

# MOZAMBIQUE News reports & clippings

491 22 June 2020 Editor: Joseph Hanlon ( [j.hanlon@open.ac.uk](mailto:j.hanlon@open.ac.uk) )

To subscribe: [tinyurl.com/sub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/sub-moz)

To unsubscribe: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

This newsletter can be cited as "Mozambique News Reports & Clippings"

Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.

---

## Important external links

Cabo Delgado civil war weekly report - Zitamar, MediaFax, ACLED - <http://bit.ly/CaboLigado>

Covid-19 daily updated data and graphs <https://covidmoz.netlify.app/>

Previous editions of this newsletter: [bit.ly/MozNews2020](http://bit.ly/MozNews2020)

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

---

## Also in this issue:

### Police death squad jailed

---

## Tony Blair Institute calls for foreign military intervention in Cabo Delgado

As well as technical support and training for the Mozambican police and military, "the international community should consider other forms of direct military assistance to Cabo Delgado," the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change said Wednesday (17 July). "For almost three years, the ISIS-affiliated extremist group Ansar al-Sunna has spearheaded an insurgency in Mozambique's northern province of Cabo Delgado," the report says, and argues that "in the context of Islamist extremism across the African continent, the situation is not unique." <https://bit.ly/BlairCabo>

"We see a strong risk of the security situation deteriorating further over the next 18 months unless a coordinated transnational effort is launched to assist national authorities to counter Ansar al-Sunna," the report continues. It recommends "The US, UK, EU and other actors provide technical support and training" to the Mozambican police and military.

The report puts overwhelming stress on outside Islamic involvement. But it admits the militant group "exploits Islam and local grievances to recruit members and uses its regional and global links to train and arm them. Ansar al-Sunna's message has resonated with disgruntled youth in Mozambique. The group's hard-line narrative positioned its idea of puritanical Islamic government as a panacea for decades of political exclusion, unemployment and poverty, which are more prevalent in the Muslim-majority areas of the north."

The Blair Institute argues that "Ansar al-Sunna is a home-grown insurgency amplified by transnational networks" that is now so strong that it requires external support "to counter and prevent Islamist extremism." But after seven recommendations on political and military intervention, it's last recommendation is "support the government of Mozambique to address underlying socio-economic drivers of extremism in Cabo Delgado through targeted developmental, educational and vocational interventions."

**Comment:** Tony Blair has a history here. As Prime Minister of the UK, he used false claims of Islamic weapons of mass destruction to promote the disastrous invasion of Iraq in 2003. From 2001 to 2007 he strongly backed Gadaffi in Libya in order to gain his support against militant Islam in Africa and Afghanistan. Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan have never recovered and their wars continue. *jh*

## Catholic bishops say cause of war is internal, not external

"The cause of so much suffering [in Cabo Delgado] has deep roots in the time when the people were forgotten", declared the Catholic bishops' Episcopal Conference of Mozambique (CEM) in a statement released on 15 June. The bishops are directly challenging the government claims that the causes of the war are foreign. And they call for using mineral and gas resources to develop Cabo Delgado.

The bishops also appeal not just to feed the suffering, "but also to intervene in the causes, not just to regain order, but also primarily with development projects, and the local use of the resources of the province for infrastructure, jobs, and essential services such as health and education."

English article and bishop's letter in Portuguese: <https://bit.ly/BishopsCaboD>

## Police and military fight over who controls the war - and contracts

The riot police and the Ministry of Interior are running the Cabo Delgado war, but the army and Defence Ministry are fighting to take over. Always known collectively as the Defence & Security Forces (Forças de Defesa e Segurança - FDS), under Nyusi it was the paramilitary riot police (UIR, Unidade de Intervenção Rápida) that had the senior position and did the key fighting, from the 2013-15 fighting with Renamo and continuing in Cabo Delgado. The new turf war was reported by *Africa Monitor* (Lisbon, 12 June). The struggle appears to be about trust and money .

