

MOZAMBIQUE News reports & clippings

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Total CEO: No gas return until all displaced have gone home

'Its war' 'Security force not in control'

"We will not build a plant in a country where we'll be surrounded by soldiers. It does not work like that," Patrick Pouyanne, TotalEnergies Chair, CEO & President, told an investors conference call on 10 February. "Let's be clear, it's a war" and the security forces "do not today control the full Cabo Delgado"

TotalEnergies will only return when "the civilian population is back in the villages and with a normal life," he said. "And so we'll not relaunch the project as long as I see photos from refugee camps."

"The day after we declared the force majeure, we gave the money back. We stopped the letters" of credit, he said, adding "there is no pressure for us to exit out of force majeure".

"We have not decided at all to abandon the project, but we will only come back when we are convinced that basically we can come back, but not to leave after six months, because then that is the end of the matter," he told AFP. (10 Feb)

It was a strong and explicit message to President Filipe Nyusi. Palma was attacked on 24 March last year, just hours after Total issued a statement saying it would resume work based on a security promise from Nyusi. Pouyanne is saying promises from Nyusi will not do - he wants evidence the war is over, that normality has returned, and displaced people have gone home.

That is not going to happen this year, which will create problems for Nyusi. The Frelimo 12th Congress 23 to 28 September will make the key decisions about the balance of power in the party and the 2014 presidential election. Nyusi has staked his prestige on winning the war and having Total back in before the Congress - and it is not going to happen.

The Mozambique section of the transcript is on <https://bit.ly/Moz-Total-CEO-war>. The full transcript is on <https://bit.ly/3JqogWi>. A recording of the brief 1 Feb press conference of Patrick Pouyanné,

TotalEnergies chief executive, has been posted by *Zitamar* on <https://zitamar.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/PR-E-TOTAL.mp3>. In it he makes clear that although he would like the gas project to restart this year, that requires not just military security but that Cabo Delgado is "back to normality".

ISS: 'Can Frelimo's elites agree to share the country's riches?'

Five years after the start of the war, the government - with input from donors - is developing its first counter-terrorism strategy. The Resilience and Development Strategy for the North is the first official document to recognise internal factors. It cites socio-economic inequalities, frustration related to the exploitation of natural resources, especially among youth in the north, political and economic exclusion, and perceived marginalisation by the local population, write Borges Nhamirre for the South Africa based Institute of Security Studies (ISS, 8 Feb, <http://bit.ly/Moz-ISS-Nhamirre>)

But "the country's leadership and influential members of Frelimo still don't accept that there are internal grievances behind the Cabo Delgado conflict," Nhamirre writes. To accept this "would be acknowledging that its governance has failed. It would be admitting that instead of wealth and cohesion, it has generated socio-economic inequity, youth frustration and political and economic exclusion. Most importantly, Frelimo would need to convince its comrades that the current style of government must change. This would mean an end to party elites benefitting from business opportunities, jobs and the country's most fertile lands."

"A commitment to change is vital for the poor communities of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula – and the entire country – to also benefit from the country's riches, such as the Montepuez rubies, or the fertile lands of Macomia. Without this, the Resilience and Development Strategy for the North will fail and donor money will have enriched the elite rather than addressing internal grievances."

"The counter-terrorism strategy also needs to be implemented by credible bodies that have the trust of local populations – rather than those responsible for applying public policies that exclude the poor. For the strategy to succeed, there must be zero corruption, zero nepotism, and zero political patronage," Nhamirre concludes.

Don't believe people offering jobs and money, John Issa Mualo, head of Mueda militias, told young people. There are no jobs and these offers are from insurgents. Young people should go back to their farms, he said. (*Noticias de Defesa*, 9 Feb)

'Insurgency not as weakened as claimed'

President Nyusi visiting the EU in Brussels and at the African Union summit in Addis Ababa stressed that Rwandan and SADC forces are making significant inroads into beating the insurgents. But *Rhula Weekly* (2-9 Feb) said that the insurgency is not as weakened as claimed. Undoubtedly Rwandan forces have been successful in securing Palma and Mocimboa da Praia districts, but there have been daily attacks so far this month, mainly in Macomia, Quissanga and Nangade districts - as well as attacks in Meluco and Ibo districts in late January.

