{"id":19152,"date":"2021-09-17T14:17:53","date_gmt":"2021-09-17T13:17:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ounews.co\/?p=19152"},"modified":"2021-09-17T14:17:53","modified_gmt":"2021-09-17T13:17:53","slug":"russias-state-broadcaster-rt-going-all-out-to-boost-legitimacy-of-rigged-duma-election","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/arts-social-sciences\/russias-state-broadcaster-rt-going-all-out-to-boost-legitimacy-of-rigged-duma-election\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia\u2019s state broadcaster RT going all-out to boost legitimacy of rigged Duma election"},"content":{"rendered":"

Written by Precious Chatterje-Doody, Lecturer in Politics and International Studies<\/a> at The Open University<\/a> and Ilya Yablokov, Lecturer in Journalism and Digital Media, University of Sheffield.<\/em><\/p>\n

Russia goes to the polls on September 19 to elect a new Duma \u2013 the country\u2019s legislature. Russian elections are not known for their unpredictability \u2013 United Russia, the party linked to the president, Vladimir Putin, tends to come away with more than\u00a0half of the vote<\/a>. The remainder is split between well-established \u201copposition\u201d parties including the Communist Party and the (populist right-wing, don\u2019t be fooled by the name) Liberal Democratic Party.<\/p>\n

Underhand administrative tricks are often used to keep genuinely opposing parties\u00a0off the ballot<\/a>. Any opposition parties allowed on to the ballot are part of the mechanism the Putin regime uses to give an appearance of legitimacy to what is in fact a predictable electoral outcome.<\/p>\n

In 2021, the balancing act may prove more difficult than usual. These are the first Duma elections since\u00a0significant constitutional reforms<\/a>\u00a0last year, which strengthened the powers of the Russian president, increased the powers of the centre over regional and local governments, and reduced the independence of the courts. United Russia\u2019s approval rating, meanwhile,\u00a0is way down<\/a>\u00a0after it increased the retirement age in 2018.<\/p>\n

But the opposition is not in a strong position to capitalise on United Russia\u2019s drop in popularity. The closest person Russia has to a genuine leader of the opposition \u2013 Alexei Navalny \u2013 is now languishing in a Russian jail, having been\u00a0nearly fatally poisoned<\/a>\u00a0by Russian security services late in 2020, and then\u00a0arrested for violating his parole<\/a>\u00a0in receiving treatment in Germany.<\/p>\n

\n
\n
\n
\n

There was hope Navalny\u2019s \u201cSmart Voting\u201d initiative<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 a tactical voting strategy aiming to maximise the chances of opposition candidates being elected \u2013 might chip into United Russia\u2019s numbers. But Navalny\u2019s organisation has been classified as \u201cextremist\u201d and its\u00a0<\/span>web content<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 including\u00a0<\/span>Smart Voting<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 has been blocked.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

Managing criticism<\/h2>\n

Russia\u2019s domestic TV broadcasters do an effective job of managing public criticism. A recent survey found that\u00a072% of Russians<\/a>\u00a0rely on the television for their news, of which the highest viewing figures go to the state-linked broadcasters Rossiya-1 (48%) and Channel 1 (47%) \u2013 both of which toe the Kremlin\u2019s line. Opposition broadcasters have been largely\u00a0forced out<\/a>\u00a0of Russia\u2019s domestic media markets.<\/p>\n

Many independent media outlets have been forced to\u00a0self-declare as \u201cforeign agents\u201d<\/a>, which involves publicly declaring foreign funding, damages advertising revenue and increases auditing obligations. Others have been forced to\u00a0shut down<\/a>\u00a0or relocate abroad, while coordinated\u00a0so-called \u201cpatriotic\u201d media outlets<\/a>\u00a0flood Russia\u2019s online space with a pro-regime line.<\/p>\n

View from abroad<\/h2>\n

But what about international public opinion? Since 2005, Russia\u2019s international broadcaster, RT (formerly Russia Today) has been presenting a Russian perspective on global affairs for international audiences. The network\u2019s editor-in-chief is Margarita Simonyan, a\u00a0close Putin ally<\/a>\u00a0who also runs the state-owned media conglomorate,\u00a0Rossiya Segodnya<\/a>. RT tends to present Kremlin-friendly views tailored to an international audience.<\/p>\n

So, if the international media take an anti-Russian line \u2013 for example, that\u00a0Russia was the aggressor<\/a>\u00a0in the\u00a02008 Russo-Georgian war<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 RT works hard to present\u00a0pro-Kremlin interpretations<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\n
\"Russian

