

Africa Yearbook

*Politics, Economy and Society South
of the Sahara in 2019*

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Climate change, natural gas, a new civil war, the \$ 2 bn secret debt, and the re-election of Frelimo in a dubious election dominated the year. Two record-breaking cyclones hit the centre and north, causing extensive damage. Investments inched forward to develop the natural gas fields off the coast of Cabo Delgado, but the worsening insurgency killed 583 people, closed roads, and disrupted gas construction. Legal cases in New York and Johannesburg provided more evidence of bribery and corruption in the secret debt saga. The re-election of Nyusi as president was besmirched by widespread misconduct. But the huge gas fields and potential investments and contracts meant that donors fully backed the Frelimo government and no longer challenged its corruption and misconduct.

Domestic Politics

Filipe Nyusi was re-elected president on 15 October with 73% of the vote, in a landslide nearly as large as Armando Guebuza's re-election in 2009. Frelimo won 184 seats in the 250-seat parliament and received the most votes in all 154 districts – even opposition strongholds such as Beira, Quelimane, and Nacala. But there were

more reports of serious misconduct than in any previous election. “The elections were not free, fair and transparent and the results are not credible”, concluded eight major civil society organisations. The European Union cited “an unlevel playing field” and said that the electoral administration and judiciary were not independent or free of political influence. United States observers were also critical, especially about the counting process. Both criticised general sloppiness and lack of transparency. The final results were announced by the Constitutional Council (CC) on 22 December, and were wrong – ironically excluding votes for Frelimo. The ruling document posted on the CC website was then changed twice – in secret, without it being said that changes had been made – and still contained errors.

Frelimo was the *liberation movement* which won independence in 1975 and has been in government ever since, winning all six multi-party elections. Renamo (‘Resistência Nacional Moçambicana’) waged war as a guerrilla movement in the 1980s and after a 1992 peace accord became the main opposition party, but in 2019 it won only 60 seats in parliament (‘Assembleia da República’, AR). The Mozambique Democratic Movement won 6 AR seats.

Troubles began with the *registration process* in April and May 2019. Gaza province is Frelimo heartland and always votes overwhelmingly for the party. Election officials registered 1,166,001 voters, but the accurate 2017 national census showed that there would be only 836,581 voting-age adults in 2019. The respected heads of the National Statistics Institute and of the census were both dismissed for refusing to retrospectively bend the census results. There was also over-registration in Frelimo-supporting areas of Cabo Delgado province and in the register for voters in Africa outside Mozambique. And in the opposition province of Zambézia, the number of registration brigades was cut and an estimated 186,000 potential voters were not registered.

A key check on the process is *domestic and international observation*, and the law required that observers must be registered within five days of application. District election commissions refused to issue credentials to 3,000 civil society organisations, particularly in Gaza and Zambézia. But they did issue more than 20,000 credentials to openly Frelimo-linked “observers”. A police hit squad gunned down the head of Gaza civil society observation on 7 October, a week before the election. Two of the assassins were killed in a car crash, leading to the government admitting that the killers were police. On voting day, polling stations were tense, and domestic observers and even some EU observers were not allowed in polling stations. Counting in many places was done in secret, which is illegal.

Elections took place against the background of a growing *insurgency* in the north-east of the country, in nine districts of the province of Cabo Delgado. Fatalities in the war rose from 188 in 2018 to 583 in 2019, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). The insurgency was superficially fundamentalist Islamic. Young men influenced by radical preachers made simple

fundamentalist demands concerning wearing shoes in mosques, a reduced role for women, and not attending state schools. But the core grievance was lack of jobs and not benefiting from the gas and mineral wealth of the province.

Cabo Delgado is both Mozambique's richest and its poorest province. The war is taking place along the coast near one of the largest offshore gas fields in Africa, being developed at a cost of over \$ 100 bn. The zone is also an important minerals producer, notably rubies and graphite. But Cabo Delgado is the province with the highest inequality, highest illiteracy rates, highest level of child malnutrition, lowest level of access to health facilities, worst housing, and fewest children in school. Because it is also mineral-rich, almost the entire province has been allocated to companies for mining or mining exploration (or national parks or hunting reserves). Attempts have been made to relocate people for ruby mining and gas, but there is no farmland available and they are unable to earn a living. The number of young people is growing and they have primary education, so they want something better than their illiterate peasant parents. And they see no gains from the wealth of the gas and rubies.

