Police ban demos and press conferences

Maputo police have stopped two press conferences and used violence against a women's peaceful anti-violence demonstration. All were legal and the police had no right to intervene. Peaceful demonstration do not need authorization, although authorities should be informed. Press conferences require neither authorisation nor notification.

Police physically prohibited a 19 January press conference by the Human Rights Network (Associação Rede dos Direitos Humanos, ARDH) to oppose a decision by the Maputo Municipal Council to raise the poll tax from $7.60 per year to $8. The tax is paid only by those in formal employment. When journalists and ARDH arrived at the site of the press conference, they found it blocked by the police. No explanation was given.

Police arrested the Maputo ARDH head for trying to speak to the press on 31 December. A press conference has been arranged in Xipamanine, Maputo, by ARDN to explain its opposition to an increase in bus fare from 16 to 18 US cents ($0.18). But when ARDN and reporters arrived, they saw a heavy police contingent on board a pickup truck and police blocking the entrance to the building. ARDN Maputo head Sergio Matsinhe then tried to address the journalists on the pavement, but was pulled into the truck by the police.

ARDH submitted a formal complaint to the Mozambican Attorney-General’s Office (PGR) on 24 January accusing two police commanders of illegal action in prohibiting the press conferences.

Police used violence to break up a peaceful demonstration protesting violence against women. The 7 December action was part of the United Nations international campaign entitled “16 days of activism for the end of gender-based violence”. The protesters gathered about 100 metres from the Maputo Palace of Justice, with the women accusing Mozambican institutions of justice are not acting promptly enough to deal with violence against women.
Police arrested 19 protestors and held them for several hours at a police station – and then released them without charge, apparently because the police realised that their actions were being filmed.

Under Mozambican law peaceful demonstrations do not require authorisation, but the organisers should notify the authorities four days in advance. One of the organisers, Quiteria Guirengane, said “We informed them of our demonstration on 29 November - nine days in advance…. And this morning the Municipal Police contacted us to clarify some details about the demonstration”. (AIM 31 Dec, 11, 13, 19, 25 Jan; Lusa 24 Jan)

**Demonstrations are expected today (26 Jan) against the introduction of tolls** next Tuesday on the Maputo ring road. The road opened five years ago and people have become accustomed to using it without tolls. But the government budget does not have enough money for adequate road repair, and it has been under pressure from the World Bank and others for more than two decades to impose tolls. The tolls will hit hardest the people who bought relatively cheap imported Japanese second hand cars, who are also hit by rising petrol prices. The toll is $0.63 for light vehicles, minibuses and motorcycles rising to $6 for heavy lorries. But the main public transport, minibuses called *chapas*, pay only $0.16. The state company Revimo runs the ring road and will collect the tolls; it already does this on the bridge to Katembe and road south to South Africa. Revimo is owned the state road fund (70%), the state pension fund (INSS, 15%) and Kuhanlha (15%, Bank of Mozambique Pensions Fund).

**Quitéria Guirengane is Savana’s person of the year**

*Savana* (31 Dec) named activist Quitéria Guirengane as its person of the year. She is head of the Women’s Observatory, a forum of 40 civil society organisations, and she was one of the leaders of the 7 December peaceful protest on violence against women. She was previously active in the Youth Parliament and now in a small political party, New Democracy.

*Savana* labels her “the new face of activism”, and the 31-year-old Guirengane is part of a new younger generation not linked to Frelimo but also largely outside electoral politics. Establishment civil society groups are mainly funded by donors and international groups who set the agenda (and often pay high salaries), at the same time their actions are circumscribed by Frelimo. Breaking up the 7 December demonstration underlined why many established CSOs are afraid to try even peaceful marches. But an educated and social media linked younger group is looking for new ways forward, and Guirengane is one of their faces.

**Storm Ana**

**Tete administrator killed as flood destroys key bridge**

Ana, the first tropical storm of the year, hit Ancoche Monday (24 Jan) and moved inland dropping heavy rain in Nampula, Zambezia and Tete provinces and Malawi. Flooding on the Revúbu River washed out a section of bridge cutting the main link between Tete and Moatize (photo below and [https://www.opais.co.mz/ana-mata-administrador-de-tete/](https://www.opais.co.mz/ana-mata-administrador-de-tete/)).

Four official cars were swept away when the bridge washed out, including cars with the governor, the mayor of Tete city, and the administrator of Tete district. The body of administrator José Maria Mandere was found this morning at Benga, 8 km downstream. Most people were rescued, although the mayor of Tete was injured and it was reported yesterday than 3 people were clinging to trees waiting to be saved by boats. The remaining officials remain stuck in Moatize and cannot return to Tete.
This bridge was only repaired in 2020 at a cost of $3.7 mn after washing out during Cyclone Idai in 2019. The Revúbué River was 4 metres above alert level and still rising yesterday. Heaviest reported rain on Monday was in Tsangano (262 mm) and Angónia (170 mm) in Tete and Tacuane (200 mm) and Mocuba (196 mm) in Zambézia.

