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Notes on the evolution of the Cabo Delgado war: Although the global should not be forgotten, the local is most important

These are personal notes drawn from published sources and an IESE (Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos) conference 5-6 December 2019 in Maputo. The conference was conducted under the "Chatham House Rule" that "participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed." No sources are cited in this article even if these sources were not at the conference as it is impossible to identify sources without suggesting that people were at the IESE conference. I thank the various researchers for the words and insights I have used. These notes, interpretations and errors are entirely my responsibility.

The best background paper is the September 2019 IESE paper by Saide Habibe, Salvador Forquilha and João Pereira. I have not repeated much of their material here, and assume some background knowledge of the Cabo Delgado war.

Joseph Hanlon

1. Introduction

What are labelled as Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies are occurring in several Africa countries, and there are overlaps. But in each country the armed conflicts are different and are "path dependent" - that is, they follow a trajectory that is shaped by local history and context more than external factors. In these notes I look at the roots and evolution of the Islamic insurgency or civil war¹ in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. I will argue:

- The antecedents of this war go back decades. and that there are a very large number of external and internal actors and contexts.
- Externally, Cabo Delgado has been a playground for a wide range of religious missionaries, global natural resource companies, and traders in legal and illegal commodities. World Bank and IMF policies have set the development strategy.
- Internally, poverty and inequality are growing. Greed and corruption have exacerbated the inequalities and caused a growing discontent, especially from marginalised young people.
- External and internal actors work together. The local elite (internal) works with the natural resource companies and illegal traders (external). But at a lower level some people respond to the crisis of poverty and inequality by looking to religious leaders and sects for an

1. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines armed conflict as: "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year." An "internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states." Thus the present conflict is in Cabo Delgado is clearly an "internal armed conflict". The definition of civil war is less precise, but I argue that that this internal armed conflict is a civil war.

explanation and solution, while religious leaders (both internal and external) try to interpret their doctrines and teachings as a solution to these crises, in order to recruit followers. Religion is presented as an answer to a development crisis.

- The distrust of local elites is greater than many realise and there is a history of violence, from cholera riots two decades ago to a mass invasion of ruby mines in February 2020. Following this history, it is less surprising that marginalised young people will join a violent group pledged to redress inequality.

I argue that the local is most important, but the global should not be forgotten. The growing civil war does not have a military solution. Civil war is fed by grievances, which must be resolved to end support for insurgents. But external factors must also be controlled to end the war, and it needs to be remembered that external factors are not just foreign Islamic militants, but also natural resource companies and illegal traders.

2. History

History matters and is a living presence in Cabo Delgado. Alberto Chipande fired the first shot of the independence war on 25 September 1964, in Chai, Macomia district, Cabo Delgado. Chai and Macomia are at the centre of the new civil war. Chipande (born 10 October 1939) remains a powerful and active politician and is still a member of the Frelimo Political Commission.

Coastal Mozambique has a long history of Islamic influence and KiSwahili is an understood language along the coast from Nampula province north to Somalia. The Cabo Delgado coastal zone is traditionally occupied by a Muslim KiMwani- and KiSwahili-speaking community. As fishers, traders and seafarers along the coast, their links are as much to Zanzibar as to the provincial capital Pemba. But many Muslims backed Frelimo's independence struggle and in 1965 several leaders were executed by the Portuguese colonial power. Local leaders have always been annoyed that their role in the independence struggle was not recognised, and they see the largely Christian Makonde speakers from Mueda and Muidumbe districts dominating Frelimo and moving into the coastal areas. The KiMwani speakers have tended to vote for Renamo against Frelimo, and elections in Mocímboa da Praia have been close; when Renamo lost a close by-election in 2005 there was violence in which seven people were killed. This very local internal factor often interacts with the Cabo Delgado-wide and national factors set out below (all referred to here as "internal"), and a wide range of external factors from outside Mozambique.

Frelimo at independence was strongly secular and Frelimo members were not supposed to attend religious services, although a welcome remained for those Protestant groups and a few Catholic orders which had supported Frelimo during the independence war. Frelimo nationalised religious schools and hospitals. In 1982 President Samora Machel met with leaders of all faiths to try to rebuild relations; the Mozambique Islamic Council (Cislamo) was created in 1983 and the Catholic Church regained some of its property which has been confiscated at independence. After Machel's death in 1986, the new President Joaquim Chissano improved relations further. The Pope visited Mozambique in 1988 and 2019. Mozambique joined the Saudi Arabia-based Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1994, and with government support, students were sent to study in Saudi Arabia.