The goal is to control foreign military support, which could involve lucrative contracts. Police General Commander Bernardino Rafael signed the contract with South African mercenary company Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) to supply the helicopters, light planes and drone now in use in Cabo Delgado. *Africa Monitor* says that DAG is contracted to supply six combat helicopters, which are currently in use in Libya, leased to Eric Prince's Frontier Services Group. Prince also has companies in South Africa. Military chiefs say that Rafael and DAG are using the wrong type of equipment, simply adapted from civilian helicopters. They say in the attack on Macomia, the helicopters had to keep interrupting their missions to fly 100 km back to Pemba for refuelling. Currently Mozambique has only one attack helicopter of its own, a Russian-built MI-8, and the military say it would be sensible to buy more equipment for the military to allow it to fight the war.

The military point to the close Frelimo network. Nyusi, Rafael, and Cabo Delgado big man Alberto Chipande are all Macondi from Mueda. Interior Minister Amade Miquidade has military experience and headed UIR. *Africa Monitor* says Miquidade, in turn, has close economic and security business links with former president Joaquim Chissano and with former security minister Mariano Matsinhe. *Africa Monitor* claims Matsinhe, in turn, has links with the multinational security company G4S and with Eric Prince.

On the other side, Nyusi does not trust the military. In February he sent a team of close confidants to investigate, who reported both that senior military were lying to the president, but also that information on military plans was leaking to the insurgents, *Africa Monitor* says. In January, Nyusi appointed Jaime Neto as Defence Minister. Neto has no military experience, and comes from Vilankulo, Inhambane. This could be interpreted as a way to keep the military weak and subordinate and away from the Macondi group controlling the police.

---

***More on the Cabo Delgado war below***

---

## Police death squad jailed, but those at top protected

A police death squad was jailed on 18 June for gunning down civil society election observation organiser Anastácio Matavele in Xai Xai, Gaza, on 7 October, just before the election. But the court blocked all attempts to identify who gave the order and refused to hold the state responsible.

The group was only caught because after the drive-by shooting they were involved in a traffic accident which killed two members of the death squad. A third disappeared after the accident and is still on the run. Convicted were the head of the paramilitary riot police (UIR, Unidade de Intervenção Rapido) unit that carried out the killing and the commander of the UIR's special operations group (GOE, Grupo de Operações Especiais), as well as two GOE members who took part in the murder. They were each sentenced to 23-24 years in jail. Two other UIR officials were fined 40-45,000 Meticas (\$570-\$640) for lying and trying to cover up the crime. The owners of the borrowed car used were acquitted.

Matavele's family and their lawyers argued that this was an official mission ordered at higher level. All those involved were police using guns formally handed out to them by the UIR. All were taken off other police duties for two weeks to prepare. Three were subsequently promoted. And the police supplied their lawyer at the trial.

The prosecution argument was that this was all organised by Agapito Matavele (no relation), who ran away from the crash and is conveniently missing, and the motive was a personal dispute which was never explained.

Matavele's family's lawyers petitioned the court to ask for the defendants mobile telephone records for the days before the murder, which might have shown if they were talking to people at higher levels, but this request was refused. Mozambique's constitution says the state is liable to compensate for damages caused by its agents, but the court in Gaza refused compensation on the grounds that the police were not acting for the state.

CDD (Centro para Democracia e Desenvolvimento) followed the May trial and published daily reports, some also in English, on <https://cddmoz.org/boletim-sobre-direitos-humanos/>

## Resources

**Gas writedowns raise Cabo Delgado questions:** BP on 15 June wrote down (reduced the value of assets in its accounts) the value of its gas and oil assets by \$17.5 bn and writing off gas assets it will not now develop. Chevron wrote down its gas assets by \$11 bn last December, including cancelling a major Canadian LNG project. The write-downs reflect the opinion that responses to climate change and Covid-19 are making permanent economic changes, and that high prices and demand for gas will never return. Exxon Mobil has delayed its final investment decision in the Cabo Delgado gas field, Mozambique's National Petroleum Institute head Carlo Zacarias said on 4 June. On 18 June Zacarias estimated that for Cabo Delgado to be viable, oil prices (on which gas prices are based) would need to be \$45-60 per barrel. The current price is \$27 and BP said it was planning based on an expected \$55, but many oil experts said this was overoptimistic. The gas bubble has burst and the giant companies are now saying there will not be a market for all the gas available, at least at a price that makes it worth developing. Will at least some of Mozambique's gas be left in the ground?

