said the livestock *técnico*. 'That's not what's meant to happen. He should have kept some, for seed. If an evaluation team goes there, they won't find those animals, and will think that we did nothing, while in fact the animals we gave have been killed.'

Casting ZADP as a patron allowed 'beneficiaries' a level of leverage over World Vision that would otherwise have been denied to them. Emphasising their dependence on the project, their gratefulness to it, and the power that staff had over them, beneficiaries in turn were trying to gain a level of control over ZADP, and to define a role for themselves in a situation in which their own agency was limited. Those who did not wish to get involved did not deny the identification of the project as patron; they were simply indicating their unwillingness to become involved with it. Ironically, it could even be argued that the suspicions of this group, and their tendency to fight shy of processes over which they had limited control was itself based on a desire for self sufficiency: ultimately, for the kind of 'sustainability' and non-dependence which ZADP was itself advocating.

Like the rest of the thesis so far, this chapter has dealt with both of my fieldwork *localidades*, and has argued that to a considerable extent the same processes characterised the two sites. However important differences have also emerged. Mutange was a less remote *localidade*, and one from which a higher proportion of people fled to displacement camps with an NGO presence. It had also been the site of substantial agricultural investment in the early 1980s. Political division was not evident on an everyday basis, and organisation around political parties was not central. I have also argued that the fact that long-serving Frelimo leaders tended to be involved with the Association of Mutange Villagers rather than with ZADP, meant that there was less of the sense of betrayal that characterised relations between Mugaveia leaders/facilitators and the project. The result was that suspicion of ZADP was less widespread in Mutange than in Mugaveia. In Mugaveia, a more remote *localidade* from which many people had fled in small groups to the mountains, both political parties had

a strong everyday presence, and divisions coalesced around party politics. The next chapter focuses specifically on Mugaveia, and on questions of trust and envy in the context of project relationships.

## Chapter 7. Trust and Envy

At the start of August 2001, Rita and I returned to Mugaveia after several weeks' absence. We had sent word that we would be coming, and Francisco Namatala, the Frelimo leader with whom we regularly worked, was waiting for us at our house. We clambered out of the Landrover, and were soon ready to set off for the interviews he had arranged, but as he continued to sit on our three-legged chair, twisting his threadbare hat and smiling at the floor, we realised something was up. The village President, said Sr. Namatala, had forbidden us to do any more work without first consulting him. Unable to worm any more details out of our friend we headed for the President's house. A jumbled story greeted us. A report had reached the President that he, Rita, and I had been seen in the village cemetery, digging for bones in the dead of night. At the same time a rumour had started to circulate that the rat data collectors were undertaking some kind of 'hidden work' (*trabalho escondido*), and that the white 'owners' of the project – including me – were secretly employing them to murder.

The rat data collectors were working as part of a trapping project, a new part of ZADP. In Nicoria two hundred households had each been provided with ten rat-traps, which they set each night, and the number of rats caught was recorded each morning by a local data collector. For three days in each month the rat corpses themselves were collected, to be weighed and sexed. On those three days thirty other households from Inhape were loaned ten traps, from which corpses were also collected.

For my informants, the purpose of these activities was deeply obscure. Although an introductory meeting had been held in Nicoria, few had attended, and local leaders had not been specifically invited. Nobody could explain why some had been lucky enough to receive the traps, or how traps would spread through the community. 'Rat-traps don't breed', said one man, 'it would have been better to have had a cat project'. The employment of the rat data collectors also caused concern as, against all previous project policy, they were paid a regular salary of US\$ 30 per month. Why was it that the newest employees were being so richly rewarded, when the faithful facilitators continued essentially as volunteers?

**Figure 7.1 Rats in project-supplied traps**



**Figure 7.2 Trapped rats being measured**



Moreover, the rat data collectors were given equipment and a uniform – this in a place where matching clothes were almost unheard of. Their equipment included latex gloves and scales. Latex gloves were associated with hospital-based childbirth, and neither informants nor the data collectors themselves were able to explain why they were needed for handling dead rats.

The rumours that we first heard that day provided an explanation both for the exorbitant payments, and for the peculiar equipment. It was said that a woman had been attacked at night by one of the rat data collectors, who had intended to kill her. Had he succeeded, her heart would have been removed (using the medical gloves, which would mean that the murderer could not be detected by machines), weighed (using the scales), and then according to some accounts given to me to take to my home country to allow me to get rich. The bones from the cemetery were to be used for the same purpose: for the manufacture of *droga* (medicine) to bring wealth.

**Figure 7.3 Eating roasted rat**



Rat data collector and another individual eating roasted rat. The rat data collector is wearing his uniform. (Source: Belmain 2002.)

## 7.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on allegations of occult trading, both those made in the episode recounted above, and those which surfaced in various forms at different stages of the project. I explore the hidden arts that people associated with ZADP, and consider the situations in which accusations of involvement with the occult arose. The chapter follows directly from the last, which argued that ZADP was only able to establish legitimate exchange relationships with those who identified it as a patron. Here I go further, and look at how trust and confidence in ZADP as an institution was built up and/or fractured through the practical operation of project activities. This allows me to show that legitimation and recognition were ongoing processes, and were shaped by the choices and decisions that project staff and participants made.

I make two main arguments. The first is that talking about the occult proved to be a productive way for people to discuss relationships not only with ZADP, but with the state and with each other. What West called the ‘discursive terrain of sorcery accusations’ (West 1997b) was in Mugaveia used as a way of talking both about issues associated with the morality of accumulation, and also about the possibility and impossibility of entering into relationships with organisations where ‘trust’ was required. Second, although the chapter, like the thesis, is focused on ZADP, I suggest that the implications of these ways of talking extended further than the project itself. Attitudes towards the occult, as towards traditional leaders, were said to distinguish Renamo and Frelimo. Frelimo supporters and ZADP staff, identifying themselves as modernisers, tended to blame problems, *confusão* (confusion, dissent), and *desinformação* (disinformation) on Renamo adherents. For them, talk of the occult was redolent of the destabilising agenda they associated with Renamo. By contrast, Renamo leaders rejected the suggestion that they alone made and believed accusations, a repudiation that my own research bore out. I show that members of both political parties were involved in accusations and counter-accusations relating to the hidden arts, and I explore how the occult realm became another arena of political struggle.

I also suggest that this realm was one in which villagers were able to assert some agency over ZADP staff, who were generally far more powerful than them. This was partly because the influence of the hidden arts on project implementation was –

unsurprisingly – not considered in project design. It was thus one area in which ZADP staff were very much not in control, and where they found themselves confronted by situations they had not expected. Moreover, as modernisers themselves, they were easily wrong-footed, especially as many of them were in fact deeply ambivalent in their attitudes towards the occult. Despite this ambivalence, a rationalising, evidence-demanding approach to accusations of occult trading prevented ZADP from developing an analysis which would have allowed them to see the realm of the occult as another contested sphere, with different parties manipulating strategically within it.

Analysing the occult as another arena of struggle widens the general argument that development projects of necessity operate within existing social structures. These structures are shaped by conflicts between social strata, gender, age, ethnic and religious groups, and as a result the benefits brought by a project – which may be economic, social, or otherwise intangible – are interpreted, shared out and struggled over in the context of these already-existing structures, riddled with vested interests and hidden agendas. I suggest here that accusations of occult practices were a manifestation of struggles that also occurred in other realms, about the distribution of benefits, and about the right ways of interacting and articulating with new and illegible outside organisations.

## 7.2 Hidden Arts

The rumour recounted at the outset of the chapter, that ZADP staff were involved in procuring body parts through murder and grave robbing, was by no means unique. Similar allegations dogged the project from the outset. I now outline the beliefs about occult trading and *droga* (medicine, sorcery) that these rumours drew on, and consider their connection to accumulation and wealth.

Over the life of ZADP, staff were accused of two different kinds of occult trading, though in neither case were World Vision employees the only people alleged to have been involved. Other NGO workers, village officials and visiting traders were also implicated. The first accusation was that facilitators and *técnicos* throughout Gurué district were *ninjas*.<sup>185</sup> *Ninjas* were believed to be professional thieves, stealing

---

<sup>185</sup> ‘*Ninja*’ is not found in Portuguese dictionaries, though it was used as a Portuguese word in Zambézia. One person told me that it came from Chinese karate films, but there may well be other etymologies. I acknowledge the help of Fernando Pequenino in helping me understand this and other terms discussed in this paragraph.

children and body parts as well as other goods. The term *namaahita* (Elomwé, pl. *anamaahita*) was also used, meaning a person who murdered with a machete (Elomwé: *ohita*). An internal project report noted that 'In Incize, during the first years of ZADP, people said that World Vision, while giving many things on credit, would steal children. The facilitators were accused by the community of being *anamaahita*, that is murderers' (Pequenino 2001).

At the outset of the project, staff were frequently accused of having designs on children, and throughout my time in Mugaveia I was treated with the gravest caution by all but the children I knew best. When I first visited the *localidade* in December 2000, my colleague Amâncio stopped the car suddenly to point out a termite mound. Seeing the car halt without explanation, the women and young children who had been gathered by the mound scattered, running as fast as they could into the bush. Even in Lower Zambézia, where tales about child-stealing had less currency, fears were still latent, as I found when Jacinta once asked me to take her baby daughter back to Mutange with me, as she was travelling alone on her motorbike. Thinking nothing of it, I agreed. As the only woman in the car, and the person the child knew best, it was assumed to be my responsibility to sit in the back with Edith on my lap. But when we drove into Namacurra market to buy fish I realised that what I was doing was not alright at all: horrified faces stared at me through the windows; people shouted and pointed; a few ran after the car and hit it. Even in Lower Zambézia the sight of a white woman holding a small black child, sitting in a World Vision car, aroused grave concerns. When I gave Edith back to Jacinta and explained what had happened, she laughed. The reaction that had been caused was not unexpected, but it was one she refused to see as significant. The child of a senior worker at the Boror Company, and unusually well-educated for a Zambézia woman, her self image as a modern woman relied in part on distancing herself from occult rumours.

The second form of occult trading was in blood, procured by the *chupa sangue*, the blood sucker. When ZADP began to work in the more remote Gurué *localidades*, accusations that project staff were connected to the *chupa sangue* were common. Again, this was not unique: rumours about the *chupa sangue* surfaced soon after Independence and have recurred almost annually since (Bowen 2001: 329, Serra 1997: 68-9, Pequenino 1995). Though the *chupa sangue* is a relatively recent development in

Mozambique, vampire beliefs are widely known in East Africa.<sup>186</sup> Associated by some with the replacement of the *escudo* currency with the *metical*, others linked their appearance to Frelimo's Dynamising Groups, the blood donation and vaccination campaigns of the late 1970s or communal villages (Serra 1996). I heard no clear explanation of the purpose to which the blood was to be put. However all agreed that the sucking process was hi-tech: the *chupa sangue*, from outside the area, was believed to be guided by insiders, and to insert some kind of a sucking tube through a hole in a wall or door. As Bowen summarises:

'*Chupa sangués* are not witches. They are human agents assisted by local informants who receive compensation for their work and conduct concrete financial exchanges of blood for money. The means of doing so are more concealed. They attack at night and enter through the grass roofs of houses... A group of houses must join together, using drums to stay awake throughout the night. If one falls asleep, even a short distance away from the others, one is susceptible to attack' (Bowen 2000b: 330).

I experienced no *chupa sangue* panics in Mugaveia. Although less prevalent at the time of my fieldwork than at the start of the project, they did not completely vanish.<sup>187</sup>

The people with whom I discussed occult trading were all agreed that, while the purpose of these evil activities was obscure, it was connected to the search for wealth. The blood, organs and bones collected were, it was believed, going to be used to make *droga* (medicine) that would bring wealth – in the case of the story recounted at the outset, 'to take to my own country to allow me to get rich.' Occult trading thus fed into a broader strand of beliefs about sorcery, and the connection between sorcery and accumulation.

*Droga*, usually purchased from *curandeiros* (traditional healers/witch doctors), could be used malevolently, or for legitimate and positive ends such as protection or attracting customers (Bowen 2000b: 233-7). Of itself *droga* is amoral, and moral judgement pertains primarily to its usage rather than to its existence. Mystical powers are used regularly in everyday life: tiny children are protected by amulets, *curandeiros* are consulted about peculiar ailments, and this is seen as normal and sensible. *Droga* can be made from many things, with some ingredients being more powerful than others.

---

<sup>186</sup> See White (1990, 1993a, 1993b), Pels (1998), Jarosz (1994), Musambachime (1988) and Weiss (1998) for comparative discussions of vampire rumours in Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania and Madagascar.

<sup>187</sup> It was suggested that Estevão, the *técnico* in Vehiua, was connected with the *chupa sangue*, because he rode a red motor-bike. At the end of the project, *técnicos* listed 'witchcraft, rumour of blood suckers – "*chupa sangués*"' alongside health and robbery as significant risks encountered in their work (Queiroz de Souza 2002).

The ingredients believed to be acquired through occult trade were thought to be particularly powerful, as were a number of other hard-to-come-by ingredients like the gall bladder of the crocodile. The fabrication of *droga* was done by *curandeiros* through what can be seen as sorcery:

‘The supernatural power to cause another person or that person’s possessions harm through the use of various substances or acts. The efficacy of sorcery depends upon the nature of the acts performed rather than upon the moral character of the practitioner’ (Beidelman 1971: 131).

It was often suspected that *curandeiros* were also witches (*feiticeiros*<sup>188</sup>), but a user of *droga* was generally him/herself neither sorcerer nor witch.

*Droga* was often used in the illegitimate accumulation of wealth. For example, it could cause a person’s labour to be stolen. I heard of a magic that could make your sleeping body go and work at night on someone else’s *machamba*. In the morning you would wake exhausted. Alternatively, someone could appear to die and be buried, when in fact their body had been sent to South Africa to work in the mines, with their salary going to the person who killed them. This resembles the *ekong* witchcraft of Cameroon (Geschiere 1988), and the zombie-creation of the South Africa-Mozambique border (Golooba-Mutebi 2003, Niehaus 2001). Such magic could be discovered when a friend visited from the mines, bringing recent news and sometimes even gifts and photographs from the man believed to be dead.<sup>189</sup> *Droga* could be used to conjure a person-animal,<sup>190</sup> which would then be used to steal. Snakes, rats or birds would be conjured, which, at harvest time, would go to people’s *machambas*, eat the crop, and take it to the house of their ‘owner’ who would therefore profit from the work of others.

It was also considered possible to suck the good from other people’s fields, using *droga*: this meant that the work the victim put into his/her field brought no results, but

---

<sup>188</sup> Witchcraft, *feiticaria*, was also known: an inherent malevolent power, called *okhwiri* in both Echuabo and Elomwé (see also Brentari n.d., cf. Evans-Pritchard 1937: 21). A person who practised witchcraft was a *feiticeiro* or *mukhwiri*, and had evil in his/her heart. *Feiticaria* was greatly feared and often talked about; but as it was neither discussed nor alleged in the context of ZADP I discuss it no further here.

<sup>189</sup> Rita knew of a case involving the late supervisor of a World Vision health programme, said to have been killed by his uncle.

<sup>190</sup> People-lions and people-snakes, known as ‘sent’ lions/snakes (*leões mandados* or *cobras mandadas*, from *mandar*, to send), were most talked about. Visibly indistinguishable from a ‘real’ lion or snake, they were created through a process of magical transformation. As this kind of sorcery was never alleged in connection with ZADP, I did not enquire into the mechanisms and reasons for such transformations. For comparative accounts see West (1997a, 2001) for Cabo Delgado province, and Wyatt (1950) and Schneider (1962) for Tanzania. See also Roberts (1986), Taussig (1987), Jackson (1990), Niehaus (1995) and Kapferer (1997). In 2003 a case of deaths caused by suspected ‘people-lions’ appeared in the international media (Agence France Presse 2003).

only served to increase the harvest of the bewitcher. This mirrors the beliefs of the Uluguru in Tanzania, who believed that unusual success in farming had little to do with hard work, correct spacing or the use of good seed or fertiliser. It might instead be ascribed to evil magic, which had sucked the good from other people's fields and thus reduced their yields (Brain 1982, see also Sanders 1999). Not only was this considered morally unacceptable, but active attempts might be made to attack the perpetrator and reduce him to the level of everyone else.<sup>191</sup>

It is this last point that was most pertinent in the context of ZADP. Although those who worked most closely with ZADP were, as I described above, at times accused of procuring the ingredients for wealth-creating *droga* for their 'patrons', it was never suggested that they themselves had used *droga* themselves to get rich. Rather, they felt at particular risk from harm-doing by the envious poor,<sup>192</sup> which could even take the form of direct poisoning.<sup>193</sup> The President of Mugaveia said 'Every person who works, the population calls a witch'. It is to the question of envy that I now turn, as jealousy associated with wealth, consumption and knowledge was involved in many of the cases where connection with the hidden arts was alleged.

### 7.3 Envy

Envy was considered an inevitable part of life: 'envy will not end in this world' said one Mugaveia facilitator. People had to deal with it when it arose, but tried to avoid creating it, as it was believed that the envious were ready users of *droga*. In cases where project resources were distributed only to the few, it was often alleged that *droga* was used, or might be used, against recipients. To some observers it appeared that jealous, better-off people were using the fear of *droga* as a means of strategically discouraging and manipulating the poorer individuals who were the project's original target group. It was also observed that certain kinds of goods provoked more envy – and thus more sorcery – than others. These tended to be things that were less shareable: metal roofing sheets; furniture; project goats. Furthermore, envy was not confined to the material. 'Being in the know' was greatly valued and even envied, and the

---

<sup>191</sup> For a similar account from Kenya see Brantley (1979), and for a contradictory one (based on data from Uganda and Ghana) see Brokensha and Erasmus (1969: 95-96).

<sup>192</sup> See Gable, (1997) Gluckman (1956), Ardener (1970: 147-8), Fisiy and Geschiere (1991: 253).

<sup>193</sup> My experience mirrored that of Ferguson in Zambia (1999: 119-20), who found that poisoning was considered a form of witchcraft. When Maria Namuteca, one of our Mugaveia hosts, described how the family had lost several pigs as a result of poisoning with DDT, she labelled this *droga*, and suggested that it had been done by an envious person.

distribution of knowledge, like wealth, was contested. I now look in turn at the ways in which envy was connected not only to uneven distribution, but also to uneven consumption and sharing.

## **Distribution**

Uneven distribution of limited resources was a primary cause of envy, as shown by the case of the rat-trapping component outlined at the start of the chapter. This activity was undertaken in collaboration with the Natural Resources Institute (NRI), and was developed by scientists who knew little about rural Zambézia. It was intended to address one of the severe problems of post-harvest storage that were such a problem for villagers (ZADP 1998). It was estimated that rats consumed about 150 kg of food per household per year – a serious issue in less food-secure areas. Rats carry a range of dangerous diseases including plague, and often injure people with their bites (Belmain 2002). The trapping project was intended to ‘develop a methodology for assessing the impact of rodents on household food security, and their potential impact on health and nutrition of rural families’ (Natural Resources Institute 1999: 2). Rats were a valued foodstuff, so the project focused on trapping rather than poisoning, and thus developed the secondary justification of demonstrating that village-scale trapping by contiguous households was both viable and cost-effective in reducing the general rat population in an area (Steve Belmain, e-mail, 01.10.03).

Accordingly, a *célula* with approximately the target number of households was chosen as the ‘treatment area’ (Nicoria), and an attempt made to distribute traps to every household. As described in Chapter 6, data on the number of rats captured was collected each day by data collectors, and to avoid conflicts of interest, it was decided that existing ZADP facilitators should not do this work (page 216). Payment was provided in order to ensure dedication to the job – it was recognised that a daily commitment of two or three hours could not go unpaid, particularly as the work was for the good of the project.<sup>194</sup> But while the process of the selection of both data collectors and households to receive traps was logical to the scientist designers, it was obscure to my informants. Many were envious of the way in which the rat data collectors had, so swiftly and so incomprehensibly, been picked for jobs that turned out to be so profitable.

---

<sup>194</sup> By contrast, facilitators were conceived of as working for the good of the ‘community’.

The design meant that only a limited number of people in the *localidade* received traps, and this unfairness was further compounded by the fact that trap recipients were concentrated in one area. The problems caused, in the shape of the sorcery accusations related at the beginning of the chapter, were by no means unique: it was frequently the case that when a few gained a benefit denied to others this caused jealousy. In another Gurué *localidade* I heard of a case where a man had ended up looking after all the goats that had originally been intended for eight people. When the credit was repaid the man did not consider the other group members to have a call on the animals, as they had not contributed to their care. The other members disagreed, and took the case to the DDADR in Gurué, where it was decided that only one person had a claim on the goats. But the local *técnico* said it was a pyrrhic victory:

‘As people saw that he had repaid all the animals, they wanted to spite him (*querem vingar*). Some people are his relatives and there has been vengeance (*vingança*). The owner says that some of his animals have been pregnant, yet they don’t conceive. There have been many problems.’

The concentration of benefits on a single person was contested, and informants suggested that sorcery provoked by envy could result.

In numerous cases the ill-luck of recipients of project inputs was attributed to the envy of non-recipients. Neighbours’ jealousy was often cited as the cause of goat death, although the explanation was not accepted by project management. In one case in Nicoadala district eight people received goats in 1997 (Phase I) and all the goats died.

