

MOZAMBIQUE News reports & clippings

483 27 April 2020 Editor: Joseph Hanlon (j.hanlon@open.ac.uk)

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Massacres by both sides & press restrictions

Information has only come out in the past week about the massacres two weeks ago by the insurgents in Xitaxi, which killed 50-70, mostly young men, and in a series of attacks on civilian boats by the military on Ibo island which have killed 18-48, including a local Renamo leader.

Reports are confused and sometimes conflicting, which is exacerbated by the increasingly severe limitations on the press. Palma community radio journalist Ibraimo Mbaruco has been missing since he was taken, apparently by the military, on 7 April; there are growing fears that he has been "disappeared" by the military. And for its regular Wednesday Maputo press briefings, the General Command of the Mozambican Police on 15 and 22 April only invited state media, Radio Moçambique (RM) and Mozambique Television (TVM), and excluded all private and independent media. MISA (Media Institute of Southern Africa) in a critical 24 April statement suggested this was a response to private media criticism of police behaviour.

Comment: We have no independent sources and as the newsletter title "News Reports & Clippings" makes clear, we report what is in the media. The media crackdown has, we think intentionally, made people in Cabo Delgado afraid to report. This leaves the field open to rumour, error and exaggeration. The best we can do is apply a plausibility filter and cite the sources. (See also the background note below.) *jh*

Xitaxi massacre confirmed

The Mozambican police have confirmed the story first published in Pinnacle News (8 April) and Savana (10 April) that insurgents killed at least 52 people on 8 April in Xitaxi. Muidumbe district, on the N380 road where it divides with the N380 going north to Palma and a branch going up the hill to Mueda.

Cited by Radio Mozambique (21 Apr), the spokesperson for the General Command of the Mozambican police, Orlando Mudumane, said insurgents "cruelly and indiscriminately shot dead 52 youths in the village of Xitaxi," He said that in their attempt to recruit young people to their ranks, they encountered resistance, and reacted by murdering those who refused to join.

Investigative journalist Armando Nhamumbo who wrote the *Savana* article disagrees with the police interpretation and the numbers. (*Savana* 24 April) He says that local people were called to a meeting at 13h00 and people of all ages were there, from children to the elderly. The insurgents

began to behead people and when people tried to flee, they were machine-gunned. The 52 dead were the bodies found by the police on the site. But Nhantumbo says others, although seriously injured, fled to the bush, where they died. He estimates the total dead at more than 70.

Nhantumbo also disputes the cause. The dead were not all young men. Instead the massacre was in retaliation for an attack on the insurgents the day before, when veterans of the liberation war killed more than 30 insurgents in a battle.

Savana says that Muslim coastal villages are now largely controlled by the insurgents. It appears the attacks on Muidumbe district were an attempt to push inland and up onto the Mueda plateau. Xataxi at the foot of the plateau is largely Christian in a zone with an historic catholic mission. The Makonde from the plateau formed the core of the initial independence guerrilla force and still form a key part of the army, faced with such a weak response from the military, it was left to independence war veterans and the families to stop the insurgents climbing up the hill.

Ibo 'police state'

"Security forces turning Ibo Island into murderous police state, locals say," was the *Zitamar* (23 Apr) headline. Arriving boats were attacked on 12, 16 and 21 April, with estimates of civilians killed ranging from 18 to 48.

In an unusually detailed statement on 23 April, Renamo national spokesperson Jose Manteigas accused the armed forces (FADM) of murdering defenceless civilians on Ibo. He said that on 12 April, a boat carrying people and goods from Pemba was intercepted as it arrived at the Ibo jetty. FADM members allegedly dragged the boat under the pier, and opened fire against the occupants. Manteigas gave the names of eight people who had been killed, including the Renamo head of mobilisation in Ibo district, Momade Chabane, and his son, Samuel Momade, who was also a member of Renamo. The killers threw the bodies into the sea. The Renamo statement is on <https://bit.ly/Renamo-Ibo>

Other reports said 12 people were killed, but *Carta de Moçambique* (24 April) said 40 people were killed and that the attack was by members of the riot police (UIR, Unidade de Intervenção Rápido). Most people on the boat were traders carrying merchandise, and the riot police took all the goods they had been transporting, says *Carta*.