**Sasol paid too little tax** on its gas and oil operations, according to an audit commissioned by the INP (National Petroleum Institute). "Recoverable costs" are capital expenditure and operating costs which are charged before profits are calculated. The audit showed that for the two years 2017 and 2018 Sasol charged \$263 mn in recoverable costs, but the audit found \$100 mn was not eligible to be recoverable costs. The \$100 mn should be subject to tax. Sasol denies the allegation.

**Coal dust from open cast mining** carried out by Brazilian firm Vale and India's ICVL is polluting the air, water and soil in the province, to the detriment of the population's health and livelihoods, especially farming and fishing, according to a survey by Mozambican NGO Sekelekani. A separate secret report known to Vale and government showed the same thing last year. (Zitamar 17 June)

**The Administrative tribunal has ordered Indian Mining company Jindal to resettle a further 70 families** within six months from the village of Cassoca, Marara, Tete. The families are currently living within the coal mining concession area. The dispute has been running for 10 years and the number of families increased because children have become adults and had children and established homes of their own in the village. The tribunal found that Jindal had failed to follow the resettlement agreement it signed a decade ago. Importantly, the 70 families will be provided not just houses, but the means to earn a living. (*Carta de Moçambique* 17 June)

**Coal companies lost \$3.4 bn in 2019**, according to the state accounts. The big losers were Revúboe, Vale, MidWest Africa and Ncondezi. Five other of the Big Projects did make a total of \$152 mn profit. They were Sasol, Mozal, Moma heavy sands, Indal, and ICVL Benga. Thus tax from the Big Projects fell to \$128 mn. All together, the Big Project employ 7,533 workers, of whom 537 are foreign. (*Carta de Moçambique* 17 June)

**Mpanda Nkuwa** has a new director, Carlos Yum, who has been transferred from being administrator of the state electricity company, EDM, where he was replaced by Marcelino Gildo Alberto. The dam would be built downstream from Cahora Bassa, and has been a dream for many years. The problem is that to be built it needs a long contract with a buyer of much of the electricity, and South Africa - the obvious buyer - is not interested.

## Other news

**Another Limpopo valley and Chokwe irrigation programme** was announced by Agriculture & Rural Development Minister Celso Correia on 11 June. A 100,000 ha special economic zone will be established with \$8.6 mn of government money, in an attempt to boost production. The Chokwe and Lower Limpopo irrigation schemes cover 50,000 ha, of which only 21,600 ha is being used. Local farmers complain about lack of an assured market at a reasonable price, as well as lack of finance, machinery, and water. (AIM, 19 June)

**Personal comment:** My very first article on Mozambique was published in *New Scientist* on 24 August 1978 and was about attempts to boost Limpopo production by two early agriculture ministers. In the 42 years since then, every agriculture minister has tried to boost Limpopo production, and all have failed. In the neo-liberal era, the private sector tried, and also failed. Every attempt faced two core problems - the giant Portuguese colonial irrigation scheme was badly designed with incorrect water supply and drainage, and Limpopo rice cannot compete with cheaper imported Thai rice. A 2009 World Bank report actually suggests Thailand rice as a model for Africa; this involved small farmer commercial rice production promoted over many years with a high level of support and subsidy that has never been allowed in Mozambique. We cite it in chapter 1 of our 2014 book *Chickens and Beer (Galinhas e Cerveja)*. Perhaps Correia is the first agriculture minister with enough political power to support family commercial farming, and the new World Bank representative might actually support it since the Bank itself has promoted Thai rice production as the model for Africa. *jh*

**45 new Covid-19 cases** were reported Sunday by the Ministry of health, the highest daily number since 6 June. One new death has raised the total to 5. Nine people are in hospital, of whom one is in intensive care.

The 45 new cases are distributed as:

Cabo Delgado: 22 (Pemba - 18, Palma - 3, Ancuabe - 1)

Provincia de Maputo: 8 (Marracuene - 1, Moamba - 1, Namaacha - 5)

Cidade de Maputo: 7.

