On March 24th 2017, we held a Research Day on the theme of perception. In the morning, our own Derek Matravers spoke on ‘Visualising Representations’…

Summary: When we visualise a tree, do we imagine seeing a tree, or just imagine the visual appearance of a tree? This esoteric question (the ‘dependency thesis’) has been much debated to the neglect of another possibility: that sometimes, although certainly not all the time, when we visualise a tree we imagine (or imagine seeing) a visual representation of a tree. This paper considers the motivation for making this suggestion, and its plausibility.

…and in the afternoon, Louise Richardson (University of York) gave a talk on ‘Smelling Sweetness’…

Summary: There are a number of obstacles to thinking that we can smell – olfactorily perceive – properties such as sweetness and saltiness. The most serious of these is the role of learning in their aetiology, which has suggested to some that what we might think of as ‘smelling sweetness’ is in fact a form of smell-taste synaesthesia. I argue that the claim that sweetness can be smelled is defensible, and that accepting it does not require taking on any controversial assumptions.

All are welcome to the following Philosophy Research Seminar.

Neil Sinhababu, National University of Singapore
‘A Reliable Route from Is to Ought’

Time: 5th April, 2.00pm to 4.00pm
Place: Meeting Room 5, Wilson A, Open University (Walton Hall Campus)
Contact: Derek Matravers

Abstract: I present a strategy by which moral knowledge can be derived from non-moral knowledge, using insights from reliabilist epistemology. The strategy begins by discovering which cognitive processes generate which moral and nonmoral beliefs. We can then assess the reliability of these cognitive processes for moral belief formation by considering to what extent they produce true belief on non-moral issues, and by checking whether they produce contradictory moral beliefs in different people. By retaining reliably caused beliefs and abandoning unreliably caused ones, we can move closer to moral truth. No normative ethical assumptions are required.

Alex Barber and Sean Cordell are running an AHRC funded project, the Role Ethics Network, with a number of events over 18 months involving academics from across the globe. The rationale of the project is that social roles – our occupancy and performance of them – shape our ethical lives in ways that have not been fully appreciated or understood. Full details are on the project website.

The next is a workshop in Manchester on March 22, at which Alex will deliver a paper on a puzzle about wellbeing: wellbeing is an individualist notion (it equates to that which is good for a particular person), and achievement is an ingredient of wellbeing, but achievement is often collective rather than individual (just think about orchestral performance). Alex argues that thinking about the fulfillingness of role occupancy and role performance can help dissolve the tension.

The seminar will be held at the Open University’s campus at Walton Hall, in meeting room 5, Wilson A, from 2pm – 4pm, Wed 1 March 2017.

Professor Stella Sandford (Kingston University) ‘Kant, Teleology and Natural History: “Race” in the Critique of Pure Reason’

Abstract: As the fact and the nature of Kant’s controversial essays on race become better known, the question of their relationship to his major philosophical works is extremely vexing. Starting with the critical philosophy, and recognising the application of aspects of it in the essays on race, still allows, in principle, for their separation, isolating and marginalizing the topic of ‘race’ in Kant’s oeuvre. Starting instead with Kant’s ‘natural history of the human races’, this talk will suggest that there are ways in which Kant’s work on race may be more tightly woven into the critical philosophy that has hitherto been recognized, giving aspects of the critical philosophy – specifically Kant’s philosophical claims concerning the necessity of teleological judgement in both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgement – its lead, and perhaps even its practical motivation. Although this does not mean that the critical philosophy is hopelessly compromised (study of it will remain important and productive), this does mean that the place of ‘race’ in Kant’s oeuvre will need to be reconsidered.

All welcome. Contact: Cristina Chimisso

OU Philosophy welcomed guest speaker Phillip Meadows from the United Arab Emirates University to a one-off Metaphysics Day on November 30 2016. He talked about the puzzle of absences, which seem to be both vital to causal explanations (‘It happened because there were no electron’) and yet incapable of causing anything (‘How can absent electrons, or absent anything elses for that matter, have causal properties?’)

OU philosophers rounded out the day with contributions on the metaphysics of sports (Jon Pike), moral refutations of metaphysics (Alex Barber) and the objectivity of ordinary life (Sophie Grace Chappell).

Dr Henry Taylor (Cambridge University): What Can Zombies Teach Us About Consciousness?
Where: Newnham Terrace Seminar Room, Darwin College, Cambridge (enter by the main door on Silver Street).
When: 5.00pm to 7.00pm, Monday 5th December.

Entry is free and open to everybody.

For all enquires, email Derek Matravers (derek.matravers@open.ac.uk)

Consciousness is simultaneously the most intimate, and the most mysterious aspect of our lives. In one sense, we know a lot about consciousness because we are conscious beings. We know what it’s like to look at a beautiful sunset, to have a dream, to think about politics, to taste a lemon tart, or to listen to music. These are all elements of our conscious lives that we are intimately familiar with, and we know a lot about consciousness from a first person point of view.
In another sense, we know almost nothing about consciousness. We have no idea where it comes from, which animals have it, how it is related to the brain, and whether or not it is part of the normal physical world.
In this lecture, Dr Taylor will outline the phenomenon of consciousness, and why it has struck so many as so mysterious. Then he will look at the famous ‘zombie’ argument, which aims to show that consciousness is not a physical phenomenon. He will also suggest some ways we might make progress about this issue in the future.