Flooding on the Licungo and other rivers has also cut roads. There is also warning of flooding in Beira and rain induced landslides in Chimoio and Gondola. (Boletim Hidrológico Nacional 19, 25 Jan; https://bit.ly/Moz-Flood-2022; O País 26 Jan; Revúbué bridge pictures https://twitter.com/SigahTheDoc/status/1485950582678593538)

There have been 12 deaths so far reported. A woman and her child drowned in the flooded Licungo River in Mocuba. Seven people have been killed by flooding in Tete, and two died when a house wall collapsed in Manica. (Lusa 25 Jan)

**Resource curse**

**Another dream shattered as Vale sells its mine and railway**

Vale has agreed to sell its coal mine and railway to the Indian Jindal for just $270 mn. "The $270 mn is about 10% of what Vale and its partners borrowed from the banks in the days when coal appeared to have a future", comments AIM (22 Dec 2021). "It may seem hard to believe now, but at the turn of the millennium coal was hailed as a possible saviour of the Mozambican economy. But the hoped-for exports of over 100 million tonnes of coal a year (mn t/y) never materialised, and nor did the coal fired power stations that several companies promised to build at the entrance to their mines."

The Brazilian company Vale with the Japanese company Mitsui developed the mine and created the 912-km long Nacala Logistics Corridor railway line which runs from Moatize, including a new railway line across neighbouring Malawi, to the deep-water port at Nacala-a-Velha.

But climate pressure caused both Vale and Mitsui to want to pull out of coal. Mitsui gave its share to Vale for $1 just a year ago (21 Jan 2021). The mine and railway will now be sold to Vulcan, a subsidiary of Jindal, for $270 mn plus a royalty on coal produced. Jindal already operates the
Chirodzi open cast coal mine in Tete, with a capacity to mine 5 mn t/y. Vale’s Moatize mine has the capacity to produce around 15 mn t/y.

Jindal still wants coking coal for its steel making.

**Vale still owes money to people resettled a decade ago**

Mozambique's Bar Association (OAM) demands that Vale settle its compensation and indemnity lawsuits because of the “unjust and abusive” way in which 760 families were treated during the resettlement process in 2010. OAM says that Vale has failed to pay $19 mn in compensation owed to people resettled in “precarious and problematic” areas. OAM also filed a lawsuit with the administrative court to summon the land, environment and rural development ministry to impose a fine on Vale corresponding to 10% of its business for its failure to comply with the settlement plan. (Carta de Moçambique, AIM 11 Jan)

The issue relates to the classic problem of resettlement across all of the big projects in Mozambique, including the gas site of Afungi. The people resettled in Cateme had previously depended on selling vegetables in the city of Moatize. They were moved 40 km away and given houses (badly built) and only 1 ha of land (without water), and were too far away to travel in to Moatize to sell what they did grow. They were resettled but lost their livelihoods.

"VALE's poisoned gift to Mozambique" is the headline of a report by Estacio Valoi of the Investigative Journalism Centre. It outlines other communities hurt by Vale’s mining - through dust from the open cast mines to loss of livelihoods for tile makers and others. Published 18 January, it is only available in Portuguese https://cjimoz.org/news/o-presente-envenenado-da-vale-para-mocambique/ "Fifteen years ago, when the government of Mozambique signed the contract with VALE, almost everyone thought that coal would develop the country. This investigation exposes some of the destruction that VALE Mozambique is preparing to leave behind," writes Valoi.

**Coal exports fall sharply as Mozambique continues an extractive economy**

Aluminium, coal, electricity and heavy sands are Mozambique biggest exports, underlining that Mozambique is an extractive economy. Data from the National Statistics Institute for the first three quarters of 2021 show:

- **Aluminium** ($750 mn exports for first three quarters). Alumina imported from Australia is smelted using cheap electricity from South Africa, and all exported to South Africa.
- **Coal** ($721 mn) exported to India and China. But coal exports are falling dramatically, from $375 mn in the first quarter to only $117 mn in the third quarter
- **Electricity** ($428 mn) from Cahora Bassa exported to South Africa
- **Heavy sands** ($247 mn) for titanium, ilmenite, rutile and zircon, exported to China (41%) and nine other countries.

Government expects electricity exports to fall 13% in 2022 due to a planned reduction in electricity production by the Cahora Bassa dam. (Noticias 24 Jan)

Questions are also being raised about the Mozal aluminium smelter. Mozal’s 950 MW hydroelectric power contract to import cheap Cahora Bassa electricity expires in 2026. It is unlikely to be renewed because both Mozambique and South Africa want that hydropower. The Total LNG terminal due to open in Matola seems the most obvious source of fuel to generate electricity. But as well as raising the cost of electricity, this is a switch from hydro to a fossil fuel, and Zitamar (21 Jan) notes that the EU and other countries seem likely to start imposing taxes on the carbon content of imports. Mozal is owned by Australian company South32, which was created when BNP
Billiton was split in half in 2015. The smelter only exists because of cheap electricity, which could be ending.

**Mozambique's trade balance is sharply negative**, with imports of $6 bn in the first three quarters and exports of only $3.5 bn.