Coastal Cabo Delgado is a Muslim area with long historic links to the Muslim *Kiswahili-speaking coast* of Tanzania and Kenya. The past two decades have seen a huge growth in the number and influence of fundamentalist Christian and Islamic preachers. In Cabo Delgado, fundamentalist preachers blame traditional Imams for teaching a false Islam and being allied to an elite that benefits from mineral wealth. Challenging the Imams was seen as a way of challenging Frelimo. From mid-2019, the insurgents began to fly the black Islamic State flag. The government (and some in the international community) try to blame external Islamist forces. But outside influence appeared limited. Mozambican researchers consider it a largely domestic insurgency, and blame it on poverty, the lack of jobs, and rising inequality.

There was a big increase in the number of attacks, with 125 in the second half of the year, which accounted for 400 of the 583 deaths in 2019. The insurgents were better equipped and trained, with arms taken from raids on military bases and training from former Renamo and government soldiers as well as Islamic militants. Strategy by both sides seemed modelled on the 1982–92 war. The insurgents attacked road traffic, villages, and eventually isolated military and police posts, and the government increased its military and police presence (with the riot police taking the lead) but with government forces largely tied to bases. The insurgents developed a strategy of attacking a village, looting and burning, and retreating after just two hours, before government forces could arrive. Insurgents appeared to be trying to take control of Macomia district – situated on the coast and with the only paved north–south road.

There was a press crackdown in Cabo Delgado and local journalists were illegally detained by military and police. “People and communities and, in particular, journalists, feel threatened and coerced into silence about what they see and hear.

The press speaks of its meetings with the authorities in terms of intimidation and threat. There is talk of agents infiltrated among the population so as not to let any information come out”, declared Pemba bishop Luiz Fernando Lisboa in an 18 July pastoral letter. “What do civil and military authorities want, creating this climate of secrecy and silence? What is the secret they neither want to reveal nor be revealed? Why don’t they let themselves be helped in the investigation by brave, serious and responsible journalists?” Hundreds of people had been detained, the bishop noted, “but the attacks do not stop. Are the attacks linked to extreme poverty? Is there not a problem of too much land given to mining companies?” And in an unusually strong statement, seven NGOs meeting in Pemba on 23 August blamed the insurgency in Cabo Delgado on poverty, lack of development, and government backing of big mining and gas companies instead of local people. “Widespread poverty co-exists with the emergence of high but frustrated social expectations that generate conflict.”

Meanwhile, Ossufo Momade was elected president of Renamo and national presidential candidate at the Renamo congress on 17 January on the Gorongosa mountain. He had been acting head of Renamo since the death from diabetes of Afonso Dhlakama on 3 May 2018. Momade gained 410 votes, against 238 for Elias Dhlakama, the brother of Afonso. This led to a regional split – the late president Afonso Dhlakama had his support base in the centre of the country, notably in Manica, Sofala, and Inhambane provinces, while Momade’s base is further north in Zambézia and Nampula. There may also be a religious division – the Catholic Church in Beira traditionally backed Dhlakama, while Momade is Muslim.

President Filipe Nyusi and Ossufo Momade signed a *ceasefire* on 1 August at Chitengo, in Gorongosa National Park. Momade had remained in Satunjira, the Renamo base on the Gorongosa mountain, since his election, but as soon as he signed the ceasefire he flew to Maputo to launch his campaign for the 15 October presidential election. On 6 August, Momade and Nyusi signed a peace accord in Maputo that involved the integration of some of the claimed 5,221 Renamo fighters into the national army and police, and demobilisation of others. The first 50 Renamo fighters were formally demobilised at a ceremony in Satunjira on 29 July, although only six handed over their weapons and remained at Satunjira. Two issues remained unresolved. Renamo has been demanding the integration of Renamo fighters into SISE, the State Information and Security Service, and Frelimo continued to resist this. Nyusi was pushing for the demobilisation to be completed before the 15 October elections, but that did not happen. Demobilisation was delayed by both sides until after the 15 October elections.

