Seminar: Dr Goff Philip, 5 March 2014

Dr Goff Philip, University of Liverpool
Cognitive phenomenology makes it hard to naturalise the mind
5 March 2014

In the twentieth century there was a broad consensus that thought and consciousness were quite distinct aspects of mentality. In the twenty first century, a growing number of philosophers believe that occurrent thoughts just are, or at least are grounded in, conscious states. I argue that this view, call it ‘phenomenal intentionalism’, makes the project of giving a naturalistic account of the mind extremely problematic.

Firstly, phenomenal intentionalism renders more acute problems associated with the under-determination content (contrary to the claim sometimes made by its proponents that it makes things easier in this regard). Secondly, phenomenal intentionalism implies that there is no logical connection between thought and behaviour, and this makes it extremely difficult to explain why, always or for the most part, thoughts give rise to rationally appropriate behaviour.

Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness merely threatens physicalism; there are naturalistic forms of dualism and panpsychism. The hard problems associated with a commitment to phenomenal intentionality threaten any theory of mind we might plausibly call ‘naturalistic’.

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Seminar: Prof Paul Noordhof, 5 February 2014

Prof Paul Noordhof, University of York
Evaluative Perception as Response Dependent Representation
5 February 2014

After having distinguished at least two forms of evaluative perception across subject matter, I relate the debate to the question of whether perceptual content should be understood richly or austerely. One way to capture some of the motivations of both parties is to distinguish between sensory and non-sensory perceptual content. Evaluative properties typically figure in non-sensory perceptual contents.  Nevertheless, interestingly, many don’t display a hidden structure as, for example, kind properties do.  I seek to explain the way the way in which they are presented in experience – non sensorily but without hidden structure – in terms of the way in which they are represented. I argue we need to recognise the existence of representations constituted by our dispositions to respond in certain ways and outline how this may be developed.

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Seminar: Alex Barber, 8 January 2014

Alex Barber
Equality, roles and station
8 January 2014

The topic of distributive justice (within a single society) is normally approached through the question:

Q: How and why should a society’s resources be distributed across its population?

Or, more colloquially, ‘Who gets what?’ I propose we split Q into two less familiar questions:

Q(i): How and why should a society’s resources be distributed across various social roles?
Q(ii): How and why should a society’s roles be distributed across its population?

The reason for making such a split is twofold. First, justifications of inequality are, in practice, usually tied directly to social roles and only indirectly to the people occupying them. In the context of paid employment, for example, an office cleaner receives less than a university professor because of differences in how these roles are constituted and evaluated. Much of the existing philosophical literature on equality glides over this fact (or else focuses solely on the role of free-market entrepreneur).

Second, it is tempting for  supporters of social equality to think that, broadly speaking, equality thrives better under conditions of co-operation, collaboration and common purpose than under conditions of competition between individuals in, say, an open market. In this talk I examine justifications for inequalities that emerge when we work together as part of a group or society. Working together involves us in occupying different roles. I argue that diversity between social roles (in respective of their entrance/exit conditions, their obligations and entitlements, the importance of their function) permits non-egalitarians to defend a relatively uneven distribution of society’s resources. I end by considering possible egalitarian responses, with the hope of improving on Cohen’s response to Rawls on entrepreneurs.

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Seminar: Derek Matravers, 9 January 2013

Professor of Philosophy, Derek Matravers
‘Life and Narrative’
9 January 2013

Summary

Many people maintain that some sense of narrative is necessary if we are to make sense of our lives. In his last book, The Mess Inside, Peter Goldie argued that there are certain ‘dangerous fictionalising tendencies’ of narrative that have the potential to distort that sense. I argue two points. First, that some of what Goldie sees as properties of fictional narrative are, in fact, properties of narrative per se. Second, that these are not uniformly dangerous; it depends on what we are trying to achieve with the narrative.

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Seminar: Derek Matravers, 6 November 2013

Derek Matravers, Professor of Philosophy
Pots, deception, and beauty
6 November 2013

In their 1994 book, Artful Crafts, Michael Vickers and David Gill argue that the value we place on Greek pots stems from a deliberate deception practiced by Sir William Hamilton in the 1770s. Without this deception, we might never have found them valuable and (I shall assume) they would not have the place in our aesthetic pantheon which they currently occupy. In short, we have been conned into seeing them as beautiful. I consider what we should do in response to this, and also what light this throws on the nature of beauty.

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Seminar: Timothy Chappell, 2 October 2013

Timothy Chappell, Professor of Philosophy
Plato and Socrates on evil
2 October 2013

As Nietzsche observed, our ethical tradition has often been dominated by the idea of evil as malign force, energetic malice. I contrast this essentially Judaeo-Christian conception with the Greek conception of evil as incompetence, suggesting that there is much to be said for the latter.

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Choose your own philosophy adventure

Castle, Forest, Island, SeaThe OU philosophy department has worked with an independent production company to create an online ‘choose your own adventure’ game. You will be asked to make a number of decisions, and, as you progress the game will get a feel for what you think about various matters. Once the game is completed, you will get an analysis of your choices, and a map showing how your choices compare to those of different philosophers through the ages. Explore this interactive feature now …

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Seminar: Phil Bates, 1 May 2013

Phil Bates, Lecturer in Law, Open University Law School
Killing Law and Murdering Philosophy
1 May 2013

Bizarre killings, either imagined or historical, feature in Philosophy seminars and in Law tutorials. Philosophers may stress that they are interested in the ethical or conceptual aspects, while lawyers will say that ‘this is a court of law, not of morals’. Legal discussion necessarily takes place within a framework of authority, and national jurisdiction, which has little or no relevance to philosophical debate. Nevertheless, students of both disciplines (and members of the public and juries) may struggle to distinguish the legal and ethical elements, particularly if there is an appeal to intuition or ‘common sense’. In addition, each discipline may sometimes present a simplistic version of the other perspective, for its own purposes. In this paper, Phil will ask what is at stake when different disciplines discuss responsibility for killing, and what we can learn by considering these disciplinary perspectives together.

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Seminar: Chris Belshaw, 5 June 2013

Chris Belshaw, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy
The Language of Harm
5 June 2013

What is harm? Or, when is it correct to say that a person, or a thing has been harmed? I defend a familiar account against a recently advanced rival.

I claim –a) all and only things having a good of their own – people, animals, plants – can be harmed; b) they enter a harmed condition when their level of well-being becomes less good than it would have been, were some harming event not to have occurred; c) harm involves ones undergoing some intrinsic change – relational change isn’t enough.

Three important consequences of this: death can harm us; there are no posthumous harms; undiscovered betrayal doesn’t harm us.

What can justify these claims? I contend that all there is to harm is what, ordinarily but after reflection, we want to say about it. Hence my title, and the familiarity of much of what I say. An alternative account, that we need a philosophical investigation into the nature of harm, is one that I consider and reject.

This talk will be of interest to all those needing to know what harm is, and when it occurs.

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Seminar: Dr Lubomira Radoilska, 7 November 2012

Dr Lubomira Radoilska, University of Cambridge
Moral responsibility and control
7 November 2012

Summary

Moral responsibility is often conceptualised in terms of control. The basic intuition at the heart of this approach is that a person may only be held responsible for things that are under her control, and only in so far as they are under her control. In this paper, I look into some apparent counterexamples, and argue that these are better accounted for by a theory of moral responsibility that, like Aristotle’s, operates with two separate, equally fundamental notions of control rather than by alternative theories that reject control as irrelevant.

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