‘Farmers said everybody in the community was jealous because of them and they sent sorcery and killed all the goats. This is popular belief in the area. Everybody in the group believes it was sorcery from jealous community members’ (Pequenino 2000: 30).<sup>195</sup>

In some cases, as with micro-credit, fear of the consequences of jealousy could discourage potential recipients from accepting inputs:

‘One concern that the women raised was if a person (male or female) receives a loan, people were worried that someone else would be jealous and go to the *curandeiro* (witch doctor) to put a spell onto that person. This magic would then make the business fail. The recipient of the loan might then fall sick and be unable to repay their loan. The person would then be in a worse situation than before since they would have to pay medical fees to the doctor for treatment, in addition to their debt on the loan’ (ZADP 1999b).

---

<sup>195</sup> The livestock technician attributed their death to the fact that the communally-held goats went unfed, as no member of the group wanted to take responsibility for their care.

Some project staff suggested that these fears were actively encouraged by certain (unidentified) non-recipients, who intended to discourage and demotivate those who had received things in the hope of capturing the resources for themselves. In Mutange Jacinta observed that particular leaders were involved in spreading rumours about the abduction of children and the probable trickery involved in the goat restocking programme (see page 213). She thought that these leaders had tried to discourage the women on whom the programme was targeted,

‘so the women took the animals with fear, not knowing if the government would come and demand money. They wondered whether, if they didn’t pay, then the government would confiscate their things, or even send them to prison. And some women were too scared to receive things.’

Likewise in Gurué, Estevão commented that,

‘These stories start when there are resources. There are problems with envy, there are some people who can’t see another with a good social position. It’s a characteristic of people in villages. I think that these stories about the person who gets a goat having a child taken are to demoralise the people who received them. It is not possible to get something without paying.’

Estevão’s explanation was functionalist, positing a definite intent on the part of the rumour-spreaders to dispirit those who had received what were seen as valuable goods. Further weight is given to this account by the fact that some of those who spread rumours later became involved in project activities. One Mugaveia facilitator commented that

‘those who spoke ill of the project are now those who are within the groups, as they are convinced that they do no ill, but rather help. People were just envious because the facilitators received bikes; they had thought that the projects were just short-term passing things (*eram passageiros de pouco tempo*).’

When it turned out that the projects were longer-lasting and real benefits derived from them, some of those who were not originally participants attempted to join, at times by attempting to displace earlier participants by demoralising them.

## Consumption and Sharing: Goods and Knowledge

The last section was concerned with envy resulting from the uneven and possibly unfair distribution of limited resources. In other situations envy could be associated with contested consumption and sharing. Although people were suspicious of those who became rich with great speed, it was not always accumulation itself that was the problem. In rural Zambézia, as in Dedza, Malawi, profit-making was seen as natural:

‘Dedza villagers do not view participation in commodity production, transactions and consumption as inherently problematic and dangerous. The market economy is, rather, a taken-for-granted feature of their lived-in world, and virtually every villager is thought to have a desire to prosper in it. In such a context, witchcraft represents an argument about how that prosperity is to be achieved’ (Englund 1996: 260).<sup>196</sup>

In Mugaveia conflicts were generally associated not simply with accumulation, but with a failure to distribute wealth and benefits appropriately. It was not so much that accumulation, or commercial transactions, or commerce were intrinsically dangerous; it was the way in which assets were consumed or shared that led to moral evaluation, often in terms of witchcraft (Bowen 2000b: 232). Bowen goes on to say that ‘as long as relationships are visible, through gifts and through helping, the spending of money shows one’s worth and importance and insulates one from accusations of illegitimately acquired wealth’.

Ordinary accumulation could thus be legitimate, so long as the source of wealth was clear, and so long as the person continued to participate in relations of reciprocity and helping. ‘What is particularly unfathomable is the sudden discrepancy in wealth, the rapid accumulation by those who one once knew and recognised as economic and social equals’ (Bowen 2000b: 234). Raúl Muanavola (page 151), the carpenter who had only recently returned to live in Mugaveia, and who was much better off than anyone else around, once told me that despite his wealth he was not afraid of being assailed by the envious. ‘My friends will not envy me, and ask where I got my things, because they know that I am working, and going from one place to another to get something.’ Raúl was known for his generosity, and he took particular trouble to cultivate good relations with neighbours, colleagues, and leaders. In Mutange, Henriques Francisco (page 145), although he did not make the same efforts as Raúl, was also well aware of the risks of unusual prosperity, and tried to protect himself by avoiding conspicuous consumption.

---

<sup>196</sup> Compare Green (1995), Lan (1989), Shipton (1989), and Masquelier (1993, 1997), who argue that in other parts of the world commodities and the market economy are sometimes seen as evil.

However, not all goods were equally shareable, something that particularly affected those who worked with ZADP. Unlike goods acquired through trade, or meat from hunting, money, bicycles, rat-traps and clothing were hard to share around (cf. West 2001). As in Mueda, Cabo Delgado, so too in Mugaveia were some kinds of wealth more problematic and prone to causing problems than others. West suggests that ‘the discursive terrain of sorcery accusations and counteraccusations provided a fertile substrate on which ... residents could express profound ambivalence about the new forms of power these objects represented and constituted’ (2001: 128). This was particularly important as the people on whom the benefits were concentrated were not always those who had traditionally been powerful. Rat data collectors were not leaders, nor did they necessarily come from important families. Similarly the goat restocking programme ran into problem after problem until leaders were provided with livestock.

I do not intend to suggest that it was only goods provided by ZADP that were difficult to share out and that were therefore risky. Many things from outside the area were seen as having the potential to attract harm. One example was the zinc roofing sheets with which many people aspired to cover their houses. Though people liked the idea of having a watertight house, and one that they could be proud of, they were very aware of the risks involved. Many believed that death was likely to follow rapidly after the re-roofing of a house.<sup>197</sup>

Envy was not confined to material goods. In the case of the rat-trapping component, village leaders felt that they had been excluded from knowledge about the nature of the project at the outset. The village President said that since ‘no introductions’ had been made, he was not going to help when problems arose.

‘The President said that the day when the traps were brought he and other leaders were in a meeting about goats. Three World Vision cars came, and when they arrived they asked Agostinho to go with them to Nicoria and the traps were then distributed just in Nicoria. Those who were in the [goat] meeting didn’t know about anything, they just went home and only heard afterwards that rat-traps had been distributed. People complained, asking how it was possible just to give traps to Nicoria and not here [Intuba], but though there was much talk, nothing changed. The President said that at least they should have informed him so that he knew, in that all who arrive are introduced by his hands. *And as he wasn’t informed, he takes no responsibility for the problems that have arisen.*’ (Rita’s field journal, my italics)

---

<sup>197</sup> Those who were able to afford the zinc sheeting were usually individuals who had migrated, either to the mines or within Zambézia. Miners tended to die young from lung disease, and HIV/AIDS had started to take a toll. Migrants often only returned home when they were already weak, possibly leading to the observed connection between roofing and death.

In the case of the other rumour in which I was involved – digging in the cemetery – the opposite happened. The President had known about our work from the outset, and had been in charge of channelling information about it within the *localidade*. Moreover he was implicated in the rumour, and as a result of these two factors it was rapidly quashed. The same thing happened when ZADP project facilitators were accused of stealing children using their newly acquired bicycles: leaders of both parties, who had been told what was happening and who had received project benefits (such as goats), were quick to reject the tales.

In the case of the rat-trapping, it can be argued that leaders and project facilitators felt that their trust had been betrayed. They were the ones who had, at some risk to themselves, been the project's primary collaborators in the difficult early years. However when a new and lucrative activity came along not only were they excluded from benefits, they were also excluded from knowledge of it. It is to the question of trust – how it was developed, on what it was based, and how it could be fractured – to which I now turn.

#### **7.4 Trusting ZADP**

The last chapter looked at how the identification of ZADP with Frelimo and the state coloured the ways in which different people chose to interact with it. Here I look at how people came to make choices about involvement, how those choices changed over the life of the project, and how they were evaluated through the lens of 'trust'. The word used in Portuguese in these cases was *confiança*. Like trust, *confiança* is a polysemic word, which translates into English as confidence, trust, faith, belief, reliance, self-reliance; intimacy, familiarity; boldness, impudence, pertness (Porto Editora 1998). As such, it does not map precisely onto the English concept of trust which, as Harriss points out, is in important ways distinct from both faith and confidence (2003: 757). Nevertheless, Harriss's definition of trust as pertaining to 'circumstances in which an actor chooses to believe in the good will of another whilst having no reliable knowledge that she or he will behave in the way that is expected' is equally applicable to *confiança*. For Hart, trust is 'the negotiation of risk occasioned by the freedom of others, who we know personally, to act against our interest in the relative absence of constraint imposed by kinship identity and legal contract' (2001: 111). Both writers emphasise the gamble and uncertainty that trust involves.

When ZADP first started to operate in the more remote parts of Gurué District like Mugaveia, staff found it very hard to persuade people to work with them and trust them. This was not only because of fears of sorcery, but also due to wartime experiences. A government agriculture official explained that,

‘Working with the community wasn’t easy, because as the people had only just come out of the war, when they received visits, they thought that the *técnicos* were also guerrillas. It was even worse when they saw *cooperantes*; they thought that they had come to support the war, not to resolve the problems of war.’

Previous experiences with outsiders had often involved violence and exploitation, and vulnerability to abduction or at the very least the expropriation of household labour resources had been a feature of Zambézian life for many decades.

Literature shows that fears about the stealing of people are ancient in Zambézia. Isaacman and Isaacman wrote of the class of thieves known by Sena people as *mupanga* who, in the nineteenth century, would steal young children at the time when the grass was high and they could therefore approach villages undetected (1977:109). Pequenino referred to similar fears in Mugeba (Mocuba District), terming the thieves *amapanka* (1995: 79-82). These concerns were linked to folk memories of the slave trade, to the idea that *régulos* got their positions under the Portuguese colonial government in return for giving up a nephew or other relative,<sup>198</sup> to forced labour on colonial plantations, and to wartime recruitment by both Renamo and Frelimo. This further substantiates the point made in Chapter 3, that people interpret ‘development’ interventions in the light of earlier outsiders’ interferences.

The materiality of people’s concern that real ZADP staff would abduct their real children chimes with Harry West’s suggestion that interpreting such beliefs metaphorically is unsatisfactory. When he presented his work on the symbolism of ‘people lions’ in Cabo Delgado to a local audience, listeners vehemently protested that the lions were not symbolic, but a real and material danger: they were actual lions. The point can be well made in the Zambézian context. When people spoke of their fears that their children would be taken, they were expressing a real worry that a son or daughter

---

<sup>198</sup> Informants in Mugaveia said that the *régulos* got their positions following the ‘sale’ of a nephew or a brother to the colonial authorities. This resonates with rather different beliefs about the ‘sale’ of children for witchcraft. An Intuba church leader was suspected this on the death of his epileptic daughter. She was the third child to die within six months, and it was suspected that he had been ‘selling’ his children in order to enrich himself. The exchange of offspring or bodily force for wealth is a common theme in Africa (see de Boeck 1998: 789, Kindness 1996: 14).

might disappear, not some intangible concern about the generalised expropriation of African labour:

‘The traffic in people, body parts and body fluids moves beyond immediate concerns of state legitimacy on the part of an ‘alienated’ peasantry. It responds to larger scale historical processes and the recent experiences of the war, but also reflects the biomedical, modernised world of medicine and hospitals, the vulnerability of bodies, and allows for debates on shifts in regional entrepreneurship’ (Bowen 2000b: 335).

Bowen’s analysis emphasises the unpredictability of processes and practices external to people’s everyday worlds.

Given these fears, a great many people in the more remote Gurué *localidades* were predisposed to mistrust the project when it first appeared in 1997. The situation was unwittingly worsened by the behaviour of ZADP staff undertaking PRAs, which confirmed people’s lurking suspicions that the project and its workers were associated with dangerous and illegitimate sorcery. A *técnico* told me what had happened:

‘World Vision arrived and started to talk to people. They asked a lot of questions. At that time people were just coming out of the war and they didn’t have *confiança* in anyone. And the big problem that day was when a mapping process was done. People at that time associated mapping with an attack: people came to do mapping, people came to attack (*vinham fazer o mapiamento, vinham fazer ataque de guerra*). And when the staff talked of mapping, people had doubts, they thought of war, because others who had mapped the area had been guerrillas. And people thought that “Ah, the first ones who did mapping were guerrillas, and so there’s a problem with these ones too”.

And it got worse then they said: “Where is the cemetery?”, as a reference mark. And that was where all *confiança* was really broken (*ali fica quebrada a confiança toda*), and people said: this is not a project, this is war which is coming once again... In the African tradition, people value the cemetery because it is a sacred place, very sacred. And anyone who comes to a community and asks where the cemetery is – well, the population will read lots of things into it. There are many things that are done traditionally, based in cemeteries: *feitiçaria, droga*. It’s always dangerous for someone’s first question to be about a cemetery!’

In one Mugaveia *célula* the PRA had to be abandoned entirely, and in other *células* in the district it proved impossible to draw maps or carry out any exercise which required farmers to be named (ZADP 1997: 10). The people organising the PRA were, quite correctly, seen as exceptionally successful, exceptionally rich. Such wealth and recognition was deemed most likely to have been obtained at the expense of others, and World Vision’s assertions that they were there to ‘help’ (*ajudar*) convinced few in the early years.<sup>199</sup>

---

<sup>199</sup> The PRA report attributed problems to the ‘sharp conflict between political parties in the District’, and to the fact that communities in both Mugaveia and Nipive *localidades* ‘thought that the research team

According to project *técnicos*, the trust of villagers was built up very gradually. They attributed increasing trust to growing experience, and to the example of a few brave pioneers who showed the risk of involvement with ZADP was worth taking. These pioneers tended to be leaders, those who had worked for many years outside the *localidade*, or those who had previously worked with foreigners. This pattern was most clearly demonstrated in the area of goat restocking. When goats were first offered, many people refused them, alleging that payment would later be required for this ostensible gift, probably in the form of children (page 235). This fear affected all the Gurué *localidades* and many in Namacurra and Nicoadala. However a small number of people, often leaders, did accept goats. Rodrigues explained that ‘as time passed, people saw that no children died, and that no children were taken by World Vision, and realised that it was all disinformation from within the community.’ As a result demands for goats grew: ‘Now we can’t satisfy all the people who want them.’

During my fieldwork I was frequently told this story by informants explaining how their relationship with the project had changed. They would tell me just how frightened they had been when ZADP first arrived, offering goats on credit, and how they had thought that there must have been a ‘hidden motive’. They would then describe how they gradually realised that the rumours they had believed were untrue, and how they had come heartily to regret not taking up the opportunity to own livestock when it was offered to them. They would ruefully compare their own goat-less state to that of people who had taken the gamble of involvement (cf. Hart 2001, Harriss 2003), which in this case had paid such dividends. Yet although I heard this story often, not everyone came to trust ZADP. Many of those living within project *localidades* had little to do with *técnicos* or other staff, and as Estevão explained, their ideas often remained the same:

‘The project doesn’t have the human capacity to touch everyone. And other people in the areas where we don’t go have perturbed ideas. They don’t hear what we do. No, they hear stories about things we don’t do, but people tell them we do. And people who get these messed-up messages don’t change their way of thinking.’

Right up until the end of the project, a substantial number of people had no desire to get involved with ZADP activities, and remained concerned about the ‘real’ reason for intervention.

---

would conspire to take their land from them and that they would all be sold into slavery’ (ZADP 1997: 10).

While a gradually more trusting atmosphere developed between project staff and ordinary beneficiaries, though with the caveats already mentioned, the situation was rather different in the case of leaders and facilitators. ZADP depended on leaders of both parties to mobilise their members to participate in activities, and made sure that leaders were early beneficiaries of most activities. The facilitators were the people with whom the *técnicos* worked most closely, and on whom they relied. It should be remembered that relations between them and the project were by no means without difficulties, and involved constant contestation about the appropriate level of reward for the work they did (see page 215). Many facilitators abandoned their jobs, some near the outset of the project, others after several years of work. This was generally due to a perceived lack of appreciation by the project, or sometimes due to new and preferable opportunities. Those facilitators who remained active acted as channels of information between the project and the population at large, and were regularly visited by well-dressed people travelling in prestigious vehicles. Prior to the advent of the rat-trapping component, although there were tensions in the relationship between project and facilitators, there was a reasonable equilibrium.

As already described, the rat-trapping component did not work through the structures that ZADP had developed over the preceding three years. Existing facilitators were not offered jobs as rat data collectors, nor were they automatically offered traps. Village leaders were not informed about the new intervention, nor were they all given traps. The relationship between ZADP and the leaders and facilitators was then further shaken by the revelation that the data collectors were to be paid. Both leaders, who had not been kept informed, and facilitators, who had not been offered jobs, felt that their trust had been betrayed, and that to use Harriss's earlier definition, their gamble in trusting an unknown project had, after all, proved ill-advised (2003). Although there is no evidence to suggest that any of the rumours started with them, they did little to quash them.

## **7.5 Manipulating Accusations**

This chapter has looked at how the complicated relationships between villagers and project were articulated and explored through the idiom of the hidden arts. I have suggested that this idiom highlighted currents of envy and of trust, which in turn ran through and affected much of what ZADP did. This begs other questions. What was it

about the occult that made it an appropriate idiom for the expression of relations of envy and trust? How was the project able to take cognizance of and react to concerns expressed through this – to them – highly exotic idiom?

The second question needs answering first, for it was only because project staff and facilitators were able to hear and respond to accusations concerning the occult that the accusations had any power. Though the project was designed by English-speaking foreigners, and the influence of the occult was not considered at the outset, nevertheless most of the field-level implementers shared a common cultural background. Facilitators came from the very *células* where they worked, and the *técnicos* were all Zambézian. Agostinho and Estevão had been brought up in Gurué district, and Jacinta was born in Namacurra. Although many senior staff were either foreign or from southern Mozambique (see page 69 for a discussion of senior staff backgrounds), by the end of the project a number of Zambézians had also been employed. When thinking about how the hidden arts affected the implementation of ZADP it must therefore be borne in mind that none of those engaged in village work were fully external to these ideas.

Although project field staff may have laughed at the rumours which circulated, most of them believed that the tales were, at some level, true. Rita told me quite seriously that child stealing still continued. She knew someone whose sister's child had disappeared, and it was only by chance that he was found in a car with two 'whites'.<sup>200</sup> The car had a puncture on the outskirts of Gurué city, and bystanders watching the wheel being changed saw movement under the tarpaulin securing luggage, which turned out to be the awakening child. She said that people did not know quite why children were taken, though it was said that it was for their eyes, genitals and hearts, which were perhaps used to fabricate wealth-bringing *droga*.<sup>201</sup> In a similar fashion, *técnicos* had an ambivalent attitude towards the *chupa sangue*. Some were not entirely sure that the *chupa sangue* did not actually exist. Agostinho, the Mugaveia *técnico* once said that he knew for certain that the *chupa sangue* existed, as he knew someone whose blood had been sucked.

These were opinions that I heard in informal conversations with my research assistants, *técnicos* and other colleagues. ZADP staff were not unaware of the influence

---

<sup>200</sup> See footnote 95.

<sup>201</sup> Much more recently (February-March 2004) there was a widespread panic in Mozambique about child-stealing, indicating that such tales have wide currency and the potential to instil fear.

of the occult on their activities and the people who participated in them. While partly convinced of the backwardness, traditionalism and *obscurantismo* that such rumours represented, at the same time they were personally unable to dismiss them completely, and indeed took entirely for granted the existence of some kind of a 'hidden realm'.<sup>202</sup> Yet these were not beliefs that were reflected in project reports, which reported occasionally on what were designated 'traditional' beliefs.

Formally, tales of sorcery or the trade in blood and body parts were dismissed. Amongst *técnicos*, facilitators and village leaders such dismissal was generally made with reference to a modernising and rational discourse which had no place for 'traditional' beliefs. When Agostinho recounted the story of the woman whose blood had been sucked, his colleagues dismissed the tale, pointing to the lack of concrete evidence. 'How can it be, will they test the blood types right there then? They'd have to travel with a laboratory!', they said. 'How about AIDS then?'

These rhetorical demands for evidential proof were characteristic. As one facilitator in Mugaveia put it,

'We said, "you have told these stories from 1997 to the present day, and where is the child that has disappeared?" And there was no answer.'

When the rat data collectors were accused of attacking people, leaders said that the accusers should go and take a photograph of the place where an attack took place, so it could be investigated. After Rita, the President and I were accused of digging in the cemetery, a public meeting was held at which anyone who had seen this digging was asked to identify themselves. When nobody did, and when the leaders could also find no evidence of illicit activity (no holes in the ground), the matter was considered settled. This pattern – rumour and accusation, followed by unmet demands for evidence, followed by the widespread dismissal of the story – occurred again and again.

---

<sup>202</sup> Witchcraft was familiar to my Mozambican colleagues. An expatriate employee of World Vision noted that when one of his staff had a car accident, he blamed it on something occult: 'He said afterwards that he saw these little pools of water in his office, and that must have been a sign. The accident was not really his fault. This man has a degree, he lives in Maputo usually – and yet he is convinced that this happened...' The same employee later had his motorcycle stolen from outside a bar, and again blamed this on 'somebody doing something': 'When his motorbike gets stolen, what does he say? "I've been working for X years since leaving university, and nothing like this has ever happened before... Someone is doing it to me, and it's probably a member of staff, because I'm a southerner and they don't like, they don't respect me.'"