Foreign religious groups such as Christian missionary Heidi Baker's Arco Iris and the Aga Khan Foundation have built significant presences in Cabo Delgado. In the 1990s Christian fundamentalist missionaries were free to visit from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Brazil, the US and elsewhere, and Islamic preachers came from Tanzania and further north. The re-opening of the main north-south EN1 road after the 1992 peace accord led to substantial movements of people including many migrants trying to reach South Africa, as well as others looking for work in Mozambique, for example as artisanal miners. Within that traffic, little note was taken of fundamentalist Christian and Islamic missionaries.

The border between Tanzania and Mozambique is porous and people have family, business and religious contacts on both sides of the border. The 1990s saw a religious revivalism in Tanzania

with both Christian and Islamic fundamentalists. Indeed, in a play on the well known term "born again Christians", Tanzanians refer to "born again Muslims".

There was a two-way traffic, with Mozambicans going to Tanzania to study and even further north to Kenya, Somalia and the Great Lakes, while preachers from Tanzania and beyond came south to Cabo Delgado. These networks, in turn, had links with leaders from Saudi Arabia, Libya, Sudan and Algeria. Videos were increasingly widely circulated.

Islamic fundamentalist preachers were noted in Nangade district, on the border in Tanzania, in 1990, and later in Balama and Chiure districts in the west and south of Cabo Delgado. In 2000 in Memba and Angoche in Nampula province it was noted that unemployed youth were under the new influence of "al-Sunnahs" who refused to participate in ceremonies and who organised agitation. Then, the Islamic issue was not raised because government wanted, wrongly, to blame Renamo. In reality, this was a protest led by unemployed youth who saw no future for themselves, and whose actions had the tacit backing of their elders. An interview subject identified only as "an influential person", in a prescient warning, said "there will be a war in Mozambique, a war without a leader or president, because young people feel abandoned in their own land and by their own government."

By 2005 more Mozambican preachers were returning from Tanzania, along with preachers of other nationalities, and opening mosques and madrassas in Cabo Delgado. The new teaching included not going to state schools and hospitals, which was leading to open confrontations with the authorities. In several places there were meetings with the Mozambique Islamic Council, in which the new fundamentalist preachers called for religious reform. They tried to convince traditional Islamic leaders to change the way they interpreted the Koran, and challenged the Islamic Council's links to the state and Frelimo.

A doctrinal issue became symbolic of the confrontation: wearing shoes in mosques. The Prophet prayed in his shoes, in part to be different from Jews and Christians who did not pray in socks or shoes. But the shoes should not have dirt on them. Later, as mosques had carpets, worshipers took their shoes off, to avoid dirtying the carpets, and this became normal custom. Thus fundamentalist preachers insisted on wearing shoes in mosques.

After these meetings with local authorities and the Islamic Council, some preachers were expelled and even arrested and mosques were forced to close. Fundamentalist religious leaders and their followers went elsewhere in Cabo Delgado or to Tanzania. In other places tacit agreements were reached and fundamentalist mosques and madrassas were allowed to continue.

Videos and CDs of speeches by radical preachers in Tanzania began circulating in Cabo Delgado and increasingly radical material was available on the internet. By 2013 there were already reports of jihadi sects in Mocimboa da Praia. There were the first references to "al Shabaab", which simply means "the youth" in the local Arabic; it is used by both members and the general public and has never implied a link to al Shabaab in Somalia. In 2015 there was a local confrontation in Pangane, on the coast of Macomia district, as militants tried to prevent the sale of alcohol. There were increasing reports of parents not sending their children to state schools and instead sending them to madrassas.

The challenge to the state was becoming direct, in a way that had not happened since 1976. Then, at the height of the anti-religion period, Jehovah's Witnesses had demanded to be allowed to be separate from the state; many were arrested and forced to move to remote areas of Zambézia and Tete. With the opening to religion in the 1990s, the flood of missionaries were careful not to challenge the state. The Brazilian Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus (IURD, Universal Church of the Kingdom of God) has become powerful by not challenging the state. Members gained important posts in the state administration, notably in justice; IURD has a TV station and had sent missionaries to Cabo Delgado by 2000.