There is increasing use of roadside ambushes. Main attacks have been on or near the N380, the only paved road, and the insurgents may be attempting to close it. This is a SAMIN (SADC) zone and Rwandans are not present. A joint SAMIM-Mozambique patrol was ambushed near Nova Zambézia, Macomia, with one Mozambican soldier killed and five attackers killed. Insurgents killed at least six men and abducted 10 women in four ambushes on the N380 main road south of Macomia town. Trucks carrying construction material to repair a bridge were attacked and one driver killed. (*Rhula Weekly*, *Lusa*, *Zitamar*, *MediaFax*, *Africa News*, Cabo Ligado))

In Mucojo, coastal Macomia, four fishers were killed and their boats burned on 7 February.

On 7 February insurgents killed three people, stole food and burned houses in Nambedo, Nangade. The next day insurgents kill three people in Namwembe, Nangade.

IOM (UM Migration) reports 3316 people fleeing Meluco district during the week of 2-8 February and 549 fleeing Ibo district or displaced within the district in that week.

Zimbabweans are training Mozambican forces in Chimoio, President Filipe Nyusi said after a meeting with Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa.

Displaced encouraged to return, but not to Mocimboa da Praia

In Muidumbe and Palma, displaced people are beginning to return. Electricity and mobile phone service is restored, but banks are still closed and little money is circulating. Repairs are being made to the Amarula Hotel in Palma, not damaged by insurgents but looted by the police.

But the Cabo Delgado governor, Lusa Valige Tauabo, in a 4 February interview discouraged the return of people to Mocimboa da Praia. Rhula Weekly (2-9 Feb) suggests that "insurgents may likely have already infiltrated IDP populations and returning IDPs could, therefore, present an opportunity for combatants to infiltrate Mocimboa da Praia once again". And it may be easier to protect the port and airport of a ghost city.

Crisis Group: Talk to Terrorists

The foreign troops working with Mozambique's army have reclaimed significant territory from insurgents, while donor money has brought Cabo Delgado's population some relief. Yet these remedies alone are unlikely to resolve a conflict born of local grievances. With those untreated, the insurgency will persist as a source of regional insecurity," reports International Crisis Group in a 10 February briefing. "Mozambique's African partners should press Maputo to open dialogue involving political elites to set conditions that might persuade insurgents to surrender."

"Military operations by themselves are unlikely to eradicate a rebellion that has grown out of grievances felt deeply by large sections of Cabo Delgado's youth," reports ICG. "Without government efforts to address the insurgency's political roots, especially through dialogue, the civilian population of Cabo Delgado will probably have to live through a prolonged period of conflict."

"Despite being under military pressure, the insurgency is surviving. Many al-Shabab fighters have simply resumed living among the civilian population, including in internally displaced persons camps where they are biding their time, while also recruiting more youth. Mozambican and foreign forces deployed in Cabo Delgado have noticed more and more IEDs [improvised explosive devices] planted along the roads they patrol. These devices are rudimentary, often relying on the victim rather than a remote system to trigger detonation, but their increasing use suggests that the insurgents are deliberately moving toward more asymmetric warfare. Security sources believe it is only a matter of time before insurgents are able to acquire more sophisticated roadside bombs."

Insurgents not involved in illicit economy; the illicit is controlled by the elite and drives the war, says new study

"There is no evidence that [Cabo Delgado] insurgents have taken over any illicit economies. Rather, illicit economies seem to have contributed to the conditions which gave rise to the insurgency and continue to drive it: endemic corruption, elite economic capture and a lack of legitimate economic opportunities for large sections of the population," concludes the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) in its 27 January report. But it notes that "the insurgency is largely driven by resentment of endemic corruption and the feeling that local youths are having their futures stolen from them."

