{"id":22967,"date":"2023-02-24T10:18:17","date_gmt":"2023-02-24T10:18:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ounews.co\/?p=22967"},"modified":"2023-02-24T10:18:17","modified_gmt":"2023-02-24T10:18:17","slug":"the-russo-ukraine-conflict-one-year-on","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/arts-social-sciences\/the-russo-ukraine-conflict-one-year-on\/","title":{"rendered":"Russo-Ukraine conflict one year on"},"content":{"rendered":"

Dr Precious Chatterje-Doody<\/a> is a lecturer in politics and international studies at the OU and specialises in <\/em>communication, misinformation and security, particularly in Russia. Here she looks back on a year of war in Ukraine \u2013 lessons learned and reasons for an increasingly isolated Russia.<\/em><\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s stated aim in invading Ukraine in 2022 was to achieve \u201cdemilitarisation and de-Nazification\u201d \u2013 essentially a pretext for regime change in Kyiv.<\/p>\n

It clearly anticipated a replay of its successful five-day war with Georgia in 2018 \u2013 Russian state media even accidentally published a pre-prepared article written as if victory had actually taken place<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Clearly, Russia had not accounted for the Ukrainian resistance, nor that President Zelenskyy \u2013 whom the Kremlin saw as a pampered celebrity \u2013 would stay behind and lead it.<\/p>\n

Putin\u2019s changing objectives and the West\u2019s previous mistakes<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Putin portrayed Russia\u2019s annexations of Eastern Ukrainian regions as the will of the people<\/a> \u2013 despite clearly manipulated referenda, and Russia\u2019s flimsy<\/a> hold on much of the relevant territory, which Ukraine subsequently liberated.<\/p>\n

Russian state media graduated from the so-called objective of \u201cde-Nazification\u201d to \u201cde-Ukrainisation\u201d \u2013 an openly genocidal argument about Ukraine being a made-up country with no right to exist<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Prior to the invasion there had been inadequate international responses towards Russia\u2019s 2008 war with Georgia, 2018 Salisbury poisonings, and 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea \u2013 which set in motion the antecedents of today\u2019s war.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s major miscalculations<\/strong><\/h2>\n

In spite of co-ordinated diplomatic expulsions at the time, Russia still hosted a record-breaking FIFA World Cup<\/a> a few weeks later, using it to great PR effect<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The Kremlin basically took this as a green light for its 2022 invasion, but it miscalculated. Western countries gave early warnings of intelligence about Russian tank movements and helped pre-debunk its narratives of Ukrainian provocation.<\/p>\n

Unprecedented military aid<\/a> has kept Russia on the back foot; Russian media operations<\/a> have been disrupted<\/a> in the Euro-Atlantic space; and the UN Security Council has refused to platform bad-faith motions<\/a> by which Russia mirrors its alleged crimes onto others. These changes mean that Russia cannot simply revert to \u201cbusiness as usual\u201d.<\/p>\n

Russian alliances are crucial<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Russia\u2019s alliances have helped shaped its invasion. In the early stages of the war, Russian attacks from over the Belarus-Ukraine border massively increased Kyiv\u2019s vulnerability.<\/p>\n

Subsequently, Russia\u2019s war effort has relied on Iran<\/a>ian and North Korea<\/a>n drones and missiles.<\/p>\n

As Putin\u2019s rhetoric and actions have become more extreme, his less-isolated allies like India and China have expressed doubts about the war, but abstained<\/a> on crucial UN resolutions<\/a>.<\/p>\n

But Ukraine has powerful allies, too<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Ukraine\u2019s defence has also relied heavily on support from allies. US intelligence first predicted the invasion, and internationally co-ordinated sanctions on Russia soon followed.<\/p>\n

Since then, there has been an unprecedented supply of arms<\/a> and a warm welcome<\/a> for (some<\/a>) Ukrainian refugees. If Russia was counting on a loss of allies\u2019 will for its success, then it has so far been disappointed.<\/p>\n

But much can change on the ground during lengthy delays between allies\u2019 promises and their delivery. Ukraine\u2019s continued resistance is contingent on timely and ongoing military and humanitarian support from its allies.<\/p>\n

Human stories have real power<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The conflict has demonstrated the power of human stories to generate sympathy and political action in the reception of narratives by the presidents of Ukraine and Russia.<\/p>\n

Zelenskyy makes a good underdog: celebrity turned statesman who has risen to the challenges of his time \u2013 an excellent figurehead for the Ukrainian people who have had to rise to a challenge not of their choosing.<\/p>\n

By contrast Putin has aptly filled out the cartoon villain role. Not only has he launched an unprovoked war of choice, but his regime and its proxies<\/a> have committed multiple atrocities, the likes of which state media representatives have shamelessly promoted<\/a> on TV.<\/p>\n

Contemporary political communication relies heavily on its capacity to engage people\u2019s emotions, and both sides have used humour<\/a> in different ways to engage online audiences.<\/p>\n

Yet, their stories hit differently across the world. Ukraine\u2019s courageous underdog story has resonated in the western world, which has seen itself on the receiving end of Russia\u2019s overseas adventurism.<\/p>\n

By contrast, Russia\u2019s portrayal of the war as a response to western leaders\u2019 provocations has resonated better across much of the Global South, still attuned to its colonial experiences.<\/p>\n

Perception is very much conditioned by prior experiences, and it is crucial to remember this when trying to build consensus internationally.<\/p>\n

Who wins the global narrative<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Russia\u2019s image as a master manipulator of political communication has slipped. Its war on Ukraine has demonstrated this and Ukraine\u2019s allies have learned lessons about how to resist Russia\u2019s attempts to control global narratives. Ukraine has proven to be an effective communicator on the world stage in its own right.<\/p>\n

A pariah state in much of the West, Russia has shifted its focus towards the Global South. India\u2019s abstention on key UN resolutions demonstrates that Putin\u2019s tactic has had some success.<\/p>\n

This is particularly the case where there are historic and cultural reasons to relate to Russia\u2019s stories about resisting Western leaders.<\/p>\n

But the UN voting records also show how Russia\u2019s attempts to court public and political opinion have fallen short across large swathes of the world. The war has removed the veneer of respectability from Russia\u2019s foreign policy. A year in, it looks increasingly globally isolated.<\/p>\n

Picture credit: Evan Huang for Shutterstock<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Dr Precious Chatterje-Doody is a lecturer in politics and international studies at the OU and specialises in communication, misinformation and security, particularly in Russia. Here she looks back on a year of war in Ukraine \u2013 lessons learned and reasons for an increasingly isolated Russia. Russia\u2019s stated aim in invading Ukraine in 2022 was to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":18,"featured_media":22986,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[860,869,1525,1640,2386],"class_list":["post-22967","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-arts-social-sciences","tag-faculty-of-fass","tag-fass","tag-news-home","tag-ou-home","tag-war-in-ukraine"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22967","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/18"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=22967"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22967\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/22986"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=22967"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=22967"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.open.ac.uk\/blogs\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=22967"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}