Like the Jehovah's Witnesses four decades earlier, some fundamentalist preachers wanted a society separate from the Mozambican state, with a caliphate under Islamic law. By 2015 there was a consensus among some of the radical sheikhs that discussion would not shift the Islamic Council, Frelimo and the state, and that more militant action was required. Some of the new mosques were on normal housing compounds with a house at the front and mosque and madrassa of local construction behind. There was an open space between the buildings which began to be used as a training ground for future guerrillas. In some districts, training camps were opened in the forests. Religious groups were creating military cells.

The radicalisation of followers was built on the changing situation of young people in Cabo Delgado. The saying "dry grass burns more easily" is cited. Education had improved and most young people had at least primary or madrassa schooling, and saw themselves as educated and did not want to be like their parents - farmers with nothing but a hoe, or fishers standing in the waves with a net. Corruption was increasing, and the presence of wealthy people and mining and gas contractors in 4x4s stressed the rising inequality.

By 2015 there were major land concessions for the gas and mines; farmers, fishers and artisanal miners were pushed off land. Resettlement proved unexpectedly difficult because huge land concessions to the resource companies meant there was actually a shortage of good farmland and of land along the coast. Nice resettlement houses have been built with electricity and piped water, but the resettled farmers and fishers have no way to earn a living to pay the electricity and water bills. And the mine and gas projects produce few formal sector jobs. Young people argue that they were being deprived of a share of the province's natural wealth.

Cabo Delgado is Mozambique's most marginalised province. It is not the poorest province, but it has the highest inequality, highest illiteracy rates, highest child malnutrition, lowest access to health facilities, worst housing, and fewest children in school. There is severe poverty and inequality, especially group inequality, and unequal access to land and jobs, which was being made worse by displacement caused by mining and gas. It was easy for radical preachers to say that a Frelimo elite was eating the wealth, and that traditional Muslim leaders were part of a Frelimo-linked elite. Fundamentalist Islam was presented as more egalitarian.

Mosques and churches are important social support centres for communities across Mozambique, helping those in need. Some of the new mosques in Cabo Delgado began to give money to local people who could not get finance from banks or government to start businesses; some were successful and created desperately needed jobs. In Chiure young people were given sacks of onions or potatoes. Children attending madrassas received food and sometimes money, which was important for poor large families.

3. Cholera, vampires and lions - 'they' want us dead

In 1999 there were angry local demonstrations against cholera-prevention and treatment teams, who were accused of spreading the disease rather than treating it. In Cabo Delgado province, in Montepuez two health workers were killed and in Mecufi a crowd attacked and burned a cholera treatment and isolation tent. In neighbouring Nampula province, there were attacks in 5 mainly coastal districts. In 2001 there were more cholera riots in Nampula. In Memba a local chief (*regulo*) was beaten and accused to having been paid to put cholera in the water to kill local people. In Nacala-a-Velha, 66 houses were burned, many belonging to local leaders who had attended an anti-cholera meeting and who were accused of having been paid at the meeting to spread cholera.

Researchers were sent to coastal Nampula and they were shocked to find that many people believed the local elite wanted them dead. This linked in with the common local beliefs in vampirism - the elites want to drink their blood (*shupa-sangue*) or at least sell it, and that elites want to kill them to steal and sell their organs.

Muidumbe district, Cabo Delgado, is one of the areas affected by the current civil war. Back in 2002-3, 24 people were lynched. They were accused of magically commanding 7 lions who ate 46

local people. All accused were important people – district administrator, chiefs, members of Frelimo, and a local businessman. What is important here is that many people believe that local elites don't just want to exploit them, they want to drink their blood and steal their organs. They command lions. They want "us" dead. And the protests are against authority figures who are often only a little bit richer and more powerful than those protesting, but seen as distant, arrogant, and, most importantly, not delivering.