*Técnicos* would dismiss the backwardness of those who believed such stories, and suggested that those who believed in the more outlandish explanations of what the project was ‘really’ up to were ignorant and backward. This mirrored the terms of Frelimo’s earlier campaigns against *obscurantismo*, traditional leaders, and so-called superstitious beliefs. Although they might, in a private context, believe in phenomena similar to the *chupa sangue*, within the professional context of a modernising project such phenomena were implausible and thus could not be acknowledged. In addition, what was entirely unbelievable was the suggestion that *people like themselves* should be involved in occult trading. What was *not* dismissed was the suggestion that such a trade existed, or that *droga* was indeed made and used for a variety of nefarious purposes.

A similar argument can be made for the facilitators, though they were even more absorbed into local society than the *técnicos*. In Chapter 6 I explained that for all recipients, but in particular the facilitators, the project’s greatest value was not inputs or activities, but the relationship itself. The most active facilitators consciously emphasised and worked to strengthen the link between themselves and the project, some visiting or talking to the *técnico* on an almost daily basis. They would ask for his/her advice on the most basic of issues, and resisted carrying out any tasks unsupervised. In a similar fashion, facilitators identified themselves with the project, rather than ‘the community’ when it came to discussions of the occult (see page 216). In discussions of the occult, facilitators were keen to identify themselves with modernising discourses which had no place for the trade in blood or body parts.

I return now to the question I posed at the start of the section: why relations of envy and trust were explored and expressed through the hidden arts. The answer recalls once again the political divisions between Renamo and Frelimo to which the thesis has repeatedly referred. Accusations made in the realm of the ‘traditional’ were difficult for Frelimo to handle, given their historic dismissal of such beliefs. When tales about occult trading arose, both *técnicos* and local Frelimo officials would habitually blame Renamo supporters for inventing and propagating such stories. Frelimo officials would blame Renamo for *confusão* (confusion, dissent), for *desinformação*, for having *complicado* (complicated) adherents. The identification of Renamo with ‘traditional’ or superstitious beliefs has long been a feature of Frelimo’s modernist agenda, and Frelimo did not have a way of dealing with such beliefs when expressed by members of their

own party. In this they mirrored the attitude of the *técnicos* described above: private beliefs, however dearly held, did not find a public place.

However, although *técnicos* and ‘official’ (i.e. Frelimo) leaders generally suggested that Renamo supporters were behind the rumours described, my research suggests that a party identification was not accurate. I found supporters of both parties who believed in or repeated these tales. Feelings of doubt and concern were widespread, but could not easily be expressed by ‘rational’ ‘modern’ Frelimo supporters. It was thus easier to identify what were actually widely-held beliefs with the opposition party, which allowed them to be discussed in a suitably ‘othered’ fashion, than to suggest that Frelimo supporters also shared the same ideas. This argument is given credence by the fact that it was not just Renamo supporters who were afraid of receiving project inputs, and that in Mutange it was in fact a Frelimo official who spread the most alarming rumours about the consequences of participation.

## **7.6 Conclusion**

Allegations of occult practice, such as those described at the outset, formed part of ongoing debates about accumulation and knowledge, and a way of articulating doubts about relationships with illegible and potentially untrustworthy outsiders. ZADP was just one such illegible outsider, and in the thesis I have considered the various ways in which people attempted to position it and to imbue it with responsibilities. Chapter 6 looked at how those who participated in project activities constructed ZADP as a patron, and were thus able to enter into an exchange relationship with it. In that discussion I noted that by no means everyone felt themselves able or willing to involve themselves with the project. The most important determinant of involvement was political allegiance, which this chapter also shows to have been critical – less in determining who was likely to make accusations against the project, but much more in identifying who would be blamed for any rumours that did emerge.

It might be thought that allegations of occult practice by the project and its staff signified that it was unsuccessful, that it was not working well, that it was unwelcome. This would not be right. Rather, the resources brought by ZADP were strongly desired by many, even by those who wished that they had been brought by a different organisation. Debates about the occult were debates about the morality of differential accumulation, and centred on the distribution and not the existence of wealth. Modern

goods were nothing new to the people of Mugaveia; the problem with them was that there were not enough to go around.

The occult realm was one in which ZADP had little power. When the project was first set up it was not envisaged that it would have to have a ‘witchcraft strategy’, alongside its targeting strategies and extension action plans – and of course no such strategy was ever developed. Responses to accusations were *ad hoc* and individual; the problem was not one that was ever institutionally comprehended. This is significant. ZADP was able to reduce the impact of potentially serious accusations by relegating them to the world of the obscure, the archaic, the irrelevant. But at the same time, by operating in a realm of which project staff had little knowledge, in which they had neither strategy nor power, villagers were able to assert some control and influence over activities which was otherwise denied them. However, as the concluding chapter now elaborates, although villagers were able to exert a certain level of influence over project practices, in the end internationally-driven imperatives were of much greater significance in labelling ZADP, and in redefining the nature of DFID interventions.

## **Chapter 8. Muddled Fashions: Anti-Politics and Aid Effectiveness**

After what has been a detailed examination of a single development intervention, I return to some of the central questions I have sought to address in the thesis. What was the significance of working hand-in-hand with state structures in Renamo-voting *localidades* where the state was synonymous with Frelimo? Ten years on from Hanlon's devastating criticisms of donors and NGOs in Mozambique, in what ways have things changed? And how did a rapidly changing policy environment affect a project that finished in a self-consciously different era to that in which it was designed?

Running through my argument has been a constant emphasis on the need to contextualise and historicise. I have spurned grand categories, and looked instead at negotiations and contestations over labels and practices. My conclusions are on the same canvas, and I do not attempt to draw out wide-ranging inferences. Instead I look at two sets of themes that run through the thesis: questions relating to the state, politics and anti-politics; and debates about development effectiveness.

### **8.1 Anti-Politics, Politics and the State**

In examining political contestation at many different levels, I have interrogated some of the arguments made by Ferguson in *The Anti-Politics Machine* (1990). He argued that 'development' interventions have regular consequences, including 'the expansion and entrenchment of bureaucratic state power, side by side with the projection of a representation of economic and social life which denies "politics" and, to the extent that it is successful, suspends its effects' (xiv-v). He suggested that while development interventions were only sporadically successful in reducing poverty, they appeared to have systematic effects in terms of depoliticisation and the propagation of state power. He argued that there might be some justification for speaking of 'a kind of logic or intelligibility to what happens when the "development" apparatus is deployed – a logic that transcends the question of planners' intentions' (Ferguson 1990: 255). In a similar manner, Escobar wrote that the result of the development encounter was that 'states, dominant institutions, and mainstream ways are strengthened and the domain of their action is inexorably expanded' (1991: 667).

This begs the question of what the state is and should be. Implicit in Ferguson and Escobar's arguments is the assumption that the state, loosely conceived of as the bureaucratic public sector, is a 'bad thing'. Both writers espouse an inherently populist approach in which the increasing reach of state bureaucracies, said to be an inevitable consequence of 'development', is deplored (cf. Robertson 1984). Yet rational bureaucracies (in the Weberian sense) are surely a prerequisite for economic growth, improvements in health outcomes or other indicators of social progress. At least that is what the historical evidence suggests. It is worth bearing in mind that many other economic anthropologists have recognised this. For Keith Hart, for example, the informal sector is itself a product of a lack of development. It is 'non-rational' labour in that it is not regulated (and workers are not protected) by state institutions (Hart 1973). Even most neo-liberal economists now accept that a strong state is essential to poverty-reducing growth and the proper functioning of markets. They would see this as distinct from corrupt, inefficient and inflated governmental sectors of the kind that the IFIs have attempted to target (cf. Edelman 1999: 8)

The question of the 'appropriate' role for the state in 'development' is one to which this thesis has frequently returned, and which I examine in more detail here. First, has the effect of projects like ZADP been, as Ferguson might argue, to entrench the state, however conceived? Or might a more helpful way of conceptualising the relationship be to consider the extent to which non-state organisations can produce what have been termed 'state effects'? Second, what was the relationship between the neutrality espoused by ZADP and DFID staff, and the party political colouring attributed to them by beneficiaries? Third, to what extent has the older neo-liberal agenda of 'rolling back the state' been overturned by more recent imperatives to 'work with government'? How did attitudes towards relationships between the state and non-state actors themselves become an area of contestation?

### **State Effects**

Much of the thesis has dealt with questions relating to the role of the state, the ways in which it was perceived, and the ways in which non-state institutions produced state effects. The 'state effects' I am concerned with are those that Trouillot (2001) calls *legibility effects*, by which a language and a knowledge for classifying and regulating collectivities is developed. Development organisations are adept at this kind

of classification; as Scott pointed out, it is not only governments that ‘see like states’ (1998), and as a result the production of ‘state effects’ is not confined to them. Trouillot suggests that ‘state effects’ can be produced by organisations as diverse as NGOs, separatist movements, multinational companies or multilateral bodies (126), particularly where the correspondence between the state system and ‘ideological state apparatuses’ has declined, so that it reflects rather than deflects social tensions (130). He argues that the national state ‘no longer functions as the primary social, political and ideological container of the populations living within its borders’ (2001: 130). Ironically, this can mean that even in weak nation states, individual citizens may find themselves ‘more than ever before ... [living] in the shadow of the state’ (Miliband (1969), quoted in Trouillot (2001: 125)).

Thinking in terms of ‘state effects’ produced by a range of different institutions helps to go beyond some of Hanlon’s (1991) arguments about the pernicious effects of development organisations on Mozambique. Fundamental to Hanlon’s argument that the sovereign Mozambican state was being undermined by NGO activities was a belief about an ‘appropriate’ role for the state as sole provider of basic services.<sup>203</sup> At the time when he wrote *Who Calls the Shots?*, there was only one political party in Mozambique, which claimed to stand for the entire Mozambican population, and of which Hanlon was a strong defender. Hanlon saw no valid space in which INGOs could operate, or in which they could elaborate alternative development models.

Yet in a province like Zambézia, what actually was the state? Chapter 3 provided evidence that the colonial state, although theoretically long-established, actually rested very lightly on the province until the end of the nineteenth century. From then on, plantation companies, supported by and supportive of the state, were the most dominant organisations in the lives of my informants and their parents. Recruitment to these private companies was organised by the state, with the help of local native police (*cipaios*) and the *régulos*, and at the end of six-month contracts, deferred salary payments were made through the local administration. Social services and education were provided to (some) workers and their families by the companies. All in all, the distinction between state and company was far from clear. In the early years of the

---

<sup>203</sup> In his later work (in particular 2001, 2002a, 2002c, 2002b), he has been much more critical of the (largely Frelimo) elite. It is no longer tenable to see Frelimo as the defenders of ‘all Mozambicans’, particularly not all Zambézians, and his analysis has changed to reflect this.

Frelimo government, the same confusion was rife. A fragmented but all-powerful state was involved in activities as disparate as reforming previously privately-owned companies, restructuring agricultural marketing and forming agricultural cooperatives and *aldeias comunais*. By the time the war hit Mutange and Mugaveia, NGOs were already involved in running the camps for displaced people, and providing services to them. Where, then, was the all-powerful state in Zambézia, the role of which Hanlon felt NGOs were taking over? For my informants, it had never existed; rather, services had always been provided by a patchwork of different providers.

Against Hanlon, who argued that NGOs were intentionally paralleling the state, I have also shown that this paralleling was not always deliberate. I found that even when ZADP *técnicos* consciously attempted to emphasise the difference between themselves and the state, they were still widely identified with it, and – even more problematically – with Frelimo. The fact that the project had been designed to work hand-in-hand with state structures and to capacitate district and provincial level government meant that ZADP activities were frequently attributed to – and at times claimed by – government. These claims would sometimes be made with ZADP’s overt approval, as they were seen as a sign of ‘ownership’. At the level of district government, Frelimo government officials were only too happy for World Vision to build schools and bridges, or give out goats, particularly when they were then invited to come along to opening ceremonies (Figure 6.1). Such occasions were invariably used to talk about the government programme for the development of an area, and the ways in which the intervention at issue fitted in with government development plans. As Bratton pointed out (1989: 572-3), in some cases when NGOs are able to deliver services to which the government is publicly committed, but which it does not have the capacity to provide, then it might prove in the public interest for the government to mobilise NGOs. In such cases ‘political leaders might stand to gain if NGOs can mobilize resources and deliver benefits to regions and communities that are otherwise unreachable’ (572).<sup>204</sup> In just this way, district (Frelimo) officials claimed and co-opted NGO achievements.

There were also significant fractures within the state, which could result in what at first seem like perverse alliances. This can be seen in the case of the 1997 Land Law, a progressive piece of legislation passed following a prolonged consultation process, and

---

<sup>204</sup> He also pointed out that the converse could be true, and that better service provision by NGOs might be seen to reflect poorly on government performance.

which is still highly regarded. However since 1997 there has been a gradual process of back-peddalling by government officials at all levels, and according to a report from the ZADP land component, district authorities tended to perceive the Land Law as ‘a potential blockage to the national project of development and a hindrance to the attraction of outside capital’ (Norfolk and Soberano 2000: 42):

‘The District Director of Agriculture in Gurué ... state[d] that the idea of partnerships is a very dangerous concept to broach with local communities since it would lead them to think that they have a role in the issuing of concessions and licences to investors, a role which he clearly indicated he believed should be the exclusive prerogative of the state’ (43).

The ZADP land component, as part of a donor-funded project implemented by an international NGO, thus found itself in the unusual position of defending peasant interests against recalcitrant sections of a state bureaucracy, using the state’s own legislation. This is not an incident that can be comprehended using Hanlon’s vision of parallel systems, and rather demonstrates that alliances are formed and broken depending on context.

I also showed that ‘development’ was at times explicitly and overtly ‘claimed’ by Frelimo supporters in both *localidades*, while Renamo supporters remained much more cautious in their attitude towards modernity, development and change. The attribution of NGO activities to the state, and the claim of NGO activities by state officials, was not the simple substitution that Hanlon described, but a more complex form of paralleling. These claims and attributions mean that it is difficult to identify a stark and clear line between ‘state’ and NGO. It is not plausible to see NGOs and IFIs lining up on one side of an ideological debate, with a unified sovereign government on the other. Reality was much more complex and contested. For that reason it is more fruitful to talk in terms of the production of ‘state effects’ by different institutions than to castigate non-national-government institutions for usurping the state’s role.

### **Neutrality and Party Politics**

Neutrality, particularly as regards party politics, is one of the central tenets of NGOs’ work. Necessary for funding reasons, it also fits with their own motivation and beliefs. Yet this thesis has shown that project activities were nevertheless understood within a local political framework, and that mere denial of allegiance by ZADP staff did not change this. Indeed, denial had the effect of muting a process that it would have

been better to try to examine and understand. As it was, ZADP remained largely blind to silent non-participants, and was unaware of the quiet processes of opting-out that went on. Participatory rhetoric, often criticised for its lack of substance, was thus less appropriate here than ever, as a substantial group of potential beneficiaries felt themselves unable to negotiate involvement.

Behind the backs of project staff, ZADP resources and interventions were at times adopted and used for party political ends. At other times a party political inclination was ascribed to the organisation. Although ZADP attempted – and believed itself – to be apolitical in terms of party politics, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 demonstrated that it was frequently understood in just such terms, and its activities were widely associated with Frelimo.

The division between Renamo and Frelimo is fundamental to any understanding of Zambézia, and to an understanding of what ‘happened’ in ZADP. Frelimo, since Independence the governing party of Mozambique, had a very limited constituency in my two fieldwork sites. Nevertheless, the national dominance of the party, coupled with its self-proclaimed association with ‘development’ and modernity, meant that Frelimo adherents were most prominent in ZADP activities. Renamo supporters, though not defining themselves as backward (a caricature regularly made of them by their opponents), were cautious about embracing activities they associated with Frelimo. This meant that although in elections Renamo was overwhelmingly more popular than Frelimo (Table 5.1), Frelimo members were at the forefront of ZADP activities, and it was their definitions, analysis and priorities that were ‘heard’ by the project and identified as the ‘community’ voice.

ZADP staff, well aware as they were of the existence of the two parties, did not fully appreciate the implications of political affiliation. Ignoring political division was made easy by a focus on an unproblematised, ill-defined and ever-changing ‘community’. The lens through which rural Zambézia was viewed was one that blurred division and difference, and emphasised cohesion and communality. Although in practice communal activities were soon abandoned by ZADP as too difficult and unsuccessful, activities based purely around individuals – sometimes even involving payment of those individuals – continued to be labelled ‘community-based’. As

Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 showed, these activities were not only *not* ‘community-based’, in some cases unequal distribution actually fuelled jealousies and tensions.

For most *técnicos*, political affiliation was only one of several ways of categorising rural people, and was not always the most significant. They tended to give priority to distinguishing between rural, ill-educated and generally backward people, and an urban-based, mobile and forward-looking group of which they themselves formed part. Blurring the clear division between the two, they acknowledged that a small number of rural-dwelling people were members of or aspirants to their group. These might include teachers and health workers, some traders, certain leaders (Frelimo and more seldom, Renamo), and a number of the more mobile. Unlike local government officials and Frelimo party workers who would claim that it was Renamo supporters that were backward, *técnicos* would say that ‘the villager’ (*o camponês*) was traditionally-minded, conservative, and unwilling to change. They thus tended to differentiate rural dwellers according to wealth and open-mindedness, rather than party membership. Of course, there was an element of truth to this. It was not that Renamo supporters so much tended to be poor, as that Frelimo supporters were over-represented amongst the better-off. Those who had some engagement in the world outside the *localidade*, were they teachers, traders, or leaders, tended to identify themselves with the party of progress and of modernity: Frelimo. Nonetheless, the way in which *técnicos* characterised people omitted a factor that I have shown to have been important.

As I discussed in Chapter 6, those whose sympathies were not with Frelimo often felt themselves constrained from participating in ZADP activities. Although it is true that a considerable number of Renamo leaders were given project goats, rank-and-file members were rarely in evidence as beneficiaries. This may have been partly due to the frequent caricaturing of Renamo supporters as *complicado* by certain project facilitators and by the Frelimo leaders involved in the project. It is also probable that Frelimo supporters were more willing to be involved in unprofitable activities than Renamo members. Frelimo supporters were more likely to identify the project with their own party, and thus both view it as a ‘patron’, and as deserving of loyalty. They also tended to value the more intangible benefits consequent on involvement with a what was seen as a modern project.

The political divide lay at the root of individual and household decisions either to participate or not participate in project activities. Political allegiance meant that some people who might have found project activities personally beneficial chose not to take part. But as Chapter 7 demonstrated, the decision not to get involved did not mean that non-participants viewed any increases in wealth on the part of participants as benign. Rather, the very fact that they were denied access to what had in some cases proved to be effective wealth-creation activities, on the basis of already piquant political divisions, stirred up envies and jealousies.

This makes for a complication of the widely emphasised point (see amongst others Dey 1982, Crehan and von Oppen 1988, Harrison 1995b, de Vries 1996), that beneficiaries will adopt and adapt those parts of a development intervention that are most beneficial to them, whilst repudiating those they do not favour. I have argued that the choices made in Mutange and Mugaveia were not merely those of individual actors, but were also connected to structural factors in Zambézián society. Rejection of ZADP activities was seen as the rejection of the long-unpopular Frelimo state/government and hence was initially a common tactic; however it became ever more problematic as project activities improved and participants started to feel their benefits.

I have argued that patronage characterised not only the relationship between (many) ZADP participants and project staff, but also the relationship between donor and project. One of the points at issue here is intentionality. Who is it that intends or initiates patron-client relationships? It is not so unusual to say that state institutions may be used as vehicles of political patronage (Farrington et al. 1993: 6), that NGOs may be, consciously or unconsciously, the 'new patrons', or indeed that the state may be viewed by some as 'patron of last resort, thus securing micro-level patron-client relations which contribute to the reproduction of poverty' (McGregor, cited in Lewis forthcoming-b). But I have written about something very different: the ways in which a project, linked to but not part of the 'state', was constructed as a political patron in a way it neither understood, recognised or intended. ZADP did not intend to act as a patron, and as I discussed on page 217, the DFID accusation that it was 'top-down, handout, prescriptive and effectively a patronage system' was taken extremely seriously. Nor did DFID intend that ZADP should act as its client. Yet in both cases a certain

room for manoeuvre was consequent on the client's designation of its donor as 'patron', and this designation – uncontested because it was rarely recognised – thus proved useful.

I have argued throughout that different kinds of equivalences were made between Frelimo, the state and the government; between the state/Frelimo and NGOs; and between the colonial and post-colonial state. That the division between state and party remains murky is undisputed, but the other two claims are more novel, and therefore more open to question. In particular, the similarities that my informants noted between the state/Frelimo and NGOs do not appear to be universal in Mozambique. That villagers saw World Vision as part of some amorphous state/party entity was recognised by all ZADP *técnicos*, who knew very well that their activities were strongly associated with the government despite their attempts to assert an individual identity.<sup>205</sup> Yet in Nampula, the situation reported by other researchers is apparently different:

'The fieldwork revealed considerable confidence and trust in NGOs, in particular, as a vehicle of communication between local people and governmental authorities. This is at least partly due to the way in which communities perceive the working methods of government employees. As some poor community members in Nampula put it: "*The government just gives orders, this is their way of working... they say... this year we want this, that and the other...*" ...Communities' positive perceptions of NGOs relate, at least in part, to the absolute control that the post-colonial state (as well as the colonial state) exercised until fairly recently' (Kanji, Braga, and Mitullah 2002: 18, authors' italics).