Nampula (cidade de Nampula): 6

Zambézia (Morrumbala): 1

Gaza (Xai-Xai): 1

Four provinces have the most active cases (people who have not died or recovered yet):

Maputo city: 75 active cases, 6.8 per 100,000 population

Cabo Delgado: 125 active cases, 5 per 100,000 population

Nampula: 218, 3.5 per 100,000

Maputo province: 52, 2.4 per 100,000

National: 547, 1.8 per 100,000

Pemba and Nampula are now officially areas of community transmission, and Maputo and Matola are expected to be added to the list shortly. Total number of cases has risen to 733 but the doubling time has dropped back to 17 days.

**UK ends 'giant ATM in sky':** Following the model of most other donors, the UK announced on 16 June that its separate aid ministry (Department for International Development, DfID), would become part of the foreign ministry (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO). In his announcement Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that the 0.7% of GDP would be maintained, but that more of aid would be used to promote UK business and diplomatic interests. Some aid will be taken away from Africa and given to eastern Europe, which is more important to a post-Brexit Britain. "For too long, frankly, UK overseas aid has been treated like a giant cash-point in the sky, that arrives without any reference to UK interests," Johnson said.

**Bednets survive 2 years:** A follow-up study of 1000 insecticide treated bednets distributed in three provinces showed survival in serviceable condition after 36 months was 57% in Inhambane, 43% in Tete, and 33% in Nampula, corresponding to median survival of 3.0, 2.8, and 2.4 years. However, while insecticidal performance was still optimal up to 24 months, at 36 months it dropped significantly - only 3% of samples showed optimal effectiveness in Inhambane, 11% in Tete and 29% in Nampula. The study traced specially labelled polyethylene 150-denier long-lasting insecticide nets (Royal Sentry® and MAGNet®) distributed during a 2017 mass campaign. (*Malaria Journal*, 17 Jun 2020)

<https://malariajournal.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s12936-020-03282-w>

### Dates:

**Saturday 20 June:** 100th birthday of Eduardo Mondlane, born 20 June 1920 in Manjacaze. Killed 3 February 1969.

**Thursday 25 June:** Independence day. 45th anniversary of formal independence in 1975 and the 58th anniversary of the founding of Frelimo in Dar es Salaam in 1962.

## Cabo Delgado civil war

**Violence reporting:** For more detailed reporting, we recommend *Cabo Ligado*, an excellent weekly report on the Cabo Delgado war produced by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) with Zitamar and MediaFax in Maputo. <http://bit.ly/CaboLigado>. Subscription is free, on <http://bit.ly/CaboSub> - go to the bottom of the form and select the Cabo Ligado option.

The Ministry of Defence now has its own website <https://defesamoz.info/contrainsurgência> linked to a Facebook page <https://www.facebook.com/Noticias.Defesa20/> with Cabo Delgado war reports.

## Heavy fighting in Macomia and near Mocimboa da Praia

The past month saw the occupation of Macomia town with major destruction and continued fighting along the N380 road that runs through Macomia, as well as major fighting in the coastal areas of Mocimboa da Praia district as mercenaries dislodged insurgents from one or more bases, and incidents on the coast of Macomia district. This report is based mostly on Cabo Ligado and Intelysse.

There appear to be five different insurgent groups, probably based along the coast south of Mocimboa da Praia and near Quiterajo, and inland, at Bilibiza, south of Macomia, and near Miangelewa. (See map)

Insurgents are better equipped and on 27 May Interior Minister Amade Miquidade, said insurgents were using drones for reconnaissance. This had been reported by local people. On 26 May the World Food Programme (WFP) said it had shut some of its warehouses in areas affected by insurgency.

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) announced on 5 June that it is withdrawing from the Macomia as a result of the destruction of its health centre in an attack; it had 27 staff. MSF had closed its operation in Mocimboa da Praia after the insurgent occupation there in March.

Private military contractor Dyke continues operations, but with problems On 15 June a Dyke micro surveillance Bat Hawk aircraft crashed near Miangelewa, Muidumbi district, in dense forest near the N380 main road (see below). The pilot was seriously injured but, using the locator beacon on the plane, was located and rescued by helicopter. The plane was probably trying to find insurgent bases hidden in the very dense forest.

There are 211,000 internally displaced people due to the Cabo Delgado civil war, UNHCR estimated in an 18 June statement. This is 10% of the province's population. More than 5000 of them are in Nampula province, according to INGC on 19 June.