Then in early 2009 there was another outbreak of the cholera war. In Cabo Delgado in coastal Mecufi, angry local people attacked an anti-cholera team. A nurse, a driver, and six others were beaten. In Pemba, local people burned down three tents which had been set as a cholera treatment centre - accusing the local elite of bringing cholera to Pemba to kill them. Further south but still along the coast, in Nampula province, in Moma district one person was killed by police and three injured as a crowd of 300 attacked a health post. A man called Folgado, wounded by the police, said he was proud of destroying the health post because it stopped health workers bringing cholera into the area - "we are tired of dying of cholera". In Mogincual, two Red Cross volunteers were beaten to death, and in Angoche a policeman was brutally killed. Finally police arrested 48 people and packed them into single tiny cell; 13 died of suffocation. To local people, it was a vivid demonstration that police and elites wanted them dead.

Thus, in looking at the Cabo Delgado civil war, it is important to recall this violence and the sincere belief of many people that elites want them dead and they are acting to defend their lives and those of their families.

In 2016 police evicted thousands of artisanal miners from the ruby fields that had been given to Montepuez Ruby Mining (MRM). The entire value chain was broken and thousands lost their income - traders, suppliers and farmers as well as the actual miners. The repression led to a radicalisation. In January 2019 Gemfields, majority owner of MRM, agreed an US\$8.3 million out-of-court settlement to settle 273 claims of death, beatings and other human rights violations by mine guards. But the violence continues. Twice in February 2020 there were coordinated invasions by very large numbers - estimated 500-2000 - of artisanal miners of the huge MPM ruby mining area near Montepuez. An MRM patrol car was burned and its occupants badly beaten. MRM director Asghar Faqhr said the attackers seemed to have "military style preparation and command".

4. Rapidly changing violence

The first shot of the new civil war was a large attack on Mocímboa da Praia on 5 October 2017. The date was carefully chosen - it was the day after the Peace Day holiday, and most officials were away at a Frelimo rally in Pemba, so there was no resistance. The raid targeted 3 police stations and was led by 30 armed men who killed 17 people, including two police officers and a community leader. The attackers took firearms and ammunition and told residents that they rejected state health and education, and wanted a separate Islamic state. The attackers were not all young men, and leaders included businessmen with Tanzanian links and two Tanzanian religious leaders. Funding came from illicit local networks and trade in timber, charcoal, rubies and ivory. Some attackers were people who had received money to set up businesses and were told they had to join the attack.

Al Shabaab used the publicity of the Mocímboa da Praia attack for recruiting, locally through friends and informal networks. Recruitment went further afield, to poor areas of coastal Nampula, including Memba and Nacala-a-Velha, and north into Tanzania. Artisanal miners evicted from ruby and other mines joined. Initially these were young people who thought they could change Mozambique through al Shabaab. Later, recruiters made promises of cash, employment and even scholarships abroad.

Al Shabaab expanded rapidly from a small group of perhaps 50 militants in local mosques to an armed force of about 300 people. This group had the ability to attack the state and sow panic among local communities. There were small attacks on villages, especially targeting people who had dropped out of al Shabaab or who had been given money but failed to join the war. The

attacks sometimes targeted the richest person in the village, perhaps the family with a motorcycle or even a bicycle. Initially these were religious groups that had formed guerrilla cells. Young people whose families had lost land or suffered extreme poverty joined, sometimes with support of their families. The militants built up an intelligence network with families, giving mobile phones and small amounts of money to report on troop movements. Local safari guides showed them the best local routes. Market traders told them when soldiers were being paid so that they attack that night when soldiers were drunk in the market. Similarly they were able to time attacks after deliveries of food and weapons. Local people were paid to make replica government military uniforms so that the guerrillas could stop traffic on roads and move in disguise.

The response was a large presence of the army and special police units - Special Operations Group (*Grupo de Operações Especiais* - GOE) and the riot police (*Unidade de Intervenção Rápida* - UIR). But it became a classic anti-guerrilla operation, in which slow moving military groups try to catch rapidly moving groups of three or four people communicating by mobile telephone. Indeed, slow-moving large military and police units were increasingly tied down trying to protect themselves and villages from attack. Violence by the police and army against communities had a radicalizing effect, building support for the insurgents. Hundreds of people were arrested in late 2017 and early 2018, held for months, and tried (illegally) in secret. Journalists were also arrested and held illegally. There is considerable fear and mistrust in Cabo Delgado. But as happened with cholera, taking up arms seems sensible to some who see no future and feel that elites want them dead.