These authors argued that 'communities' distinguished between NGOs and the state in a way I did not find to be the case in Mutange and Mugaveia. This may reflect the distinctness of the Zambézian historical experience when compared with Nampula, or it might be the result of a less in-depth study than the one reported here.

### **Contestation**

Finally, at the time of my fieldwork there was no agreement about what the 'state' was or what an 'appropriate' role for it or for NGOs might be; these were subjects for contestation and negotiation. Actors positioned themselves in relation to these debates, and their positions were moveable.

---

<sup>205</sup> These attempts tended to remain at the level of assertion, as actual practice often involved close collaboration with state structures. So, for example, the ZADP team in Gurué always used a vehicle with the DDADR logo on it, a vehicle that had been 'given' to the Gurué District Director of Agriculture, but to which ZADP maintained almost exclusive access rights. DDADR staff were often carried in World Vision vehicles, and they attended a number of exit meetings from project *localidades* in 2002, where they were identified as 'the people who will be carrying on the activities'.

Contestation about the ‘appropriate’ role for NGOs had profound effects on ZADP. In 2000-2002, although the plethora of NGOs, donors, UN bodies and Bretton Woods institutions Hanlon had described in 1991 still remained, relations between them had altered. NGOs like World Vision came to prominence in Mozambique in the 1980s and early 1990s as service providers. On the one hand criticised (for setting up unnecessary parallel systems), on the other hand encouraged (through substantial and continuing financial support), during the 1990s NGOs like World Vision sought to placate their critics by working more closely with the government institutions they had once been accused of trying to replace. This was what it was originally intended that ZADP should do.

In Chapter 2 I discussed the policy changes that took place over the five year life of ZADP. Donors like DFID moved away from attempting to deliver poverty reduction themselves. They withdrew much of their support from INGOs, and turned their attention to encouraging national policy reform. They justified the change by citing the poor performance of INGO projects, and the need to reinvigorate and recapacitate a state that only a decade before was being explicitly by-passed. ZADP happened at the same time as these deep-seated attitudinal changes were unfolding. Designed at a time when it was still considered justifiable for an NGO to be providing services, it was implemented while DFID was becoming more ‘statist’. Criticism of INGOs like World Vision sharpened, and pressure to link with government institutions became ever stronger.

ZADP managers were well aware of the need to respond to these new policy directions. They maintained that they collaborated effectively with district-level agriculture staff, and provided valued support to poorly-resourced departments. Yet this was not what DFID Advisers were really concerned about. They were interested in national policy initiatives, and the strengthening of government systems. ZADP activities could, they believed, only be sustainable if they were ‘owned’ by government, and for that reason they constantly urged ZADP managers to link more effectively with government. ZADP staff were not only resistant to what had in the past proved to be time-wasting exercises (see page 78), they strongly contested the value of DFID’s wider focus on purely national-level institutions and policies. Several argued that national-level corruption and a tendency for state resources to be concentrated on Frelimo-voting

provinces meant that DFID's change in policy effectively meant the withdrawal of resources from Zambézia.

There was thus mutual contestation over the 'right' way to engage with government. Neither ZADP nor DFID accepted that the other was engaging in a way that could bring about positive and poverty-reducing change. For DFID staff, ZADP was out-dated, traditional, 'dodgy', expatriate-dominated and expensive. For ZADP staff, DFID was out of touch, expatriate-dominated, ideological, and extravagant. It is to such debates about the 'right' way to do 'development' that I now turn.

## **8.2 Development Effectiveness**

This thesis has considered some of the practical effects of the rapidly spinning whirligig of development fashion. Here I look briefly at a key area where policies and ideas changed – debates about development effectiveness – and consider how the changes affected ZADP.

ZADP coincided with important shifts in debates on development effectiveness. Following a long period in which economists were fairly pessimistic about the effectiveness of aid (discussed by Hudson 2004: 185), work by Burnside and Dollar (2000, see also World Bank 1998) took a much more optimistic view. They argued that aid had 'a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies'.<sup>206</sup> I am not competent to comment on the validity of the economic arguments presented, which have been challenged by Dalgaard and Hansen, (2000), Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Easterly et. al. (2003); however for my purposes what was noteworthy was the enthusiasm with which this academic paper was taken up by aid agencies (see Easterly 2003: 23-26 for a full discussion). The second DFID White Paper (2000a) argued, for example, that 'development assistance can contribute to poverty reduction in countries pursuing sound policies'.

As a country already defined as a Good Performer 'pursuing sound policies' (see Chapter 4), Mozambique benefited from the new analysis, becoming eligible for new forms and increased flows of aid. With a PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) in

---

<sup>206</sup> Easterly (2004: 13-15) has commented on the peculiarity of calling countries 'developing' when there is precious little evidence that they actually are.

place, it qualified for increased debt relief,<sup>207</sup> and a number of donors, including DFID, committed themselves to providing Direct Budget Support. In this new context, DFID practices and policies changed in three key ways.

First, there was a move away from ‘projects’ towards macro-level policy reform. ‘Delivering development’ through service-delivery projects like ZADP was not part of the new agenda. DFID’s new priority was to ‘try to change the systems that leave people poor, both at the international and the national level’ (Anderson, Head of Office), an aim which involved working almost exclusively at the level of national policy. This involved a concentration on ‘changing processes, not ... outputs’ (Jackson, Livelihoods Adviser). The change in emphasis was of great importance for projects like ZADP, which, it was argued, could no longer be justified under the new aid regime. Area-based interventions were deemed ineffective and unfair. Even leaving moral judgements about inclusion and exclusion aside, it is clear that area-based inputs will rarely show up in macro statistics against which performance is to be measured under the new regime. This means that, unless a secondary form of evaluation is used, investments made through area-based projects such as ZADP cannot be justified as their impact cannot be assessed. Measurement thus skews choice of intervention.

Second, the move to Direct Budget Support led to the increased concentration of DFID efforts in Maputo. As projects like ZADP were no longer considered valid, and as providing support to lower levels of government was defined as ‘undermining’ rather than ‘strengthening’, DFID officials had fewer and fewer incentives ever to visit provincial Mozambique. Their work took place almost entirely in Maputo, and increasingly involved high-level policy negotiations with government (Frelimo) officials. What actually went on in a province like Zambézia was no longer of much significance, so long as the ‘policy dialogue’ continued in Maputo, and so long as the macro-level measures continue to show (unattributable) improvement. As Anderson, the DFID Head of Office put it, ‘we’re not responsible for poverty reduction. Mozambique has got to be responsible for its poverty reduction’.

---

<sup>207</sup> Hanlon points out that the PRSP, which involved significant short-term cuts in health and education budgets, was opposed by several Mozambican civil society groups, but was nevertheless passed because the World Bank and other donors were under significant pressure from campaigners to grant enhanced debt relief to more countries (Hanlon 2002a: 10).

Anderson's comments highlight the third significant change, that under the new regime it was 'no longer possible to justify a programme on the basis of the number of people it helps directly' (Jackson). This marked a move away from the 'poorest' towards a more abstract concern with 'poverty'. For ZADP, although there were debates about ways, means and targets, the actual day-to-day situation of the rural poor, in particular 'the poorest', was at the centre of the picture. Leaving behind the focus on contact farmers (advanced peasants) that had pertained during ZADP (I), the project concentrated on family farmers, attempting to identify and overcome constraints on production and income generation. Although the land tenure component was concerned with some macro-level issues, such as the allocation of land and negotiation with investors, in the main ZADP activities were targeted directly at poor farmers. Such a micro focus, which was in line with the analysis of Social Development Advisers at the start of the project (see Chapter 4), did not fit well with the increasingly macro-level DFID approach. In a world in which macro statistics count, the actual situation of particular farmers is of very little interest. If GDP per capita continues to grow, the fact that inequality is rising can be masked.

Two significant points should be made about these changes. The first deals with labels. Changes in donor policy towards Mozambique consolidated its definition as a Satisfactory Reformer. Any change in its classification would endanger the whole aid enterprise in Mozambique, and as such would be difficult to consider. Hanlon argued that a desire not to rock the boat led donors to close their eyes to clear evidence of increasing poverty and corruption, with the full cooperation of what he termed Mozambique's 'predatory elite':

'The Mozambican elite has become highly skilled at giving the donors what they want. Thus management of donor money is transparent and clear. The predatory elite do not steal donors' funds; instead they rob banks, skim public works contracts, demand shares in investments, and smuggle drugs and other goods – and they ensure that the justice system does not work so they cannot be caught.

Similarly, donors see rapid GDP growth, growing exports, increasing enclave foreign investments, growth in the areas of Maputo that they frequent, and a government which does the bidding of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and can manage donor projects. They choose not to see that poverty is worsening in rural areas' (Hanlon 2002a: 3).

Projects like ZADP, which continued to present evidence that all was not well at the district and local level, became more and more difficult for DFID Advisers to comprehend. As I recounted at the outset (page 54), this incomprehension affected me

personally during my research, and I never found effective ways of communicating with many of the DFID Advisers.

This ‘intentional ignorance’, as Chomsky (1999) has termed it, may be explained by the mutual dependence of donors and the Mozambican elite, an interdependence that at first seems counter-intuitive, given Mozambique’s heavy reliance on external aid (see Table 4.1). However while donors are important for Mozambique, Mozambique is also important for the donors. There are so few ‘poster children’ in Africa that damaging the glowing reputation of Mozambique would be a tacit admission of the failure of aid policies over the last decade. As Hanlon has written, ‘a symbiotic relationship has grown up between the Mozambican predatory elite and the donors to maintain the myth of the Mozambican success story’ (Hanlon 2002a: 13). Manning’s book (2002), discussed in Chapter 5, looked at a non-aid area where the same perverse symbiosis held true. She argued that at the national level Renamo has managed to continue negotiating outside formal political institutions by exploiting donor desires for Mozambique to remain a multiparty democracy. Here too the presentation of a particular façade justified potentially detrimental ‘backstage’ practices.

The second important conclusion has a somewhat smaller, though equally significant canvas. Policy debates within DFID had practical consequences for the beneficiaries of project like ZADP. The move to Direct Budget Support, and the consequent end to the financial support of district and provincial level government departments, and to service-delivery by NGOs, effectively involved the withdrawal of DFID funding to the entire agriculture sector in Zambézia. Although some of my informants in Mugaveia and Mutange had been able to turn many ZADP activities to their own advantage (cf. Hill 1986: 1), their ability to negotiate and manoeuvre and make the best of a bad job broke down when funding was completely withdrawn. The new DFID policy gave no chance for the ‘poor’ to speak or comment on the change. For them, the result of the move towards government-to-government aid was the ending of services. The *técnicos* who left the *localidades* when their ZADP contracts expired were not replaced. Nor was there really much likelihood that funding going in ‘at the top of the hopper’, as the Economic Adviser termed it, would find its way down through the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development into interventions at the *localidade* level. Thus, whilst we must allow for the agency of the less powerful (Scott’s (1985)

‘weapons of the weak’), it would be inaccurate to sound too optimistic a note about their room for manoeuvre. As the example of ZADP shows, the final decisions about whether the project would continue or not were taken without consultation with the relatively powerless; their compass of action was thus circumscribed.

### **8.3 Conclusion**

‘Development’, it can be argued, is a modernist project, teleological, and reliant on an underlying idea of progress. Rostow’s ‘stages of development’ theory exemplifies this, confidently outlining the steps needed for traditional low-income societies to move towards ‘take-off’ (Rostow 1960). ‘Development’ today still envisages such a positive progression (Easterly 2003: 30-33), though talk is currently phrased in terms of ‘pro-poor growth’, and the role of the state has been significantly downplayed. The agricultural component of ZADP can also be seen to have conformed to this modernising paradigm, with its (largely fruitless) search for appropriate technologies and technological solutions to transform the lives of peasant farmers.

ZADP had ambitious goals (see Table 1.1): increasing food security for the poorest groups in Zambézia, through crop production and marketing increases, a fifty percent increase in the range of income-generating activities, and a fall in levels of child malnourishment. There is no evidence that the project itself achieved these goals: although there were substantial improvements in project baseline indicators from 1998 to 2002 (Collins 1998, 2000, 2002), attribution of change is problematic, and ZADP reached only a small proportion of the target population (see Table 5.2). Given that the estimated population of the intervention area was approximately 225,000 (Bias et al. 2001), the project’s lack of impact was unsurprising. Simple division of the project budget (£7,753,000) by the population gives a figure of £34.50 per person, just £8.60 per project year. Compare this to Easterly’s admittedly polemic assertion – based on World Bank figures – that it takes US\$ 3521 in aid to raise a poor person’s income by US\$ 3.65 per year (Easterly 2002: 41). As Moynihan wrote thirty five years ago, ‘we constantly underestimate difficulties, overpromise results, and avoid any appearance of incompatibility and conflict, thus repeatedly creating the conditions of failure out of a desperate desire for success’ (Moynihan 1969: xii-xiii).

It was intended that the changes in British aid to Mozambique described in the last section would overcome these problems, which were identified as being associated with

the ‘project approach’. The novelty of DFID’s radical new agenda was emphasised to me time and again by its strongest supporters, who would suggest that now problems were really understood, and were being tackled at source, ‘development’ would really start to show results. Yet could it not be argued that, far from being novel and innovative, DFID’s new approach actually represented a return to a belief in the Weberian legal/rational state, and a move away from the populism of the past thirty-odd years?

This continuity with older patterns of thought was not recognised, but even more importantly, nor were the very serious obstacles to the development of a legal/rational state taken seriously. Hanlon’s comments on the predatory nature of the Mozambican elite have been echoed in other parts of Africa (Bayart 1993, Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999), and the legacy of the one-party state, in terms of the party politicisation of state institutions, has been noted throughout this thesis. The changes needed if DFID’s state-channelled aid is to achieve what has been promised, which include the reduction of the power of more powerful elites and the redistribution of resources, have not been seen as the fiendishly complex tasks they undoubtedly were. As Moynihan noted many years ago, it could appear that ‘socially concerned intellectuals never took seriously enough their talk about the “power structure”. Certainly, they seemed repeatedly to assume that those who had power would let it be taken away a lot easier than could be possibly be the case if what was involved was *power*’ (1969: 135, original italics).

These changes in aid policy occurred far from my local setting, in which an ‘unsuccessful’ ‘traditional’ project, ‘of the type we don’t now do’ was being implemented. But they did impinge on my field sites. I started the thesis with the taunts reported by ‘unemployed’ project facilitators: ‘your patron has left you now’. ZADP may not have achieved much with its £7.8 million, according to its funders, and as I have demonstrated (in particular in Chapter 7) some of its activities were deeply problematic. Yet the project did provide a certain amount of outside investment and resources to extremely remote areas. Yellow-fleshed sweet potato may not have been as widely grown as its promoters had hoped it would be, but those who grew it in small quantities liked both its taste, and the fact that it was said to be good for children. The research on varieties of cassava resistant to Brown Streak virus may not have paid great

dividends over the life of ZADP, but as the disease spreads further through Mozambique (IRIN 2004), it has started to show its value.

The point is that fads and fashions at the international level have a real effect on poor people, on the poor people that ZADP tried to target. Conflicting fashions meant that the project was designed both to encourage economic growth, and to focus on poverty alleviation for the very poorest. As policies changed, DFID staff attempted to persuade ZADP into or out of activities; although they were not always successful, and changes and new policies were sometimes resisted (page 94), their efforts had a seriously destabilising effect. The failure of 'projects' to achieve either of the original goals (economic growth or alleviation of the poverty of the poorest) led to the withdrawal of direct funding for activities in rural Zambézia, in the long-term national interest.

A great deal of effort, much by anthropologists, has been devoted to examining why projects like ZADP 'fail' (see, for example, Barnett 1977, Porter, Allen, and Thompson 1991, Mamdani 1972). Yet, as Ferguson (1990) showed over a decade ago, development clearly 'works' for some. Perhaps even more importantly, the labelling that Wood showed to be so important in allowing or prohibiting peasant access to interventions (1985a) is equally significant in designating and defining interventions themselves. Once again the question is '*which* labels are created, and *whose* labels prevail to define a whole situation or policy area, under what conditions and with what effects' (7)? The attribution of 'success' or 'failure' is political; a claimed 'failure' needs to be set within a broader context, one which comprehends the possibility of 'hidden transcripts' of success (cf. Scott 1990). It is not surprising that as fashions change, interventions should come to be labelled 'unsuccessful'; success is, after all, dependent on the measures used to evaluate it.

## **Appendix A: Terms of Reference**

The post holder will be attached to the World Vision International Zambezia Agricultural Development Project. She will be based in Quelimane, Zambezia Province, Mozambique and will report on a day-to-day basis to the Project Manager, Zambezia Agricultural Development Project. Professional social development support will also be provided by the DFID Social Development Adviser based in Harare.

The APO will develop an approach to social ethnographic research that can produce findings to assess emerging project impacts, and feed this into the on-going implementation of the project. The APO will work closely with the Mozambican anthropologist to conduct in-depth research at the project/district and community level. They will each cover two field sites. The research will focus on a total of four communities (*células*) where ZADP has been working for more than two years, probably consisting of two in Gurué District (highland zone) and two in Nicoadala or Namacurra District (lowland coastal zones). The in-depth research will enable the project to understand the perceptions of primary stakeholders, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, regarding the nature and extent of project impacts, and will complement more quantitative data emerging from the base-line survey.

The Social Development APO will also work closely alongside other World Vision staff, particularly the Rural Sociologist and Monitoring and Evaluation Unit to help ensure that research findings influence the scope and direction of the project. She will work with one or two research assistants.

The attachment will be for one year, which will commence after an intensive Portuguese language training course.

### **1. Purpose of Attachment**

To conduct research that will help ZADP understand the impact of project activities on those living within the project area, in particular the rural poor, and to provide recommendations on how future activities can be modified to enhance project impact. In particular the research will illuminate:

- How project interventions are perceived by different groups in the project area

- Which socio-economic groups benefit from or are affected by project activities, and how this has changed
- What factors affect people's willingness or ability to participate in project activities
- What community-level institutions exist, and how the project can build on them
- What factors outside the project's control (e.g. more general social and economic changes etc.) are impacting on the project, and how

The research will need to be of sufficient academic rigour to form the basis of a Ph.D. thesis to be completed on return to the UK

## **2. Scope of Work**

### **2.1 Project/District level familiarisation**

At a project/district level the Social Development Associate Professional Officer will review secondary documentation (including design stage participatory rural assessment work), and conduct interviews with key project stakeholders and other officials, aiming to:

- Obtain an overall picture of the project area including its ethnic, economic and physical diversity
- Understand how the project goals and interventions have been developed, including strategies for targeting and promoting community participation
- Explore the methods and objectives of other governmental and non-governmental projects and programmes affecting the project area and how ZADP fits in with them
- Explore the wider social and economic changes taking place within the project area which may not be attributable to specific projects

## 2.2 Field Level Research

The Social Development APO will carry out qualitative research in two communities to:

- Investigate the socio-economic profile of participants in different project activities, and how this has changed.
- Interview both participants and non-participants about their perceptions of ZADP and the effects (direct and indirect) that the project has had on different groups and individuals within the area.
- Investigate how participants and non-participants feel ZADP has had these effects, in particular considering forms of information-sharing and the role of community level institutions.
- Examine the extent to which project activities bring about unintended negative impacts on poor people and how these might be mitigated.
- Examine local perceptions of the ZADP project activities, staff, CEWs and credit promoters, and what adjustments are suggested. Explore understandings and concerns about outsider involvement at the village level.
- Explore the extent to which primary stakeholders in the project area are also engaged in non-project agricultural/credit/commercial institutions and how these compare to project institutions.
- Investigate factors, including power relations and gender relations, which affect people's ability to participate in project activities, and reasons why people choose not to become involved in project activities.
- Investigate ongoing processes of change at the village level, and how these are perceived, e.g. the effects of conflict, changing patterns of employment and agriculture etc.
- Investigate existing power structures, gender relations, community level institutions and how these influence community level participation and group formation.

### **3. Outputs**

- 3.1 A work plan within one month of commencing work in Zambezia Province
- 3.2 Thematic quarterly reports to be shared and discussed by the wider project team. Topics will be agreed with the Project Manager but could include ‘community level institutions’, gender impacts of project activities’, and ‘forms and patterns of participation’
- 3.3 A report summarising key findings from qualitative research for circulation to feed into the Mid Term Review (February 2001). Preparatory work for the review may also require additional social development consultancy inputs to be determined by the Project Manager in discussion with DFID.
- 3.4 Present a (draft) final research report before completing the attachment to ZADP/DFID Harare with clear recommendations on future directions.

The Social Development APO will undertake to submit all reports and papers produced during the period of the attachment to DFID Central Africa and the Project Manager and World Vision International for comment before publication, and to acknowledge project support in all publications.

### **4. Reporting responsibilities**

The Social Development APO will report on a day to day basis to the ZADP Project Manager. The Social Development Adviser based in Harare will also provide intermittent support during six-monthly and annual reviews. She will also receive professional support from the project’s Rural Sociologist.

The officer will attend monthly project management meetings to report on progress made during the past month and plans for the next month, feeding back research findings, situating them in the wider project experience and making suggestions for on-going changes.