Ibo has a large military presence and many refugees from the mainland, notably from Macomia and Quissanga, which have been repeatedly attacked. But many residents fled Ibo after insurgents attacked neighbouring Quirimba island on 10 April. On 22 April the Ibo administrator ordered the reopening of district offices of health, education and others which had been closed after the attack on Quirimba, and gave civil servants who had fled six days to return to work.

Controlling a key corridor

Insurgents have been moving over the past two months to control a key 100 km east-west corridor south of Macomia and the Quirimbas national park. See map on <https://bit.ly/BilibizaMap>. This is an area of only 3 main roads.

- + The N380 is the only paved road from Pemba to the gas fields. Going north it crosses the washed out bridge over the Montepuez river and runs north through Nangololo to Macomia and then further north to Muidumbe where there were further attacks, including the massacre at Xitaxi.
- + Just north of the Montepuez river there is a dirt road going east from Montepuez through Meluco, which then crosses the N380 south of Nangololo and goes to Bilibiza and then ends at Mahate at the coast, where it joins
- + a dirt road runs from Quissanga, an important coastal port, south to Pemba; 10 km south of Pemba is Mahate, with the road west to Bilibiza, and the road continues south over the Montepuez river (over a bridge which is also washed out).

Control of this zone south of the Quirimbas park and north of the Montepuez river gives the insurgents the ability to tax and attack all west-east and south-north traffic. The move from Quissanga to Quirimba island was straightforward. Ibo is the obvious next target, because control of Ibo and Quirimba would give the insurgents control of coastal shipping as well.

These are recent incidents reported in this corridor:

Qurimba. After the Qurimba island attack on 10 April, a large group was taken both to carry goods taken from the market to Quissanga, and to serve as shields against the Dyke helicopter gunship. Some were quickly released, but 26 young women and 15 young men are still being held - the men apparently to be guerrillas, which is a further indication that the insurgents are following the 1980s Renamo model of kidnapping school-age young men as fighters. There are rumours of similar kidnappings from other villages,

Quissanga. Insurgents have been living alongside locals since Quissanga was occupied on 25 March. Officials and many residents fled to Pemba, and the insurgents exert some control over daily life for those who remain, reports Zitamar (24 Apr). They encourage those in the town to pray every morning, and encourage fishers to continue, but demand a portion of the catch for themselves. On Sunday 19 April insurgents played - and won - a football match against the local youth, according to a source employed by the district administration, who has sought refuge in Pemba. The insurgents are staying in the unfinished new building of the Quissanga secondary school, the source said. Zitamar says that the insurgents are trying to win hearts and minds in coastal areas, but are being much harsher inland.

Mahate, the village 10 km south Quissanga at the junction of the roads going west to Bilibiza and south to Pemba. Local people have been encouraged to take food from a warehouse with aid for the victims of cyclone Kenneth that hit the area just over a year ago. (Zitamar 24 Apr)

Bilibiza, 30km southwest and inland from Quissanga. Insurgents have banned the sale of alcohol and tobacco. In one incident, locals helped insurgents collect firewood for cooking; on their return to the town, insurgents fired into the air, causing local traders to flee - allowing the insurgents to distribute food to the local people, in particular the elderly. (Zitamar 24 Apr)

Cagembe, 20 km north of Bilibiza. Insurgents are issuing travel passes to peasants to allow them to tend their fields without fear of assault. (Zitamar 24 Apr)

Nangololo, on the N380 between Macomia and the junction of the east-west road, has had three attacks and decapitations in the past week. Four people were decapitated during the 18-19 April weekend. Four men in Imbada village were surprised by attackers while participating in a funeral ceremony on 22 April, and were beheaded. Three more people were beheaded in the nearby village of Unguia on 25 April. (Zitamar 24 Apr; @jasminechic00)

Foreign support arrives in Pemba

Two pictures of foreign military support at Pemba airport have been posted on 25 and 24 April by Portuguese journalist Nuno Rogerio on his Facebook. Both are confirmed to be Pemba airport, but without a date. The first (right) shows the arrival of unidentified African troops.

