Jana Hönke

Companies, communities and local security governance:
Disciplinary paternalism, participatory community engagement and indirect rule

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Introduction

This paper traces the evolution of mining companies’ policies in what I call the ‘community belt’. These are policies and practices addressing local people living on or next to mining operations. The recent discourse on corporate social responsibility indicates that not only development agencies, IOs and INGOs intervene in African societies promoting to build liberal states - and civil societies. Multinational companies are expected to, and increasingly do engage in participatory community development. They might be the most active promoter of what some refer to as liberal (global) governmentality (Neumann/Sending 2010) in business spaces in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

In this paper I analyse company community discourse and practices in Southern Katanga, DRC, and additionally draws on research on similar regions. I argue, firstly, that company governance in communities is nothing new and presents how it worked in the early 20th century. I then look at the new techniques of community engagement post-1995. I show that new participatory institutions go along with indirect mechanisms of power and exclusion. Less about political emancipation, they remain a technocratic, top-down exercise in managing communities. Dominating official discourse, these coexist with older practices of paternalistic cooptation and indirect rule at the local level and represent only a small part of the hybrid mix of security practices companies use for securing their operations. The co-existence of these different practices needs to be better understood in research on business and governance without government in “most of the world” (Chatterjee 2004). Besides problematic assumptions inherent to the idea of participatory development, companies’ use of participatory engagement is compromised by manager’s ultimate interest in stability.

After briefly looking at the literature on participatory community development and corporate-community relations, I analyse the community practices of mining companies in Katanga /DRC. I discuss, firstly, corporate policies and practice towards communities in the early 20th century in Katanga (DRC), then describe, secondly, how participatory community

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1 Post-doctoral researcher, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany, jana.hoenke@fu-berlin.de. The paper builds on material from my doctoral thesis which dealt with liberal discourse and hybrid practices of corporate security governance in the DRC and South Africa.
engagement has emerged in the mining industry since the late 1990s and is being practices in Katanga. Finally I discuss the techniques of cooptation and indirect rule and how these different rationales of ordering co-exist today.

**Foreign companies, local ordering and the community**

Security governance by companies in Africa has mainly been studied as part of research on the privatisation of global security governance and with a focus on new configurations of state-non-state governance (Avant 2005; Abrahamsen and Williams 2010). The security practices of corporations not specialised in security, such as those of the extractive industries, are still little researched. An exception is the literature on oil companies, and here in particular the Niger Delta even though some of these studies remain at a rather general level (Ferguson 2005; Soares De Oliveira 2007). There are a few studies of how companies react to community protest (Frynas 2001) and how they use development approaches to prevent conflict with and attacks from communities and local militias (Watts 2004; Zalik 2004). Looking at governance by companies from the ‘bottom-up’ perspective, these studies show that company practices are to an important extent decoupled from the ideal of popular sovereignty and self-determination. Also, participatory development as practices in the business community appears to give rise to new forms of exclusion and sometimes simply maintain old hierarchies for achieving stability (Zalik 2006; Welker 2009).

Research about the dis-assemblage and re-assemblage of states (Sassen 2006) and as a result, of global and local ordering (Agnew 2009; Abrahamsen and Williams 2010; Engel and Nugent 2010) also suggest that MNCs may have gotten (again) increasingly involved in local ordering at production sites in Africa (see also Hönke 2010).

In this paper I start closing an empirical and theoretical gap concerning the ordering practices of external non-state actors in Africa by looking at the community discourse and practices of large, multinational mining companies in Katanga, DRC. I put them into historical perspective in order to evaluate what of these ‘new’ community practices is actually new. I look at how the rationalities and practices of governing communities have changed over time, and discuss the heterogeneous regime of contemporary security practices in these business enclaves. Different rationalities of governing structure companies’ policing practices in Katanga, demonstrating the multiple modernities which people create and in which they live today. Besides the internal contradictions of participatory community development discussed elsewhere (Cleaver 1999), I emphasize how these techniques coexist with, and are contradicted by, other discourses and practices. Here the literature on business – community relations has a lot to learn from critical participation studies in development (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Dill 2009)
Between coercive and paternalist discipline – company practices, 1906-20s

As in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, the first foreign mining companies where created and set up operations in Katanga in the late 19th century. As opposed to today, setting up an industrial extraction of copper was closely related to colonial occupation and the establishment of direct territorial control. Despite this difference, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK), founded in 1906, shares with contemporary corporate activities in the DRC that it operates in an institutional context characterised by weak state capacities and plural authorities: No state monopoly of violence was in place and various actors competed over local power. Looking at the ordering practices of the UMHK reveals another striking similarity. Maintaining industrial production in the area involved not only protecting private property with private force. Companies in both time periods of time had active community policies in order to create stable working conditions for their economic activity.