"The ways illicit markets operate reinforce structural and social inequalities as networks built on corruption at all levels ensure that the wealthy and politically connected benefit most," the report points out. "Local economic opportunity is viewed as being captured by the elite, or by foreigners who are allowed access to the resources under corrupt systems. This includes the illicit economies."

Insurgents in Cabo Delgado are not benefitting from, involved in, or profiting from the drug and wildlife trades nor in international people trafficking, reports GI-TOC. Largely because of violence and roads closed by insurgent activity, landing of heroin from dhows has moved south to Angoche and Nacala, while people trafficking has moved west to Niassa and Malawi.

The insurgents do kidnap, however: women and girls to serve as soldiers wives, some skilled people such as nurses and drivers are captured, and several foreigners have been for ransom.

("Illicit economies and armed conflict", GI-TOC, 27 Jan, <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/illicit-economies-armed-conflict/>). See also "The Global Organized Crime Index 2021, GI-TOC, 28 Sep 2021, <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ocindex-2021/>)

'Corruption in Cabo Delgado is now rife and leading to a major breakdown in law and order'

"High-level corruption and local government corruption in Cabo Delgado in particular are now rife and are leading to a major breakdown in law and order," warns GI-TOC.

And it is not just Cabo Delgado, but throughout the north of Mozambique. "There is virtual impunity for high-ranking politicians involved in criminal markets. Moreover, the police are described as the closest thing to a mafia group in the country, with law-enforcement officers often engaging directly in organized crime activities and acting as a hit squad for the government and ruling party."

"Most markets are dominated by networks of foreigners and local businessmen, with political corruption providing the protection for operations." Powerful families exercise control over some of the ports and have a strong presence in the biggest cities in the north. These groups have established tight relationships with Mozambique's political elite. The second channel for drugs (after dhows) is in containers arriving on cargo ships at Pemba and Nacala. This "is organized by networks of high-volume traffickers reputedly enjoying support from senior party and government officials."

In 2016, the Mozambican government introduced licensing that made informal mining technically illegal, so local police became essential to the market's functioning. Artisanal miners – *garimpeiros* – report "local arrangements with police, either through profit-sharing agreements or bribes ... Police may even run their own mining operations. There are also reports that police control and extort miners through the threat of violence. Police and security guards at concessions also

facilitate mining. [Miners] often bribe police to gain access at night, typically for a slot of two to four hours," notes the report.

Indeed, GI-TOC notes that within the illicit trade, the north is better organised and less violent. "The level of violence linked to illicit markets in [the north] is low. It is almost non-existent for drug traffickers or wildlife traffickers. ... Kidnapping between criminal net-works or gangs is more common in the south of the country, as is kidnapping for ransom. Assassinations are also a more common phenomenon in the south of the country."

Cyclone Batsirai avoids Mozambique

After crossing Madagaacar, Cyclone Batsirai last week made a sharp left turn and moved south in the Mozambique Channel and missed Mozambique completely.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) now posts very good **cyclone track information and satellite pictures of flooding**, on https://reliefweb.int/updates?view=maps&advanced-search=%28C164.C144_C146%29_%28DT4618.DT4611%29_%28F12570.F12.F10%29 and Flash Updates on <https://www.unocha.org/rosea>

Follow up and notes from readers

Returning to the toll booths

My short item on the protests over toll booths on the Maputo ring road brought some response, with people arguing that those toll booths were illegal. Probably true. But my argument was that the main beneficiaries of the campaign were people who had bought relatively inexpensive second hand Japanese cars. But most Maputenses walk and cannot dream of a car. So my question: With so many illegalities to choose from, why is civil society deciding to campaign to defend car owners - the middle class?

Across the city, many main roads do not have proper sidewalks/pavements. This forces people to walk in the road. Not a word from civil society. Perhaps they do not walk enough to notice.