**Macomia and the N380.** The N380 is the only paved road from Pemba north to Mueda and Mocimboa da Praia and the gas fields. The section from the Montepuez river through Macomia district town up into Muidumbe district has been attacked repeatedly. Insurgents had occupied Miangelewa and Xitaxi in Muidumbe and finally withdrew on 22 May. Soldiers dismantling a barricade found two bodies. Insurgents attacked a village south of Macomia on 24 May.

Around 100 insurgents attacked Macomia district town and at least five villages along the N380 road, including Chai north of Macomia and Koko south of Macomia, on 28 May. The attackers were dressed in Mozambican security force uniforms and armed with rocket-propelled grenades and a Chinese-built armored personnel carrier equipped with a W85 heavy machine gun captured from government forces. After a brief but intense battle with Mozambican forces stationed in the town, government troops fled.

There was organised destruction of homes, government buildings, shops, and other sites associated with government and religious authority. Targets included the central market, jail, town hall, health centre, primary and technical schools, police station, World Food Programme office, agricultural extension office, and a mosque. Insurgents are now sabotaging electricity and telecommunications infrastructure, and they destroyed the Movitel and Vodacom installations and a major electricity transformer on the outskirts of town, plunging surrounding areas into darkness on the night of 28 May. State electricity company EDM said the districts of Macomia, Meluco, Quissanga, Ibo and Muidumbe were left without electricity

Defense forces regrouped and supported by helicopter gunships from Pemba by private military contractors Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) recaptured Macomia on 31 May. But Chai was occupied until 1 June, and almost all buildings in the village were burned down, except the Catholic church. The town is now mostly abandoned.

Local people report 29 civilians and 10 member of the UIR riot police were killed in Macomia, 6 in Chai and 5 in Litamanda by insurgents. Defense Minister Jaime Neto claimed that the Macomia operation killed 78 insurgents, but *Cabo Ligado* notes that returning civilians found no insurgent bodies and the government has produced no evidence to back up their claims.

Macomia was already hosting 30,000 displaced people for surrounding villages, and many fled southwest toward Montepuez.



On 29 May insurgents were ambushed in the town of Nova Zambezia while they were travelling through the town with looted goods taken from Macomia that day. Insurgents responded by attacking the village the next day. Of 52 villages in Macomia district, insurgents have attacks 37.

Intelyse (3 June) writes: "The capture of Macomia arguably supplants the 23 March sack of Mocimboa da Praia as the insurgency's most significant victory to date. While insurgents have frequently launched attacks in Macomia district, the capital was largely perceived as secure, with thousands of IDPs from areas impacted by the insurgency fleeing to the town in recent years. Macomia was also garrisoned by significant numbers of police and military personnel, which had been bolstered in recent months as the government has slowly moved to counter the insurgency. Warnings of an attack were also reportedly relayed to security forces in the town days before the insurgent assault, a sufficient amount of time for security forces to have further strengthened their defences in the town."

Attacks along the N380 continued. On 3 June the village of Imbada, south of Maomia, was attacked and three people beheaded. Insurgents fired at a group of refugees who were attempting to return to Macomia. On 13 June security forces clashed with insurgents in the Chinda area. On 16 June houses were burned in Koko, which had been attacked on 28 May. On 19 June Xitaxi was attacked again, shops looted and houses destroyed. There was fighting with government security forces.

## **Mocimboa da Praia**

Fighting continues to control the strategic 100 km coastal strip from Mocimboa da Praia south to Pangane and Mucojo. On 9 June government and mercenary forces began a major offensive in the northern part of the coastal strip, against insurgents in areas surrounding Mocimboa da Praia, and residents reported insurgents fleeing through Mocimboa town and moving north. But further south insurgents seem to be maintaining their control of the coast of Macomia district. This section of coast is one of the top fishing grounds, and Minister of the Sea, Interior Waters and Fisheries, Augusta Maita said on 8 June that 5,000 fishermen were affected by the insurgent attacks - most ceased activities.