The second photo (below) shows a drone which he identifies as a Viper 1000/Helix ISR UAS, alongside a Cessna Caravan, both from Ultimate



Aviation of South Africa. The Viper is a South African design. The Viper 1000 has night vision capability and comes with command and control centre on a double axle trailer. It has an 18 m wingspan. <http://ultimate-aviation.net/viper-1000c/>



Africa Intelligence (22 April) says that President Filipe Nyusi has turned to mercenaries because South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola and SADC refused requests for help. But apparently no one told the South Africa government and an embarrassed State Security Agency first learned about the Dyck Advisory Group helicopters from video footage on social media.

Foreign aggression?

"The authorship of the attacks has been claimed by the Islamic State, a terrorist organisation, which shows that we are facing foreign aggression perpetrated by terrorists," declared the National Defence and Security Council (CNDS), a body that advises President Filipe Nyusi, at its 23 April meeting in Maputo. (AIM 24 Apr)

In the attack on Mocímboa da Praia on 23 March, TVM said that the insurgents included two men "of Asian origin", one of whom was killed by the military. "The presence of Asians contributes definitive proof that the terrorist group acting in Cabo Delgado has strong links with Islamic State," writes the Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (CEEI, Strategic Studies Centre) of Universidade Joaquim Chissano (formerly ISRI, Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais, and with close government links as the diplomatic training institution). CEEI's Security Brief 2 is on <https://bit.ly/CEEI-2> (Portuguese only).

CEEI: Strategy only military but army unable to confront insurgents

"Dozens" of government soldiers were killed in the Mocímboa attack, says the CEEI report, in what is perhaps the most candid analysis of government failures to be made by a public institution. It argues that the insurgent "group proved that it is evolving and that it has a great capacity to quickly adapt its tactics, operating modes and military targets," yet the government is failing to win over the population and the military has neither the equipment nor the leadership to defeat the insurgents.

In its analysis of insurgent strategy, CEEI says: "In the beginning, terrorists primarily targeted unguarded villages, considered easy. However, its modus operandi evolved, starting to attack road

traffic. In the attack on Mocímboa da Praia, unlike the attacks in the villages, there was no beheading of people as had become usual. In addition, there was a use of heavy artillery. Considering this, we can affirm that the objectives of these attacks were quite clear: 'to show real military strength to the political leadership of the country.' This time the terrorists aimed only at military and economic targets, mainly state institutions. As proof of this, when they arrived, they sent local people away, saying that they only wanted to attack and confront the FDS." FDS (Forças de Defesa e Segurança) is the defence and security forces, the army as well as the riot police (UIR) who are doing much of the fighting.

Criticising the government response, CEEI says: "The Mozambican government is conducting a strategy to neutralize terrorist groups that does not match the needs on the ground to isolate groups from their main source of survival: the people. The strategy employed until today only contemplates military actions that involve attacks against terrorist camps and the constant pursuit of terrorists in the bush. Members of the armed group began to circulate in larger groups, with more than 30 men approaching villages without being identified or even being harassed by the armed forces. This reveals an authentic inability of the FDS or, even more serious, a high level of infiltration of the terrorists in the FDS, a high level of complicity of some members of the FDS with the group, or even a sign of incompetence of the commanders seconded to direct the operations in that region. What is most frightening is not simply the government's inability to suppress this genocidal insurgency, but the reports that indicate that the military equipment used is inadequate and outdated. The Mozambican military are inadequately equipped to confront terrorists and there are no signs that the situation will change rapidly."

"It should be noted that the terrorist group intensified the attacks after the FDS started an offensive in the last quarter of 2019, aimed at exterminating the terrorist group and destroying its bases, with the help and support of Russian mercenaries. But the operation failed to kill or capture the insurgents. At the time, the FDS claimed to have caused huge casualties in the group and boasted of the number enemy casualties. There was an excess of optimism on the government side as they believed that the situation was under control and there was a relaxation of surveillance that proved fatal. In response, the terrorist group, which previously only attacked villages, started a terror campaign targeting the FDS with ambushes on military patrols and attacks on garrisons, camps and military bases. The attack on FDS positions has become normal and shows that the terrorist group has improved its capabilities. According to sources, the terrorists who attacked the towns of Mocímboa da Praia and Quissanga were heavily armed and briefly took control of the villages in a clear display of strength. According to some military and eyewitnesses who watched the assault in Mocímboa da Praia and Quissanga, terrorists are, in general, better trained and better equipped than government officials and the Army. The return of the FDS to the villages was not result from the deployment of new reinforcements or a counter-offensive, but from the "will" of the terrorists." In other words, the FDS was allowed to return. The report is on <https://bit.ly/CEEI-2>