## Appendix B: Interview Details

### 1. Taped Interviews

Date	No.	Interviewee
28.11.00	O1	Stephen Barnes, ZADP Project Manager
30.11.00	T1	Meeting in Mutange
07.12.00	G1	Meeting in Intuba
14.12.00	O2	Meeting in Pidá
14.12.00	O3	Meeting in Pidá
21.02.01	T2	Carlos Gomes, (late) President of Mutange
21.02.01	T2	Verónica Cipriano, Wife of <i>secretário do círculo</i>
23.02.01	T3	Vuia Mutange, (late) <i>régulo</i>
23.02.01	T3	Lemes Cuaré, <i>Secretário do círculo</i>
05.03.01	G2	Group of leaders, Intuba
15.03.01	T4	Sidónio Sortane, <i>Líder comunitário</i>
16.03.01	T5	João Mário and Banco Joaguinte, workers on ZADP nursery
16.03.01	T6	Joana Fernando
23.03.01	O4 & 5	DFID Presentation
28.03.01	G3	Mugaveia village leaders
05.04.01	T7	Henriques Francisco, Frelimo <i>chefe de zona</i>
05.04.01	T8	Joana Veloso
05.04.01	T8	Abílio Mussa
06.04.01	T8	Mau Tempo and family
06.04.01	T9	Eusébio Costa Carafage, Facilitator
06.04.01	T10	Pordina Ernesto
09.04.01	T10	Horácio Tomás
10.04.01	T11	Virginia Barbosa and Rosa Orapa
10.04.01	T12	Vuia Mutange and Sissino Anselmo
10.04.01	T13	António Amuza Tatula
11.04.01	T14	Ernásia José, member of Land Committee
11.04.01	T15	Lemes Cuaré, <i>Secretário do círculo</i>
12.04.01	T16	Victorino Pedro
12.04.01	T17	Violina Costa
12.04.01	T17	Isabel José, Member of Land Committee
17.04.01	G4	Rafael Manuel and Ricardo Manuel
18.04.01	G5	Gonçalves Maluwaia, Deacon of Baptist Union Church
19.04.01	G4 & 5	Meeting in Nicoria
19.04.01	G6	Rodrigues Naquele, <i>Secretário</i> of Inlixé
21.04.01	G7	Virgílio Muanariri
23.04.01	G8	Meeting with leaders, Mugaveia
23.04.01	G9	Domingos António
24.04.01	G10	Nikomo, Renamo leader

24.04.01	G11	Andre Nshima and Gilda Maluwaia
24.04.01	G12	Frederica Abele
25.04.01	G13	Ramos Mucuapa and Marta Mussumahiva
25.04.01	G14	Junior Pareua
25.04.01	G15	Romão Francisco and Lucia Albino, President of Mugaveia and wife
26.04.01	G16	Julião Mauinto and Maria Naquele,
26.04.01	G17	Maria Botomane
07.05.01	T18	Rosalina José
08.05.01	T19	Rafael Daniel
08.05.01	T19	Costa de Sousa
08.05.01	T20	Group of rat data collectors
09.05.01	T21	Ricarda Vinho
09.05.01	T21	Hilária Paulino
16.05.01	G18	Vasco Paulino and Berlinda Sevene (R)
16.05.01	G19	Rosa Matxua, Widow of late <i>régulo</i> (R)
16.05.01	G20	Joana Sevene, Daughter of late <i>régulo</i> (R)
16.05.01	G20	Rosalina Sevene, Daughter of late <i>régulo</i> (R)
16.05.01	T22	Nunes Olímpio and Alves Agostinho
16.05.01	T23 & 24	Zachariah Fonseca
17.05.01	G21	Silvestre Andrassone Nipahawaca (R)
17.05.01	T25	Felizardo Lemeia
17.05.01	T25	Inacia Benjame
17.05.01	T26	Grigório Olimpico
18.05.01	T26	José Albino and Belita Virgílio
18.05.01	G22	José Alves Macompa and Lídia Sevene (R)
18.05.01	G22	João Albino and Belita Virgílio
18.05.01	G23	Tomás Mangrassse (R)
23.05.01	G24	Amélia Paulo (R)
23.05.01	G24	Hortensia Kanamareya (R)
23.05.01	G25	Nunes Alberto (R)
23.05.01	G25	Fernando Xavier (R)
29.05.01	T27	Lina Davide and Rosa Escrever
29.05.01	T28	Headmaster of Mutange EP1 school
29.05.01	T29	Sidónio Sortane
29.05.01	T29 & 30	Zachariah Surash
30.05.01	T31	Josefa Castina
30.05.01	T32	Jurfina Inrawe
30.05.01	T33	António Borame
31.05.01	T34	Zebelino Caixe and Daniel Eduardo
31.05.01	T35	Julia José and Rasido
31.05.01	T36	Judith Manuel, wife of health worker
30.06.01	O6	Bernard Chidzero and Rui Afonso, consultants
18.07.01	G26	Tiago Armando and Laurentina Maluwaya (R)

18.07.01	G26	Lidia Maluwaya (R)
18.07.01	G27	Tomás Nacuvene and Lúcia Sevene (R)
18.07.01	G28	Baptista Germias and Julieta Farias (R)
19.07.01	G29	Muisira Yowaniwa (R)
19.07.01	G30	Fonsina Maluaya (R)
19.07.01	G31	Amélia Armando (R)
25.08.01	O7	Stephen Barnes, ZADP Project Manager
26.09.01	T37	André Meio Dia
26.09.01	T38	Elda Essalamo
27.09.01	T39	Lucas Jonas
27.09.01	T40 & 41	Lemes Lemeia
27.09.01	T41	Castinha Nemes
02.10.01	T42	Abílio Catorze
02.10.01	T43 & 44	Arminda Sambique
03.10.01	T45	Amalique Froi
03.10.01	T46	Aida Ismael
04.10.01	T47	Diviguana Ofinar
10.10.01	G32	Namuteko Mwiweha
10.10.01	G32	Muhonopi Nipapaya
11.10.01	G33	Group of elderly men
11.10.01	G34	Muisira Yowaniwa
11.10.01	G35	Amélia Nalalaca
12.10.01	G36	Agostinho Austen
12.10.01	G37	Claudino Austen
12.10.01	G38	Pedro Virgílio
15.10.01	G39	Guilherme Muhona
15.10.01	G40	Raúl Murria, Deputy President
15.10.01	G41	Nahemo Nvalo
16.10.01	G42	Joana Campa
17.10.01	G43	Ropate Mukwarane
17.10.01	G43	Marina Epuri
17.10.01	G44	Antonio Muhiwa
17.10.01	G45	Kinhanuemane
18.10.01	G46	Antonio Mutxaca
18.10.01	G46	Pedro Macumanha
19.10.01	G47	Vasco Mucheya
26.10.01	T48	Adolfo and Maria Mbudiga
30.10.01	T49	António João Manhinda
30.10.01	T50	Luis Chico Pezula, Health Worker
05.12.01	G48	Tomás Mangrassé, Facilitator
05.12.01	G49	Carlitos Martinho, Facilitator
05.12.01	G49	Tomás Muanavohua, Facilitator
06.12.01	G50	Arlindo Alberto, Facilitator
07.12.01	G51	Eugenio António, Facilitator

07.12.01	G51	Inoc Alberto, Facilitator
07.12.01	G52	Bernadino Haria, Facilitator
12.12.01	T51	Hilário Tiogo, Facilitator
12.12.01	T52	Belito Daniel, Facilitator
12.12.01	T53	António Congo, Facilitator
13.12.01	T54	Hortência Jafar, Facilitator
13.12.01	T54	Maria José, Facilitator
13.12.01	T55	Agusto João, Facilitator
13.12.01	T56	Felizardo Dourinho, Facilitator
13.12.01	T57	Gonçalves Rafael, Rat data collector
14.12.01	T58	Eugénio Nhacorrente, Facilitator
14.12.01	T58	Casquero Marque, Facilitator
08.01.02	T59	Abílo Masaude, Rat data collector
08.01.02	T59	Tomé Mutange, Rat data collector, brother of <i>régulo</i>
08.01.02	T60	Hilária José, Facilitator
09.01.02	T61	Joaquim Albino (A)
09.01.02	T61 & 62	Sousa Dhuvumele (A)
09.01.02	T62	David Liguene (A)
10.01.02	T63	Paulo Dias (A)
10.01.02	T64 & 65	Bento Obre (A)
11.01.02	T65	Violinda Arage (A)
15.01.02	T66	Aristima Ronco (A)
15.01.02	T66 & 67	Julia Custema (A)
15.01.02	T67	Helena Baladjane (A)
15.01.02	T73	Luzia Armazia (A)
16.01.02	O7A	Hendrik Petersen, <i>Acção Agrária Alemã</i>
16.01.02	T68	Madrinha Made (A)
16.01.02	T69	Sidinha Munhanhia and Dandinha Abucara (A)
17.01.02	T70	Aberna Jussar (A)
17.01.02	T71	Bernadette Armazia (A)
17.01.02	T72	Fernando Aliz (A)
18.01.02	T74	Jacinto Lavaio (A)
22.01.02	T75	Paulina Rubate, <i>Curandeiro</i>
22.01.02	T76	Moisés Paulo, Church leader
23.01.02	T77	Henriques Francisco, Frelimo <i>chefe de zona</i>
24.01.02	T78	Estofem Henriques
28.01.02	T79	Jordao Estevão
29.01.02	T80	Francisco Baptista, Baptist church leader
29.01.02	T81	Octano Ricardo
29.01.02	T82	Odete José
30.01.02	T83	Isáquiel Anselmo
30.01.02	T84	Nonito Agostinho
30.01.02	T85	Carlota Amilai
31.01.02	T86	Mariamo Sambique

31.01.02	T87	Sufriana Alves and Moisinho Dramuz
13.02.02	G53	Joaquim Benedito Natxeco
13.02.02	G54	Marcelina Raúl and Jorge Felizardo
14.02.02	G55	Juliana Muhoma
14.02.02	G56	Sopra Napiri
14.02.02	G57	Daniel Namuteca
15.02.02	G58	Felizardo Waxiroma, Frelimo <i>chefe de zona</i>
15.02.02	G59	Agnesse Mahwa, Church elder
15.02.02	G60	Agosto Pitra, Health worker
15.02.02	G60	Maria Parua, Church elder
16.02.02	O8 & 09	Padre Elias Ciscato
18.02.02	G61 & 62	Albino Sampara
19.02.02	G63 & 64	Focus Group, Renamo Leaders
20.02.02	G65	Timitório Sérgio
20.02.02	G66	Eriasse Cozinheiro
20.02.02	G67	Galhardo Horácio
20.02.02	G68 & 69	José Lourenço Guruvate, Teacher
21.02.02	G70	Lucia Forma
21.02.02	G70	Vicente Munawova
22.02.02	G71	Sarconda Namatala, <i>Secretário</i> of Frelimo
22.02.02	G72 & 73	Focus group of Frelimo leaders
25.02.02	T88 & 89	Focus group of Renamo leaders
04.03.02	T90 & 91	Joao Matraia Nangura
05.03.02	T92 & 93	Focus group of young people from Namuinho B
06.03.02	T94 & 95	Focus group of Frelimo leaders
06.03.02	T96	Focus group of women
14.03.02	G74	Director of Intuba School
14.03.02	G75	Crvalho Narson, Health Worker
15.03.02	G76	Alberto Rafael, First <i>secretário</i> of Nicoria
15.03.02	G77	Gasten Mussaraua, <i>Curandeiro</i>
15.03.02	G78	Director of Nicoria School
21.03.02	G79	<i>Chefe de Posto</i> in Mepuaguia
26.03.02	T97 & 98	Focus group of Association members
26.03.02	T99	Focus group of facilitators
26.03.02	T100	Belito Daniel, Facilitator
27.03.02	T101 & 2	President of Mutange
27.03.02	T103	Zachariah Fonseca
01.04.02	O11	Cipriano Amélia
04.04.02	T103A	ZADP meeting about goats, Naminane
04.04.02	T104	ZADP meeting about goats, Mapiazua
06.04.02	T105	Final goodbye meeting in Mutange
08.04.02	G80 & 81	Focus group of male project participants
08.04.02	G81 & 82	Focus group of project participants
09.04.02	G83	Focus group of facilitators and most active participants

09.04.02	G84	Raúl Muanavola
09.04.02	G85 & 86	Focus group of CCM Facilitators
10.04.02	G87 & 88	Focus group of goat recipients
10.04.02	G88	Focus group of leaders from Mugaveia
10.04.02	G89	Focus group of rat data collectors
11.04.02	G90 & 91	Focus group of CLUSA group members
12.04.02	O10	Rodrigues Alberto, ZADP livestock <i>técnico</i>
12.04.02	O12	André Cigarro, ZADP <i>técnico</i>
20.11.02	O13	Jim Cope, ZADP Project Manager
22.11.02	O14	Lourenço Piri Piri, ZADP livestock <i>técnico</i>
22.11.02	O15	Barbara Johnson, ZADP rural sociologist
23.11.02	O16	Joaquim Tomás, ZADP research agronomist
24.11.02	O17	Richard Dove, Manager of World Vision agriculture project
25.11.02	O18	Gil Fonseca , Concession holder in Mutange
25.11.02	O19	Ana Bela Cambaza, ZADP veterinarian
26.11.02	O20	Fernando Marrime, ZADP extension supervisor
27.11.02	O21 & 22	Roberto Cassiano, ZADP livestock technician
28.11.02	O22 & 23	Estevão André, ZADP <i>técnico</i>
28.11.02	O23	Alberto Jaime, CCM <i>técnico</i>
28.11.02	O24	Adrião José, Ex-manager of tea plantation
29.11.02	O25	Filipa Gouveia, ZADP anthropologist
29.11.02	O26	Gemusse Manuel, CCM extension supervisor
29.11.02	O26	Ana Maria Jacinto, ZADP <i>técnico</i>
01.12.02	O27	António Tcheco, ZADP extension supervisor
02.12.02	O28	Horácio João Rubalaine, ZADP bridge technician
02.12.02	O29	Jacinta Lopes, ZADP <i>técnico</i>
02.12.02	O30	Alberto Chirindza, ORAM worker
03.12.02	O19 & 28	Rafael Valoi, ZADP deputy project manager
03.12.02	O31	Jemusse Jordão, District Director of Agriculture, Namacurra
03.12.02	O32	Brian Hilton, Manager of World Vision agriculture project
08.12.02	O33	Claire Lloyd, Deputy Director of Agriculture, World Vision
08.12.02	O34	Neil Holmes, DFID Economic Adviser
09.12.02	O35	Patrick Anderson, DFID Head of Office
10.12.02	O36	Gary Bayer, Director of Agriculture, World Vision
10.12.02	O37	Rebecca Jackson, DFID Rural Livelihoods Adviser
10.12.02	O38	Ruth Hobson, Country Director, World Vision
10.12.02	O39	Stephen Barnes, ZADP Project Manager
11.12.02	O40	Emidio Oliveira, DFID rural livelihoods programme officer

Key:

T = Mutange, G = Mugaveia, O = Other

(R) = interview carried out by Rita

(A) = interview carried out by Arcanjo

NB Interviewees who have been quoted have been given pseudonyms

## **2. Key meetings**

DFID review of ZADP, 15-19 May 2000

DFID strategy meeting, Maputo, 19-21 November 2000

DFID visit to ZADP, 21-23 November 2000

DFID 'in-week', Harare, 22-26 January 2001

ZADP training workshop, Participatory Impact Assessment, 5-9 February 2001

ZADP Mid-Term Review final workshop, 19-23 March 2001

DFID regional social development advisers' conference, Dar es Salaam 4-8 June 2001

ZADP vision and strategy workshop, 25-30 June 2001

ZADP workshop on participatory planning with communities, 16 August 2001

DFID social development advisers' global gathering, Cambridge, 11-14 September 2001

ZADP experience sharing workshop, 17-18 December 2001

DFID aid effectiveness and performance management workshop, Maputo, 13-14 February 2002

DFID review of ZADP, 13-16 May 2002

DFID social development and governance advisers' workshop, Oxfordshire, 22-28 September 2002

Final Review of ZADP, 5-16 May 2003

## Glossary

<i>agricultor</i>	large-scale farmer; in colonial times a classification giving exemption from forced labour
<i>aldeia comunal</i>	communal village
<i>ajuda mútua</i>	mutual help
<i>azungu (sing. muzungu)</i>	white people ( <i>Elomwé</i> )
<i>bairro</i>	neighbourhood
<i>branco</i>	white person
<i>catxaço</i>	distilled spirit, usually from sugar cane
<i>camponês</i>	villager, peasant
<i>canteiro</i>	field ridge
<i>célula</i>	cell, administrative subdivision of a <i>localidade</i>
<i>chefe de dez casas</i>	head of ten households
<i>chefe de zona</i>	zone chief
<i>chibalo</i>	colonial-era unpaid forced labour
<i>Chuabo</i>	name given to people living in and around Quelimane; also the local name for Quelimane
<i>chupa sangue</i>	blood sucker, blood thief
<i>cipaio</i>	colonial-era police
<i>comunidade</i>	community
<i>comparticipação</i>	co-participation, cost-sharing
<i>confiança</i>	trust
<i>confusão</i>	confusion, dissent
<i>conselho executivo</i>	<i>localidade</i> -level executive council
<i>cooperante</i>	white worker for the Mozambican government
<i>curandeiro/a</i>	healer, witchdoctor
<i>desenvolvimento</i>	development
<i>deslocado</i>	displaced person
<i>devoções</i>	devotions
<i>distrito</i>	district
<i>donativo</i>	donation
<i>droga</i>	drugs (meaning sorcery)
<i>Echuabo</i>	Chuabo language
<i>Elomwé</i>	Lomwé language

<i>emergência</i>	emergency, used to refer to the war and immediate post-war period
<i>Estado Novo</i>	New State, name for Salazar's regime
<i>facilitador</i>	facilitator, local collaborator with ZADP
<i>feiticeiro</i>	witch
<i>feitiçaria</i>	witchcraft
<i>Frelimo</i>	ruling ex-socialist party
<i>ganho-ganho</i>	casual labour, paid in cash and/or kind
<i>Lomwé</i>	name given to the people of Upper Zambézia
<i>localidade</i>	locality, administrative subdivision of an administrative post
<i>machamba</i>	field
<i>mambo</i>	chief (for Renamo) ( <i>Elomwé</i> )
<i>metical</i>	Mozambican currency
<i>mukhwiri</i>	witch ( <i>Elomwé</i> )
<i>musso</i>	colonial tax
<i>mwene</i>	chief ( <i>Elomwé</i> )
<i>obscurantismo</i>	obscurantist behaviour
<i>oferta</i>	present, gift
<i>okhwiri</i>	witchcraft, malevolent power ( <i>Elomwé</i> )
<i>patrão</i>	patron
<i>prazo</i>	colonial era crown estate
<i>posto administrativo</i>	administrative post
<i>regadio</i>	irrigation scheme
<i>regedoria</i>	land under control of a colonial <i>régulo</i>
<i>régulo</i>	chief during the colonial era; now used of 'traditional' leaders, often Renamo supporters
<i>Renamo</i>	opposition party
<i>saljema</i>	salt substitute, made from burnt maize husks ( <i>Elomwé</i> )
<i>samassua</i>	deputy <i>régulo</i> in colonial times
<i>secretário</i>	Frelimo party secretary
<i>técnico</i>	agricultural extension worker
<i>trabalhar muacuante</i>	colonial-era unpaid forced labour
<i>Visão Mundial</i>	World Vision

## Acronyms

ADP	Area Development Project
APO(S)	Associate Professional Officer (Scheme), run by DFID
BDDCA	British Division for Development, Central Africa
CCM	<i>Conselho Cristão de Moçambique</i> , Christian Council of Mozambique
CDC	Community Development Committee
CEA	Centre for African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University
CEW	Community Extension Worker
CLUSA	Cooperative League of the USA
DDADR	District Department for Agriculture and Rural Development
DINAGECA	<i>Direcção Nacional de Geografia e Cadastro</i> , National Directorate for Geography and Cadastre
DFID	Department for International Development, UK
EP 1	<i>Escola Primária 1</i> ; Primary School, classes 1-5
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FFS	Farmer Field School
FRG	Farmer Research Group
GoM	Government of Mozambique
HDI	Human Development Index
IDA	International Development Association
IFI	International Financial Institution
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDER	<i>Instituto de Desenvolvimento Rural</i> , Institute of Rural Development
INGO	International NGO
MADER	Ministry for Agriculture and Rural Development
MISAU	Ministry of Health
MT	<i>meticals</i> , Mozambican currency
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NRI	Natural Resources Institute

ODA	Overseas Development Administration, now DFID. Also official development assistance
ORAM	<i>Organização Rural de Ajuda Mútua</i> , Rural Association of Mutual Help
PAAO	Provincial Budget and Activity Plan
PARPA	Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
PIA	Participatory Impact Assessment
PIDE	Colonial secret police
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRE	Economic Rehabilitation Programme
Proagri	Sector Investment Programme for Agriculture
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan
Promiza	ZADP micro-credit component
PY	Project Year
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SPGC	<i>Serviço Provincial de Geografia e Cadastro</i> , Provincial Cadastral Service
SWAp	Sector-wide Approach
WV(I)	World Vision (International)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ZADP	Zambézia Agricultural Development Project

## Bibliography

- (i) Published Books, Articles and Reports
- (ii) Unpublished Papers and Reports
- (iii) Reports relating to ZADP
- (iv) Electronic Newsletters, Newspapers and Magazines
- (v) Theses and Dissertations

### (i) Published Books, Articles and Reports

- Allen, T. 2000. "Understanding Health: Biomedicine and Local Knowledge in Northern Uganda," in *Health Promotion: New Discipline or Multi-Discipline?* Edited by R. Edmondson and C. Kelleher, pp. 147-173. Dublin and Portland, Oregon: Irish Academic Press.
- Allina, E. E. D. 1997. 'Fallacious Mirrors:' Colonial Anxiety and Images of African Labor in Mozambique, ca. 1929. *History in Africa* 24: 9-52.
- Allina-Pisano, E. 2003. Borderlands, Boundaries, and the Contours of Colonial Rule: African Labor in Manica District, Mozambique, c. 1904-1908. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 36(1): 59-82.
- Alpers, E. 1974. Ethnicity, Politics and History in Mozambique. *Africa Today* 21(4): 39-52.
- Alvares, P. A. 1916. O Regime dos Prazos da Zambézia. *Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa* Série 34: 137-213.
- Amit, V. (ed.) 2002a. *Realizing Community: Concepts, Social Relationships and Sentiments*. London and New York: Routledge.
- 2002b. "Reconceptualizing Community," in *Realizing Community: Concepts, Social Relationships and Sentiments*. Edited by V. Amit, pp. 1-20. London and New York: Routledge.
- and N. Rapport. 2002. *The Trouble with Community: Anthropological Reflections on Movement, Identity and Collectivity*. London: Pluto Press.
- Anderson, B. 1983/1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso.
- Arce, A. 2001. "Experiencing the Modern World: Individuality, Planning and the State," in *Resonances and Dissonances in Development. Actors, Networks, and Cultural Repertoires*. Edited by P. Hebinck and G. Verschoor, pp. 103-117. Assen: Royal Van Gorcum.
- and N. Long. 1992. "The Dynamics of Knowledge: Interfaces between Bureaucrats and Peasants," in *Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development*. Edited by N. Long and A. Long, pp. 211-246. London: Routledge.
- and N. Long. (eds.) 2000a. *Anthropology, Development and Modernities. Exploring Discourses, Counter-Tendencies and Violence*. London: Routledge.
- and N. Long. 2000b. "Reconfiguring Modernity and Development from an Anthropological Perspective," in *Anthropology, Development and Modernities*.