The war by "al Shabaab", as it is called locally, has shifted rapidly over two years, from religious groups turned guerrillas into a much more organised military guerrilla presence. This includes: A shift to a **semi-territorial strategy**, in which it dominates, but does not attempt to control, growing parts of rural areas and their roads and small towns. This allows the control of trade and the ability to tax. Control of northern Macomia district and the small coastal fishing ports such as Quiterajo allow the insurgents to control or at least tax the illegal timber and other trades from the interior to the coast. Powerful men linked to al-Shabaab already controlled much of the illegal timber trade in Macomia.

There are **bases** but for the most part groups are small, often three or four people, living in the bush or in a community, who are brought together for military actions.

Training was initially ad hoc, in part using foreigners with military experience in the Great Lakes and Tanzania, as well as people who had been dismissed from the police and border guards. But there is now evidence that demobilised Renamo and government soldiers are being paid to provide training. Some al-Shabaab recruits have been told to join the army to get military training.

Recruits were initially disaffected youth, such as street traders in Mocimboa da Praia. They were joined by others, including displaced artisanal miners and army deserters saying they were not prepared to die for a miserable army salary. But it appears that the supply of willing local recruits may be drying up, and there has been a move into neighbouring provinces of Nampula and Niassa to recruit young men with promises of jobs. The government's response has been to say people should never believe such recruiters, because there are no jobs - itself a shocking admission that points to the core of the problem.

Much is made by government of the insurgents being "faceless", not identifying themselves or stating demands. This could reflect the Islamic concept of Taquiyya, or deception, which is permitted in war or situations of persecution to avoid fatalities. This could include not making clear that a target of the insurgency is a separate Sharia state, and not exposing leaders and representatives to capture or attack.

The war has created a large number of refugees - more than 100,000 according to UNHCR in February 2020 - many of whom have lost everything including their identity documents. The displaced complain of having no food, houses, and livelihoods. To some extent the refugees support Frelimo because government is giving them a little food and shelter - although there are continued complaints of hunger among the refugees; corruption is sometimes blamed, with refugees saying they see aid food being sold along the roads. But refugees are not trusted and sometime harassed by police and military. A repeated lament is a total lack of trust - within families and groups, and between individuals and the state and elites.

5. Global or local?

Global forces have had unchecked influence in Cabo Delgado in part because it is so far from the capital, Maputo. The mining and gas companies have almost unquestioned power. Missionaries have free reign. Foreign heroin, timber and ivory traders work openly. The neoliberal economic model imposed in the 1990s and IMF spending caps have led to no support for domestic job creation and limited spending on education.

At the local level, Cabo Delgado is one of the most "corrupt" provinces because local officials and local elites have more unchecked power. This has led to growing wealth and inequality. And the conflict between elites and ordinary people is demonstrated by belief in vampires and elites spreading cholera, and the willingness to take violent action to defend themselves against the belief that elites want them dead.

And on both sides there is a convergence of interests and collaboration between local and global. The 1990s global message that "greed is good" is still the motto of many in Frelimo and the elite, who act on a view that the free market which makes them rich will also lead to development "trickling down" to the poor. And to a small group it does, although not to the poorest. The close links between global business, legal and illegal and from gas to heroin, benefit the elite but money passes down the chain in contracts and sub-contracts and bribes to officials and police. At the lowest level, some in Frelimo and with low civil service jobs gain enough money to be seen by their neighbours as better off even though they are relatively poor. In attacks, this is enough to make them targets.

Meanwhile people facing hardship or crises often turn to churches or mosques. Fundamentalist preachers provide support and answers. The message from local and foreign sheiks is that fundamentalist Islam will support them against the elites taking all the wealth. And calls to join armed action follow the pattern of responses to cholera and vampires.

Islamic State (ISIS) has claimed several of the attacks by the local insurgents, and government blames foreign forces for the attacks. There is no evidence for any involvement of Islamic State, but it seems to suit Islamic State, the insurgents, and the government to foster the belief that there is a connection.

There are a number of Islamic insurgencies in Africa, some of which have continued for up to two decades. They are constantly changing, but the roots are more often local than foreign. For example, recent research shows that the drivers of Boko Haram and Islamic extremism in Nigeria are poverty, regional inequality, environmental stress, migration, youth unemployment, and state corruption and human rights abuses - exactly the same drivers as in Cabo Delgado. Some fundamentalist preachers have been called religious entrepreneurs - looking for poverty, inequality, corruption and other local grievances which can be used to mobilise and make Islam the flag to fight for truth and justice.