The CEEI report ends by pointedly citing a 2014 US Institute of Peace report "Why do youth join Boko Haram?", which says "Addressing the conditions that make it possible for insurgents to recruit young men in Nigeria can significantly diminish the strength of the insurgency, if not eliminate it altogether." <https://www.usip.org/publications/2014/06/why-do-youth-join-boko-haram>

Elsewhere

Pemba. The people of Paquitequete, a dense older neighbourhood on the shore of Pemba, evicted the police in a demonstration on 21 April, which included blocking local streets with burning tyres. Many displaced people fleeing insurgent attacks in Quissanga and Mocimboa da Praia have recently arrived in Paquitequete, and police clearly fear that insurgents could have arrived with the displaced people. On 14 April police illegally detained journalist Izidine Acha, a journalist who photographed them beating a local people - police forced him to delete his pictures, but the beating was filmed: <https://bit.ly/Paquitequete> Police have imposed at 19h00 curfew on Pemba (although they have no right to do so) and were trying to enforce it on 21 April when local people resisted. Police fired shots into the air and used tear gas against the crowd, but they proved unable to

disperse the protesters, who remained on the road linking Paquitequete to the centre of Pemba. Finally, the police withdrew. (*Carta de Moçambique* 23 Apr, Moz24h 22 Apr)

Palma. Soldiers shot and killed four named civilians, according to Renamo in its 23 April statement. No date was given. *Carta de Moçambique* (27 Apr) reports that an important Islamic leader, Sheik Kidume, has been kidnapped. Journalist Ibraimo Mbaruco, apparently kidnapped by the military on 7 April, remains missing.

Beira. Two police have been arrested for beating to death a 44-year old man, Abdul Razak, in Beira on 19 April. Police had dispersed a group of adolescents playing football, in defiance of the rules of the Covid-19 state of emergency. Police picked up their ball, and began to play football themselves. Razak criticised the attitude of the policemen and said he would film them. Two policemen turned on Razak and began beating him with their guns. Passers-by urged the policemen to stop the violence, but they ignored all such appeals. The badly battered Razak was thrown into a cell in the Beira fourth precinct. Three hours later, his relatives found him there and demanded his release. "They demanded beer from us and 300 meticaís" (\$4.50), said Razak's sister. "Since we wanted our relative, we paid the money and he was released. But he was very weak and on the way to the hospital he died". The autopsy says that Razak died of trauma caused by being struck with heavy objects. (AIM 21, 22 Apr; STV 21 Apr)

Background

We are following the war on a disparate set of sources, and these are open and useful:

In English:

Zitamar (partial paywall): <https://zitamar.com/>

Club of Mozambique <https://clubofmozambique.com/>

Eric Morier-Genoud @emorier

Jasmine Opperman @Jasminechic00

<https://www.facebook.com/paolo.israel>

(AIM is subscription only. There are also various paid newsletters by security companies)

In Portuguese:

Carta de Moçambique <https://cartamz.com/>

Moz24horas <https://www.moz24h.co.mz/>

@Verdade <http://www.verdade.co.mz/>

@LutarCaboDelgado

@pinnaclenews79

O Pais (partial paywall) <http://opais.sapo.mz/>

(*Savana* is subscription only, the weekly *Canal de Moçambique* is not electronic)

Transcription of place names from local language into Portuguese is inconsistent. Thus Xitaxi is also known as Shitashi, and Nangololo is on maps as Nangororo.

Saturday (25 April) was the anniversary of the 1974 overthrow of fascism in Portugal by the Armed Forces Movement, largely to stop the unwinnable colonial wars, and which brought independence to Mozambique the next year. The independence war in Mozambique had started in 1964 in Chai, Macomia district, Cabo Delgado, which is now the centre of the new insurgency.