Cosying up to power: RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan is a close ally of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. EPA-EFE\/Evgenia Novozhenina\/Pool<\/p><\/div>\n

As our\u00a0recently published book showed<\/a>, RT has a well-worn approach for covering contentious issues. This pushes the idea that powerful forces are conspiring against ordinary people internationally. For example, it portrayed the 2020 US presidential elections as\u00a0being undermined<\/a>\u00a0by the coordinated efforts of big business, political elites and the mainstream media.<\/figure>\n

RT\u2019s coverage of the most recent\u00a0Russian presidential elections<\/a>\u00a0in 2018, meanwhile, often mirrored Russian domestic coverage by foregrounding humorous stories about opposition candidates, which worked to undermine their credibility.<\/p>\n

In the run-up to this month\u2019s Duma election, RT\u2019s coverage has combined \u201cclickbait\u201d with conspiracy. It has poked fun \u2013 for example \u2013 at the opposition Communist Party\u2019s\u00a0flirtation with religion<\/a>\u00a0and its claim that Jesus\u00a0was the first communist<\/a>. It has also decried the Communists\u2019 attempts to\u00a0block the political candidacy of Maria Butina<\/a>. Butina, now a host of RT\u2019s Russian service, first gained notoriety after she was imprisoned and deported by US authorities for unregistered pro-Russian lobbying.<\/p>\n

\n

\"Russian

Out of the picture: Russia\u2019s main opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, had bene jailed.\u00a0EPA-EFE\/Anatoly Maltsev<\/p><\/div>

<\/figcaption>Where it comes to election issues, RT tends to uncritically\u00a0reproduce regime allegations<\/a>\u00a0about\u00a0opposition candidates<\/a>. The broadcaster has also emphasised\u00a0splits within the opposition<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 especially where this indicates that the\u00a0liberal opposition disapproves of Navalny<\/a>\u00a0for his more nationalist sentiments.<\/figure>\n

Hearts and minds<\/h2>\n

But the majority of RT\u2019s pre-election online coverage has involved stories in which\u00a0Russian officials accuse the west<\/a>\u00a0of plans to\u00a0meddle in Russia\u2019s election<\/a>. These allegations have been a staple of Russia\u2019s domestic TV coverage \u2013 but tropes such as this play well with international audiences mistrustful of what they see as western attempts to build global hegemony.<\/p>\n

RT has a long history of featuring conspiratorial content. Our\u00a0latest research<\/a>\u00a0shows how over time the network has used conspiracy theories to develop a ready-made script for interpreting any and all\u00a0domestic<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0global<\/a>\u00a0affairs.<\/p>\n

Messages pushed by RT during this election campaign include the idea that investigative journalists\u00a0are in league with foreign intelligence agencies<\/a>\u00a0to undermine Russia. Also that\u00a0the west is acting hypocritically<\/a>\u00a0for challenging Russian election meddling, as its own actions are no better.<\/p>\n

In August it emerged that the OSCE\u00a0would not send<\/a>\u00a0observers for the elections after the Kremlin placed a limit on the number allowed, citing the COVID pandemic. Candidates with near-identical names and physical appearances as opposition figures have\u00a0appeared as vote-splitters on ballot lists<\/a>. For these \u2013 and many other reasons \u2013 the\u00a0rest of the world<\/a>\u00a0remains unconvinced<\/a>\u00a0of the\u00a0election\u2019s legitimacy<\/a>.<\/p>\n

So expect RT to double down on its clickbait and conspiracy playbook between now and the election. And don\u2019t be surprised when the network hails what is almost certainly going to be a win for Putin\u2019s party as a free and fair electoral triumph.<\/p>\n

Precious Chatterje-Doody, Lecturer in Politics and International Studies<\/a> at The Open University<\/a>\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n

Ilya Yablokov, Lecturer in Journalism and Digital Media, University of Sheffield.<\/em><\/p>\n

This article is republished from\u00a0The Conversation<\/a>\u00a0under a Creative Commons license. Read the\u00a0original article<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Written by Precious Chatterje-Doody, Lecturer in Politics and International Studies at The Open University and Ilya Yablokov, Lecturer in Journalism and Digital Media, University of Sheffield. Russia goes to the polls on September 19 to elect a new Duma \u2013 the country\u2019s legislature. Russian elections are not known for their unpredictability \u2013 United Russia, the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":19,"featured_media":19155,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,15],"tags":[869,1525,1640,2200],"class_list":["post-19152","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-arts-social-sciences","category-society-politics","tag-fass","tag-news-home","tag-ou-home","tag-the-conversation"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19152","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/19"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=19152"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19152\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/19155"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=19152"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=19152"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=19152"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}