In the context of a weak and fragmented governance structure in a vast and largely unknown territory, the mining company UMHK was created in 1906 and was jointly owned by the CSK, the Belgian Société Général, the British Tanganyika Concession Limited and other minor shareholders (Ilunkamba 1984). Industrial mining took off with the arrival of the railway at Elizabethville (later Lubumbashi) in 1910, integrating Katanga as a supplier of cobalt and copper into the world market.

This process profoundly shaped local social, political and economic structures. After a period of relying on forced labour and coercive governance techniques – as known from the era of Belgian King Leopold’s vicious rule over the Congo Independent State until 1908, the UMHK management introduced another, more disciplinary logic of managing the company and its environment from the 1920s onwards. These revolved around the idea of transforming subjectivities in order to build a mass labour force fit for modern industrial, but cheap extraction. From governing through corporal punishment the company changed to more indirect and productive modes of power with a new in-depth engagement in the labour settlements.

A key mechanism was to take people out of their ‘traditional’ home communities for building new, ‘modern’ communities by settling them in one man – one woman family-units in company settlements. Workers and their families were provided with accommodation, food rations, health care and schools (for a description see (Dibwe dia Mwembu 2001). Liberal theories conceptualise private property as the natural space of private governance. In the period from the 1880s to the 1920s, this private space was an extended, semi-private space. The UMHK controlled a closed realm which extended from the workplace to entire labour settlements in which workers lived with their families.
The new camps became a node of a kind of transnational ‘multi-stakeholder’ governance (Peemans 1997: 37). An indicator is the establishment of the Commission for the Protection of Natives by the government, UMHK, and the Catholic Church in 1923. The Commission organised, in Higginson’s words, “an army of agents from helping professions and missionary societies” (Higginson 1989) who were sent into the labour camps not only with medicine, but also with moral visions of how African workers and families should behave. In the spirit of a new rationality of governance that Michel Foucault describes for Europe as a regime of discipline and biopolitics, the control and (re)production of life became the focus of interventions aimed at the production of a permanent class of wage labour (Stoler and Cooper 1997: 31f).

Colonial and company-governmental interventions intensified and the UMHK “sought to reach further under the workers’ caps while tying their hands faster to new pacesetting machinery” (Higginson 1988: 2). In the Congolese Copperbelt, this was manifested in a complex regime of governance combining control and the disciplinary power of paternal welfare provision. The virtues of the new industrial discipline were punctuality, temperance and sexual restraint. Company governance therefore reached from the workplace into the family lives of workers. To change conduct, coercive power and corporal punishment were complemented with the affecting of people’s self-perceptions and conduct through discipline and paternalism (Higginson 1988). In the workshops, priests from the Benedict Fathers and African auxiliaries were supposed to teach apprentices respect and passivity in the face of the superior European civilisation. They were also expected to educate workers in European ways of life and turn them away from “backward African customs” (Higginson 1988: 6f).

The camps constituted the colonial version of the cités ouvrières that were built in Europe in the nineteenth century to (re)produce, cater for and control a new, disciplined industrial labour force (Peemans 1997: 37). In the workers’ settlements, two authorities maintained a totalitarian subculture: ‘the compound head, responsible for discipline maintenance, and the [catholic] teacher-preacher responsible for morals and learning’ (Vellut 1983), supported by the authoritarian colonial state administration. Until the 1960s, the company, colonial state and the Catholic Church ran a regime of coercive paternalism in extended pockets of the territory: the mines and the labour settlements in their direct vicinity. The colonial state appeared as a tax collector and as a punishing agent of last resort. What began to emerge at the end of the 1920s around the mines of Katanga was a regulatory regime of discipline as known from early labour cities in Europe, yet in a more coercive and exclusive form due to the colonial context (Mitchell 1991; Legg 2007).