Decentralisation and some degree of power-sharing had been informally agreed between Nyusi and Dhlakama. Implicit in the agreement was that the election would have some degree of fair play and that Renamo would be allowed to win several governorships and a reasonable number of seats in parliament. Frelimo

accepted the deal that provincial governors would be elected, but then introduced a new post of secretary of state for the province, who was to be appointed by the president and would have all the powers of the old governor. Then Frelimo blatantly manipulated the election to win all governorships. Momade could hardly accept an outcome in which there was no sharing of power.

Renamo *dissidents* who called themselves the Renamo Military Junta rejected the ceasefire. The head of the junta is Mariano Nhongo, who held the rank of major general in Renamo and gains his support from Renamo members in Sofala. He said that his followers would not disarm for as long as Ossufo Momade remained the president of Renamo. The first attack by the junta occurred on 31 July, when five vehicles, including a bus, were attacked on the N1, the main north–south road. This picks up a tactic used by Renamo when it restarted the war with the government in 2013–14, which was to have snipers shoot at traffic along the N1, disrupting transport and forcing the military to set up convoys. This was not a full-scale war, with only irregular attacks, but it was enough to again disrupt traffic and force the reintroduction of convoys. Nhongo claimed thousands of guerrillas but appeared to have only dozens, and his attacks were largely by snipers, which required very few people. The Mozambican police and military seemed unable to find him, even though he regularly gave erratic interviews to the media.

Climate change was brutally demonstrated by two record *cyclones*. Global heating raised temperatures in the Mozambique Channel. Two tropical storms dawdled for several days over the channel, picking up heat and water, and turned into record cyclones, killing 650 people and destroying 200,000 homes, 3,500 classrooms, and 90 health facilities. On 15 March, Cyclone Idai hit the port city of Beira with 195 km/h winds and torrential rains which directly flooded Beira and other coastal towns such as Buzi. Idai then moved slowly inland, pouring water into rivers that flooded nearby towns and totally flooded Buzi. The only roads to Beira and Buzi were closed because of flooding that lasted for several days and washed away bridges. At least 400 sq km were flooded and five days after the cyclone landed, around 60,000 people were still stranded on rooftops, on trees, and on the upper stands of a stadium. The corridor from Beira west to Zimbabwe is densely populated, and suffered extensive damage. On 25 April, Cyclone Kenneth landed in Cabo Delgado with 220 km/h winds – the strongest and most northern cyclone on record. Ibo and other islands and Macomia district experienced extensive damage. There were fewer lives lost because these areas are less densely populated than those hit by Idai.

Challenges related to climate change continued into the second half of the year. The north, and in particular sections hit by the insurgency, received unusually heavy rains. A major bridge on the N380 road over the Montepuez River was washed away on 30 December, cutting the only paved road from Pemba to the gas fields near Palma. Meanwhile the southern three provinces – Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane – suffered severe drought for the third year. This was as predicted by climate change

models: worsening drought in the south, while the north had the same amount of rainfall but in more severe and concentrated bursts.

Foreign Affairs

At least four countries attempted to be the largest foreign *military powers* in the zone without too much of a commitment. France, India, and the United States all have interests in the natural gas project off Cabo Delgado. The US ran a big maritime exercise in the Mozambique Channel on 2–7 February, and at the same time France sent a surveillance frigate from Reunion to Maputo. And the first help in response to Cyclone Idai came from three Indian navy ships that had been nearby. France has a series of islands in the Mozambique Channel between Mozambique and Madagascar. The island of Mayotte is an integral part of France, and is 500 km east of Pemba, capital of Cabo Delgado. It is possible that the gas field extends into French territory.

Meanwhile Mozambique was looking for foreign military help in Cabo Delgado. Only Russia was willing to help, and a deal was agreed in August. The Russian private military contractor Wagner arrived in September with troops and equipment, and was involved in battles in October. But Wagner seemed unprepared for tropical conditions; it lost several mercenaries in the October battles and pulled out at the end of October.

Relations with Russia, South Africa, and traditional donors and lenders were also entangled in the ongoing crisis over the \$ 2 bn in *secret loans* given to the government of Armando Guebuza in 2013–14. The deal was largely negotiated by the London office of the giant Swiss bank Credit Suisse (CS) and by Prinvest, an Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates, UAE) shipbuilder. No money from the loans went to Mozambique: officially all the money went directly to Prinvest and to banks as commissions. But evidence emerging in court cases suggests that \$ 200 m was paid in bribes and kickbacks.