Insurgents issued warnings that no one should enter the coastal areas between Ulo and Lucete (Lucete. Luxete), saying militants control this 30 km swathe of territory hidden behind islands. Many local residents are avoiding this area, and many local farmers have also stopped tending fields in this area as well. On 5 June, insurgents killed two fishermen on a beach near Ulo, as they tried to reach their fishing boat that had been stranded by a low tide.

On 5 June, insurgents kidnapped girls in the Nabubussi neighborhood of Mocimboa da Praia as they drew water from a local well.

On 9 June government forces overran an insurgent base in Marere (Narere), about 40 km south of Mocimboa, which seems to have been important for controlling the coast. Three helicopters "bombed" insurgent positions. (It is not clear what "bombed" means.) Insurgents fled north through Mocimboa town, but attacked some villages along the way. Security forces on 10 June set up checkpoints and blocked the Mocimboa da Praia-Palma road to halt the insurgent flight. There was fighting between insurgents and Mozambican defense forces. On 11 June insurgents occupied the villages of Makulo and Cabaciera, 15 and 20 km north of Mocimboa da Praia, but were driven back by South African mercenary helicopters. Then on 14 June 40 insurgents entered the village of Malinde, northeast of Mocimboa da Praia town and just south of Cabaciera, setting fire to the local market as well as homes. Insurgents also reportedly killed 4 civilians. Insurgents then attacked a nearby Mozambican military base, but were repelled by Mozambican soldiers, who reportedly killed 15 militants

Some of the insurgents moved west and kidnapped at least 10 girls from parts of Mocimboa da Praia on 12 June, three of whom were sent back to the Chinda and Oasse (Awassi) to inform the villagers that the insurgents would return the next day. As a result, both villages have been

deserted. The attack happened on 17 June when insurgents attacked a farming centre between Mocimboa and Oasse (about 15 km south/west of Mocimboa): 4 casualties reported.

## Quiterão

The coastal area of Quiterajo and Mucojo of Macomia district is under insurgent control and has been the scene of a separate set of insurgent attacks, apparently without response from defence forces. *Carta de Moçambique* (22 June) reports that in the last two weeks, 27 people have been kidnaped. They include 14 young women. Of the 13 men kidnaped, six have been killed.

On 10 and 11 June ten heads of families were decapitated in Cabor near Quiterajo. Voice of America (12 June) claims they were picked out because they were Macondi. But this seems not to be true and local people say most were, in fact, Macua.

Pangane, a port on the Macomia coast south of Quiterajo, was attacked again, by insurgents on motorbikes on 15 June. Mefuze, Nanjaba and Nacotuco on the road from Pangane to Macomia town were also attacked 12-15 June. Ingoane just north of Pangane on the coast was attacked 12 June.

## Bilibiza-Quissanga

Villages of Tapara and Torono near Bilibiza were attacked 8 June. In Tapara insurgents killed out the villagers and asked who was Christian; one from Nampula was identified and killed. Three women were abducted and another person killed. Insurgents burned all the houses in the village and told villagers to go to Bilibiza, which they control. In Bilibiza, insurgents are allowing travel along the main road west to the N380 at the "ADPP-junction", named after the sign there pointing to the recently destroyed ADPP training college. But locals are banned from taking the minor road west along the Montepuez River through Tapara.

Insurgents seized the village of Ntapuate south of Quissanga on 19 June. They instructed villages to leave, which they did. Houses burned but no casualties. (<https://twitter.com/jasminechic>) Victor Novela, police operation commander told *Noticias* (19 June) that a group transporting 50 machetes had been neutralised near Cagemba near Quissanga. He added that, in operations in the regions of Ruarua, Rio and Ngure, the police seized firearms, uniforms and motor-bikes used to transport the terrorists. One of the motor-bikes had a Tanzanian number plate. Among the goods seized in this offensive was a military bed which, according to Novela, belongs to the army of a country in the Great Lakes region.

## Comments on Cabo Delgado

### Pemba bishop sees a resource curse

"So far, the resources have been a curse. Families have been removed from their homes; they have lost their fields, part of their culture and history because cemeteries have been devastated. Many people have still not been compensated and have nowhere to stay. And it seems that the whole province is being divided up and concessioned to big multinational companies. How much land is left in Cabo Delgado for cultivation, for people to plant and make a living? The province is looking like a Swiss cheese, full of holes because of these mines. If there is no control and fair distribution of the income, then the population will never benefit," said Luiz Fernando Lisboa, Catholic Bishop of Pemba, in a lengthy interview in *Savana* (15 June). The Bishop has become increasingly outspoken and come under increasing attack from Frelimo apologists and President Nyusi's praise singers who accuse Lisboa of inciting violence, hatred, disrespect for national symbols, and provoking division and racism in the diocese.