**But Drugs are really export number 2 or 3**

Drugs are not on the official export list, but they come third after coal and aluminium. The UK Navy recently stopped a drug dhow in the Gulf of Oman, surely on its way to East Africa. They seized 663 kg of heroin, 87 kg of methamphetamine and 291 kg of hashish and marijuana. The Ministry of Defence photo shows their small boat sailing toward a jelbot dhow, normally used for this trade. (BBC 23 Jan [https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-60103033](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-60103033))

The tonne of drugs is a typical cargo, and was valued by the MoD at $20 mn. In our paper on drugs ([http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin](http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin)), we estimated that up to 40 jelbot dhows with drugs reach Mozambique per year, which would thus have a value of up to $800 mn per year- or $600 mn in the first three quarters. This makes it the third biggest export for the first three quarters, but with the fall in coal exports it was number 2 in the 3rd quarter.

![UK MoD](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-60103033)

**The corrupt fight back**

Portuguese banker António Horta-Osório has been pushed out only nine months after he took over as chair of Credit Suisse to try to clean up a huge mess in lending, of which the $2bn secret loan to Mozambique was just one part. Officially he left because of breaking Covid-19 restrictions, but that is widely seen as an excuse to replace someone rocking a corrupt boat. He replaced Tidjane Thiam who had been pushed out in 2019.

Britain's attempt to adopt Mozambique's system of giving contracts to party people has been ruled illegal, but it appears the ruling will be ignored. The UK High Court on 12 January ruled that the operation of a VIP lane for suppliers of Covid-19 personal protective equipment recommended through the ruling Conservative Party was "illegal". The case involved a challenge to two contracts, for face masks and gowns which could not be used. ([Guardian 12 Jan](https://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2022/jan/12/britain-covid-19-personal-protection-equipment-vip-lane-illegal)

A *New York Times* investigation found that about half of $22 billion British government pandemic-related contracts "went to companies with political connections, no prior experience or histories of controversy". There was a secret VIP lane "for favoured companies, which proved to be 10 times more likely to win contracts than those outside that group". (17 Dec 2020; [https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/12/17/world/europe/britain-covid-contracts.html](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/12/17/world/europe/britain-covid-contracts.html)) The UK was adopting what has long been Mozambique practice for awarding contracts.
But it is clear that the UK will continue to follow the Mozambican model. The UK Treasury minister for counter-fraud, Lord Agnew, on Monday staged a dramatic public resignation over the government’s decision to write off nearly $6bn in fraudulent Covid loans. He said: “Schoolboy errors were made: for example, allowing over 1,000 companies to receive ‘bounce-back loans’ that were not even trading when Covid struck.” (Guardian 24 Jan)

Agriculture Fund head named to clean up is being smeared in a campaign to support her predecessor, who was convicted of a major fraud but is still out of jail, according to Carta de Moçambique (24 Jan). In 2018, previous Director General Setina Titosse was condemned to 16 years in prison for defrauding the Fundo de Desenvolvimento Agrario (FDA) of $3 mn, although she is still free as she has appealed. Titosse used a sophisticated scheme to paying high salaries to a wide range of Ministry of Agriculture staff by manipulating the electronic payments system and collecting part of the money. The highly respected Adélia Perpétua Magaia was named director general of the FDA last year and moved to make payments more transparent. This obviously hits those in the FDA and Ministry who benefit from inflated salaries, some of whom are now circulating an anonymous letter on social media attacking her.

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**Important external links**

- Cabo Ligado weekly report on civil war [https://www.caboligado.com](https://www.caboligado.com)

**Cabo Delgado**

Archive with reports, detailed maps, and census data [https://bit.ly/Moz-CDg](https://bit.ly/Moz-CDg)

**Special reports on the war**


**Mozambique heroin transit trade**


**Gas for development?**

- Gas_for_development_or_just_for_money?_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](bit.ly/MozGasEng)

**Background reading**

**Special reports**
Special report on four poverty surveys: bit.ly/MozPoverty

$2bn secret debt - in English

In Portuguese:

Election study collaboration: We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. http://bit.ly/MozElData
Election newsletters are on http://bit.ly/2Hs66Kg

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)
Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)
Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000 (2001)
Paz Sem Beneficio: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)
Apartheid’s 2nd Front (1986) <available shortly>

These are still available for sale:
Galinhias e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)
Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)
Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Mozambique media websites, English:
Club of Mozambique (free): http://clubofmozambique.com/
Zitamar (paywall): http://zitamar.com/

Mozambique media websites, Portuguese (all with partial paywall):
Noticias: www.jornalnoticias.co.mz
O Pais: www.opais.co.mz
@Verdade: http://www.verdade.co.mz
Carta de Moçambique https://cartamz.com

Mozambique think tanks and pressure groups, Portuguese:
Centro de Integridade Pública: CIP https://cipmoz.org/
Observatório do Meio Rural: OMR https://ommrz.org/
Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos: IESE https://www.iese.ac.mz/
Centro Para Democratia e Desenvolvimento CDD https://cddmoz.org/ (some CDD in English)
Also CDD now controls Fórum de Monitoria do Orçamento - FMO (main debt group) http://www.fmo.org.mz
and RMDDH - Rede Moçambicana dos Defensores dos Direitos Humanos (a human rights group).
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