- Exploring Discourses, Counter-Tendencies and Violence*. Edited by N. Long and A. Arce, pp. 1-32. London: Routledge.
- , M. Villarreal, and P. de Vries. 1994. "The Social Construction of Rural Development: Discourses, Practices and Power," in *Rethinking Social Development: Theory, Research and Practice*. Edited by D. Booth, pp. 152-171. Harlow: Longman.
- Ardener, E. 1970. "Witchcraft, Economics, and the Continuity of Belief," in *Witchcraft Confessions and Accusations*. Edited by M. Douglas, pp. 141-160. London: Tavistock.
- Barker, J. 1989. *Rural Communities under Stress: Peasant Farmers and the State in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barnett, T. 1977. *The Gezira Scheme: An Illusion of Development*. London: Frank Cass.
- Bayart, J.-F. 1993. *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. London and New York: Longman.
- , S. Ellis, and B. Hibou. 1999. *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*. Oxford and Indianapolis: James Currey and Indiana University Press.
- Beidelman, T. O. 1971. *The Kaguru*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Belo, J. 1927. Discurso Pronunciado pelo Ex. Ministro das Colonias. *Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa* 45: 263-84.
- Benthall, J. 2001. Time to Look 'The Gift' in the Mouth. *Anthropology Today* 17(4): 1-2.
- Bhebe, N., and T. Ranger. (eds.) 1995. *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Black, J. K. 1991. *Development in Theory and Practice. Bridging the Gap*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Boeder, R. B. 1984. *Silent Majority. A History of the Lomwe in Malawi*. Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa.
- Boissevain. 1966. Patronage in Sicily. *Man* 1(1): 18-33.
- Booth, D. (ed.) 1994. *Rethinking Social Development: Theory, Research and Practice*. Harlow: Longman.
- Bowen, M. 2000a. *The State against the Peasantry: Rural Struggles in Colonial and Postcolonial Mozambique*. Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia.
- Bowen, N. 2001. Os Chupa Sangue na Provincia da Zambézia. *Estudos Moçambicanos* 19.
- Brain, J. L. 1982. Witchcraft and Development. *African Affairs* 81: 371-384.
- Brantley, C. 1979. A Historical Perspective of the Giriama and Witchcraft Control. *Africa* 49(2): 112-133.
- Bratton, M. 1989. The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa. *World Development* 17: 569-87.
- Brokensha, D., and C. Erasmus. 1969. "African Peasants and Community Development," in *The Anthropology of Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Edited by D. Brokensha and M. Pearsall. Kentucky: Lexington.

- Burnside, C., and D. Dollar. 2000. Aid Policies and Growth. *American Economic Review* 90(4): 847-68.
- Cahen, M. 1998. 'Dhlakama é Maningue Nice!' An Atypical Former Guerrilla in the Mozambican Electoral Campaign. *Transformation* 35: 1-48.
- Cann, J. P. 2001. Mozambique, German East Africa and the Great War. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 12(1): 114-143.
- Carney, D. (ed.) 1998. *Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: What Contribution can we Make? Papers Presented at the Department for International Development's Natural Resources Advisors Conference, July 1998*. London: Department for International Development.
- Carrier, J. G. 1995. *Gifts and Commodities: Exchange and Western Capitalism since 1700*. London: Routledge.
- Casal, A. Y. 1996. *Antropologia de Desenvolvimento: As Aldeias Comuns de Moçambique*. Lisboa: Ministério da Ciência e da Tecnologia, Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical.
- Cayolla, L. 1926. A Obra da Colonização Portuguesa. *Boletim da Agência Geral das Colónias* 7: 6-29.
- CEA. 1981a. *Cotton Production in Mozambique: A Survey, 1936-1979*. Centro de Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo.
- 1981b. *Já Não Batem: A Transformação da Produção Algodoeira*. Projecto de Estudo Sobre a Produção de Algodão no Distrito de Lugela, Centro de Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo.
- 1981c. *O Trabalhador Sazonal na Transformação duma Economia de Plantações*. Centro de Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo. CEA Relatório 81-4.
- 1982. *Plantações de Chá e Economia Camponesa. Informação Básica para um Plano Director da Zona Gurue-Socone, Alta Zambézia*. Centro de Estudos Africanos, Maputo. Projecto de Emochá, Relatório <A>.
- Chambers, R. 1972. Planning for Rural Areas: Experience and Prescriptions. *African Review* 1(3): 130-147.
- 1983. *Rural Development: Putting the Last First*. Harlow, Essex: Longman Scientific and Technical.
- 1986. "The Crisis of Africa's Rural Poor: Perceptions and Priorities," in *The Challenge of Employment and Basic Needs in Africa*. Nairobi: International Labour Organisation.
- 1993. *Challenging the Professions: Frontiers for Rural Development*. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- 1995. Poverty and Livelihoods: Whose Reality Counts? *Environment and Urbanization* 7(1): 173-204.
- 1996. Participatory Rural Appraisal and the Reversal of Power. *Cambridge Anthropology* 19(1): 5-23.
- Chirwa, W. C. 1994. Alomwe and Mozambican Immigrant Labor in Colonial Malawi, 1890s-1945. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 27(3): 525-550.

- Chomsky, N. 1999. *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*. London: Pluto.
- Christie, F., and J. Hanlon. 2001. *Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000*. London: James Currey.
- Clarence-Smith, G. 1985a. Book Review: Mozambique: The Revolution under Fire; Il Mozambico Indipendente; Stato, Partito, Ideologia (1975/1980); Mozambique: Towards a People's Health Service; and Mozambican Studies, Number 1, 1980. *African Affairs* 84(337): 622-624.
- 1985b. *The Third Portuguese Empire, 1925-75*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Clark, J. 1995. The State, Popular Participation and the Voluntary Sector. *World Development* 23(4): 593-601.
- Clay, E., and B. Schaffer. (eds.) 1984. *Room for Manoeuvre: An Exploration of Public Policy in Agriculture and Rural Development*. London: Heinemann Educational Books.
- Cleaver, F. 2001. "Institutions, Agency and the Limitations of Participatory Approaches to Development," in *Participation: The New Tyranny?* Edited by B. Cooke and U. Kothari, pp. 36-55. London: Zed Books.
- Cohen, A. P. 1985. *The Symbolic Construction of Community*. London and New York: Tavistock Publications.
- 2002. "Epilogue," in *Realizing Community: Concepts, Social Relationships and Sentiments*. Edited by V. Amit, pp. 1-20. London and New York: Routledge.
- Colson, E. 1964. Social Change and the Gwembe Tonga. *Human Problems in British Central Africa* 35: 1-13.
- 1971. *The Social Consequences of Resettlement: the Impact of the Kariba Resettlement upon the Gwembe Tonga*. Manchester: Manchester University Press for the University of Zambia. Institute for African Studies.
- and M. Gluckman. 1951. *Seven Tribes of British Central Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Comaroff, J. 1985. *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- and J. Comaroff. 1991. *Of Revelation and Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cooke, B., and U. Kothari. (eds.) 2001. *Participation: The New Tyranny?* London: Zed Books.
- Cowen, M. P., and R. W. Shenton. 1996. *Doctrines of Development*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Crehan, K., and A. von Oppen. 1988. Understandings of 'Development': An Arena of Struggle. The Story of a Development Project in Zambia. *Sociologia Ruralis* 28(2/3): 113-145.
- Crewe, E., and E. Harrison. 1998. *Whose Development? An Ethnography of Aid*. London: Zed Books.

- Cross, M. 1992/4. O Capitalismo Colonial e a Força de Trabalho. A Economia Política nas Plantações de Chá do Norte de Moçambique 1930-1975. *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos* 16/17: 131-154.
- Crush, J. 1995a. "Introduction: Imagining Development," in *Power of Development*. Edited by J. Crush, pp. 1-23. London: Routledge.
- (ed.) 1995b. *Power of Development*. London: Routledge.
- Darch, C. 1989. Are there Warlords in Provincial Mozambique? Questions of the Social Base of MNR Banditry. *Review of African Political Economy* 45/46: 34-49.
- de Almeida, A. M. M. 1948. *Monografia Etnográfica Original sobre o Grupo Tchuabo*. Lourenço Marques.
- de Boeck, F. 1998. Domesticating Diamonds and Dollars: Identity, Expenditure and Sharing in Southwestern Zaire (1984-1997). *Development and Change* 29: 777-810.
- de Vasconcelos, E. 1926. Os Portugueses Não São Incapazes Colonizadores. *Boletim da Agência Geral das Colónias* 7: 3-5.
- de Vries, P. 1992. "A Research Journey. On Actors, Concepts, and the Text," in *Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development*. Edited by N. Long and A. Long. London: Routledge.
- 1996. The Multiple Faces of the Ideology of Intervention. A Story of Administrators' Fantasies and Implementors' Anxieties. *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 36: 89-110.
- Derluigian, G. 1989. Les Tetes du Monstre: Du Climat Social de la Violence Armée au Mozambique. *Année Africaine* : 89-127.
- Dey, J. 1982. Development Planning in the Gambia: The Gap between Planners' and Farmers' Perceptions, Expectations and Objectives. *World Development* 10(5): 377-96.
- DFID. 1997. *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century*. White Paper on International Development. Department for International Development, London.
- 1998a. *Mozambique: Country Strategy Paper*. Department for International Development, London.
- 2000a. *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor*. White Paper on International Development. Department for International Development, London.
- Dias, M. 1965. *Os Maganjas da Costa - Contribuição para o Estudo dos Sistemas de Parentesco dos Povos de Moçambique*. Lisbon: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar.
- Dinerman, A. 1994. In Search of Mozambique: The Imaginings of Christian Geffray in *La Cause des Armes au Mozambique*. *Anthropologie d'une Guerre Civile*. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20(4): 569-586.
- Douglas, M. 1986. *How Institutions Think*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Easterly, W. 2003. Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth? *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(3): 23-48.

- Edelman, M. 1999. *Peasants against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa Rica*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Eisenstadt, S. N., and L. Roniger. 1980. Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22(1): 42-77.
- and L. Roniger. 1984. *Patrons, Clients and Friends. Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elwert, G., and T. Bierschenk. 1988. Development Aid as an Intervention in Dynamic Systems. An Introduction. *Sociologia Ruralis* 28(2/3): 99-112.
- Englund, H. 1996. Witchcraft, Modernity and the Person. The Morality of Accumulation in Central Malawi. *Critique of Anthropology* 16(3): 257-280.
- 2002. *From War to Peace on the Mozambique-Malawi Borderland*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press for the International Africa Institute.
- Escobar, A. 1991. Anthropology and the Development Encounter: The Making and Marketing of Development Anthropology. *American Ethnologist* 18(4): 658-682.
- 1995. *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1937. *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Eyben, R. 2000. Development and Anthropology: A View from Inside the Agency. *Critique of Anthropology* 20(1): 7-14.
- 2003a. Mainstreaming the Social Dimension into the Overseas Development Administration: a Partial History. *Journal of International Development* 15(7): 879-92.
- Fabian, J. 1983. *Time and the Other: How Anthropology makes its Object*. New York: Columbia Press.
- Farrington, J., A. J. Bebbington, K. Wellard, and D. J. Lewis. 1993. *Reluctant Partners? Non-Governmental Organisations, The State and Sustainable Agricultural Development*. London: Routledge.
- Fauvet, P. 1984. Roots of Counter Revolution: The Mozambique National Resistance. *Review of African Political Economy* 29: 108-121.
- Feierman, S. 1990. *Peasant Intellectuals. Anthropology and History in Tanzania*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Ferguson, J. 1990. *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticisation and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 1994. Power or Complexity? *Transition* 64: 132-138.
- 1999. *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt*: University of California Press.
- Finnegan, W. 1992. *A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique*. Berkeley, Oxford: University of California Press.
- First, R. 1983. *Black Gold, the Mozambican Miner, Proletarian and Peasant*. Sussex: Harvester Press.

- Fisher, W. F. 1997. Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 26: 439-464.
- Fisiy, C. F., and P. Geschiere. 1991. Sorcery, Witchcraft and Accumulation. Regional Variations in South and West Cameroon. *Critique of Anthropology* 11(3): 251-278.
- Foster, G. M. 1963. The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan II: Patron-Client Relationship. *American Anthropologist* 65(6): 1280-1294.
- Fowler, A. E. 1998. Authentic NGDO Partnerships in the New Policy Agenda for International Aid: Dead End or Light Ahead? *Development and Change* 29(1): 137-159.
- Francis, P. 2001. "Participatory Development at the World Bank: The Primacy of Process," in *Participation: The New Tyranny?* Edited by B. Cooke and U. Kothari, pp. 72-87. London: Zed Books.
- Freire de Andrade, A. 1914. *Rapport Présenté au Ministre des Colonies, a propos du Livre Portugese Slavery, du Missionaire John Harris*. Lisbon.
- Gable, E. 1997. A Secret Shared: Fieldwork and the Sinister in a West African Village. *Cultural Anthropology* 12(2): 213-233.
- Galli, R. E. 1987. The Food Crisis and the Socialist State in Lusophone Africa. *African Studies Review* 30(1): 19-44.
- Gardner, K. 1997. "Mixed Messages: Contested 'Development' and the 'Plantation Rehabilitation Project'," in *Discourses of Development: Anthropological Perspectives*. Edited by R. D. Grillo and R. L. Stirrat, pp. 133-156. Oxford: Berg.
- and D. Lewis. 2000. Dominant Paradigms Overturned or 'Business as Usual'? Development Discourse and the White Paper on International Development. *Critique of Anthropology* 20(1): 15-29.
- Geffray, C. 1985a. La Condition Servile en Pays Makuwa. *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* (100): 505-535.
- Geffray, C. 1985b. *Transformations historiques de l'organisation familiale Ma-Khuwa 1940-1975*. Erati, Paris. Rapport 4.
- 1991. *A Causa das Armas: Antropologia da Guerra Contemporânea em Moçambique*. Porto: Edições Afrontamento.
- 2000. *Nem Pai, Nem Mãe. Crítica do Parentesco: O Caso Macua*. Lisboa: Ndjira, Coleção Estudos Africanos.
- and M. Pederson. 1986. Sobre a Guerra na Provincia de Nampula. Elementos de Análise e Hipóteses sobre as Determinações e Consequências Socio-econômicas Locais. *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos* 4/5: 303-318.
- Geschiere, P. 1988. Sorcery and the State - Popular Modes of Action among the Maka of Southeast Cameroon. *Critique of Anthropology* 8(1): 35-63.
- Giddens, A. 1984. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gluckman, M. 1956. *Custom and Conflict in Africa*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- 1958. *Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand. Rhodes-Livingstone Papers No. 28*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Godelier, M. 1999. *The Enigma of the Gift*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Goodell, G. E. 1985. Paternalism, Patronage and Potlatch: The Dynamics of Giving and Being Given To. *Current Anthropology* 26(2): 247-266.
- Gordon, C. 1991. "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. Edited by G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller, pp. 1-51. London: Harvester Wheafsheaf.
- Gray, R. 1981. Khalai-Khalai: People's History in Mozambique. *People's Power* 18: 3-15.
- Green, M. 1995. Why Christianity is the "Religion of Business": Perceptions of the Church among Pogoro Catholics in Southern Tanzania. *Journal of Religion in Africa* 25: 25-47.
- 2000. Participatory Development and the Appropriation of Agency in Southern Tanzania. *Critique of Anthropology* 20(1): 67-89.
- Gregory, C. A. 1982. *Gifts and Commodities*. London: Academic Press.
- 1997. *Savage Money: The Anthropology and Politics of Commodity Exchange*. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic.
- Grillo, R. D., and R. L. Stirrat. (eds.) 1997. *Discourses of Development: Anthropological Perspectives*. Oxford: Berg.
- Grilo, F. M. 1929. O Problema Indígena no Distrito de Quelimane (Continuação). *Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa* 3-4: 79-89.
- Grindle, M., and J. Thomas. 1991. *Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries*. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Guijt, I., and M. K. Shah. (eds.) 1998a. *The Myth of Community: Gender Issues in Participatory Development*. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- and M. K. Shah. 1998b. "Waking Up to Power, Conflict and Process," in *The Myth of Community: Gender Issues in Participatory Development*. Edited by I. Guijt and M. K. Shah, pp. 1-23. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Haas, P. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. *International Organisation* 46(1): 1-35.
- Hall, M. 1990. The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO): A Study in the Destruction of an African Country. *Africa* 60(1): 39-68.
- and T. Young. 1997. *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence*. London: Hurst and Company.
- Hanlon, J. 1984. *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire*. London: Zed Books.
- 1991. *Mozambique - Who Calls the Shots?* London, Bloomington and Indianapolis: James Currey and Indiana University Press.
- 2000. How much Debt must be Cancelled? *Journal of International Development* 12(6): 877-901.
- 2002b. Bank Corruption Becomes Site of Struggle in Mozambique. *Review of African Political Economy* 29(91): 53-72.

- Hansen, H., and F. Tarp. 2001. Aid and Growth Regressions. *Journal of Development Economics* 64(2): 547-70.
- Harris, L. 1980. Agricultural Co-operatives and Development Policy in Mozambique. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 7(3): 338-52.
- Harrison, E. 1995b. Fish and Feminists. *IDS Bulletin* 26(3): 39-47.
- Harrison, G. 1999. Corruption as 'Boundary Politics': The State, Democratisation, and Mozambique's Unstable Liberalisation. *Third World Quarterly* 20(3): 537-550.
- . 2000. *The Politics of Democratisation in Rural Mozambique: Grassroots Governance in Mecúfi*. Lampeter and New York: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Harriss, J. 2003. 'Widening the Radius of Trust': Ethnographic Explorations of Trust and Indian Business. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 9(4): 755-773.
- Hart, K. 1973. Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 11(1): 61-89.
- . 2001. *Money in an Unequal World: Keith Hart and his Memory Bank*. London: Texere.
- Hedges, D. (ed.) 1999. *História de Moçambique. Volume 2. Moçambique no Auge do Colonialismo, 1930-1961*. Maputo: Livraria Universitária.
- Hellinger, D. 1987. NGOs and the Large Aid Donors: Changing the Terms of Engagement. *World Development* 15 (Suppl.): 135-43.
- Hetherwick, A. 1931. *The Romance of Blantyre: How Livingstone's Dream Came True*. London: James Clarke and Company.
- Hilhorst, D. 2001. Village Experts and Development Discourse: 'Progress' in a Philippine Igorot Village. *Human Organization* 60(4): 401-413.
- Hill, P. 1986. *Development Economics on Trial: The Anthropological Case for a Prosecution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hillery, G. A. 1955. Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement. *Rural Sociology* 20: 86-118.
- Hirschman, A. O. 1967. *Development Projects Observed*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute.
- Hobart, M. 1993. "Introduction: The Growth of Ignorance?," in *An Anthropological Critique of Development: The Growth of Ignorance*. Edited by M. Hobart, pp. 1-30. London: Routledge.
- . 1997. The Missing Subject: Balinese Time and the Elimination of History. *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Studies* 31(1): 123-172.
- Hoile, D. (ed.) 1994. *Mozambique 1962-1993: A Political Chronology*. London: Mozambique Institute.
- Hudson, J. 2004. Introduction: Aid and Development. *The Economic Journal* 114: 185-190.
- Hyden, G. 1980. *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania. Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry*. London: Heinemann.
- Isaacman, A. 1969. The Prazos da Coroa 1752-1830: A Functional Analysis of the Political System. *Studia* 26: 149-178.