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2 The company and the church initiated, for instance, religious associations which should displace the traditional lodges in which most mine workers were organised and kept close relationships with their rural home region. The attempt was largely unsuccessful Higginson, J. (1988). “Disputing the machines: scientific management and the transformation of the work routine at the Union minière du Haut-Katanga, 1918-1930.” African Economic History 17: 1-21.
It is notable that a new dividing line was constructed by UMHK management as between their workers, whom they sought to transform through paternal welfare and discipline, and other natives associated with backward traditions and disorder. The upgraded labour settlements remained geographically separated from the African quarters of the growing mining towns not controlled by the company, and management sought to “prevent bad influence” on the behaviour of workers by keeping them segregated from ordinary African townships (Dibwe dia Mwembu and Kalaba Mutabusha 2005: 62). The idea was to isolate the community of workers and the bubble of industrial, disciplinary order established in the labour camps from an environment perceived as hostile and more disorderly. This selective application of disciplinary power in the bubble of the extended fortress of the mine is an interesting contrast to the scope of disciplinary regimes observed in Europe that targeted entire populations within state territories (Foucault 1975; Foucault 1976).

Therefore, the UMHK rarely got directly involved in governing the communities and urban areas outside the extended zone of (semi)private governance described above, such as in the new mining cities of Elizabethville (Lubumbashi), Jadoville (Likasi) and Kolwezi? The way these cities developed resembles the early South African mining towns, and the model of racial segregation of colonial urbanism more generally. The ‘European city’ was separated geographically from the UMHK camp for black labour, as well as were the growing cité indigène, the neighbourhoods in which other Africans resided (Fetter 1976).

**Liberal economic discourse, CSR and participatory community engagement, 2005-08**

How does such paternalist, ‘pastoral’ (Foucault) techniques of securing production – by transforming subjectivities and building and growing labour communities – differ from new concerns about communities and a discourse of corporate social responsibility today? Governing their own security in volatile social and political environment, companies get more involved in securing extraction through selected engagement in adjacent towns and villages. Where there is no strong authoritarian regime protecting industrial extraction, companies are exposed to social and political conflicts that may exist or emerge in the environment in which they intervene. Security managers now increasingly consider managing security risks for the mine at the scale of the community.

It seems that this is an expression of a new liberal governmentality that emerged in the business sector and now dominates transnational liberal governance discourse and practice. Multinational extraction firms’ security governance has become less reactive and more preemptive; security managers complement reactive punishment with acting on risks preemptively rather than damage that has already been committed. What has been described for policing, which since the 1980s has turned to a kind of “actuarial risk management”
(O'Malley 1996), seems also to have travelled to remote business spaces in the South. As opposed to other regimes of securing extractive businesses, such as through force and repression such as before the 20th century in Africa, or through controlling mass labour through discipline and welfare, security governance now works more through managing particular risk groups, issues and spaces. Such techniques are better known from shopping malls and gated communities: inviting the ‘good community’ - the inhabitants of the middle class neighbourhood, the consumers – to use and help protect these spaces, walls, cameras, patrols and spatial design exclude those with supposedly abnormal behaviour: potential ‘criminals’, hawkers and non-consumers for instance.

In Katanga and elsewhere, security strategists see security risks to mining companies increasingly emanating from the communities next to the mines. No public actor can be easily made responsible for taking care of the grievances artisanal miners and communities living adjacent to the mines. Also, reputational risks have grown over recent years and have become an important factor in the local risk calculations of firms. Companies in Katanga thus refer to these communities ambiguously as both most immediate threat and potential belt of protection for operational security.3 Companies have began encouraging workers and adjacent communities to behave in favour of the company and to help secure its premises, while at the same time keeping tight physical controls and fences in place keeping people out.

Conflicts erupt over access to land, over relocation, and more generally over who has to bear the costs of mining and how the benefits of extraction should be distributed. In addition to the frequent violent confrontations with artisanal miners, there are other examples of how communities turn to confrontational methods in Katanga to make such claims. In Ruashi, a neighbourhood of Lubumbashi, for instance, people organised protests to complain about the unjust treatment and insufficient compensation by the South African company Ruashi Mining (Metorex Group) for small-scale miners and those having to leave the concession.4 In the former Gécamines labour settlement UZK in Kolwezi, inhabitants organised protests and took a mine manager hostage to pressure the Canadian company FQML to repair the local sewage system.5

The community relations manager of a larger firm complains that companies were under pressure to take on more and more social functions in Katanga.6 Companies often lay the blame on the legacy of Gécamines for that. In their view, the paternalism of the colonial Union Minière du Haut-Katanga and the post-independence parastatal Gécamines created an

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4 Int. 110 Consultation with community representatives of the commune de Kaluluku, Commune de la Ruashi, November 2008, Lubumbashi.

5 Int. 140 Company security manager, November 22 2008, Kolwezi.

6 Int. 9 Manager community relations and social development, October 3 2007, Johannesburg.
attitude of making exorbitant demands and aspiring to all sorts of material benefits from mining companies. In their view, they seek to substitute decreasing patronage by the state through direct benefits from the firm. However, the phenomenon is not specific to Katanga at all. Situated at the bottom of a transnational, asymmetric field of struggle, communities stage conflicts at the very local level of an industrial operation. These conflicts are increasingly less mediated or repressed by host states (see also Szabowski 2007). From companies’ point of view the greatest risk at the community level has become that local communities might link up with transnational INGOs or media. In this context, a local company representative says: “We cannot point to the government. We cannot wait for government to build up”.8

As a result of both, transnational and local factors, local security governance has changed:

“Security is evolved off the years and many people think […], see security as a main guarding function, iron gates, security an office complex or mine complex against theft or wrongdoing. Some people even extend that to situations you see across many African countries in the last 10 or 20 years, how we get the ex-patriots out of the countries, when the place goes horribly wrong. In a broader context, certainly, the industry is involved in the last 10 years. …security moved on. It's much more of a risk management role we now fulfill.”9

This view is supported by the observation of an NGO project manager working with another mining company that he was seeing “more and more interest to really link the agendas of security and social development […] in the last two years with a lot of the major internationally listed companies” in Southern Katanga.10 This perception of security pays more pro-active attention to the communities living on or next to mining operations. It seeks to make them partners in policing local order using dialogue and participant development initiatives as techniques.

An example for such activating modes of security governance is the model of risk management deployed by a company in Kolwezi. At the core is the creation of a joint unit, combining security, social development, and public relations departments. He has been recently recruited because he emphasises soft modes of managing potential threats and grievances by engaging with communities. The assumption of the model he has developed is that providing security for the company needs to take into account local people’s culture. In Katanga, he highlights to central elements the company needed to use to its advantage: the

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8 Int. 128 Social development and security managers, November 7 2008, Lubumbashi.

9 Int. 137 Ex-group security manager, October 26 2007, Ndola.

10 Int. 90, Pact representative, October 17 2008, Lubumbashi.
importance of talking with people (in his words a culture of ‘palaver’ prevailed in the region), and of providing small but direct material benefits.\textsuperscript{11} The idea behind cultural adaptation is to avoid confrontation with communities over critical issues at low cost. Strategic philanthropy might also do ‘good’ in that it might improve collective goods provision in local communities. Communication might prevent violent conflict. Such involvement, however, also comes with important effects on local politics and the distribution of power and authority. People might raise concerns in stakeholder forums and local development committees, but find themselves in a hierarchically structured and discursively largely predetermined setting. Investment in a school or development project in a particular area might benefit some but put others at a disadvantage.

The social and community manager of another company describes how, through a dialogue with the communities and education, his company was trying to make people accept its mining operations in their midst as “patrimoine de leur environment”: as a property and valuable part of their environment that they want to protect. In his account, the exclusive, island-like character of the idea of a community belt becomes evident. The idea is to make the poor village communities living next to the mine partners of the private for-profit endeavour of the company. Once communities perceived their own well-being and prosperity as linked to that of the company, according to the rationality of this approach, they would socially sanction theft from the mine, and help to denounce illegal intruders and thieves.\textsuperscript{12}

Therefore, strategically placed development projects in the communities in the immediate environment of mine operations have become an important security practice for governing potential security risks. The NGO Pact introduced new participatory procedures around the operations of Anvil mining. Local development committees were formed by the company to represent these communities better \textit{vis-à-vis} the companies. Companies thereby create political institutions parallel to the structures of the state and traditional polities. These may put local political hierarchies into question and create political instability. Such involvement of companies in local politics goes far beyond the domain of their private property. Questions arise about the authority and legitimacy of company interventions and how they relate to existing political and social structures. Finally, companies’ developmental engagement has a narrow geographical scope. Security managers divide the area around their mines into zones of high, medium, and low risk and choose instruments of protection and prevention accordingly. A security manager describes the enclave character of corporate community investment as follows: “We are not interested in building roads way outside our theatre of operation which has no direct advantage to the mining operation”.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11} Int. 143 Head of security/development/public relations, November 21 2008, Kolwezi; Int. 142 Public Relations & Community Development Manager, November 20 2008, Kolwezi.

\textsuperscript{12} Int. 143 Company social development manager, November 15 2008, Lubumbashi.

\textsuperscript{13} Int. 137 Ex-group security manager, October 26 2007, Ndola; 126 General manager and social manager, November 11 2008, Lubumbashi.
The new emphasis on local communities in security thinking is also expressed in the proliferation of regular consultation with communities in the neighbouring former Gécamines cities, as well as in villages. Companies introduced liaison officers in each of the settlements, who are hoped to resolve potential conflicts in advance through communication. They also provide the company with intelligence so that they are better aware of risks and can be prepared in advance against potential trouble. They are also supposed to dissolve grievances by giving people the possibility to express their complaints and demands without taking recourse to violence.

Two problems with this new public-private partnership approach can be pointed out on the basis of the Katangese experience. First, why is public money spent on managing the social risks of large and profitable private companies in the DRC? Whereas with time, the companies took over payments for Pact, the financial crisis in 2008, and the subsequent dramatic fall in demand for copper and cobalt form Katanga, demonstrated the insecurity of company funding for longer-term social projects. Also, for all its valuable efforts, PACT has been criticised for being drawn onto the companies’ side and, despite initiating seemingly ‘public initiatives’, serving the firms’ private security ends.

Second, firms not only co-operate with the state intelligence services in Katanga, the liaison officers can also be interpreted as extended arm of in-house intelligence as they are informants placed within communities and provide local information. This makes community engagement an ambivalent endeavor. Liaison officers formally have a social mandate, but they can be seen as additional important set of ‘eyes and ears’ for the company in the mining communities. In this logic they are part of the intelligence services, an early warning system in place that should increase awareness of risks.

Apart from these problems with the partnership agenda, community engagement policies are controversial in another respect. Whilst community engagement has been advertised much in recent years by companies’ public relations and CSR departments, the actual implementation and effectiveness of many transnational CSR initiatives are highly uncertain. The Katanga case shows some of the limitations of actual corporate linkages with the community. Multinational mining companies use more and more technology, less and less workers and hardly any local input for extraction so that there are few economic linkages with the areas in which they operate. There is a lot of conflict over few jobs. Violent protest erupted in January 2008 at Fungurume in which 3000 to 5000 people reclaimed their right to employment with TFM. An Australian subcontractor with TFM had refused a list of local job candidates, and TFM was accused of employing people from far-away regions instead of giving jobs to the

15 Int. 129 Company Social programme manager and ex-Pact Congo, November 8 2008, Lubumbashi.
16 Int. 135 Company security manager DRC, November 22 2008, Lubumbashi.
17 Int. 134, 135 Company security and social development manager, November 15 & 21 2008, Lubumbashi.
local population, as promised. A TFM spokesperson explained that several hundred people, most of whom live in the area, had protested outside the gates of the mine on Monday morning. The incident arose over a “misunderstanding” that led several hundred residents from outside the local area to believe they would be hired for the day. Local employment is thus a critical issue. In Katanga several companies have promised to recruit local people for low-skilled jobs on the mines, however, these projects are generally extremely limited in their reach, especially when keeping in mind the fact that thousands of people lost their source of income due to the economic restructuring. There are a lot of informal arrangements with government, chiefs and social networks behind the scenes so that the few jobs available are distributed within the networks of the powerful. Also, many doubt the sustainability of the small businesses developed by companies as they mainly produce for these companies’ construction projects, which will come to an end soon, and because many similar enterprises compete against each other.

Finally, there is a contradiction between corporate, private security interests and participatory and sustainable community engagement. Instead of contributing to the companies’ overall goal of achieving stable (secure) working conditions, these new techniques sometimes undermine the social and political stability on which companies depend so that firms sometimes step back from too progressively intervening in local social and political hierarchies. Anthropologist Marina Welker, for instance, demonstrates the political effects of the mining company Freeport’s community programs in Indonesia, which the company introduced after having been criticised for partnering with the regime and not working enough with local communities. She demonstrates how the company nurtures existing patrimonial networks and sides with incumbent, conservative chiefs against environmental activists to maintain stability (Welker 2009) (see below for further discussion).

Cooptation and indirect rule

The security manager of a multinational company in Katanga describes the logic behind a third, pragmatic logic of managing the companies’ security that involves host communities:


20 Part of Pact’s work with artisanal miners, financed by companies, is to create small business projects to create alternative income opportunities, but also to bring them into jobs with the mine, such as security guards, gravel-makers, and short-term contract workers. TFM has a brick project, in which some former ‘illegal’ artisanal miners have been transformed into legal entrepreneurs.
“We are stuck to those who are legally in power. There is no purpose in lamenting about the authorities. You want that copper? Deal with it”.

Concerning the host state it has been described at length, in the rentier state literature and elsewhere, how this logic strengthens unaccountable political regimes (Reno 1997). Contrary to arguments that interpret the described increase of private actors such as companies in local governance as a sign of weak statehood, I agree with Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams (2010) that we rather see here a restructuring of states and the emergence of transnationalised ‘governance assemblages’ co-existing with this state. I have argued elsewhere that what the increasing role of corporate entities in security governance in Katanga can be understood as a new form of indirect discharge used by the Kabila government and external states (Hönke 2010). For the government in Kinshasa, foreign transnational mining companies are easier to control, and bribes and taxes easier to collect from them. The new multinational investors thus helped to (re)centralise mining revenues from Katanga in the hands of Kabila’s political network. Furthermore, companies addressing local grievances and engaging in social ordering take this burden of social control and/or redistribution from the government.

In this paper I am more concerned, however, with the practices of clientelism and cooptation at the local level and in particular in company-community relations. The engagement with communities discussed above is based on the idea that – from the point of view of the firm - it should help to manage reputational risks the company mainly faces at the transnational level, and social risks emanating from communities at the local level. This makes engagement an ambivalent endeavour as engagement and participation can be detrimental to the ultimate goal of a firm that is to ensure an ordered working environment. There is thus a second model of how companies interact with ‘their’ communities in Katanga to counter that ambiguity. As opposed to strategies of community engagement, which have emerged more recently and which seek to make the entire community an active part of corporate security management, the second model follows the traditional logics of indirect rule and cooptation. These are old and well-known mechanisms of governing African business spaces, and populations more generally, used by pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial interveners and local power holders. The distinction is an analytical one, and both modes do coexist and overlap in practice.

Local government in the DRC has not been elected since the new constitution that requests local elections was adopted in 2006. The same is true of decentralisation, which was enacted in the new constitution, but has still not been implemented, either at provincial or at district and lower levels. The lower tiers of the state administration are still built on ‘traditional chiefs’ and local power structures (Young and Turner 1985). As regards mineral rights and surface land rights, ‘traditional authorities’, the main de facto authorities

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21 See footnote above.
at the local level, are legally in a weak position in the Congo. The constitution and the mining code attribute both mineral and surface rights to the state, which concentrates the politics of mining in the hands of central government. However, politically chiefs have much more weight in Congolese local politics than they have in many other cases, such as South Africa, where they have legal rights. While the mining legislation officially deprives them of their land rights, they have an important role in local governance. Local administration, if there is any, depends on the chiefs. Without them, nothing works.\(^{22}\)

Proof is provided by the capacity of chiefs to mobilise village communities in favour or against the company. In mid-2008, for instance, a confrontation between the company TFM and local communities on the issue of employment took place:

“Chief Bayumia's family has ruled this land for seven generations... but he told us Freeport has ignored the concerns of his people. He says they will resort to violence if needed...and it's not an idle threat. In January, thousands of local protestors demanding jobs at the mine, including some from this village, clashed with local police.”\(^{23}\)

Several observers suggest that the riots between artisanal miners, communities and Anvil in March/April 2008 were not provoked by coincidence. It is said that Anvil did not come to an agreement with a militant traditional chief. Some observers point out that there was quite a lot of local politics behind the violence at Anvil Mining concessions in Kolwezi. Riots seem to have been organised by the local chief in reaction to his conflict with the company.\(^{24}\)

The old co-optation model is in the long tradition of indirect rule. It consists of supporting chiefs and local big men to guarantee local order. As chiefs are legally “pas important, mais indispensable”\(^{25}\) in Katanga, local chiefs always used to be the privileged contact and partner of mining companies. In the mining regions, therefore, a clientele pattern has been deeply entrenched in firm-chief interactions, which goes far beyond the custom of paying tribute to the local authority by offering a gift. Stability is privileged over legitimacy. There is evidence for a mere co-opting of local chiefs, who are put on the payroll of the company and receive strategic investments in their jurisdiction in exchange for social peace.\(^{26}\) For instance, when, in February 2008, the inhabitants of the village of Tshala, located next to the KMT concession of FQML in Kolwezi, organised a protest march against the company, the local security and community manager entered discussions with the chief, and they agreed that FQML would...
build a market in Tshala. DCP used to have all local chiefs in the vicinity of their operations on their payroll.

While trying to restructure local political relations to a certain extent, companies stick, at the end of the day, to those legally in power. This poses a constraint to alternative representative political structures described above. William Reno is right that companies are conservative forces in the sense that they usually side with those in power for legal and de facto physical security (Reno 2004). Despite the potential discussed in the norm diffusion literature in International Relations, this limits the potential that companies act as progressive transformative agents in local, or national, politics in Katanga.

Privatised risk management in a transnationalised space - hybrid practices and contradictions

The paper has shown that western multinational mining companies – for providing a stable working environment – have discovered adjacent communities as a matter of concern and as a site of governmental intervention. That, however, is not entirely new as a look at company practices at the beginnings of industrial extraction has revealed. Corporate community politics were driven by a paternalist and disciplinary logic of producing a mass labour force, and were justified by a discourse of civilization and modernization. The UMHK created a new community of 'modern' subjects that was largely isolated from the 'other', 'traditional' and 'backward' world of African community. Industrial mining thus created an extended bubble of semi-private governance largely shut off from its larger environment.

The new strategies of participatory development and techniques of community engagement have emerged since the late 1990s. Community engagement is no longer about transforming people but follows a logic of strategically managing and preventing security risks. Dominating official discourse, these coexist with older practices of paternalistic cooptation and indirect rule at the local level and thus represent only a small part of the hybrid mix of security practices companies use for securing their operations. Ultimately aiming at the protection of company assets, companies’ use of participatory engagement is compromised by manager’s ultimate interest in stability. Transformative paternalist community policies have become rare, however, and demonstrate the hegemony of the principles of liberal governmentality, such as a focus on the self-responsible individual.

I have given examples of how these new participatory institutions go along with indirect mechanisms of power and exclusion, yet this point needs further research. It seems more

27 Int. 140 Local company security manager, November 22 2008, Kolwezi.
28 Int. 143 Company manager security & development, November 21 2008, Kolwezi.
likely that the use of participatory methods by profit-oriented actors such as mining has a depoliticizing effect (Ferguson 1991) that prevents a transformation of unequal political, economic and social structures. The structural inequalities of what Chatterjee (2004) describes as ‘political society’ may obstruct the potential for democratic decision making over, and equal access to, company community benefits even more in the context of private governance. Despite all failures, however, the new governmental techniques may contain emancipatory potential in this context as well. Overall, there are ample reasons for critically (re)examining governance by profit-oriented actors.

**Literature**