It is useful in this context to look at military tactics and strategy. Hit and run attacks on villages and roads, and attempts to cut traffic and commerce, are reminiscent of early Renamo. This has been followed by the use of these tactics to expand the area of influence, creating large numbers of refugees and pushing out communities and government. The tactics are to attack villages and small towns to gain dominance over rural areas, and to use rare attacks on larger towns for publicity. The January 2020 attack on Bilibiza follows this pattern with a large force moving across 40km in an important area and heavily damaging government installations, without serious military challenge. Where people remain they sometimes support the insurgents, which leads to military repression and forcing people to become refugees, which in turn creates new supporters. This is the Renamo model, a domestic model of military actions. So far there have been none of the hallmarks of Islamic attacks, such as suicide bombers.

Foreign mining and gas companies and heroin and ruby traders have all distorted the local economy in ways that increase inequality and discontent. Foreign fundamentalist preachers have used that discontent to promote an insurgency with the goal of creating an Islamic state. Thus there is undoubtedly a foreign role in the insurgency.

But the inequality is fuelled by Mozambican greed and corruption and economic policies that increase inequality. And the sheiks organizing guerrilla forces appear to be Mozambican. Young Mozambicans are fighting for food, housing, land, dignity and a more just society, against an elite that they believe wants them dead. Islam has become the flag to follow, in their quest they see fundamentalist Islam as the way to regain dignity and redress their poverty.

In 2019 there was a tendency in government to blame ISIS and argue that this was a war being waged against Mozambique by Islamic State or other "external forces". But in 2020 there has been a subtle change in rhetoric. The new Interior Minister Amade Miquidade said on 24 February that he had no doubt that "somebody from outside is financing these activities." He added that the attacks were done with "sophisticated resources" and involved "people of other nationalities". He seemed to accept that this is a local civil war, with foreign support.

Is the government coming to understand that although the global cannot be ignored, the local is most important? And when it looks at the global, will it remember that the global is not just Islamic militants, but mining companies and timber traders as well?

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27 February 2020

Relevant published articles

- "Bishop of Pemba writes on the insurgency in Cabo Delgado" Club of Mozambique 19 July 2019 citing Carta da Moçambique and giving a link to the Portuguese text of the pastoral letter. <http://bit.ly/2Y2PuiA>
- Habibe, Saide; Salvador Forquilha and João Pereira (2019). "Radicalização Islâmica no Norte de Moçambique: O Caso de Mocímboa da Praia" <http://bit.ly/IESE-CaboDelgado> and "Islamic Radicalization in Northern Mozambique: The Case of Mocímboa da Praia" (http://www.iese.ac.mz/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/cadernos_17eng.pdf)
- Hanlon, Joseph (2009). "Mozambique: the panic and rage of the poor", *Review of African Political Economy* 119, March 2009.
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- Morier-Genoud, Eric (2019). "Tracing the history of Mozambique's mysterious and deadly insurgency", *The Conversation*, 18 February 2019 <https://theconversation.com/tracing-the-history-of-mozambiques-mysterious-and-deadly-insurgency-111563>
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Weimer, Bernhard (2018). "Vampires, Jihadists and Structural Violence in Mozambique. Reflections on Violent Manifestations of Local Discontent and their Implications for Peacebuilding"

Yanacopoulos, Helen and Joseph Hanlon, eds. (2006). "Civil war, civil peace". Oxford, UK: James Currey.

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Background reading

Special reports

Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroina>

Gas for development?

Gas_for_development_or_just_for_money?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasEng

Gás_para_desenvolvimento_ou_apenas_dinheiro?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasPt

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: bit.ly/MozPoverty

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

\$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) bit.ly/MozAR-debt

Election study collaboration: We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicycletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

Two more will be available shortly to download:

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

These are still available for sale:

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

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Mozambique media websites, Portuguese:

Notícias: www.jornalnoticias.co.mz

O País: www.opais.co.mz

@Verdade: <http://www.verdade.co.mz>

Carlos Serra Diário de um sociologo: <http://oficinadesociologia.blogspot.com>

Mozambique media websites, English:

Club of Mozambique: <http://clubofmozambique.com/>

Zitamar: <http://zitamar.com/>

Macauhub English: <http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/>

AIM Reports: www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news

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