The secret loans have triggered legal action in six different countries. Mozambique is suing CS and Prinvest and its Lebanese-French billionaire founder Iskandar Safa in the London high court. Prinvest has responded with arbitration demands in Switzerland and in the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. An NGO has lodged a criminal complaint against CS in Switzerland.

On 3 January, the United States released the charges against eight people, including Manuel Chang; two officials of Prinvest including Jean Boustani; and three senior officials of CS, including Andrew Pearse, the managing director at CS Securities Europe, who arranged the \$ 2bn secret debt. Pearse was accused of receiving \$ 45 m and Boustani \$ 15 m, but Boustani was acquitted on 3 December. The indictment

made clear that the whole idea came from CS and Privinvest and that Privinvest had to “persuade Mozambican government officials” to accept the deal and quickly “negotiated the first round of bribe and kickback payments that Privinvest would have to make for the benefit of Mozambican government officials for the project to be approved”. On 19 July, in New York, Pearse pleaded guilty to “wire fraud” relating to the payment of bribes and kickbacks to corrupt foreign officials and bankers. In his confession, he stressed that CS turned a blind eye to obvious corruption, pointed to the direct involvement of Safa and Privinvest in bribery, admitted that the loan was larger than could be justified by what Privinvest was supplying, and asserted that all the loans were obtained corruptly. He said that Privinvest senior executive Jean Boustani had told him that \$ 50 m in bribes was paid to Ndambi Guebuza, the oldest son of former president Armando Guebuza. The two other senior CS bankers, Surjan Singh and Detelina Subeva, also pleaded guilty.

Meanwhile in Mozambique, on 22 March, 20 people were charged with embezzlement, extortion, money laundering, corruption, abuse of office, falsifying documents, and criminal association, and most were detained. They included then finance minister Manuel Chang, Ndambi Guebuza, and two top SISE officials (Gregorio Leao and Antonio Carlos do Rosário). On 4 June, the Constitutional Council ruled that all three of the loans that made up the \$ 2 bn secret debt package were null and void and that the government guarantees were illegal.

As well as the court cases in various countries, the secret loans had repercussions in relations with Russia and South Africa. Most of the loan was organised by CS, but \$ 535 m of it was lent by VTB, the Russian bank majority-owned by the state. The loan has been subject to intergovernmental discussions, but the chair of the VTB board of directors, Andrey Kostin, told the press at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September that “If our colleagues in Mozambique do not take steps to speed up this process, by the end of the year we shall have to declare that the country has defaulted”. When President Filipe Nyusi attended the Russia–Africa summit in the Black Sea city of Sochi in October, he met with Kostin, who claimed that VTB could “never” give an ultimatum to Mozambique. On 23 December, VTB in London sued the Mozambican government and Mozambique Asset Management (MAM) over the \$ 535 m loan. Documents filed gave no other details.

Another diplomatic dispute around the loan was between Mozambique, South Africa, and the United States. In 2013 and 2014, President Armando Guebuza’s finance minister, Manuel Chang, signed illegal government guarantees for the loans, even though the constitution and budget law requires parliamentary approval. Chang was arrested on 29 December 2018 in transit at Johannesburg airport on a US arrest warrant and charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering, wire fraud, and securities fraud.. Mozambique submitted its own extradition request, and Mozambican civil society joined the case, saying that Chang should be sent to

the US as it was unlikely he would be tried in Mozambique. After a long court battle, it was ruled that the South African justice minister, Ronald Lamola, should decide Chang's fate, and he was still in jail in South Africa at year's end.