"Fog of war" is the title of an 1896 British book which describes "the state of ignorance in which commanders frequently find themselves as regards the real strength and position, not only of their foes, but also of their friends." But the concept draws on 1830s analysis by the Prussian military analyst Carl von Clausewitz. (Wikipedia)

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Covid-19 cases will continue to increase until end of year, says minister

The government is hoping to delay the peak of Covid-19 infections as a means of protecting the Mozambican health system from being overwhelmed, according to Health Minister Armindo Tiago. "Right now, what we are trying to do is push the peak to between December 2020 and February next year", he said Tuesday 21 Apr. (AIM 22 Apr)

The number of people in Mozambique known to have been infected with the coronavirus that causes the respiratory disease Covid-19 has jumped by 30 Friday to Sunday (24-26 Apr), to a total of 76. All of the new cases are at the Total gas construction camp on Afungi, Cabo Delgado, which has two-thirds of all detected cases. The other 20 are in Maputo and Matola. Of the 76 cases, 8 are imported and the rest are local transmission. There have been no deaths. The Ministry of Health publishes a daily bulletin on <http://www.misau.gov.mz/index.php/covid-19-boletins-diarios> A good up-to-date summary is on <http://www.misau.gov.mz/index.php/covid-19-boletins-diarios?download=288:suma-rio-epidemiologico>

The Ministry is stressing testing, contact tracing, and enforced isolation of contacts, which has led to the identification of a large group at the Total camp. The worry is that the disease is spreading in other places and has not been reported. One case reported Thursday is of a Mozambican man, resident in Matola and aged over 30, not known to have had any contact with the Afungi camp and not having been outside of Mozambique recently. Many of the cases detected in Afungi are asymptomatic but still contagious - meaning people did not know they were infecting others.

STV reported a suspected Covid-19 case who was not home when health officials arrived to check on him, and who had broken quarantine to attend his mother's funeral in Magude, Maputo province.

More than 1000 cultural and tourism establishments have closed and at least 5000 people have lost their jobs, according to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Museums, libraries, schools, beaches, bars and casinos are closed; groups over 10 people are banned; these are some restrictions on public transport. Restaurants and bottle stores are allowed to remain open, but many restaurants and tourist resorts have closed. The largest poultry producer in northern Mozambique, Novos Horizontes, says it has huge quantities of unsold chickens on its hands because most of the clients had been hotels, restaurants, and take-aways, which have closed. It says it has 380 tonnes of frozen chickens in its freezers and 170,000 live chickens ready to be slaughtered.

There is growing evidence that the state of emergency and restrictions are being ignored in many parts of the country. Police arrested a protestant pastor and his assistant in Zavala, Inhambane, who violated the state of emergency regulations by holding a religious ceremony attended by over 300 people. In Nampula city and Nacala, there is no attempt to ensure social distancing. Crowds of people continue to gather in formal and informal markets, at shops and banks, and in buses and minibuses. Drivers and passengers in minibuses are supposed to wear masks and the loading is restricted, but this is ignored. (AIM 22, 23, 24, 25 Apr; O Pais 27 Apr))

Security Brief 2 by the Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (CEEI) of Universidade Joaquim Chissano has a detailed analysis of the economic and social impacts of Covid-19 on Mozambique, noting in particular that it will increase poverty and inequality. It also warns that "The possibility of total confinement of a population that survives from daily work on a self-employed basis is a challenge for countries such as Mozambique. The possibilities for greater resistance, demonstrations or the occurrence of acts of violence and vandalism cannot be ruled out. ... If the government fails to approve a package of assistance for the people who will suffer most from the economic crisis resulting from the closure of economic activities, there will be an upheaval. ... If the state does not inject huge sums of money into the economy to rescue companies and sectors at risk that are considered essential, the popularity and legitimacy of the government will be questioned." CEEI's Security Brief 2 is on <https://bit.ly/CEEI-2> (Portuguese only).

Is lockdown feasible?

South Africa has the most cases and deaths in Africa south of the Sahara, with 4,546 cases and 87 deaths. Because of different country sizes, it is easier to compare the rate per million population - South Africa has 77 cases per million and 1 death per million, compared to Mozambique with just 2 cases per million and no deaths. Zimbabwe and Malawi have 2 deaths each and 2 cases per million population; Tanzania has 10 deaths and 5 cases per million. (These are low compared to Europe and the US, which have 2000 to 5000 cases per million population and 200 to 500 deaths per million population. Portugal is seen as a success in curbing the disease, but still had 2,300 cases per million and 186 deaths per million.)