"Mozambique is very rich in resources. Here we have a few millionaires, but we are one of the poorest countries in the world. All the wealth has to be distributed. A person, a group of people or a company cannot profit alone from the impoverishment of others. Any resource must be turned to the benefit of the entire population, who are the first owner of the resource," Lisboa continues. "If we think, for example, of the Montepuez rubies that are said to be of the best quality in the world and of auctions millions of dollars, we ask ourselves: what is the population benefiting from? We are here and we are not seeing the benefits for the population."

The province is being forgotten, he says. "Look at a district like Chiúre, the most populous in Cabo Delgado, with only 3 secondary schools, for a district with many inhabitants. In the Mazeze region, with dozens of villages around, pupils only have up to 7th grade."

"If there is no job creation policy, especially for the youth, we will continue to lag behind and our youth will be co-opted for delinquency, for drugs, for the insurgency. Because of low schooling, lack of employment, lack of prospects, many young people are taken with insurgent groups."

"If there is no investment in youth employment, in youth training, investment in health, it is clear that we will continue in the worst human development rates not only in Mozambique, but in the world."

And he attacks President Nyusi's campaign promise of a hospital in each district, and corporate social responsibility gifts of ambulances. "Don't talk to me about hospital and ambulances, that's almost a joke to me. ... There is very little access to health yet. They say 'Ah, but lately hospitals have been built'. They have been. But hospitals are not enough. You need doctors, nurses and medicine. It's not enough to have a health unit if there's no medicine."

"But I'm not saying resources are always a curse; they should and can be a blessing. We have examples from various countries here in Africa," in particular citing Botswana. The full interview, in Portuguese, is on <https://bit.ly/Savana-Lisboa>

## Women are active insurgents

Some women "are active in the insurgency. They are not only being dragged and kidnapped. ... Some of them have been really active from the very beginning," says Liazzat Bonate, a Lecturer in African History at the University of the West Indies and a researcher on Mozambique and the Cabo Delgado war. And she points out that "a lot of women have been arrested" - sometimes to find their men, and sometimes because of their own activities.

Bonate stresses that the regional mix of matrilinearity and Islam has existed for centuries in coastal Cabo Delgado. "A particularity of Islam in this region is that there are traditional chiefs who are women and Muslims. Women are very important in this society and very influential, but they tend to be ignored by researchers and policy makers."

And she argues that having women fighters in the new insurgency should not be surprising. "We should not forget that this region area was in the liberated zones in the anti-colonial war. The women's detachment [Destacamento Feminino] also emerged in this region. Historians and researchers tend to downplay or not report that Muslim women made a very significant part of the first contingent of the female detachment." Muslim women were armed fighters.

Liazzat Bonate was a speaker at a Chatham House (London) webinar on the war in Cabo Delgado on 16 June. The webinar was part of series on the war organised with the World Bank. All sessions were closed except this one, where a video has been posted on <https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/webinar-finding-solutions-insecurity-cabo-delgado>. Bonate's intervention on women is at 1 hour and 10 minutes.

===

**Numbering error:** The 14 June issue should be number 490, not 489

=====

This newsletter can be cited as "Mozambique News Reports & Clippings".

If you need to cite it for academic purposes, treat it as a blog. The normal citation format would be:

"Mozambique News Reports & Clippings, number XXX", DATE, [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb), accessed XXX.

**Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material** are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

=====

## Background reading

### Special reports

#### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT>

2001 first article - English and Portuguese <https://bit.ly/MozHeroin2001>

#### Gas for development?

Gas\_for\_development\_or\_just\_for\_money?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gás\_para\_desenvolvimento\_ou\_apenas\_dinheiro?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

#### \$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

#### In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

**Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

#### Two more will be available shortly to download:

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

#### These are still available for sale:

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

=====

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.