Mozambique's relationship with traditional donors and lenders was initially hit by the 2016 revelation of the secret loans. The IMF and donors cut off all budget support and other direct aid to the government, only continuing aid via NGOs and contractors, and aid continued to fall in 2019 (see below). The October elections continued Mozambique's steady fall in democracy ratings. In the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) democracy index in 2007, it was 96th out of 167 countries, and considered a "hybrid regime". In the 2019 index, it was 120th out of 176 and considered an "authoritarian regime". Nevertheless, the donor and lender mood changed sharply in 2019. The government realised that it had survived the cut in aid, and donors realised that with no direct aid to the government they had lost their only power. Meanwhile, contracts linked to the huge natural gas project had become a major priority in donor capitals, and new arrivals in Maputo as part of normal diplomatic turnover were briefed that contracts and investment were the new priority, not governance. The World Bank poured in money during the election year 2019 – \$ 700 m compared with \$ 530 m in 2018 and \$ 104 m in 2017, when Mozambique was still being punished for the secret debt. The World Bank rural water and health programme became a central part of Nyusi's 2019 campaign. China also threw its weight behind Nyusi, promising to build 35,000 houses in 2019. Just a week before the election, Exxon created an entirely artificial ceremony for an "initial investment decision" for the gas that was meant to back Nyusi's campaign. Pope Francis visited Mozambique on 4–6 September, in the middle of the presidential election campaign, in which Catholic Filipe Nyusi faced Muslim Ossufo Momade. In the days after the election results, donors queued up to praise the new government. The United States, Britain, France, Portugal, and Italy all issued early statements of support for the government, with no criticism of the election. The US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) announced that it expected a large new programme within two years. But fulsome statements were matched by a refusal to let the government get its hands on donor and lender money. At a donor conference in Beira on 1 June, the government asked for \$ 3.2 bn for cyclone relief and reconstruction. But donors pledged only \$ 1.2 bn, just 38% of what the government said it needed; of that, only \$ 790 m was new money while \$ 390 m was reallocated from other programmes. The release of funds was slow as donors and lenders organised non-government channels such as the UN and NGOs. Lack of funding forced the too-hasty resettlement of displaced people.

Gemfields, the 75% owner of a major ruby mine in Cabo Delgado listed in London and Johannesburg, agreed in January to pay \$ 8.3 m to settle 273 claims of killings, severe beatings, and house burnings related to clearing residents and artisanal miners from the 34,000 hectare mine area. The case was registered at the London high

court in April 2018 but eventually settled through mediation on a “no admission of liability” basis. But, significantly, Gemfields agreed to settle all of the claims.

The development of the huge *gas fields* off Cabo Delgado continued and was expected to produce 10% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG). The fields are divided. Area 1, closet to the coast, was developed by a consortium led by the US company Anadarko, which was taken over by another US company, Occidental, which in turn quickly sold the Mozambique part of Anadarko to the French company Total for \$ 3.9 bn on 30 September. On 5 August, President Filipe Nyusi laid the first stone in the construction of a \$ 25 bn gas liquification plant in the Afungi peninsula in Palma district, Cabo Delgado. Two LNG processing plants (known as “trains” because they have a series of units) were to be built for Area 1. Nyusi said that they were expected to produce 12.6 m tonnes per year (MTPA) of LNG, of which 11.1 MTPA was already earmarked for sale through medium- and long-term contracts. A US company, Exxon Mobile, was expected to build other trains on the site for Area 4. Italian company Eni, which shares control of Area 4, was constructing a floating LNG liquification facility which is to begin producing 3.4 MTPA from 2022.

President Nyusi visited Mauritius on 1–3 February to encourage more investment from the tax haven, one of the top ten investors in Mozambique.

The UN secretary-general António Guterres was in Mozambique on 11 July to support peace talks with Renamo; he named the Swiss ambassador in Maputo and chair of the peace talks, Mirko Manzoni, as his personal envoy for Mozambique.

Socioeconomic Developments

“An imbalanced growth path disproportionately benefited the better-off and caused increasing inequality, especially in more recent years, curbing the necessary reduction of poverty”, concluded a study by the United Nations University World Institute of Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) in Helsinki in July. This significant increase in inequality is “characterised by the emergence of a non-subsistence economy in Maputo and other urban areas, in a resource-based country, with a shrinking public sector, the expansion of education and the emergence of a small but highly educated elite”. The study notes that inequality is higher in Mozambican urban areas than the Africa average. Maputo city has the highest inequality. Nearly half of the population remains below the poverty line and inequality is increasing, especially in recent years, “due to consumption disproportionately increasing among the better-off”. Carlos Lopes, former executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, made the same point in a speech on 11 July in which he said “Mozambique is not a country that is making reforms to transform its economy structurally. It is rather a country that is sinking more in rentier dependence.”