With relatively high numbers, South Africa imposed a complete lockdown to try to stop the spread of Covid-19. The choice as presented is cruel and stark for individual families - to suffer real and serious disruption and even possible hunger by maintaining social distancing (to step the spread of the disease), or to continue approximately normal life only to have a significant chance of major disruption due to family members seriously ill with Covid-19 and some perhaps dying.

A new study headed by Sam Jones at the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER) argues that most people in Mozambique, even in urban areas, do not meet the most basic conditions for lockdown or isolation, namely safe drinking water, adequate sanitation at home, and a source of reliable energy. Many more depend of a daily income to survive. They say: "Rather than blindly replicating policies from higher income contexts, we recommend practical alternatives to a complete or general household lockdown. While this must be designed locally, ideally with community engagement, part of such a package must involve extensive testing and tracking to identify virus hotspots, as in Vietnam, as well as extensive prevention measures. And even if a lighter form of lockdown must be enforced, large-scale social protection programmes (such as cash transfers) and basic service expansion (such as mobile drinking water stations) would be required to avoid an even greater catastrophe."

<https://theconversation.com/the-five-criteria-low-income-countries-must-have-in-place-for-lockdowns-to-work-136263>

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Hidden debt and keeping \$ away from government

As part of the donor attempts to not give cash to government, the European Union signed an agreement with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on 22 April for the UNDP to manage a Mozambique post-cyclone recovery fund with \$37 mn from the EU. (AIM 22 Apr)

The IMF announced Friday 24 April that it would disperse \$309 mn under the IMF's Rapid Credit Facility to allow the country to meet health and other costs of Covid-19. But IMF Deputy Managing Director Tao Zhang made clear this emergency funding does not mean a new IMF programme for Mozambique. That is still to be negotiated and will require "strengthened debt management and transparency" and "structural reforms". The Public Integrity Centre (CIP) in a statement the next day called for civil society to monitor the use of this money and for the government to create a formal mechanism to do this. <https://cipmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ORÇAMENTO-PARA-COMBATER-O-COVID-19-1.pdf>

Donors no longer trust government to manage aid after the \$2 bn secret debt scandal. Thus it was seen as government thumbing its nose to the donors when Maria Isaltina Lucas, the finance ministry national budget director who signed the illegal government guarantees on some of the \$2bn secret loans in 2013-4, was recently appointed as an adviser to Prime Minister Carlos Agostinho do Rosário. Under pressure from people within Rosario's office, she has now resigned rather than further embarrass the Prime Minister. (Mediafax 21 Apr)

Police sold 100kg of seized drugs on black market

Over 100kg of the 430kg of heroin and methamphetamine seized last year in Cabo Delgado was stolen by police officers in Pemba, which continued until the remaining drugs were taken to a secret warehouse. The drugs in question were intended to serve as evidence during the trial of the traffickers, who are being held in the local maximum security prison in Mizeze. A spokesman for criminal investigation service Sernic recently denied that Mozambique was a drug-trafficking corridor on the grounds that no drug seizures had been verified since 2018. (*Carta de Moçambique* 21 Apr)

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"Mozambique News Reports & Clippings, number XXX", DATE, bit.ly/mozamb, accessed XXX.

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on bit.ly/mozamb

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Background reading

Special reports

Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT>

Gas for development?

Gas_for_development_or_just_for_money?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasEng

Gás_para_desenvolvimento_ou_apenas_dinheiro?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasPt

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: bit.ly/MozPoverty

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

\$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) bit.ly/MozAR-debt

Election study collaboration: We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

Two more will be available shortly to download:

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

These are still available for sale:

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

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Mozambique media websites, Portuguese:

Notícias: www.jornalnoticias.co.mz

O País: www.opais.co.mz

@Verdade: <http://www.verdade.co.mz>

Carlos Serra Diário de um sociologo: <http://oficinadesociologia.blogspot.com>

Mozambique media websites, English:

Club of Mozambique: <http://clubofmozambique.com/>

Zitamar: <http://zitamar.com/>

Macauhub English: <http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/>

AIM Reports: www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news

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