{"id":19349,"date":"2021-10-04T13:36:33","date_gmt":"2021-10-04T12:36:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ounews.co\/?p=19349"},"modified":"2021-10-04T13:36:33","modified_gmt":"2021-10-04T12:36:33","slug":"joe-bidens-pledge-of-support-reassures-syrias-embattled-kurds","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/arts-social-sciences\/joe-bidens-pledge-of-support-reassures-syrias-embattled-kurds\/","title":{"rendered":"Joe Biden\u2019s pledge of support reassures Syria\u2019s embattled Kurds"},"content":{"rendered":"

Written by Cengiz Gunes, Associate Lecturer<\/a>, Faculty of Social Science at The Open University<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

The hasty and badly organised\u00a0US withdrawal from Afghanistan<\/a>\u00a0in August prompted fears among Washington\u2019s other allies about the durability of US friendship. Kurdish troops in northeastern Syria, facing multi-pronged opposition from Islamic State fighters as well as the Assad regime and the prospect of Turkish incursion, have felt particularly vulnerable.<\/p>\n

So recent meetings between senior US officials and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which resulted in a pledge by US president, Joe Biden, that the\u00a0US would not abandon them<\/a>\u00a0have gone a long way to allaying those fears.<\/p>\n

There are about 35 million ethnic Kurds living in Kurdistan, an area comprising parts of northeastern Syria, northern Iraq, southeastern Turkey and western Iran. At various times groups in different parts of this area have pressed for independent statehood, but on the whole the majority \u2013 at present, at least \u2013 are relatively content to occupy autonomous regions. In Syria this is the\u00a0Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)<\/a>\u00a0otherwise known as Rojava.<\/p>\n

US involvement in Syria and military support for the Kurdish-led forces has paid significant dividends for both sides. Supported by around 2,000 US troops on the ground and an air campaign, the SDF has proved to be an most effective buffer against Islamic State in Syria and played a decisive role in\u00a0ending its territorial control in March 2019<\/a>.<\/p>\n

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But there has been an ever-present fear that the US will pull out, leaving them at the mercy of their enemies. This fear was stoked in October 2019 when former president Donald Trump ordered US troops to withdraw from the region<\/a>, effectively giving the green light to a Turkish invasion and capture of a large area of AANES territory. In the event, Russia brokered an agreement between Turkey and SDF. Turkey got a safe zone along the border and SDF\u00a0<\/span>agreed to withdraw 20 miles south of the border<\/a>. The US, meanwhile, maintained enough of a military force to continue supporting the Kurds\u2019 efforts to stabilise the region. But the possibility of an abrupt US withdrawal has been shaping Kurdish actions ever since.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

The election of Joe Biden in November 2020 raised the hopes that the US would adopt a steadier approach in its dealings with the Kurds in Syria. And it seems that, on appearances at least, the US is willing to do so.<\/p>\n

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Meetings between US state department officials and the SDF leadership in August and September 2021 ended with <\/span>the US emphasising<\/a>\u00a0its \u201ccommitment to the campaign against ISIS and stability in the region\u201d and assuring the SDF that \u201cthere will be no changes in Syria\u201d in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

What\u2019s in it for America<\/h2>\n

The US military support and security umbrella it provides may have been a critical factor behind the Kurds\u2019 success, but safeguarding Kurdish gains is not the reason behind the Biden administration\u2019s decision. There are several other factors at play. Firstly, the threat posed by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria continues, despite the group\u2019s loss of its territorial control. Iraq\u2019s short and medium-term security and stability remains a\u00a0key US priority<\/a>\u00a0and an abrupt withdrawal from Syria would aid the resurgence of IS in Iraq.<\/p>\n

The US military presence in Syria is also needed to curb Iran\u2019s influence in both Iraq and Syria and address the security concerns many US allies \u2013 particularly Israel \u2013 in the region feel as a result.<\/p>\n

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Victory for the SDF: thanks to help from the US.\u00a0EPA-EFE\/Ahmed Mardnli<\/p><\/div>\n<\/div>

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The continuation of the US military support and financial aid is crucial to the region\u2019s stability and could act as a springboard for accommodating Kurdish rights and the inclusion of the AANES into Syria if political pluralism and a\u00a0decentralised governance model<\/a>\u00a0is accepted.<\/p>\n

AANES\u2019s prospects are closely tied to its inclusion in the\u00a0UN-led peace process<\/a>\u00a0for ending the civil war in Syria. So far, its efforts have\u00a0not managed a seat at the table<\/a>. A more concrete commitment from the US in the form of political support for the inclusion of AANES representatives at the UN peace talks could change the situation in its favour.<\/p>\n

Thwarting Turkey\u2019s plan<\/h2>\n

But AANES has more urgent concerns. Turkey continues to threaten, seeing the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party (PKK) guerrillas that it has been battling in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan since 1984. Turkey invaded the Kurdish-controlled regions of Syria in 2018 and 2019, and small-scale attacks by Turkey and Turkish-backed Syrian groups on the rural areas of AANES territory continue daily, as do the human rights violations committed against the Kurdish civilians in the areas under the control of the Turkish-backed Syrian groups. On August 19,\u00a0drone attacks by Turkey<\/a>\u00a0killed three SDF commanders and two fighters.<\/p>\n

Eliminating the influence of the SDF in Syria remains a key objective for the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan. But the US presence, and its commitment to the region\u2019s stability, will act as a deterrent against a new large-scale Turkish military operation. Previous Turkish attacks in the AANES territory were made with Russia\u2019s tacit support and encouragement, something which is thought less likely to be granted now the US has clearly stated its support for the SDF. And US troops on the ground in eastern Syria will also deter the Assad regime from destabilising AANES in a bid to take its territory back under full control.<\/p>\n

US military support means Turkey\u2019s attempts to label the SDF as \u201cterrorists\u201d are less likely to succeed. Erdo\u011fan has used Turkey\u2019s military operations against the Kurds in Syria as a sop to his strongly nationalist base \u2013 and he has repeatedly used western support for the Kurds as an example of the west\u2019s antipathy towards Turkey.<\/p>\n

With the likelihood of a Turkish military operation lessened, Erdo\u011fan\u2019s ability to please nationalists with an easy victory against the Kurds is less likely. Erdo\u011fan retains a firm grip on power in Turkey, but there are reports that Turkey\u2019s opposition parties are\u00a0working with Kurdish groups<\/a>. If a united opposition can inflict defeat on Erdo\u011fan\u2019s Justice and Development Party in the next election in 2023, then this would be one more step towards a peaceful future for the Kurds.<\/p>\n

Cengiz Gunes, Associate Lecturer<\/a>, Faculty of Social Science at The Open University<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

This article is republished from\u00a0The Conversation<\/a>\u00a0under a Creative Commons license. Read the\u00a0original article<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Written by Cengiz Gunes, Associate Lecturer, Faculty of Social Science at The Open University. The hasty and badly organised\u00a0US withdrawal from Afghanistan\u00a0in August prompted fears among Washington\u2019s other allies about the durability of US friendship. Kurdish troops in northeastern Syria, facing multi-pronged opposition from Islamic State fighters as well as the Assad regime and the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":19,"featured_media":19351,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,15],"tags":[869,1525,1640,2200],"class_list":["post-19349","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-arts-social-sciences","category-society-politics","tag-fass","tag-news-home","tag-ou-home","tag-the-conversation"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19349","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/19"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=19349"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19349\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/19351"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=19349"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=19349"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=19349"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}