- 1972a. *Mozambique. The Africanization of a European Institution: The Zambesi Prazos, 1750-1902*. Madison, Milwaukee and London: University of Wisconsin Press.
- 1972b. The Origin, Formation and Early History of the Chikunda of South Central Africa. *The Journal of African History* 13(3): 443-461.
- 1976. *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique: The Zambesi Valley, 1850-1921*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 1977a. Resistance and Collaboration in Southern and Central Africa (1850-1920). *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 10(1): 31-62.
- 1977b. Social Banditry in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Mozambique 1894-1907: An Expression of Early Peasant Protest. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 4(1): 1-30.
- 1982. The Mozambique Cotton Cooperative: The Creation of a Grassroots Alternative to Forced Commodity Production. *African Studies Review* 25(2/3): 5-25.
- 1985. Chiefs, Rural Differentiation and Peasant Protest: The Mozambican Forced Cotton Regime 1938-61. *African Economic History* 14: 15-56.
- 1992. Coercion, Paternalism and the Labour Process: The Mozambican Cotton Regime 1938-1961. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18(3): 487-526.
- 1996. *Cotton is the Mother of Poverty. Peasants, Work and Rural Struggle in Colonial Mozambique, 1938-1961*. Portsmouth, NH, Cape Town & London: Heinemann, David Philip & James Currey.
- 1997. Historical Amnesia or, the Logic of Capital Accumulation: Cotton Production in Colonial and Postcolonial Mozambique. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 15: 757-790.
- and B. Isaacman. 1975. The Prazeros as Transfrontiersmen: A Study in Social and Cultural Change. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 8(1): 1-39.
- and B. Isaacman. 1977. "Slavery and Social Stratification among the Sena of Mozambique, A Study of the Kaporo System," in *Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives*. Edited by S. Miers and I. Kopytoff, pp. 105-120. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- and B. Isaacman. 1983. *Mozambique from Colonialism to Revolution*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- and R. Roberts. (eds.) 1995. *Cotton, Colonialism and Social History in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Portsmouth, NH and London: Heinemann and James Currey.
- and C. Sneddon. 2000. Toward a Social and Environmental History of the Building of Cahora Bassa Dam. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(4): 597-632.
- , M. Stephen, Y. Adam, M. J. Homen, E. Macamo, and A. Pililão. 1980. "Cotton is the Mother of Poverty": Peasant Resistance to Forced Cotton Production in Mozambique, 1938-1961. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 13(4): 581-615.
- Ishemo, S. L. 1995. *The Lower Zambezi Basin in Mozambique. A Study in Economy and Society, 1850-1920*. Aldershot: Avebury.

- Jackson, C. 1997. Sustainable Development at the Sharp End: Field-Worker Agency in a Participatory Project. *Development in Practice* 7(3): 237-247.
- Jackson, M. 1990. "The Man Who Could Turn into an Elephant: Shape-shifting among the Kuranko of Sierra Leone," in *Personhood and Agency: The Experience of Self and Other in African Cultures*. Edited by M. Jackson and I. Karp. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- James, D. 2002. "To Take the Information Down to the People': Life Skills and HIV/AIDS Peer Educators in the Durban Area. *African Studies* 61(1): 169-191.
- forthcoming. *Gaining Ground? "Rights" and "Property" in South Africa's Land Reform Programme*. London: Glasshouse Press.
- Jarosz, L. A. 1994. Agents of Power, Landscapes of Fear: The Vampires and Heart Thieves of Madagascar. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 12(4): 421-436.
- Jerve, A. M. 2002. Ownership and Partnership: Does the New Rhetoric solve the Incentive Problems in Aid? *Forum for Development Studies* 2: 389-407.
- Kanji, N., C. Braga, and W. Mitullah. 2002. *Promoting Land Rights in Mozambique and Kenya: How do NGOs make a difference?* London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
- Kapferer, B. 1997. *The Feast of the Sorcerer: Practices of Consciousness and Power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kloock-Jenson, S. 1998. "Locating the Community: Local Communities and the Administration of Land and other Natural Resources in Mozambique." *International Conference on Land Tenure in the Developing World, Cape Town, 1998*, pp. 450-461.
- Kriger, N. 1992. *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lacerda, F. G. de 1929. Os Prazos da Zambezia. *Boletim da Agencia Geral das Colonias, Lisboa* Ano 5, No 50(Agosto).
- 1934. Breve Notícia sobre os Aborígenes da Zambézia. *Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa* 9/10: 345-55.
- 1939. *Cartas da Zambézia*, 3rd edition. Lisboa: Livraria Rodrigues.
- 1944. *Os Cafres - Seus Usos e Costumes*. Lisboa: Livraria Rodrigues.
- Lan, D. 1985. *Guns and Rain. Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe*. London: James Currey.
- 1989. "Resistance to the Present by the Past: Mediums and Money in Zimbabwe," in *Money and the Morality of Exchange*. Edited by J. Parry and M. Bloch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Leeds, A. 1977. "Mythos and Pathos: Some Unpleasantnesses on Peasantries," in *Peasant Livelihoods: Studies in Economic Anthropology and Cultural Ecology*. Edited by R. Halperin and J. Dow. New York: St. Martins Press.
- Legrand, J.-C. 1993. Logique de Guerre et Dynamique de la Violence en Zambézia, 1976-1991. *Politique Africaine* 50: 88-104.

- Lentz, C. 1988. Why the Most Incompetent are on the Village Council: Development Projects in an Indian Village in Ecuador. *Sociologia Ruralis* 28(2/3): 199-215.
- Lewis, D. forthcoming-a. "Anthropology and Development: The Uneasy Relationship," in *Handbook of Economic Anthropology*. Edited by J. Carrier. London: Edward Elgar.
- forthcoming-b. On the Difficulty of Studying 'Civil Society': NGOs, State and Democracy in Bangladesh. *Contributions to Indian Sociology*.
- , R. Gregory, and G. D. Wood. 1993. Indigenizing Extension: Farmers, Fishseed traders and Poverty-Focused Aquaculture in Bangladesh. *Development Policy Review* 11: 185-194.
- Li, T. M. 1996. Images of Community: Discourse and Strategy in Property Relations. *Development and Change* 27(3): 501-527.
- 1999. Compromising Power: Development, Culture, and Rule in Indonesia. *Cultural Anthropology* 14(3): 295-322.
- Long, N. 1968. *Social Change and the Individual: A Study of the Social and Religious Responses to Innovation in a Zambian Rural Community*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Long, N. 1989a. "Conclusion: Theoretical Reflections on Actor, Structure and Interface," in *Encounters at the Interface: A Perspective on Social Discontinuities in Rural Development*. Edited by N. Long, pp. 221-244. Wageningen: The Agricultural University.
- (ed.) 1989b. *Encounters at the Interface: A Perspective on Social Discontinuities in Rural Development*. Wageningen Studies in Sociology 27. Wageningen: The Agricultural University.
- 1992. "Introduction," in *Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development*. Edited by N. Long and A. Long. London: Routledge.
- 2001. *Development Sociology: Actor Perspectives*. London: Routledge.
- , and A. Long. (eds.) 1992. *Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development*. London: Routledge.
- Lundborg, P. 1998. Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange. *Economics and Politics* 10(2): 127-142.
- Lundin, I. B. 2000. Will Mozambique Remain a Success Story? *African Security Review* 9(3).
- Mackintosh, M. 1983-85. Comércio e Acumulação do Milho na Alta Zambézia. *Estudos Moçambicanos* 4: 77-102.
- 1987. Agricultural Marketing and Socialist Accumulation: A Case Study of Maize Marketing in Mozambique. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 14(2): 243-267.
- and H. Dolny. 1982. *Agricultural Marketing in the District of Alto Molocue, Zambezia Province*. CEA, Maputo.
- and M. Wuyts. 1988. Accumulation, Social Services and Socialist Transition in the Third World - Reflections on Decentralised Planning Based on Mozambican Experience. *Journal of Development Studies* 24(4): 136-79.

- Magaia, L. 1989. *Dumba Nengue - Run for Your Life. Peasant Tales of Genocide in Mozambique*. London: Karnak House.
- Mamdani, M. 1972. *The Myth of Population Control: Family, Caste and Class in an Indian Village*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Manghezi, A. 1981. O Trabalho Forçado por Quem O Viveu. *Estudos Moçambicanos* 2: 30.
- Manning, C. L. 2002. *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization 1992-2000*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.
- Marcus, G. E. 1995. Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24: 95-117.
- Marshall, J., and O. Roesch. 1993. The "Green Zones" Agricultural Cooperatives of Nampula City: A New Phase in the Mozambican Cooperative Movement? *Journal of Southern African Studies* 19(2): 240-272.
- Masquelier, A. 1993. "Narratives of Power, Images of Wealth: The Ritual Economy of Bori in the Market," in *Modernity and Its Malcontents: Ritual and Power in Postcolonial Africa*. Edited by J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff, pp. 3-33. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 1997. Vectors of Witchcraft: Object Transactions and Materialisation of Memory in Niger. *Anthropological Quarterly* 70(4): 187-198.
- Mauss, M. 1954. *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*. London: Cohen and West.
- Medeiros, E. 1985. Evolução de Algumas Instituições Socio-Familiares. *Cadernos de História: Boletim do Departamento de História, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane* 1: 19-41.
- Miliband, R. 1969. *The State in Capitalist Society*. New York: Harper Books.
- Miller, J. C. (ed.) 1980. *The African Past Speaks: Essays on Oral Tradition and History*. Folkestone: Dawson.
- Minter, W. 1989a. Inside Renamo. As Described by Ex-Participants. *Transformation* 10: 1-27.
- 1989b. The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) as Described by Ex-Participants. *Development Dialogue* 1: 89-132.
- 1994. *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique*. London: Zed Books.
- Mitchell, J. C. 1956. *The Yao village: A Study in the Social Structure of a Malawian People*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Mitchell, T. 1991. America's Egypt - Discourse of the Development Industry. *Middle East Report* 169: 18-36.
- 1995. "The Object of Development: America's Egypt," in *Power of Development*. Edited by J. Crush, pp. 129-157. London: Routledge.
- Mohan, G. 2001. "Participation: Strategies for Deeper Empowerment," in *Participation: The New Tyranny?* Edited by B. Cooke and U. Kothari, pp. 153-167. London: Zed Books.

- Moore, D. B. 1995. Democracy, Violence and Identity in the Zimbabwean War of National Liberation: Reflections from the Realms of Dissent. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 29: 375-402.
- Moore, H. L. 1992. "Households and Gender Relations: The Modelling of the Economy," in *Understanding Economic Process*. Edited by S. Ortiz and S. Lees, pp. 131-148. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Morgan, G. 1990. Violence in Mozambique - Towards an Understanding of Renamo. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 28(4): 603-619.
- Mosca, J. 1999. *A Experiência Socialista em Moçambique (1975-1986)*: Instituto Piaget.
- Mosse, D. 1994. Authority, Gender and Knowledge: Theoretical Reflections on the Practice of Participatory Rural Appraisal. *Development and Change* 25(3): 497-526.
- 1995. "Peoples' Knowledge" in *Project Planning: The Limits and Social Conditions of Participation in Planning Agricultural Development*. Overseas Development Institute, London. Agricultural Research and Extension Network Paper No. 58.
- 2001. "People's Knowledge', Participation and Patronage: Operations and Representations in Rural Development," in *Participation, the New Tyranny?* London: Zed Books.
- Moynihan, D. P. 1969. *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty*. New York: The Free Press.
- Munslow, B. 1983. *Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins*. Harlow: Longman.
- 1984. State Intervention in Agriculture: The Mozambican Experience. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 22(2): 199-221.
- Musambachime, M. 1988. The Impact of Rumor: The Case of the Banyama Scare in Northern Rhodesia. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 21: 201-215.
- Narayan, D., R. Chambers, M. K. Shah, and P. Petesch. (eds.) 2000a. *Voices of the Poor: Crying out for Change*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Narayan, D., R. Patel, K. Schafft, A. Rademacher, and S. Koch-Schulte. (eds.) 2000b. *Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us?* New York: Oxford University Press.
- and P. Petesch. (eds.) 2002. *Voices of the Poor: From Many Lands*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Negrão, J. 1995. *One Hundred Years of African Rural Family Economy. The Zambezi Delta in Retrospective Analysis*. Lund: Department of Economic History, University of Lund.
- Nelson, N., and S. Wright. (eds.) 1995. *Power and Participatory Development: Theory and Practice*. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Newitt, M. 1969. Portuguese on the Zambezi: An Historical Interpretation of the Prazo System. *The Journal of African History* X(1): 67-85.
- 1973a. The Portuguese Muzungos and the Zambesi Wars. *The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries* 4.
- 1973b. *Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi: Exploration, Land Tenure and Colonial Rule in East Africa*. London: Longman.

- 1988. Drought in Mozambique 1823-1831. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15(1): 15-35.
- 1995. *A History of Mozambique*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Niehaus, I. 1995. Witches of the Transvaal Lowveld and their Familiars: Conceptions of Duality, Power and Desire. *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* XXXV, 2-3(138-9): 513-540.
- 2001. *Witchcraft, Power and Politics: Exploring the Occult in the South African Lowveld*. London: Pluto Press.
- Nilsson, A. 1993a. From Pseudo-Terrorists to Pseudo-Guerrillas - The MNR in Mozambique (Concluding Part). *Review of African Political Economy* (58): 34-42.
- 1993b. From Pseudo-Terrorists to Pseudo-Guerrillas: The MNR in Mozambique. *Review of African Political Economy* 57: 60-71.
- Nordstrom, C. 1997. *A Different Kind of War Story*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Nuijten, M. 1992. "Local Organization as Organizing Practices. Rethinking Rural Institutions," in *Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development*. Edited by N. Long and A. Long, pp. 189-207. London: Routledge.
- Nygren, A. 1999. Local Knowledge in the Environment-Development Discourse: From Dichotomies to Situated Knowledges. *Critique of Anthropology* 19(3): 267-288.
- O'Laughlin, B. 1996. Through a Divided Glass: Dualism, Class and the Agrarian Question in Mozambique. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 23(4): 1-39.
- 2002. Proletarianisation, Agency and Changing Rural Livelihoods: Forced Labour and Resistance in Colonial Mozambique. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 28(3): 511-530.
- Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. 1988. Peasant Logics and Development Project Logics. *Sociologia Ruralis* 28(2/3): 216-226.
- Ong, A. 1987. *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Osteen, M. 2002. *The Question of the Gift: Essays across Disciplines*. London: Routledge.
- Palmer, R. 1986. Working Conditions and Worker Responses on Nyasaland Tea Estates, 1930-1953. *The Journal of African History* 27(1): 105-126.
- Pels, P. 1998. *The Politics of Presence*. London: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers.
- Phillips, S., and R. Edwards. 2000. Development, Impact Assessment and the Praise Culture. *Critique of Anthropology* 20(1): 47-66.
- Pigg, S. L. 1992. Inventing Social Categories through Place: Social Representations and Development in Nepal. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 34(3): 491-513.
- 1993. Unintended Consequences: The Ideological Impact of Development in Nepal. *South Asia Bulletin* 13(1&2): 45-58.
- 1997. "'Found in Most Traditional Societies" Traditional Medical Practitioners between Culture and Development," in *International Development and the Social*

- Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*. Edited by F. Cooper and R. Packard, pp. 259-290. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Pijnenburg, B., and I. Nhantumbo. 2002. Participatory Development Interventions in Mozambique. *Development in Practice* 12(2): 192-199.
- Pitcher, M. A. 1993. *Politics in the Portuguese Empire: The State, Industry, and Cotton, 1926-1974*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- 1995. "From Coercion to Incentives: The Portuguese Colonial Cotton Regime in Angola and Mozambique, 1946-1974," in *Cotton, Colonialism and Social History in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Edited by A. Isaacman and R. Roberts, pp. 119-143. Portsmouth, NH and London: Heinemann and James Currey.
- 1998. Disruption Without Transformation: Agrarian Relations and Livelihoods in Nampula Province, Mozambique 1975-1995. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24(1): 115-140.
- Plank, D. N. 1993. Aid, Debt, and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and its Donors. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31(3): 407-430.
- Porter, D., B. Allen, and G. Thompson. 1991. *Development in Practice: Paved with Good Intentions*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Porto Editora. 1998. *Dicionário de Português-Inglês, 2ª Edição*. Porto: Porto Editora.
- Rahnema, M. 1992. "Poverty," in *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*. Edited by W. Sachs, pp. 158-176. London: Zed Books.
- Ranger, T. 1977. The People in African Resistance: A Review. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 4(1): 125-146.
- 1985. *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study*. London: James Currey.
- Rapley, J. 1996. *Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
- Richards, P. 1991. "Experimenting Farmers and Agricultural Research," in *Rural Households in Emerging Societies - Technology and Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Edited by M. Haswell and D. Hunt, pp. 11-22. Oxford: Berg.
- Roberts, A. F. 1986. "Like a Roaring Lion: Tabwa Terrorism in the Late Nineteenth Century," in *Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa*. Edited by D. Crummey, pp. 65-86. London: James Currey.
- Robertson, A. F. 1984. *People and the State: An Anthropology of Planned Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Roesch, O. 1988. Rural Mozambique and Frelimo's Fourth Congress Policies: The Situation in Baixo Limpopo. *Review of African Political Economy* 41: 73-91.
- Rostow, W. W. 1960. *The Stages of Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rufino, J. d. S. 1929. *Albuns Fotográficos e Descritivos da Colónia de Moçambique*. Hamburgo: Broschek & Co.
- Sachs, W. (ed.) 1992. *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*. London: Zed Books.

- Sanders, T. 1999. Modernity, Wealth, and Witchcraft in Tanzania. *Research in Economic Anthropology* 20: 117-134.
- Schafer, J. 2001. Guerrillas and Violence in the War in Mozambique: De-Socialization or Re-Socialization? *African Affairs* 100(399): 215-238.
- Schneider, H. K. 1962. The Lion Men of Singida: A Reprisal. *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 58/59: 124-128.
- Scott, J. C. 1972. Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in South-East Asia. *The American Political Science Review* 66(1): 91-113.
- 1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- 1990. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
- 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Serra, C. 1997. *Novos Combates pela Mentalidade Sociológica*. Maputo: Livraria Universitária, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane.
- (ed.) 2000. *História de Moçambique. Volume 1. Parte I Primeiras Sociedades Sedentárias e Impacto dos Mercadores, 200/300-1885. Parte II Agressão Imperialista, 1886-1930*. Maputo: Livraria Universitária.
- Shahin, T. 1982. Defining Peasants: Conceptualisations and Deconceptualisations: Old and New in a Marxist Debate. *Sociological Review* 30(3): 407-32.
- Shipton, P. 1989. *Bitter Money: Cultural Economy and some African Meanings of Forbidden Commodities*. Washington: American Ethnological Society.
- Shore, C., and S. Wright. 1997. *Anthropology of Policy: Perspectives on Governance and Power*. London: Routledge.
- Slim, H., P. R. Thompson, O. Bennett, and N. Cross. 1993. *Listening for a Change: Oral Testimony and Development*. London: Panos Publications.
- Smillie, I. 1996. "The Rise of the Transnational Aid Agency," in *Compassion and Calculation: The Rise of Private Foreign Aid*. Edited by D. Sogge. London: Pluto Press.
- Smith, A. 1974. António Salazar and the Reversal of Portuguese Colonial Policy. *Journal of African History* 15(4): 653-667.
- 1991. The Idea of Mozambique and its Enemies, c. 1890-1930. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 17(3): 496-524.
- Sogge, D. 1997. "The Civil Sector," in *Mozambique: Perspectives on Aid and the Civil Society*. Edited by D. Sogge, pp. 41-68. Amsterdam: Gemeenschappelijk Overleg Medefinanciering.
- Stacey, M. 1969. The Myth of Community Studies. *British Journal of Sociology* 20(2): 134-47.
- Stein, H. F. 1984. A Note on Patron-Client Theory. *Ethos* 12(1): 30-36.