The economic squeeze continued, and *GDP* grew by only 2.5% in 2019 compared with 3.3% in 2018, with declines in mining and increases in public services. *Inflation* was 3.5%. The metical (MT) depreciated only slightly, from \$ 1 = 59 MT in 2018 to \$ 1 = 62 MT in 2019.

Aid continued to fall, with donations halving from \$ 300 m in 2018 to \$ 150 m in 2019; total aid and credits to the government fell from \$ 762 m in 2018 to \$ 622 m in 2019 instead of increasing to \$ 926 m as planned. Taking into account tax and other income, including \$ 950 m in capital gains tax from the sale of Anadarko to Total and of parts of Eni to Exxon, the government still had to borrow \$ 460 m to cover the deficit compared with borrowing of \$ 316 m in 2018. Of the 2019 borrowing, most (\$ 305 m) came from a loan from the Bank of Mozambique and only \$ 155 m was from the sale of treasury bills and bonds. During President Nyusi's term in office, the government's domestic debt had risen from \$ 1.8 bn to \$ 2.5 bn. In 2019, the government paid \$ 279 m in interest on the domestic debt to banks and bondholders. But the government says that it finally paid off nearly all of its debts to suppliers, paying \$ 100 m and leaving a debt of only \$ 8 m. In addition, the government is carrying guarantees of debts to state companies of \$ 1.9 bn, of which almost nothing was repaid in 2019.

Social and economic spending took a major hit from the cut in aid, falling slightly from \$ 2.25 bn to \$ 2.18 bn rather than increasing as planned to \$ 2.8 bn. The biggest cuts were in relation to roads (down 37% in 2019 compared with 2018; actual spending), higher education (down 18%), transport and communications (down 13%), agriculture and rural development (down 13%), and health (down 5%).

The results of the 2017 national *population census* were released in April. The population at the time of the census was 27.9 m, of whom 33% were urban and the rest rural; the median age was 17 years old; population growth was 2.8% per year. By religion, Mozambicans say they are 30% Zionist or Evangelical, 27% Catholic, 18% Muslim, and 14% no religion. Of Mozambicans over ten years old, 60% say they can read and write, although in rural areas a majority over 30 are illiterate; 75% of urban people speak the national language, Portuguese, but only 32% of rural residents. In total, 3% say they have disabilities. Four cities have a population of over 500,000: Maputo (1.1 m), Matola (1.0 m), Nampula (0.7 m), and Beira (0.6 m). The projected population for 2019 was 29.3 m.

Corruption in Mozambique was high by African standards, and by far the worst in Southern Africa, according to the Afrobarometer corruption survey released on 12 July. Compared with 2015, demands for bribes had reduced somewhat, but one in four Mozambicans dealing with schools, health posts, and the police had to pay a bribe in 2018, according to the survey. The survey also stated that ordinary people believe that government and society in general are highly corrupt.

Despite "legislative and institutional efforts, governance and corruption challenges in Mozambique remain of a systemic nature, principally due to constraints on

effective implementation”, the government admitted in a report on ‘Transparency, Governance and Corruption’. This was a government report, completed in July with “assistance” and pressure from the IMF, and published by the IMF on 23 August. The report defined systematic corruption as circumstances where “corruption is no longer a deviation from the norm, but is manifested in a pattern of behaviour so pervasive and ingrained that it becomes the norm”.

Port Maputo handled 21 m tonnes of cargo in 2019, surpassing the previous record of 19.5 m tonnes achieved in 2018. This 8% increase was attained largely due to the flow of chrome through the port, which accounted for 30% of the goods handled. But, despite the rehabilitation of the railway between Maputo and South Africa, 82% (6.4 m tonnes) of chrome exports reached Port Maputo by road.

‘Hidroelectrica de Cahora Bassa’ (HCB), which operates the Cahora Bassa dam on the Zambezi River, reported a 7.3% increase in the generation of electricity in 2018.

The Education Ministry hoped to register 1.97 m children in late 2019 to enter first grade in the 2020 term, but only registered 1.55 m – 77%. Gaza province was worst, registering only 52.9%. Adult illiteracy has declined from 45% in 2015 to 39% in 2019.