The real problem is a lack of public transport. Eight years ago a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system was agreed with Brazil, and work started, only to be caught up in the Brazilian *lava jato* corruption scheme and cancelled by Brazil. Contractor Odebrecht and Mozambicans were involved in major corruption in building Nacala airport, which remains largely unused. But, for once, no one has accused Odebrecht or Mozambicans of corruption related to the Maputo BRT.

BRT was, and is, the best solution for Maputo. BRTs are high volume "bus metros" and are widely used in Latin America - and Johannesburg. The routes have been selected and the plans exist. Where is the civil society campaign to revive the BRT. Why do they only defend car drivers? *jh*

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\$2bn secret debt trial: Daily press clippings in English on <https://bit.ly/Moz-Debt-Map-Trial> .

Important external links

Exchange rates 2006-21 & minimum wages 1996-2021 <https://bit.ly/Moz-Exch-wage-2021>
Covid-19 daily updated data <https://www.facebook.com/miguel.de.brito1> and <https://covid19.ins.gov.mz/documentos-em-pdf/boletins-diarios/>

Daily flood and monthly dry season reports - <https://bit.ly/Moz-Flood-2022>
Cyclone trackers, <https://www.cyclocane.com/> and <https://www.metoc.navy.mil/jtwc/jtwc.html>
Cabo Ligado weekly report on civil war <https://www.caboligado.com/>
Previous editions of this newsletter: <https://bit.ly/MozNews2022> and <http://bit.ly/MozNews2021>
Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>
My Mozambique archive: <http://bit.ly/Mozamb>

Cabo Delgado

Archive with reports, detailed maps, and census data <https://bit.ly/Moz-CDg>

Special reports on the war

Evolution of the war: global vs local. 27 Feb 2020 <http://bit.ly/CDelgadoOrigins>
Religion is shaping Cabo Delgado civil war. 30 April 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoReligion>
Intensifying argument over roots of war. 28 June 2020 <https://bit.ly/Moz-492>
Are the drums of war silencing any hope of peace? 26 July 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-496>
A history of violence presages the insurgency. 13 August 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-498>
Military & economic intervention. 3 Sept 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoIntervene>

Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - 2018 - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>
Portuguese - CIP- 2018 - <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT>
2001 first article- *Metical* - English and Portuguese <https://bit.ly/MozHeroin2001>

Gas for development?

Gas_for_development_or_just_for_money?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasEng
Gás_para_desenvolvimento_ou_apenas_dinheiro?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasPt

Background reading

Special reports

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>
Special report on four poverty surveys: bit.ly/MozPoverty

\$2bn secret debt - in English

Secret debt trial (Aug-Oct 2021) press reports <https://bit.ly/Moz-secret-debt>
Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz>
Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>
Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>
Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) bit.ly/MozAR-debt
2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Election study collaboration: We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>
Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kq>

Ten books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)
Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014) is on <https://bit.ly/Chickens-Beer>
Há Mais Bicycletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)
Civil War Civil Peace (2006): <https://bit.ly/Civil-War-Civil-Peace>
Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)
Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000 (2001)
Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)
Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)
Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)
Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)
Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986) <available shortly>

These are still available for sale:

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)
Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)
Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)
Beggars Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

Mozambique media websites, English:

Club of Mozambique (free): <http://clubofmozambique.com/>

Zitamar (paywall): <http://zitamar.com/>

Mozambique media websites, Portuguese (all with partial paywall):

Notícias: www.jornalnoticias.co.mz

O País: www.opais.co.mz

@Verdade: <http://www.verdade.co.mz>

Carta de Moçambique <https://cartamz.com>

Mozambique think tanks and pressure groups, Portuguese:

Centro de Integridade Pública: CIP <https://cipmoz.org/>

Observatório do Meio Rural: OMR <https://omrmz.org/>

Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos: IESE <https://www.iese.ac.mz/>

Centro Para Democracia e Desenvolvimento CDD <https://cddmoz.org/> (some CDD in English)

Also CDD now controls Fórum de Monitoria do Orçamento - FMO (main debt group) <http://www.fmo.org.mz>
and RMDDH - Rede Moçambicana dos Defensores dos Direitos Humanos (a human rights group).

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