- Stirrat, R. L., and H. Henkel. 1997. The Development Gift: the Problem of Reciprocity in the NGO World. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 554: 66-80.
- Tajú, G. 1989. RENAMO: Os Factos que Conhecemos. *Cadernos de História, Maputo* 7 (November): 5-44.
- Taussig, M. T. 1980. *The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- 1987. *Shamanism, Colonialism and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tew, M. M. D. 1950. *Peoples of the Lake Nyasa Region*. London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute.
- Thompson, P. 1978. *The Voice of the Past: Oral History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tonkin, E. 1992. *Narrating our Pasts: The Social Construction of Oral History. Cambridge Studies in Oral and Literate Culture No. 22*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Trouillot, M.-R. 2001. The Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalization: Close Encounters of the Deceptive Kind. *Current Anthropology* 42(1): 125-138.
- Tsing, A. 1993. *In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginality in an Out-of-the-way Place*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UNDP. 2000. *Mozambique National Human Development Report 2000. Education and Human Development: Trajectory, Lessons and Challenges for the 21st Century*. UNDP, Maputo.
- 2002. *Mozambique National Human Development Report 2001. Gender, Women and Human Development: An Agenda for the Future*. UNDP, Maputo.
- Vail, L. 1983. "The State and the Creation of Colonial Malawi's Agricultural Economy," in *Imperialism, Colonialism and Hunger: East and Central Africa*. Edited by R. I. Rotberg. Lexington: Lexington Books.
- and L. White. 1977. *Prazos, Peasants and International Capitalism: A Reassessment of Lower Zambesian History 1870-1900*. School of Education, University of Zambia, Lusaka.
- and L. White. 1978a. Plantation Protest: The History of a Mozambican Song. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 5(1): 1-25.
- and L. White. 1978b. 'Tawani, Machambero!': Forced Cotton and Rice Growing on the Zambezi. *The Journal of African History* 19(2): 239-263.
- and L. White. 1980. *Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique: A Study of Quelimane District*. London: Heinemann.
- and L. White. 1983. Forms of Resistance: Songs and Perceptions of Power in Colonial Mozambique. *The American Historical Review* 88(4): 883-919.
- van den Berg, J. 1987. A Peasant Form of Production: Wage-Dependent Agriculture in Southern Mozambique. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 21(3): 375-389.

- van Walraven, K., and J. Abbink. 2003. "Rethinking Resistance in African History: An Introduction," in *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History*. Edited by J. Abbink, M. d. Bruijn, and K. v. Walraven, pp. 1-40. Leiden.
- Vansina, J. 1985. *Oral Tradition as History*. London: James Currey.
- Verdery, K. 1996. *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Vereker, J. 2002. Blazing the Trail: Eight Years of Change in Handling International Development. *Development Policy Review* 20(2): 133-140.
- Vines, A. 1991. *Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique*. London: James Currey.
- 1996. *RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?*, Revised and updated edition. London: James Currey.
- von Oppen, A. 1991. Cassava, "The Lazy Man's Food"? Indigenous Agricultural Innovation and Dietary Change in Northwestern Zambia (ca. 1650-1970). *Food and Foodways* 5(1): 15-38.
- Waterbury, J. 1977. "An Attempt to Put Patrons and Clients in their Place," in *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*. Edited by E. Gellner. London: Duckworth.
- Watts, M. 2001. Development Ethnographies. *Ethnography* 2(2): 283-300.
- Weiner, A. 1992. *Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving*. Berkeley, Ca: University of California Press.
- Weiss, B. 1998. "Electric Vampires: Haya Rumours of the Commodified Body," in *Bodies and Persons: Comparative Perspectives from Africa and Melanesia*. Edited by M. Lambek and A. Strathern. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Werbner, R. P. 1984. The Manchester School in South-Central Africa. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 13: 157-185.
- Werner, C. 2000. Gifts, Bribes, and Development in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan. *Human Organization* 59(1): 11-22.
- West, H. 2001. Sorcery of Construction and Socialist Modernization: Ways of Understanding Power in Postcolonial Mozambique. *American Ethnologist* 28(1): 119-50.
- 1997a. Creative Destruction and Sorcery of Construction: Power, Hope and Suspicion in Post-War Mozambique. *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* 147: 675-698.
- Whaites, A. 1999. Pursuing Partnership: World Vision and the Ideology of Development - A Case Study. *Development in Practice* 9(4): 410-423.
- White, L. 1987. *Magomero: Portrait of an African Village*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 1990. Bodily Fluids and Usufruct: Controlling Property in Nairobi, 1917-1939. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 24: 418-439.
- 1993a. Cars out of Place: Vampires, Technology, and Labor in East and Central Africa. *Representations* 43: 27-50.
- 1993b. Vampire Priests of Central Africa: African Debates about Labor and Religion in Colonial Northern Zambia. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35(4): 746-772.

- , S. F. Miescher, and D. W. Cohen. (eds.) 2002. *African Words, African Voices: Critical Practices in Oral History*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Wield, D. 1983. "Mozambique Late Colonialism and Early Problems of Transition," in *Revolutionary Socialist Development in the Third World*. Edited by G. White, R. Murray, and C. White. London: Wheatsheaf Books.
- Williams, R. 1976. *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. London: Croom Helm.
- Wilson, K. 1991b. *The Re-Emergent Patrões and Economic Development in Zambesia: Some Comments*. Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford.
- Wolf, E. R. 1966. "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies. Peasant Wars of the 20th Century," in *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies*. Edited by M. Banton. London: Tavistock Publications.
- Wood, G. 1985a. "The Politics of Development Policy Labelling," in *Labelling in Development Policy. Essays in Honour of Bernard Schaffer*. Edited by G. Wood, pp. 5-31. London: Sage Publications.
- 1985b. "Targets Strike Back - Rural Works Claimants in Bangladesh," in *Labelling in Development Policy. Essays in Honour of Bernard Schaffer*. Edited by G. Wood, pp. 109-131. London: Sage Publications.
- World Bank. 1998. *Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't and Why. A Policy Research Report*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wuyts, M. 1996. Foreign Aid, Structural Adjustment and Public Management: The Mozambican Experience. *Development and Change* 27(4): 717-749.
- Wyatt, A. W. 1950. The Lion Men of Singida. *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 28: 3-9.
- Young, T. 1990. The MNR/ RENAMO - External and Internal Dynamics. *African Affairs* 89(357): 491-509.
- Zelizer, V. 1998. "How Do we Know Whether a Monetary Transaction is a Gift, and Entitlement or Compensation?," in *Economics, Values, and Organization*. Edited by A. Ben-Ner and L. Putterman, pp. 329-333. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

## (ii) Unpublished Papers and Reports

- BDDCA. 1995. *Mozambique. Zambezia Strategy Review 22nd October - 3rd November 1995. Report prepared by Tom Barrett, Robin Cadwallader, Andrew Hall, John Hansell, Helen Gorie, Sushila Zeitlyn*. British Development Division in Central Africa, Harare.
- Brentari, J. B. n.d. *Munuwihane. Crescei com...*, Quelimane. Mimeo.
- Carbone, G. M. 2003. *Emerging Pluralist Politics in Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Party System*. London School of Economics, London. Crisis States Working Paper. No. 23.
- Ciscato, E. n.d. *Apontamentos de Iniciação Cultural*. Quelimane: Diocese de Quelimane.
- Cosgrave, J., K. Selvester, L. Fidalgo, A. Hallam, and N. Taimo. 2001. *Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Mozambique Floods Appeal Funds, March 2000 -*

- December 2000. *Volume Two: Appendices*. Valid International and ANSA, Oxford and London.
- Dalgaard, C.-J., and H. Hansen. 2000. *On Aid, Growth and Good Policies*. University of Nottingham, Nottingham. CREDIT Research Paper. 00/17.
- de Wit, P. V. 2002. *Land Conflict Management in Mozambique: Case study of Zambezia Province. Paper prepared for the Land Tenure Service, FAO; Draft*. FAO, Maputo.
- Debella, S., T. Alberts, C. Tizikara, and W. Heemskerk. 2000. *Mozambique Proagri. Institutional Reform of the Agricultural Research System*, Maputo.
- DFID. 2003. *Mozambique: Country Assistance Plan 2004-2007. Consultation Draft*. DFID, Maputo.
- Duffield, M. 1998. *Evaluation of DFID's Contribution to Poverty Reduction in Mozambique*, Unpublished Report for DFID.
- Easterly, W. 2002. *The Cartel of Good Intentions: Bureaucracy versus Markets in Foreign Aid*. Center for Global Development, Working Paper. No. 4.
- 2004. *The Missionaries vs. the Scientists in Economic Development*. Mimeo.
- , R. Levine, and D. Roodman. 2003. *New Data, New Doubts: Revisiting "Aid, Policies, and Growth"*. Center for Global Development, Working Paper. No. 26.
- Eyben, R. 2003b. *Who Owns the Gift? Donor-Recipient Relations and the National Elections in Bolivia*. Unpublished Paper presented at the Workshop 'Order and Disjuncture: The Organization of Aid and Development', School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 26-27 September 2003.
- Gersony, R. 1988. *Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique*. Bureau for Refugee Programs, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
- Golooba-Mutebi, F. 2003. *Witchcraft and Everyday Life in Ka Masuku*. Wits University, Mimeo.
- Guilherme Pereira, F. J. 1980. *A Produção Colectiva Agrícola na Zambézia - Análise da Evolução entre 1976 e 1979*. Direcção Provincial da Agricultura da Zambézia, Gabinete de Organização e Desenvolvimento de Cooperativas Agrícolas, Quelimane.
- Hanlon, J. 2002a. *Are Donors to Mozambique Promoting Corruption?* Paper submitted to the conference Towards a New Political Economy of Development, Sheffield 3-4 July 2002.
- 2002c. *The Land Debate in Mozambique: Will Foreign Investors, the Urban Elite, Advanced Peasants or Family Farmers Drive Rural Development?* Oxfam GB, Research Paper Commissioned by Oxfam GB - Regional Management Centre for Southern Africa.
- Hermele, K. 1988. *Country Report Mozambique: War and Stabilization. A Mid-Term Review of Mozambique's Economic Rehabilitation Programme (PRE) with Implications for Swedish Development Assistance*. SIDA, Stockholm. Studies from the Research Division.
- Isaacman, A. 2002. *Domesticating a White Elephant: High Modernism, Sustainability and Struggles over Water, the Case of Cahora Bassa Dam*. Unpublished Paper

- presented at the Portuguese/African Encounters Congress, Watson Institute, Brown University, Providence RI, April 25-29, 2002.
- Long, N. 2002. *An Actor-oriented Approach to Development Intervention*. Background paper prepared for APO Meeting. Tokyo 22-26 April 2002.
- McGregor, J. A. 2000. *A Poverty of Agency: Resource Management Amongst Poor People in Bangladesh*. Centre for Development Studies, Bath. Unpublished paper originally presented at the Plenary Session of European Network of Bangladesh Studies, Workshop, University of Bath, April 1998.
- Munslow, B. 1980. *Peasants, Politics and Production (The Case of Mozambique)*. Paper presented to the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom - Annual Conference - University of Exeter - 31 March-2 April 1980.
- Newitt, M. 2002. *Portuguese Warfare in Africa*. Paper presented to the conference 'New Research On Lusophone Africa', 16-17 May 2002, Kings College London.
- O'Laughlin, B. 2000. *Proletarianisation and/or Changing Rural Livelihoods: Forced Labour and Resistance in Colonial Mozambique*. Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester, Manchester. Multiple Livelihoods and Social Change Working Paper Series. 12.
- República de Moçambique. 2001. *Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento 2001/2005*. Governo da Província da Zambézia, Quelimane.
- Serra, C. 1996. *Mudança Social e Crenças Anómicas em Moçambique.*, Comunicação a ser apresentada em "Práticas e Processos da Mudança Social", III Congresso Português de Sociologia, de 7 a 9 de Fevereiro de 1996, Lisboa.
- Shepherd, A. 1999 (2003). *Evaluation of DFID Support to Poverty Reduction. Mozambique Country Study: Aid for Recovery from Conflict: Did it Contribute to Poverty Reduction in Mozambique?* Department for International Development, London.
- Stern, N. 2002. *The Role and Effectiveness of Development Assistance: Lessons from World Bank Experience. A Research Paper from the Development Economics Vice Presidency of the World Bank*. World Bank, Washington, D.C. Paper for the UN Conference on Financing for Development, 18-22 March 2002, Monterrey, Mexico.
- van Diesen, A. 1999. *Aid to Mozambique: An End to Dependence? An Assessment of the Quality of Aid to Mozambique, with Special Reference to British and EC Aid for Health and Education*. Christian Aid, London.
- Wilson, K. 1991c. *War, Displacement, Social Change and the Re-Creation of Community: An Exploratory Study in Zambézia, Mozambique*. Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford.
- World Vision Mozambique. 1996. *World Vision Mozambique: Development Strategy into the 21st Century. A Multi-Sectoral Approach for Sustainable Rural Development and Capacity-Building in Post-War Mozambique*. World Vision, Maputo.
- Wuyts, M. 2001. *The Agrarian Question in Mozambique's Transition and Reconstruction*. UNU/WIDER, Discussion Paper No. 2001/14.

### (iii) Reports relating to ZADP

- Belmain, S. 2002. *Assessment of the Impact of Rodents on Rural Household Food Security and the Development of Ecologically Based Rodent Management Strategies in Zambézia Province, Mozambique*. Project #R7372, ZB0146. Natural Resources Institute; The Acheta Partnership; World Vision International; National Institute of Health, Mozambique, Final Technical Report.
- Bias, C., P. De Wit, P. Otero, and M. Whiteside. 2001. *Zambezia Agricultural Development Project Mid-Term Review*. ZADP, Quelimane.
- Cavane, E., L. R. C. Cossa, T. Cousins, and E. Joaquim. 2001. *Zambézia Agricultural Development Project Participatory Impact Assessment*. ZADP, Quelimane.
- Collins, A. 1998. *Baseline Survey*. Zambézia Agricultural Development Project, Quelimane.
- 2000. *Baseline Update Survey*. Zambézia Agricultural Development Project, Quelimane.
- 2002. *Baseline Update Survey*. Zambézia Agricultural Development Project, Quelimane.
- DFID. 1998b. *Project Memorandum. Mozambique: Zambezia Agricultural Development Project Phase II (ZADP II)*. Department for International Development, London.
- 1999a. *Mozambique. Output to Purpose Review Zambezia Agricultural Development Project Phase II 31 May - 4 June 1999*. DFID, Harare.
- 1999b. *Six-Monthly Review, Zambezia Agricultural Development Project, Phase II, 21-27 November*. DFID, Maputo.
- 2000b. *Follow-Up Report on ZADP, February 2000*. DFID, Maputo.
- 2000c. *Mozambique. Output to Purpose Review Zambezia Agricultural Development Project Phase II 15 May - 19 May 2000*. DFID, Harare.
- 2000d. *Report on a Visit to the Zambezia Agricultural Development Project (ZADP), 21-23 November 2000*. DFID, Maputo.
- 2001. *Mid Term Review. Output to Purpose Review. Zambezia Agricultural Development Project Phase II 19-23 March 2001*. Department for International Development, Harare.
- Natural Resources Institute. 1999. *Funding Application and Project Memorandum Form: 'Development of a Methodology for Assessing the Impact of Rodents on Rural Household Food Security, Health and Nutrition, Funding Application and Project Memorandum Form*.
- Norfolk, S., and D. Soberano. 2000. *From Conflict to Partnership: A Report on Relationships between Local Communities and Investors and Land Conflicts in Zambézia Province*. Zambézia Agricultural Development Project, Quelimane.
- ODA, and World Vision. 1994. *Zambezia Agricultural Development Project: Project Memorandum*. British Development Division, Central Africa, Lilongwe.
- Pequenino, F. 2000. *Report on Socio-Economic Impact Assessment of ZADP Goat Component, Gurúè, Namacurra and Nicoadala Districts, 1996-2000*. ZADP, Quelimane.

- . 2001. *Relatório da Avaliação Interna. Distritos do Gurué, Namacurra e Nicoadala*. World Vision, Quelimane.
- Queiroz de Souza, K. 2002. *Lessons Learnt "A Reflection on Lessons Learnt". Workshop on Experiences Realized by the Agricultural Programme of the Zambézia Agricultural Development Project II*. World Vision, Quelimane.
- Waterhouse, R., and E. Cavane. 2001. *Avaliação de Necessidades em Formação e Informação, para uma Abordagem Participativa no ZADP II*. ZADP, Quelimane.
- Whiteside, M., R. Wrangham, and S. Gudz. 2003. *Zambezia Agricultural Development Project II (ZADP II) Final Evaluation*. Report prepared for DFID Mozambique, Maputo.
- Winch, T., D. Diogo, and B. Pijnenburg. 1996. *Zambezia Agricultural Development Programme. Independent Evaluation Report Prepared for World Vision Mozambique*. World Vision Mozambique, Maputo.
- World Vision International - Mozambique. 1997. *Zambézia Agricultural Development Project Phase II. Proposal Submitted to Overseas Development Administration, British Development Division for Central Africa, Harare*. World Vision, Quelimane.
- Wrangham, R. 2002. *Zambézia Agricultural Development Project in Local Perspective: A Case Study of Mutange and Mugaveia Localidades*. Zambézia Agricultural Development Project, Quelimane.
- ZADP. 1997. *Participatory Rural Appraisal of Seven Communities in Namacurra and Gurue Districts of Zambézia Province*. World Vision, Quelimane.
- . 1998. *Draft Report on the Post-Harvest Participatory Rural Appraisal Work done in Mozambique, Zambezia Province*. World Vision, Quelimane.
- . 1999a. *Quarterly Report, April to June 1999*. World Vision, Quelimane.
- . 1999b. *Quarterly Report, January to March 1999*. World Vision, Quelimane.
- . 2000. *Quarterly Report, July to September 2000*. World Vision, Quelimane.
- . 2001. *Quarterly Report, January to March 2001*. World Vision, Quelimane.
- . 2002. *Quarterly Report, July to September 2002*. World Vision, Quelimane.
- . 2003. *Zambézia Agricultural Development Project Final Report*. World Vision, Quelimane.

**(iv) Electronic Newsletters, Newspapers and Magazines**

- Agence France Presse. 2003. *Man-Eating Mozambique Lions Spark 'Witch Hunt'*. <http://iafrica.com/news/worldnews/233908.htm>, Tuesday 6th May 2003.
- Clarence-Smith, G. 1989. The Roots of the Mozambican Counter-Revolution. *Southern African Review of Books* 2(4): 7-10.
- Finnegan, W. 1989. "A Reporter at Large. Mozambique. Part 1," in *New Yorker*, 22 May 1989, pp. 43-75.
- Hanlon, J. 2001. *Killing the Goose that Laid the Golden Eggs. English version of a series of 12 articles which appeared in Metical, 17 September - 3 October 2001*. <http://www.mol.co.mz/noticias/metical/2001/en010917.html>.

- Maier, K. 1989. The Battle for Zambezia. *Africa Report* March-April: 13-16.
- IRIN. 2002. *Mozambique: 'Authorities Know What They Want' - Donors*. IRIN-SA Update, Wednesday 9 April 2002.
- . 2004. "Disease hits Staple crop in the North," , IRIN-SA Update, 7th September 2004.
- O'Laughlin, B. 1992. Interpretations Matter: Evaluating the War in Mozambique. *Southern Africa Report* 7(3): 23-33.
- Roesch, O. 1990. Mozambique: The Debate Continues. Otto Roesch Replies. *Southern Africa Report* 5(5): 28-29.
- Tancock, C. 1999. *Mozambique: In the Shadow of the Elephant*. Developments: The International Development Magazine, produced by the Department for International Development, London, Issue No. 7.
- The Economist. 2002. "Short Change," in *The Economist*, 2nd November 2002, pp. 39. London.
- Wilson, K. 1991a. The New Missionaries. *Southern African Review of Books* July/October: 6-8.

**(v) Theses and Dissertations**

- Borges Coelho, J. P. 1993. Protected Villages and Communal Villages in the Mozambican Province of Tete (1968-1982). A History of State Resettlement Policies, Development and War. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Bradford.
- Bowen, N. R. 2000b. Traders and Livelihood Strategies in Post-Conflict Zambézia Province, Mozambique. Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics.
- Dinerman, A. 1998. Objects and Relations of State Rule: Official History, Revisionisms and Rural Political Authority in Post-independence Mozambique, 1975-1994. D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford.
- Gatter, P. N. 1990. Indigenous and Institutional Thought in the Practice of Rural Development: A Study of an Ushi Chiefdom in Luapula, Zambia. Ph.D. Thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
- Harrison, E. 1995a. Big Fish and Small Ponds: Aquaculture Development from the FAO, Rome, to Luapula Province, Zambia. D.Phil. Thesis, University of Sussex.
- Head, J. F. 1980. State, Capital and Migrant Labour in Zambezia, Mozambique: A Study of the Labour Force of Sena Sugar Estates Limited. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Durham.
- Kindness, L. 1996. Witchcraft and the Reproduction of Wealth in Southern Zambia. Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Marzetti, G. 2001. Rural Livelihoods and Agricultural Change: The Dynamics of Poverty. A Case Study from Morrumbala District, Mozambique. Ph.D Thesis, University of Manchester.
- Medeiros, E. 1995. Os Senhores da Floresta: Ritos de Iniciação dos Rapazes Macua Lomue (Norte de Moçambique). Ph.D. Thesis, Universidade de Coimbra.

- Pequenino, F. 1995. *Estrutura Social entre os Lomués do Posto Administrativo de Mugeba, Distrito de Mocuba, Província da Zambézia, c. 1900-1995*. Licenciatura, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane.
- Serra, C. 1995. *De la Gestion des Corps à la Gestion des Mentalités en Zambézia, Mozambique (1890/1983). Rapports de Domination, Conformisme, et Déviance Politiques*. Thèse de Doctorat en Sociologie, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales.
- Tierney, A. M. 1997. *Local Concepts of Development: Women Food Sellers and Fishermen in an Oxfam Programme, Tabora Region, Western Tanzania*. Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics.
- West, H. G. 1997b. *Sorcery of Construction, Sorcery of Ruin: Power and Ambivalence on the Mueda Plateau, Mozambique (1882-1994)*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin.