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Description
The programme begins by considering what it is to be the same person at one time as one was at another time. Faced with simple cases we begin by thinking that there is no more to personal identity ...than bodily identity. Bodily identity is both sufficient and necessary. Then we realise that making bodily identity sufficient leaves out so much that we regard as being important to our concept of a person. We conclude that bodily identity is not sufficient for personal identity. We then turn to the question of whether bodily identity is necessary for personal identity and look at Locke's claim that memory was the all important sufficient condition for personal identity and that one person could remember doing what a different body did.
The programme begins by considering what it is to be the same person at one time as one was at another time. Faced with simple cases we begin by thinking that there is no more to personal identity ...than bodily identity. Bodily identity is both sufficient and necessary. Then we realise that making bodily identity sufficient leaves out so much that we regard as being important to our concept of a person. We conclude that bodily identity is not sufficient for personal identity. We then turn to the question of whether bodily identity is necessary for personal identity and look at Locke's claim that memory was the all important sufficient condition for personal identity and that one person could remember doing what a different body did.
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Personal Identity | An edited version of A313/02 Personal Identity. Music and some content has been removed from this... |
